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OPSOMMING 
Die trust, ‘n regsverskynsel vanuit die Engelse reg wat vandag deel is van talle ander 
regstelsels, is bekend as ‘n effektiewe instrument vir belasting- en 
boedelbeplanningsdoeleindes. Transnasionale bewegings ter bevordering van 
belastingdeursigtigheid en -nakoming het gedurende die laaste dekade of twee druk geplaas 
op die gebruik van trusts, veral die gebruik van sogenaamde “offshore” trusts. Daarbenewens, 
as gevolg van ekonomiese, finansiële en sosio-ekonomiese veranderinge oor die afgelope 50 
jaar, het die wyse waarop en redes waarvoor trusts gebruik word ook verander. Dit kom voor 
asof die fokus verskuif het van voorsiening vir en beskerming van begunstigdes na ‘n 
belastingdoeltreffende voertuig om die oprigter se beleggings te hou. 
Teen hierdie agtergrond ondersoek die proefskrif hoe die Suid Afrikaanse trustreg met twee 
spesifieke kwessies omgaan: die toenemende behoefte van oprigters aan beheer oor trustbates, 
asook die moontlikheid dat trustees aanspreeklikheid vir trustbreuk kan uitsluit. Die vraag is 
of so ‘n verhouding nogsteeds as ‘n trust geklassifiseer kan word. Die posisie in die Suid 
Afrikaanse reg word vergelyk met die posisie in Engeland en Jersey deur middel van ‘n studie 
van, onder andere, wetgewing en regspraak. 
Die proefskrif begin met ‘n ontleding van die geskiedenis en huidige stand van die trustreg in 
die drie relevante jurisdiksies en beklemtoon ‘n aantal kernwaardes wat in al drie jurisdiksies 
teenwoordig is. Die volgende hoofstuk ondersoek die verpligtinge van trustees in die drie 
jurisdiksies, insluitende die vraag of, en indien wel, tot watter mate, aanspreeklikheid vir 
trustbreuk in die trustakte uitgesluit kan word. Verskille tussen die drie jurisdiksies word 
uitgelig. Vervolgens word die verskynsel van oormatige beheer deur die oprigter ondersoek, 
asook die omstandighede waarin dit kan lei tot ongeldigheid van die trust, of tot ‘n uitspraak 
dat die normale gevolge van die trust geïgnoreer moet word (bekend in Engels as “going 
behind the trust”). 
Die proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, in sekere omstandighede, buitensporige beheer 
deur ‘n oprigter (veral in kombinasie met ‘n oprigter wat ook ‘n begunstigde is) en ‘n gebrek 
aan toerekenbaarheid van die trustee kan lei tot ‘n besluit dat ‘n trust ongeldig is of dat die 
gevolge van ‘n geldige trust geïgnoreer moet word. Alhoewel howe in die algemeen onwillig 
is om geldige trusts te ignoreer, word dit nou aanvaar dat billikheid en regverdigheid so ‘n 
stap kan vereis. Dit is duidelik dat trustee-onafhanklikheid so ‘n besluit kan verhoed, en die 
proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat trustee onafhanklikheid ‘n gebied is waar die Suid 
Afrikaanse trustreg voordeel sal trek uit verdere ontwikkeling. 





The trust, a creature of English law that has found its way into many other legal systems, is 
well known as a useful succession and tax planning tool for wealthy individuals. In recent 
years, globalised moves towards increased tax transparency and compliance have put pressure 
on the use of trusts, particularly on so-called “offshore trusts”. In addition, due to economic, 
financial and socio-economic changes over the last 50 years, the ways in which and reasons 
why trusts are used have also changed. The focus has, in some cases at least, shifted from 
providing for and protecting beneficiaries to providing a tax efficient vehicle for holding the 
settlor’s investments.  
Against this background, this dissertation examines how South African trust law deals with 
two main issues: the increased demand for settlor control over trust assets, as well as the 
possibility for trustees to exclude liability for breach of trust. The question arises whether, in 
such circumstances, a proper trust remains. The position under South African law is compared 
to that under English law and the law of the Channel Island of Jersey, by way of a study of 
legal sources including legislation and case law.   
The dissertation starts with an analysis of the history and state of trust law in the three 
relevant jurisdictions and highlights a number of core values that are present in all three 
jurisdictions. It then continues to examine the duties and obligations of trustees under the law 
of these jurisdictions, including the possibility to exclude liability for breach of trust in the 
trust deed. Differences between the three jurisdictions are highlighted. The next chapter 
investigates the phenomenon of excessive settlor control and the circumstances in which this 
can lead to either invalidity of the trust or to a court “going behind the trust”, thereby ignoring 
the normal consequences of the trust, and applying the trust assets in favour of someone other 
than the beneficiaries. 
The dissertation concludes that, in certain circumstances, excessive settlor control 
(particularly where powers and entitlements are combined) and a lack of trustee 
accountability can result in either invalidity or a court going behind the trust. Courts appear 
reluctant to ignore validly constituted trusts, but it is now accepted that circumstances may 
exist where justice and fairness would require such a step. The virtue of trustee independence 
emerges as an important counter to the argument of settlor control, and the dissertation 
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1 Introduction to the research question 
 
This dissertation analyses the development, through legislation and case law, of English, 
Jersey and South African trust law, with a particular focus on the phenomena of (i) excessive 
settlor control and (ii) limitation or exclusion of trustee liability for breach of trust. The aim of 
this comparative study is to determine, firstly, whether and to what extent the trust concept 
can withstand these developments and, secondly, to what extent South African trust law can 
benefit from developments and experiences in the other jurisdictions.  
 
The following elements will be examined briefly in this introductory chapter: 
 
(a) contextualising the research question; 
(b) the jurisdictions used in the comparative study and the reasons for choosing those 
jurisdictions; 
(c) the two principal focal points of the dissertation; 
(d) a brief summary of the issues to be examined in the chapters that follow; and 
(e) the research methodology. 
 
2 Contextualising the research question 
 
This dissertation has a strong focus on comparing ‘offshore’ trust law with that of South 
Africa and, therefore, it may be helpful at the outset to provide some context as to the 
background and use of offshore trusts.1 This will make a comparison of trusts in onshore and 
offshore jurisdictions more useful. 
 
                                                      
1 With regard to the terminology used, the following should be noted: The word “settlor” will be used rather than 
“founder” or “truster”; the trustee will be referred to in the male gender, unless it is a female or corporate trustee, 
in which case it will be clear from the context; the document containing the terms of the trust will be referred to 
as the “trust deed”; the male gender will be used for references to natural persons unless it is clear from the 
context that a female is concerned; and although references are made to the law of England, it is, in fact, the law 
of England and Wales. 
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The trust concept itself will be analysed in detail in later chapters, but in brief a trust can be 
said to refer to the legal relationship created – inter vivos or on death – by a person, the 
settlor, when assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a 
beneficiary or for a specified purpose.2 This is similar to what is described in South African 
law as a trust in the strict or narrow sense.3 
 
Lawyers in common law jurisdictions assert that the trust has its origins in English law. This 
underplays the fact that there is a trust in non-common law countries, such as Scotland, that 
owe little as regards their origin to English law.4 Whatever the case, the concept of trust has 
made its way, in some shape or form, into the legal systems of numerous other countries. This 
will be examined in more detail in chapter 2.  
 
2 1 Uses of trusts 
 
Trusts are used all over the world for a wide variety of purposes. Common examples include 
charitable trusts, employee benefit trusts and, of course, the focus of this study, private or 
family trusts, set up by individuals for the benefit of beneficiaries who may include 
themselves and their family members. Such trusts can be testamentary or can be created 
during the lifetime of the individual. This dissertation focuses on private inter vivos trusts set 
up expressly by way of a trust deed.  
 
In the South African context, so-called “business” or “trading” trusts are used frequently. 
Business trusts refer to trusts that are used to own a business carried on for profit, including 
the owning and letting of property, and can, in that sense, be distinguished from trusts set up 
to hold and preserve or grow passive investments. 5  Many such trusts are, however, still 
private trusts set up by individuals for the benefit of themselves and their families and, 
therefore, form part of the study. Similarly, in the offshore context, trusts are often used to 
hold operating businesses. Many of the issues under discussion in this dissertation arise from 
the use of family trusts for business purposes (including abuse and liability issues), and will 
be analysed in detail in the appropriate chapters. 
                                                      
2 Hague Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition s 2. 
3 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 4. 
4 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 24; see ch 2 para 2 3. For Scottish law, see Paisley and De 
Waal in Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa 819-848. 
5 Wunsh (1986) 103 SALJ 561. 
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Providing for descendants and holding business assets can also be achieved by other means. 
However, the trust is particularly attractive for the multitude of other benefits it offers, 
explaining the widespread use of the trust.  
 
Very often, the use of a trust affords the settlor and beneficiaries substantial tax benefits. 
Many jurisdictions have in recent decades introduced anti-avoidance legislation to counter 
this, and it should be borne in mind that the tax benefits of a trust resident for tax purposes in 
England or South Africa have always been less than those of offshore trusts. This is especially 
true of discretionary trusts, where the trustee has discretion as to which beneficiaries to 
benefit, at what time, and to what extent. Provided that it is set up and administered correctly, 
generally speaking, neither the settlor nor the beneficiaries will be liable to tax on the assets 
or income of the trust (unless distributed to them). Furthermore, on the death of the settlor, 
those assets generally do not form part of the settlor’s estate for estate tax purposes.  
 
Another reason for using a trust is the protection of assets against a variety of threats, 
including government action, divorce, creditors, or other litigation. This use of a trust is legal 
in some jurisdictions only if the trust was set up prior to any notice of claims or, in other 
jurisdictions, if the motivation in setting up the trust was not one involving a desire to defeat 
pre-existing claims. Provided that it was properly set up, the segregation of assets from the 
settlor’s personal assets means that the trust assets are no longer his own and therefore, in 
principle, they are protected from claims made against him personally. 
 
Succession planning is one of the most common reasons for setting up a trust. Giving assets 
away to a trustee to hold on trust for the settlor’s descendants prevents younger family 
members from having access to substantial wealth at a young age, which may diminish their 
motivation to work hard and earn their own living. It also means that those assets do not pass 
through the estate of the deceased, thereby easing the administrative burden on the executors. 
Trusts are also a useful way to provide for incapacitated family members who will never be 
able to look after their own financial affairs. The reason for the last aspect is that the 




Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
A further benefit of using a trust is that it affords privacy and confidentiality. Given that the 
assets contributed to a trust are not registered in the name of the settlor or beneficiaries, and 
do not attract probate proceedings on the death of the settlor, using a trust offers a degree of 
secrecy that can offer protection against kidnapping, expropriation of assets or simply 
unwanted attention.  
 
Finally, a trust provides a way of consolidating assets under one umbrella. This can be 
particularly helpful for a settlor with a wide variety of assets in different countries and even 
more so after his death, especially where family members were not aware of the extent of a 
settlor’s wealth.   
 
However, as a result of, inter alia, the developments explained below, many of the advantages 
of a trust related to tax and confidentiality have been curtailed over the last two decades. 
 
2 2 Offshore trusts 
 
2 2 1 Background to the use of offshore trusts 
 
Although trusts form part of the local law of numerous jurisdictions, residents of these 
countries often do not (or not only) create a trust in their country of residence, but may decide 
to create an offshore trust. So may settlors from civil law jurisdictions where the trust does 
not form part of local law. What is meant by an “offshore trust” and why is it so popular? 
 
The term “offshore” can be defined as juridical spaces characterised by a relative lack of 
regulation and taxation. 6  Such jurisdictions are often referred to as “tax havens”. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) lists the following 
criteria to identify a tax haven: (i) no or minimal taxation; (ii) a lack of transparency; (iii) a 
lack of provision of information; and (iv) lack of substance in the relevant jurisdiction.7 The 
conventional view is that the rise of tax havens and other offshore centres can be explained 
                                                      
6 Palan The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places and Nomad Millionaires 9. Although regulation 
is now on the increase, as explained later. 
7 Hudson Equity and Trusts 67. 
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with reference to the significant increase in state regulation and taxation in the 1960s and 
1970s.8  
 
Many of the traditional offshore centres such as Jersey, Guernsey, the Cayman Islands and 
Bermuda started to attract offshore banking and trust business during the 1960s. The 
combination of having a trustworthy legal system based on English common law and a tax 
neutral position gave these jurisdictions the opportunity to capitalise on the growing 
development and liberalisation of international finance in the post-war world.9 
 
For individuals residing in high tax jurisdictions, it offered a way of protecting their assets in 
a trust whilst at the same time saving, or completely avoiding, tax on those assets. At the time 
these developments took place, many of these high tax countries had fairly relaxed tax rules 
relating to non-resident trusts. That meant that even if tax mitigation, deferral or avoidance 
was not the main reason for creating a trust in an offshore jurisdiction, it was an added benefit 
and in many cases entirely legal.10  
 
Of course there are, as mentioned before, many other, non-tax, reasons for using trusts. 
Offshore trusts proved to be particularly suitable for international business deals as well as for 
families where different family members live in different countries, and with assets in various 
locations. Offshore jurisdictions also came to play an important role in complex, multi-
jurisdictional structuring, providing a jurisdiction, perceived to be “neutral”, to hold all the 
elements of a structure together.11 
 
In addition, gifting assets to an offshore trust guaranteed the settlor confidentiality with regard 
to the ownership of such assets. Before the turn of the millennium, confidentiality, often 
simply referred to as secrecy, was a generally acceptable reason for transferring assets into an 
offshore structure. 
                                                      
8 Palan The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places and Nomad Millionaires 5-6. Although this may 
not be the only explanation, it is not the focus of this dissertation and the question will therefore not be examined 
further.  
9 Anonymous “The Cayman Islands – A Premiere Offshore Banking Center” (accessed 27-01-2015). 
10 A distinction should be made between the law governing the trust and the jurisdiction where the trustee is 
resident. The governing law determines the laws applicable to the terms of the trust. The residence of the trustee 
may determine, amongst other things, the tax regime applicable to the trust. There should be some link between 
the trust structure and the chosen governing law, but the governing law does not have to be the same as the 
residence of the trustee. One could, for example, set up a trust governed by English law, with a trustee based in 
Jersey. Such a trust would be regarded as an “offshore” trust. 
11 Downie “Client Confidentiality Under Attack” STEP Journal Roundtable (accessed 04-04-2015). 
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2 2 2 Current attitudes towards offshore trusts 
 
However, times have changed. Even before the watershed events of 11 September 2001, the 
OECD was laying the foundations for an increase in the exchange of tax-related information 
and a levelling of the playing field in international taxation, for example by blacklisting so-
called tax havens, thereby penalising those who made use of such jurisdictions. After the 
terrorist attacks in the United States of America of 11 September 2001, the focus of 
governments shifted from fighting tax evasion to fighting terrorism, including the financing 
thereof. 12 Prior to that date, for example, much of the terrorism in Northern Ireland was 
funded through the use of trusts by Americans claiming to have Irish ancestry, enabling the 
origin of the funds to be disguised, at the very same time when the United Kingdom was the 
closest ally of the United States. 
 
The financial needs of governments, coupled with the fact that offshore jurisdictions were 
being used to launder the ill-gotten gains of terrorists, drug dealers and dictators, have led to a 
relentless drive towards global tax transparency and compliance. This is evidenced by a large 
number of supra-national initiatives in the field of wealth planning, all working towards an 
automatic exchange of tax and other information.13 This has inevitably led to offshore centres 
losing a fair amount of business, even though it is fair to say that not all tax evasion and 
money laundering occurs in offshore jurisdictions.14 Because offshore trusts are used not only 
for tax and confidentiality reasons, many structures will remain offshore despite these 
developments. 
 
Over the course of the last decade or two, most countries with well-developed tax and legal 
systems have enacted laws to curb the use of offshore trusts. Wealthy individuals with 
offshore trusts have been advised for some time now to ensure that their structures are 
compliant with the tax rules of their country of residence. The so-called “trust industry”, both 
onshore and offshore, has had to deal with a wave of new regulations in order to remain 
competitive and for jurisdictions not to be blacklisted by other countries and by 
                                                      
12  Noseda The Big Debate: Transparency Versus Privacy, Common Reporting Standard and Beneficial 
Ownership Registers 15-19. 
13 Riches “Supranational Initiatives and their Impact on Wealth Planning” Trust Quarterly Review  (accessed 04-
04-2015). 
14 Hines STEP Report: International Financial Centers and the World Economy 13, 29-30. 
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intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF).15 
 
In addition, in 2017 and 2018, a network of investigative journalists known as the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists revealed information about hundreds of 
thousands of offshore entities and the holdings of numerous politicians, public officials and 
celebrities in the largest information leak of its kind, known as the “Panama Papers”. 16 
Although not all of the leaked information revealed wrongdoing on the part of the users of 
offshore structures, it highlighted only the very negative side of the offshore world. Given the 
current political climate, the occurrence of more investigations and revelations of this kind 
would not be surprising.  
 
Although many of the tax and confidentiality advantages related to offshore trusts have all but 
disappeared, this does not mean that offshore trusts have disappeared as well. For many 
individuals setting up offshore trusts today, the focus, or at least a part thereof, must be on 
long-term succession planning and asset preservation. Given the increasingly antagonistic 
political and economic environment, the choice of a reputable offshore jurisdiction and 
service provider is more important than ever.17 
 
The following opening paragraph from the Privy Council judgment (on appeal from the High 
Court of the Isle of Man) in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd18 paints a particularly bleak picture 
of the use of offshore trusts: 
 
“It has become common for wealthy individuals in many parts of the world (including 
countries which have no indigenous law of trusts) to place funds at their disposition 
into trusts (often with a network of underlying companies) regulated by the law of, 
and managed by trustees resident in, territories with which the settlor (who may be 
also a beneficiary) has no substantial connection. These territories (sometimes called 
tax havens) are chosen not for their geographical convenience (indeed face-to-face 
meetings between the settlor and his trustees are often very inconvenient), but because 
                                                      
15 Examples include the United States Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and the OECD Common Reporting 
Standard. 
16 Anonymous “The Panama Papers: Exposing the Rogue Offshore Finance Industry” (accessed 25-07-2018). 
17 Downie “Client Confidentiality Under Attack” (STEP Journal Roundtable (accessed 04-04-2015). 
18 Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709. 
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they are supposed to offer special advantages in terms of confidentiality and protection 
from fiscal demands (and sometimes problems under the insolvency laws, or laws 
restricting freedom of testamentary disposition, in the country of the settlor’s 
domicile). The trusts and powers contained in a settlement established in such 
circumstances may give no reliable indication of who will in the event benefit from 
the settlement. Typically it will contain very wide discretions exercisable by the 
trustees (sometimes only with the consent of a so-called protector) in favour of a 
widely-defined class of beneficiaries. The exercise of those discretions may depend 
upon the settlor’s wishes as confidentially imparted to the trustees and the protector. 
As a further cloak against transparency, the identity of the true settlor or settlors may 
be concealed behind some corporate figurehead.”19 
 
3 Chapter 2: jurisdictions used in the comparative study 
 
The three main jurisdictions used in the comparative study are England,20 the Channel Island 
of Jersey and South Africa. Chapter 2 contains a summary of the history and development of 
trust law in these jurisdictions. This is intended to aid the understanding of the comparative 
study that follows in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Although the three jurisdictions mentioned above form the main jurisdictional focus of the 
dissertation, trust law developments in other jurisdictions, particularly offshore ones, are 
highlighted where relevant and beneficial to the research exercise. 
 
3 1 England 
 
The law of trusts is asserted by English lawyers as having its origins in English law. English 
trust law, being centuries old, is well developed and a rich body of case law exists. In addition 
to that, the Trustee Act 2000 (replacing the Trustee Act 1925) regulates many aspects of trusts 
and trusteeship.    
 
It is a well-known fact that English law has been used as a basis for the trust law of many 
offshore jurisdictions; most of them are after all British Overseas Territories, British Crown 
                                                      
19 Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709 para 1. 
20 See ch 1 fn 1. 
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Dependencies, or form part of the Commonwealth. Similarly, South African trust law owes a 
great deal to its English counterpart.  
 
It is for the above reasons that English trust law forms part of the study. In many ways it will 
provide the benchmark for comparing legal developments in different jurisdictions. 
 
The dissertation briefly examines the origins of English trust law and, importantly, the 
concept of dual ownership. This concept – that the trustee has legal ownership of the trust 
property and the beneficiaries have beneficial ownership thereof – is a fundamental principle 
of English trust law. It means that the trustee has legal title to the trust assets and a duty to 
manage and control those assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries, who in turn have the right 
to hold the trustee to account for his administration of the trust.  
 
An examination is made of the requirements for a valid trust under English law, as well as the 
historical development of trust legislation and the common law of trusts (meaning judge-
made law, as opposed to legislation).  
 
3 2  Offshore jurisdictions: Jersey  
 
The Channel Island of Jersey is a British Crown Dependency and, given its tax neutrality, has 
been a pre-eminent location for offshore trust administration and trusteeship since the 1960s. 
Jersey has a well-developed legal system, excellent infrastructure and is economically very 
stable. It also has a very good reputation amongst international trust practitioners and has 
quickly adapted to the new regulatory framework alluded to above. 
 
Jersey has a well-developed trust law based on English common law. The Trusts (Jersey) Law 
1984 remains the most important piece of legislative material in the Jersey trust law context. 
It has been amended on various occasions, most recently in 2013. The Trusts (Jersey) Law 
1984 is considered by many practitioners as the “grandmother” of offshore trust law and has 
been used as a model by various other offshore jurisdictions. It is therefore considered very 
well suited to a comparative study. 
 
Jersey has its own court system, which is described in more detail in the next chapter. 
Importantly, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England is the court of final 
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appeal for the British Crown Dependencies. Furthermore, if no judicial authority exists on a 
specific issue, the Jersey court may have regard to English case law for guidance. This 
ensures that English law continues to have an influence on Jersey trust law. 
 
Like most other offshore jurisdictions, Jersey has been very proactive in terms of legislative 
developments catering to the needs of high net worth individuals, sometimes to the extent that 
questions are raised about the validity of such trusts, as seen in chapters 3 and 4. Jersey, 
amongst others, has, however, maintained its reputation as a jurisdiction compliant with 
supra-national initiatives aimed at tax transparency.21  
 
This part of the dissertation covers the requirements for a valid trust under Jersey law, the 
historical development of the Jersey common law of trusts, the role of the local courts and the 
influence of English law on those court decisions, and the effect of legislative developments.  
 
3 3 South Africa 
 
South Africa’s unique trust law is the result of the incorporation of the English trust as an 
institution in the early nineteenth century, combined with the lack of incorporation of English 
law as such. As a result, South African courts had to interpret English trusts, drafted by 
practitioners trained in English law, with reference to Roman-Dutch legal principles.22 The 
dissertation identifies how this has led to differences with the trust law in England and other 
common law jurisdictions, focusing mainly on the differences relevant to this study. 
 
South African trust law has not been codified, with the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 
being the only partial “codification” that has taken place. This Act regulates only the 
registration and some aspects of the administration of South African trusts.  
 
Despite South African trust law being well established, uncertainty seems to exist in relation 
to a number of issues. Some of these issues, as well as possible solutions to address them, are 
examined in the course of the dissertation. 
 
                                                      
21 OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Jersey 2017 (Second 
Round): Peer Review Report on the Exhange of Information on Request. 
22 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 21. 
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This part of the dissertation examines the reception of the trust institution into South African 
law, the development of South African trust law through legislation and case law, the 
requirements for a valid trust under South African law, and highlights relevant differences 
between South African trust law and that of the other two jurisdictions. 
 
4 The two core issues to be analysed 
 
The following two topics form the focal point of the dissertation and a separate chapter is 
devoted to each topic: 
 
(a) chapter 3: trustee obligations and liability for breach of trust; and 
(b) chapter 4: excessive settlor control: invalidity, sham and going behind the trust form. 
 
These issues are relevant and topical in a number of trust jurisdictions, not least in South 
Africa.  
 
The comparative study examines the development of the trust law in the chosen jurisdictions 
by focusing on the two issues specified above, and looking at how the different jurisdictions 
have dealt with such issues through legislation, by way of case law, or both. 
 
In each case the English position, being the benchmark, is examined first. Thereafter the 
offshore position is analysed (which may include jurisdictions other than Jersey, where 
relevant), and finally the South African position. This order is chosen specifically so that the 
position under South African law can easily be compared to the position in the other 
jurisdictions. 
 
5 Chapter 3: trustee obligations and liability for breach of trust 
 
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of the fiduciary duties of the trustee and the extent to which 
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5 1 Fundamental trustee duties 
 
As a first step, the fundamental duties of a trustee under the law of each of the chosen 
jurisdictions, as well as the origin of these duties, are examined. Specific attention is given to 
the fiduciary role of the trustee as well as the duty of care. A comparison is made of the 
strictness of the duties imposed on a trustee in the different jurisdictions. 
 
5 2 Breaches of trust 
 
Thereafter, the dissertation focuses on the circumstances in which a breach of trust occurs, the 
requirements for liability and the consequences thereof. Jurisdictional differences will be 
highlighted. 
 
5 3 Hastings-Bass rule 
 
The next part of this chapter briefly examines a particular rule of English law that allows, in 
appropriate circumstances, the setting aside of the exercise of certain trustee powers. This 
rule, known as the rule in Hastings-Bass,23 was originally intended to protect beneficiaries, 
but has been very useful for trustees to avoid the unintended tax consequences of certain 
actions and the need for beneficiaries to sue them for negligence or breach of trust.  
 
The Supreme Court in England has now restricted the ability of a trustee to rely on this rule.24 
In response, some offshore jurisdictions have passed legislation to preserve the rule in its 
previous form,25 an example of how offshore legislation attempts to counter a common law 
development perceived by offshore jurisdictions as having a negative or limiting impact on 
the use of trusts.  
 
5 4 Extent of trustee exoneration clauses 
  
Chapter 3 further examines trustee exoneration clauses and the extent to which such clauses 
can offer a trustee relief from liability for breach of trust. It is easy to imagine that a trustee 
                                                      
23 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193. 
24 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
25 Trusts (Amendment No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013; Trustee Amendment Act, 2014. 
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can be sued for breach of trust when, perhaps, it is not the trustee’s fault that the trust has 
sustained economic loss. The loss could be as a result of the fault of an investment adviser, or 
could simply be as a consequence of falling stock markets and an economic downturn. 
Furthermore, the increasingly litigious nature of society, and the perception that corporate 
trustees have deep pockets, mean that trust disputes are on the increase. 
 
On the other hand, the position of trustee, being a fiduciary one, should not be taken lightly. 
Beneficiaries of a trust should be able to hold the trustee to account for his administration of 
the trust, and where a trustee has committed a breach of trust, the beneficiaries are not the 
ones who should suffer the loss. 
 
Trustee exoneration clauses are standard in trust deeds in many trust jurisdictions, although 
the legal foundation and the ambit of such clauses differ from one jurisdiction to the next. In 
England, for example, trustees can be protected against gross negligence, although some hold 
the view that such clauses go too far, especially in the case of professional trustees. In Jersey, 
on the other hand, a trustee cannot exclude liability for gross negligence. An analysis is made 
of the law as it stands in the chosen jurisdictions, as well as recent legislative interventions 
and developments in case law. 
 
6 Chapter 4: excessive settlor control: invalidity, sham and going behind the trust 
form 
 
Chapter 4 examines the extent to which a settlor can exercise control over the trust and its 
assets without invalidating the trust or abusing the trust form. The consequences in the event 
that an abuse does occur are also examined.  
 
6 1 Traditional role of the settlor and requirement of certainty of intention  
 
With regard to the role of settlors, the general position under English law is that once a trust 
has been established, the settlor drops out of the picture and retains no interest in the trust 
(unless he is also a beneficiary or a trustee or a protector, but then his interest is in that role).26 
 
                                                      
26 Re Astor's Settlement Trusts, Astor v Scholfield [1952] 1 All ER 1067. 
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In principle, when setting up a trust, the settlor has to hand over legal title and control over 
the assets to the trustee.27 If this is not done, the benefits of establishing a trust may be lost. 
For many settlors, the handing over of control is a daunting prospect, especially if they are not 
familiar with the concept of a trust, or if the trustee is a large corporation in another country. 
Other settlors simply do not intend to properly hand over control, even though they go 
through the motions of setting up a trust, or they may decide after setting up the trust that they 
prefer having control over “their” assets after all. Although a certain level of involvement is 
acceptable, it is often taken too far. 
 
The concept of a sham trust is examined briefly, given that settlor control can, in certain 
circumstances, lead to a finding that the trust is a sham. 
 
In the South African context, the debate is complicated by the fact that, very often, the settlor 
and/or one or more beneficiaries are also trustees. It is easy to imagine how, in the case of a 
beneficiary, there could be a lack of separation between the control such a person has as 
trustee, and his expectations as a beneficiary. Furthermore, in many of the cases dealing with 
abuse of the trust form, it is one or more of the trustees who is or are responsible for the 
“abuse”. It may, therefore, look like a simple breach of trust case, but it appears that in many 
of these cases the trustee or trustees in question are also settlors or beneficiaries.28 As a result, 
it may be argued that this is still a case of settlor control and, therefore, abuse of the trust 
form. 
 
In the offshore context, the settlor and beneficiaries normally do not act as trustees (with the 
exception of private trust companies, mentioned below). Very often the trustee is a corporate 
body, far removed from the settlor, so that this confusion of interests does not normally arise. 
That does not mean that settlors and beneficiaries of offshore trusts do not wish to be 





                                                      
27 The South African “bewind” trust should be distinguished. Here the ownership of property is retained or 
transferred to the beneficiaries, but control over it is given to the trustee. 
28  See, for example, Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA); Badenhorst v 
Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
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6 2 Settlor control 
 
The reasons why settlors are increasingly expecting (and even demanding) control over a trust 
and the trust assets are examined as a next step. Thereafter, different methods of achieving 
such control are discussed. Many offshore jurisdictions have responded to the desire of 
settlors to retain varying degrees of control, by developing laws that enable a settlor to have 
an influential role with regard to the trust, without invalidating the trust itself or otherwise 
putting the trust assets at risk. These trusts are generally referred to as “reserved powers 
trusts” or “settlor directed trusts”. This type of legislation is examined in detail in chapter 4, 
together with the question of its effectiveness vis a vis other, onshore, jurisdictions, and 
whether it is contrary to the fundamental principles of a trust. 
 
Although other ways of affording a settlor control or, at least, some influence over the trust 
and its assets are also discussed, the focus in this context is on reserved powers trusts.  
 
In the South African context, control is often exercised by the settlor in his capacity as a co-
trustee, and this part of the dissertation examines how this can be similar to other methods of 
offering settlors control over a trust. 
  
6 3 Consequences of excessive control: review of case law 
 
Questions relating to the validity or effectiveness of a trust normally come to light when there 
is a dispute involving the trust. The disputes may look as follows: 
 
(a) in the context of a divorce settlement, a disgruntled spouse demands that assets of a 
trust, of which the other spouse was the settlor, be taken into account in calculating the 
settlement amount; 
 
(b) a creditor who obtained judgment against the settlor as debtor finds that the settlor 
owns very little in his own name, but transferred most of his assets to a trust, making it 
more difficult for the creditor to obtain repayment; 
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(c) a tax authority in the settlor’s country of residence questions the tax planning behind 
the trust and argues that the trust assets should be regarded as the settlor’s own for tax 
purposes; or 
 
(d) in the case of a business trust, where a commercial transaction has gone wrong, the 
trustee (who is also a settlor or beneficiary) tries to find a way of invalidating the 
transaction when, in fact, it is the confusion of interests that has led to the transaction 
being entered into in the first place. 
 
The abuse of the trust form is prevalent in many jurisdictions. This may be because the 
benefits offered by trusts – tax mitigation or deferral, asset protection, succession planning, 
confidentiality – are often “too good to resist”. In the case of trusts used to own businesses, 
the flexibility and relative lack of formalities associated with trusts (as opposed to corporate 
entities) make them very attractive.  
 
Increasingly, however, courts in different jurisdictions are illustrating that this abuse will not 
be tolerated.29 This part of the chapter looks at whether a trust can be held to be ineffective 
(can the “veneer” of the trust be “pierced” or “lifted”, or can a court “look behind” the trust) 
because of the way the trust is being managed or administered, even if a valid trust is found to 
have come into existence. Alternatively, could such control lead to a finding that a valid trust 
never existed? 
 
A detailed examination is made of relevant case law in order to find answers to these 
questions. 
 
7 Chapter 5: conclusion 
 
The final chapter examines the question of whether a trustee who allows a settlor too much 
control over the trust can be liable for breach of trust and whether, if that is the case, an 
exoneration clause should protect the trustee from liability. In such cases, does the irreducible 
core of the trust remain, or is this pushing the boundaries of the traditional trust too far? 
                                                      
29 For example in Abdel Rahman v Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited and Others [1991] JLR 103; Van 
der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van der Merwe NO v Bosman 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC); Tasarruf 
Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17; North Shore 
Ventures Ltd v Anstead Holdings Inc. [2012] EWCA Civ 11. 
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Is the designer legislation of the offshore jurisdictions the answer? Can such legislation 
survive the scrutiny of foreign courts, even though it may be a successful marketing tool for 
the offshore jurisdiction itself? Should the judiciary rather take a firmer stance and perhaps 
take note of positive developments in other countries, even though this is a slower process 
that legislative change?  
 
It is widely accepted that a comparative study of different legal systems and jurisdictions can 
aid the development of a particular national law by, on the one hand, influencing the judiciary 
and, on the other hand, influencing the drafting of legislation. There are, of course, limits to 
the extent to which one jurisdiction can copy developments that take place in the context of 
another jurisdiction. The results of the research undertaken will be used to analyse these 
questions in the final chapter, and to ascertain whether the developments in England and 
Jersey examined in this dissertation may aid the development of South African trust law. 
 
8 The research methodology 
 
This dissertation, as the title indicates, contains a comparative examination of trust law in 
specific jurisdictions, which implies the use of a comparative method of legal research. An 
element of historical background is, however, required, especially in the context of trust law, 
a field of law that developed centuries ago. Some historical research, therefore, supports and 
complements the comparative research. 
 
The research required to write the dissertation is conducted by analysing the following 
sources of information for each of the chosen jurisdictions: 
 
(a) textbooks and journal articles by leading authors are examined to ascertain the 
common law position regarding trusts in each jurisdiction. Admittedly there is a 
scarcity of textbooks regarding Jersey trust law, but in many aspects that law is the 
same as in England, and where this is not the case, journal articles and other resources 
available on the internet provide sufficient information; 
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(b) the trust legislation, previous and current, of each jurisdiction (including, where 
relevant, background as to why and how such legislation was developed), as well as 
relevant laws from other jurisdictions, are examined; and 
 
(c) case law relevant to the three focus points forms an important part of the dissertation. 
Case law from other jurisdictions is included where relevant and helpful. 





THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATE OF TRUST LAW IN 




This chapter contains a summary of the history and development of trust law in the three 
chosen jurisdictions, namely England, the Channel Island of Jersey and South Africa. It also 
examines the characteristics and fundamental requirements for a valid trust in each of these 
jurisdictions and highlights the role of the judiciary, legislation and other policy-driven 
initiatives in the development of the law applicable to trusts.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of, on the one hand, the historical 
development and, on the other hand, the current state and most important aspects of the law of 
trusts, in the chosen jurisdictions. Aspects that are regarded as relevant to the two focal points 
receive more attention. The first focal point, examined in chapter 3, is concerned with the 
standard of care expected of trustees, the liability of trustees for breach of trust and the extent 
to which liability for negligence can be excluded in the trust deed, as well as other rules 
affecting the accountability and liability of trustees. The second, examined in chapter 4, 
relates to the extent to which a settlor can exercise control over a trust without risking the 
validity or integrity of the trust (or, to use different phraseology, without abusing the trust 
form) and the consequences of such control. 
 
This chapter is not intended as a detailed account of all aspects of the history and current state 
of trust law in the three jurisdictions. Rather, the intention is to sketch sufficient background 
to aid a better understanding of the issues examined in more detail in the following chapters. 
Certain similarities between the different legal systems will be apparent, as will the diverging 
ways in which certain hurdles are dealt with.1 
                                                      
1 An example of this is the fact that neither Jersey nor South African property law recognises dual ownership 
rights, as is the case in England. In Jersey, this has been dealt with by legislating that immovable property 
located in Jersey cannot be subject to a trust. Beneficiaries may have equitable proprietary rights in other types 
of property. In South Africa, the courts have always held that beneficiaries do not have proprietary rights, but 
merely personal rights against the trustee, thereby avoiding the need to recognise two types of ownership in the 
same property. To this extent, the law of South Africa is identical with the law of Scotland. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 20 
 
One of the significant themes that this chapter will draw attention to is the importance of the 
different dimensions of a trust, namely property and obligation. A trust imposes obligations 
on the trustee, and these obligations must relate to property. A trust cannot exist without these 
two dimensions and, not surprisingly, they are found in the definition of a trust across all 
three jurisdictions. Although both these dimensions are essential to the trust concept, an 
interesting question is whether placing more emphasis on the obligation dimension, rather 
than seeing trust law as a branch of property law, would provide more satisfactory answers to 
questions such as the nature of trusts in civil law or mixed jurisdictions, where dual 
ownership rights in property are not recognised. 
 
Is it possible that the obligation on the trustee to deal with the trust property in a certain way, 
and the fact that the beneficiaries can enforce these obligations, can give rise to equitable 
proprietary rights? Even if it does not, the existence and enforceability of such obligations 
may provide sufficient protection for the beneficiaries without the need to have recourse to a 
proprietary interest. 
 
Looking at the obligation dimension from a different angle, it may be interpreted to indicate a 
responsibility on the part of trustees, settlors and beneficiaries to respect the boundaries set by 
the applicable law in order to continue to benefit from the relatively unregulated construct of 
a trust. Each party in the trust relationship has certain duties and responsibilities, even the 
settlor and beneficiaries who have to refrain from interfering too much with the trustee’s 
control over the trust assets. 
 
With the trust industry and the future of trusts under scrutiny,2 playing by the rules is more 
important than ever. Tax authorities looking to broaden their tax base will find it much easier 
to succeed in attacking a trust, if the trust form is being abused and the settlor or a beneficiary 
effectively controls the trust assets. 
 
Another important theme is the renewed focus on the “irreducible core” of the trust. The 
irreducible core refers to the minimum of duties a trustee needs to fulfil and the corresponding 
rights of one or more beneficiaries to hold the trustee accountable. What is the standard of 
                                                      
2 As explained in ch 1 para 2 2 2. 
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care expected of a trustee in different jurisdictions and, just as importantly, what are the 
penalties for breaching this standard?3 
 
These issues will form part of the focus of chapters 3 and 4, and this chapter will attempt to 
explain the historical and theoretical foundations thereof. 
 
As far as the offshore component is concerned, developments in other offshore jurisdictions 
are examined in the following chapters where this is useful to the dissertation and where, 
perhaps, other jurisdictions offer different solutions. Jersey trust law shows many similarities 
with the trust laws of other offshore jurisdictions, given that the majority of these laws have 
been influenced heavily by English trust law. An in-depth study of the trust law of more than 
one offshore jurisdiction is not considered appropriate to this dissertation, but a more rounded 
picture of the offshore trust world is acquired by examining specific, relevant developments in 




2 1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned before,4 reference is made in this dissertation to “English law” and “the law of 
England”, although it is more correct to refer to “the law of England and Wales”, as English 
law is the applicable law in England and Wales.5 However, for ease of reading, reference will 
simply be made to “English law” and “the law of England”.  
 
English law consists of common law, legislation passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, 
and European law. Common law refers to the law made by judges in court cases, when they 
apply their common sense and their knowledge of legal precedent (which is binding and not 
merely persuasive) to the facts of the case they are dealing with. Parliament can, however, 
                                                      
3 Clarry (2014) 1 JGLR paras 1-3. 
4 See ch 1 fn 1. 
5 England and Wales are constituent parts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the 
UK), but Scotland and Northern Ireland, the other constituent countries, have their own legal systems (although 
the law is similar in many areas, particularly in Northern Ireland which is a common law jurisdiction whilst 
Scotland is a mixed jurisdiction similar to South Africa). Unlike Scotland and Northern Ireland, Wales is not a 
separate jurisdiction within the UK. In the past, references to England in legislation were deemed to include 
Wales. This changed with the enactment of the Welsh Language Act 1967 and as a result the jurisdiction is now 
commonly referred to as “England and Wales”. 
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alter common law through legislation. English trust legislation will be examined, but the law 
is largely based on common law. Given that the United Kingdom remains a member of the 
European Union (at least until the implementation of Brexit), the European Court of Justice 
can direct English and Welsh courts on the meaning of areas of law in which the European 
Union has passed legislation. European law has, however, little relevance to this dissertation. 
 
2 2 Introduction to equity 
 
In order to properly understand English trust law, it is necessary to first examine its origins. 
As alluded to in the preceding paragraph, English law has more than one source, namely 
legislation and common law, being the law created by judges. The phrase common law can, in 
the English context, also be used more specifically to describe only the body of law 
developed by judges in the common law courts. This body of law is distinct from the body of 
law called equity, which was developed by judges in the chancery courts.6  
 
2 2 1 Development of equity as a body of law 
 
The original common law courts, namely the Court of Common Pleas and the King’s Bench, 
had developed in England by 1234. These courts developed the basic rules and principles now 
known as the law of tort, the law of contract, the law of restitution and the law of property.7 In 
order to start an action in one of these courts, a plaintiff had to purchase a writ from the 
King’s Chancery. New writs were developed to deal with new legal problems until the 
Provisions of Oxford in 1258 prevented the issue of new writs without the permission of the 
King’s Council. This effectively closed the categories of writs available to plaintiffs and 
limited the ability of the common law to develop effective remedies for new types of cases. In 
addition, there was a limited range of remedies available to successful plaintiffs, most 
remedies being in the form of monetary damages.8 
 
These restrictions led to the development of the Court of Chancery, and of equity as a body of 
law. If a party to a dispute heard in one of the common law courts was not satisfied with the 
outcome, he could appeal directly to the King, who retained a residuum of justice, to provide 
                                                      
6 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 13; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 4. 
7 Penner The Law of Trusts 1. 
8 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 14-15. 
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a remedy through the exercise of his discretion. The limitation on the category of writs or 
actions and remedies available meant that an increasing number of appeals were made to the 
King by discontented plaintiffs. Eventually, these appeals were delegated to the Chancellor, 
the King’s chief minister. 9  This discretionary jurisdiction of the Chancellor developed to 
become the body of law known as equity.  
 
Equity has two essential features, namely flexibility and a foundation on conscience. Because 
it is flexible, or discretionary, it was able to modify the harshness and rigidity of the common 
law. Because it was founded on the Chancellor’s discretion by reference to his conscience, it 
brought fairness, justice and morality into law. Originally, the Chancellor was an 
ecclesiastical figure and biblical notions of fairness and justice may have played a part too.10 
 
Eventually, separate courts, known as the courts of chancery, were established, as the 
Chancellor himself could not deal with the increasing number of petitions brought before him. 
The law developed and applied in this court became known as equity.11 It was much more 
discretionary than the common law and the judges of the courts of chancery had at their 
disposal powers and remedies specifically developed by the Chancellors that was not 
available in the common law courts. Of course, different Chancellors had different ideas of 
what was fair and just, and there must have been an element of arbitrariness.12 
 
Over the course of time, equity has, however, become more of a rule-based and principled 
body of law, with identifiable features, so that the arbitrariness has mostly disappeared. 
 
2 2 2 Relationship between equity and common law 
 
Although equity as a body of law became more systematic and rational from the seventeenth 
century onwards, there was a realisation in the nineteenth century that the legal system that 
had emerged was not ideal. Two parallel systems of law, common law and equity, 
administered by different courts, meant that a plaintiff had to choose the right court from the 
beginning, or face starting all over again in the other court. This caused delays, inconvenience 
                                                      
9 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 15; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 5. 
10 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 5-7; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 
5-6. 
11 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 6. 
12 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 4; Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable 
Obligations 16; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 6. 
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and unnecessary costs.13 The two systems also struggled for dominance, with proponents from 
each side believing that their approach should prevail over the other.14 
 
The Judicature Acts 1873 and 187515 simplified litigation by abolishing the common law 
courts and chancery courts and replacing them with a single High Court.16 For administrative 
ease, the High Court is (today) divided into the Chancery Division, the Queen’s Bench 
Division and the Family Division. Each division is responsible for an area of law, the 
Chancery Division dealing mostly with equity business.17 As a result of the Judicature Acts,18 
the rules of both equity and common law are now concurrently applied and administered in all 
courts.19  
 
Importantly, the effect of this legislation was not to fuse common law and equity as different 
bodies of law; it was simply to fuse the administration of the two bodies of law.20 Where there 
is a conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of common law, the legislation provided 
that the rules of equity will apply.21 The supremacy of equity was therefore ensured, and this 
is still the case today.22 
 
Great controversy still reigns about whether or not common law and equity should exist 
separately or whether they should be, or are already, substantially merged. This is examined 
further below.23 
 
2 3 The trust as equity’s greatest contribution to English law 
 
The English trust has its origins in a thirteenth-century property device called the use. 24 
Following the conquest of England by the Normans in the eleventh century, land was held 
                                                      
13 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 17-19; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 7-
8. 
14 Penner The Law of Trusts 5-6. 
15 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875. 
16 Penner The Law of Trusts 6-7. 
17 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 7. 
18 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875. 
19 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 6. 
20 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 8. 
21 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 s 25. 
22 Supreme Court Act 1981 s 49. 
23 See ch 2 para 2 4 3. 
24 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 40. The term use is misleading and means “on behalf of” or “for the 
benefit of”. 
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through a feudal system. Very briefly, this meant that rights in land were in fact rights in a 
hierarchical system of tenures of land, with the King at the top, various lords below him, and 
the person in possession of the land at the bottom. The system operated in an oppressive and 
unfair way, which caused creative medieval lawyers to find ways to avoid the negative 
elements of land tenure. The mechanism by which these elements were avoided was the use.25  
 
As an example, at the time of the Crusades,26 when a tenant of land was fighting in another 
country, a trustee would be appointed to manage the land on his behalf, and had to give the 
land back to the tenant upon his return, or, if he did not return, to his family members. This 
ensured that the land did not fall into the hands of a lord higher up the hierarchical chain, but 
rather stayed in the tenant’s family. The person the tenant wanted to benefit was called the 
cestui que use (or cestuis que use if more than one). In effect, the use was a conveyancing 
device for the holding of land and its purpose was to avoid financial liabilities and restriction 
on the inheritance of property.27 
 
The common law did not recognise the use as such nor the interests of the cestuis que use. It 
only recognised legal interests in property. As the feudal system declined, and given the 
inability of the common law courts to assist the cestuis que use, failures to perform uses were 
increasingly brought before the Chancellor in the hope that his discretionary jurisdiction 
would assist the cestuis que use. 
 
The King at the time, Henry VIII, convinced England’s Parliament to pass the Statute of Uses 
in 1535 to eradicate the use.28 This made it impossible for someone holding the legal title to 
land to be bound to benefit another, as there was no use by which he could be bound. The 
Statute of Uses did not, however, abolish all uses and, over time, loopholes were found by 
creative lawyers to replicate the use in all but name. As a result of political and social 
changes, by the turn of the eighteenth century, the courts of chancery recognised the equitable 
interest of a person, B, then called the cestui que trust and today called the beneficiary, where 
S, the settlor, transferred legal title to land to T, the trustee, to hold for the benefit of B.29 
 
                                                      
25 Penner The Law of Trusts 8-12. 
26 Religious military campaigns that started in 1095 and continued for over 200 years. 
27 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 40-41. 
28 Penner The Law of Trusts 12. 
29 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 55-58; Penner The Law of Trusts 8-12; Virgo The 
Principles of Equity and Trusts 40. 
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2 4 Definition of a trust  
 
2 4 1 Property definition and obligation definition 
 
Given the evolving nature of trusts, and the wide variety of uses it can be put to, it is difficult 
to give an exhaustive definition of a trust. English judges are able to adapt the characteristics 
of the English trust in appropriate cases, in order to take account of changing practical 
realities.30 No statutory definition is provided in either the Trustee Act 1925 or the Trustee Act 
2000, unlike the position in Jersey31 and South Africa.32 It was presumably not considered 
necessary, given the long history of trusts in England. 
 
Hayton’s definition of an English trust is a good starting point. According to him, a trust can 
be defined as an equitable obligation, binding a person (the trustee) to deal with property (the 
trust property) owned by him as a separate fund, distinct from his own private property, for 
the benefit of persons (the beneficiaries), of whom he may himself be one, and any one of 
whom may enforce the obligation.33  
 
From this definition of a trust, two fundamental features of the trust can be deduced – a 
property dimension and an obligation dimension. These two dimensions, holding property 
rights for persons (or purposes), and the personal obligations of the trustee to manage the 
property in the exclusive interest of the beneficiaries, is said to distinguish the trust from other 
legal concepts.34 
 
The obligation can be described as a tie or bond of equity, a vinculum iuris, whereby one 
person is bound to perform or forebear some act for another. It is an equitable obligation, so 
called because it was initially only recognised in courts of equity, and it is an obligation that 
must relate to property. The trustee’s obligations to the beneficiaries are in respect of specific 
property owned by the trustee, and the beneficiaries have an equitable interest in such 
                                                      
30 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees v; Virgo The Principles of Equity and 
Trusts 40. This is also the case in South Africa where the courts develop the trust by adapting the trust idea to the 
principles of South African law. See ch 2 paras 4 2 2, 4 2 3. See also ch 2 paras 3 2 2 2, 3 8 in relation to the 
development of the Jersey trust by the courts. 
31 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 2. 
32 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 1. 
33 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 2. 
34 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 42. 
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property. If someone is obliged to do something or to refrain from doing something not 
relating to property, that obligation is not a trust.35  
 
Traditionally, the property dimension was considered more important than the obligation 
dimension. The argument behind this view is that the division between legal and equitable 
title to property is the essence of the trust. Trust law is as such traditionally considered a 
branch of property law.36 
 
Although the importance of the property dimension cannot be doubted, the significance of the 
obligation dimension has recently been highlighted. This view emphasises the fact that the 
trustee’s ownership of the trust property is burdened by his obligations towards the 
beneficiaries.37 
 
One extreme theory from the United States, the “contractarian account of the trust”, 38 
concludes that the trust should be considered as a bargain between the settlor and the trustee 
as to how the trust assets should be managed and distributed. This argument does not define 
the trust only by reference to the obligation dimension (the obligation deriving from contract), 
but rather regards the trust as a hybrid of contract and property – “a contract about how 
property should be deployed”.39 The property dimension is therefore not ignored. 
 
It is true that the duties and discretions of the trustee can be prescribed in great detail in the 
trust deed, with the governing law simply being a default system of rules that will apply if no 
alternative provision was made in the trust deed. However, the problem with this theory is 
that, under English law, the trust is not a contract.40 Although the settlor may bargain with the 
trustee with regard to the terms of the trust, once the trust has been created, the settlor has no 
right to enforce the bargain and typically has no rights relating to the trust, unless he reserved 
specific rights in the trust deed. The beneficiaries, who were not parties to the bargain, are the 
ones with the right to enforce the trust.41 
                                                      
35 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 56. 
36 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 42-43. 
37 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 44. 
38 Langbein (1995) 105 Yale LJ 625. 
39 Langbein (1995) 105 Yale LJ 625 669, 671. This argument finds resonance in the South African view of an 
inter vivos trust being, or at least being created by way of, a contract for the benefit of a third party, as examined 
in ch 2 paras 4 2 2, 4 3 2 1. 
40 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 43-44. 
41 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 42-43. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 28 
 
Any useful definition of the trust must therefore encapsulate both a property dimension and 
an obligation dimension.42  
 
2 4 2 Distinction between legal and equitable ownership  
 
Crucial to the property dimension of the definition of a trust, is the division of property rights. 
Under English law, this enables one person to hold property for the benefit of another. The 
trustee holds the legal title to the trust property. In the eyes of the common law, he is the 
absolute owner of that property. Historically, the common law courts only recognised legal 
proprietary rights, and would not have protected the interests of the beneficiary of a trust, who 
is not a legal owner. Equity was, however, able to recognise that the trustee holds the property 
not for himself, but for the benefit of the beneficiary. Generally speaking, the beneficiary of 
an English law trust has an equitable interest in the trust property, the word equitable 
indicating that the right was originally only recognised in courts of equity.43 
 
The trustee, the legal owner of the trust property, who is obliged to look after it for the benefit 
of the beneficiary, stands in a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiary. An act or omission 
on the part of the trustee that is not authorised or excused by the terms of the trust deed, is 
regarded a breach of trust, and renders the trustee liable to compensate the beneficiary for any 
loss suffered.44 This is because the beneficiary, and not the trustee, is entitled to the benefit 
and enjoyment of the trust property.45 
 
Similarly, it is not the settlor who has an equitable interest in the property (unless he is 
himself a beneficiary). When the settlor creates a trust, he imposes obligations onto the 
trustee. These obligations are owed to and enforceable only by the beneficiaries and not by 
                                                      
42 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 56; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 44. A more detailed discussion of the obligations-based approach, ie, an analysis of trusts as a species 
of obligation rather than property, can be found in ch 2 para 2 7 3 2. 
43 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 73; Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and 
Equitable Obligations 53; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 13. 
44 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 3; Virgo The Principles of Equity and 
Trusts 13. 
45 It is perhaps because the beneficiary is the one entitled to the benefit and enjoyment of the trust property that 
equitable interests are sometimes confusingly referred to as beneficial interests. However, it is not exactly the 
same thing. An outright owner of property has a legal beneficial interest in that property, whereas the beneficiary 
of a trust has an equitable beneficial interest in the trust property. For more on this distinction, see Penner The 
Law of Trusts 21-22. 
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the settlor (unless he is a beneficiary or reserved rights to himself in the trust deed).46 The core 
obligation created by the settlor is the personal obligation of the trustee to produce an account 
of his trusteeship to the beneficiaries.47 
 
It should be noted that a beneficiary of a trust only has an equitable proprietary right to a trust 
asset if the trust asset is ascertained and it is clear that the specific beneficiary will benefit 
from that asset. Therefore, in the case of a fully discretionary trust with a wide class of 
beneficiaries, the objects (beneficiaries) do not have ownership rights relating to the trust 
property, unless and until the trustee exercises his discretion in favour of a specific 
beneficiary.48 However, reference is often simply made to beneficiaries of English law trusts 
having equitable proprietary rights, although it is submitted that this is a generalisation. 
Perhaps the important point is that beneficiaries of an English law trust can have ownership 
rights in relation to the trust property, such rights being equitable, whereas this is not possible 
under, for example, South African law. Alternatively, the distinction can be explained by 
classifying the rights of a beneficiary of a fixed trust as an equitable proprietary interest in the 
narrow sense, and that of an object of a discretionary trust as an equitable proprietary interest 
in the wide sense – such a right is not transmissible.49 
 
The recognition of equitable personal rights has also been instrumental to the development of 
English trust law, being a right that all beneficiaries have, unlike equitable proprietary rights.50 
The rights arising from a fiduciary relationship fall under this category. A fiduciary 
relationship is characterised by trust and confidence, such as the relationship between a 
solicitor and his client. A fiduciary owes specific duties to his principal, these duties being 
more onerous than the ordinary common law negligence standard of skill and care. 51 This 
fiduciary obligation is essential to the notion of a trust and will be examined in greater detail 
in chapter 3. Again, the two dimensions of the trust emerge – property and obligation. 
 
Where a trustee commits a breach of trust by transferring trust property to himself, the 
beneficiaries can therefore rely on their equitable proprietary rights to claim recovery of the 
                                                      
46 Re Murphy's Settlements, Murphy v Murphy [1998] 3 All ER 1 9. 
47 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 4. 
48 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 59-60. 
49 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 359-360. 
50 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 21. 
51 Penner The Law of Trusts 398-399, where a description is given of a fiduciary relationship. This will be 
returned to in ch 3. 
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property, or they can claim compensation from the trustee for the loss suffered based on their 
equitable personal rights. The dividing line between proprietary and personal rights may not 
always be clear and will depend on the particular circumstances.52 
 
2 4 3 Legal and equitable interests and the “fusion” argument 
 
The fundamental division between legal interests (or estates) and equitable interests (or 
estates) is, therefore, at the heart of equity.53 Equity developed to protect interests other than 
legal interests, and recognises that various persons simultaneously could have different 
interests in the same piece of property.54 Without this distinction, English trust law would not 
have developed in the way it did. 
 
It is important to note that not all property has a legal owner and an equitable owner. 
Equitable proprietary rights must be created specifically, by separating the beneficial interest 
from the legal title. This can be done either by the express creation of a trust over property, a 
presumed intent to create a trust over property, or by the operation of law. Where no equitable 
interest is created, the legal owner of property is also the beneficial or equitable owner of that 
property and can obtain all the benefits of the property.55 This is the normal case of owning 
one’s own property. 
 
Importantly, once an equitable interest in property is created, one person alone cannot have 
both the legal and equitable ownership of that property. 56 Although it is possible to be a 
trustee and one of the beneficiaries, it is not possible to be the only trustee and the only 
beneficiary. This also means that where an equitable interest was created and one person 
alone subsequently acquires both the legal and equitable interest, the equitable interest will be 
destroyed.57 An example is the case where X is the trustee and also one of three beneficiaries. 
If the other two beneficiaries are later excluded from benefit under the trust, leaving X as the 
only trustee and the only beneficiary, and thus the legal and equitable owner, the equitable 
                                                      
52See Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 76-79 on the nature of equitable 
interests as proprietary or personal; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 21-22. 
53 The phrases “beneficial interest” and “beneficial owner” etc are used interchangeably with “equitable interest” 
and “equitable owner”, although the latter is probably strictly more correct in the English context. 
54 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 17-18. 
55 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 5; Virgo The Principles of Equity and 
Trusts 19. 
56 Penner The Law of Trusts 21-22. 
57 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 20. 
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interest will be extinguished. X as trustee would then hold the property on resulting trust for 
the settlor. 
 
A legal estate or interest is a proprietary interest (meaning an interest in or relating to 
property) that was acquired with all the formalities required by common law or statute for 
conferring legal title to such interest. For example, a transfer of the legal title to land requires 
that certain formalities must be fulfilled, whereas legal ownership of a movable asset, such as 
a work of art, can be transferred with fewer or no formalities. A trustee normally has legal 
title to the trust property, but this is not necessarily always the case – it is possible to hold an 
equitable interest on trust for beneficiaries.58  
 
An important difference between a legal proprietary interest and an equitable proprietary 
interest is that legal title prevails against the whole world, but the equitable interest of a 
beneficiary does not prevail against a bona fide purchaser for value of the legal interest who 
did not have notice of the equitable interest.59 This means that if a trustee sold a trust asset to a 
bona fide third party who paid market value for the asset in question, and who was not aware 
that the asset formed part of a trust, the beneficiaries cannot claim the asset back from the 
third party. 
 
Despite some arguing60 that there has been (or should be) a substantive fusion of common law 
and equity, the fundamental distinction between legal and equitable interests in property 
remains. When the Judicature Act 187361 was introduced in the House of Lords, it was said 
that in order for trusts to continue, there must be a distinction between what is called a legal 
estate and an equitable estate. It was further said that the distinction between law and equity 
is, subject to certain limitations, real and natural, and that it would be a mistake to disregard 
this distinction.62  
 
                                                      
58 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 73-74. 
59 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 74-76; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 17-21. 
60 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 8; Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law 
relating to Trusts and Trustees 73-74; Burrows (2002) 22 OJLS 1. For the purposes of this dissertation it is not 
necessary to enquire into these arguments in more depth. 
61 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. 
62 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 73-74. 
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More recently, it has been argued63 that the duality of systems has an important function in 
that one system, common law, provides certainty, and the other system, equity, provides the 
necessary flexibility and adaptability to enable justice to be done. However, common law and 
equity are not two separate and parallel systems of law. The argument is that common law is a 
complete system of law, which could stand alone, but which would lead to injustice if it were 
not for the tempering effect of equity. Equity, on the other hand, is not a complete and 
independent system of law and cannot stand on its own.64 Therefore, although the two systems 
are becoming assimilated in some areas,65 the better view may be that the two systems should 
continue to co-exist.66 
 
2 5 Classifications of trust 
 
This dissertation focuses on private inter vivos trusts created expressly and documented in the 
form of a trust deed or instrument. It does not cover testamentary trusts or public trusts such 
as charitable trusts or pension fund trusts.  
 
The following classifications of trust are not exhaustive, and are not mutually exclusive. A 
particular trust can fall under more than one category. 
 
2 5 1 Express trusts and trusts arising by operation of law 
 
An express trust is created intentionally by the settlor’s declaration to that effect.67 Not all 
trusts are created intentionally though. A trust can be imposed by statute and is then called a 
statutory trust. Under English law, a trust could also be imposed by the court, applying 
equitable principles. This could be either a resulting trust or a constructive trust. These types 
of trust will not themselves form part of the dissertation, but a brief description is useful as 
they are later mentioned in specific instances. 
 
                                                      
63 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 9 where reference is made to the views of Lord 
Millett. 
64 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 23. 
65 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 74; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 23-24. 
66 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 25. 
67 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 79. 
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A resulting trust exists where the transferor was presumed to have intended that property 
should be held on trust for him. Although a transfer of property takes place, the transferor 
fails to divest himself completely of his beneficial interest in the property.68 An example of 
this is the case of a failed express trust. In such a case the trustee holds the trust property on 
resulting trust for the settlor.69  
 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, arises as a result of the application of legal rules. In 
most instances this occurs where the recipient of the property is considered to have acted in an 
unconscionable manner. 70  For example, where property was obtained fraudulently, the 
recipient of the property is deemed to hold it on constructive trust for the claimant.71 No 
formalities are required for the creation of a resulting or constructive trust.72 
 
2 5 2 Fixed and discretionary trusts 
 
Within the category of express private inter vivos trusts, a distinction can be made between 
fixed and discretionary trusts. (The same distinction can also be made with regard to 
testamentary trusts.) A fixed trust is one where the trust deed stipulates the interests of the 
beneficiaries in the capital and income of the trust, and the trustee does not have discretion to 
distribute the trust fund in a different way. 73  A trust is discretionary if the trustee has 
discretion to distribute the trust property in the way he deems fit to persons from a specific 
class of potential beneficiaries. The persons in the class of potential beneficiaries are called 
objects, and they do not have an equitable proprietary interest in the narrow sense in the trust 
property (in other words, they do not have a transmissible right),74 as the trustee may decide 
not to exercise his discretion in favour of a particular object. A beneficiary of a discretionary 
trust has a mere hope that the trustee will exercise his discretion in favour of the beneficiary.75 
Such a beneficiary does have personal rights, however. 
 
                                                      
68 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 243-244. 
69 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 265-275. 
70 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 291-292. 
71 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 293-294. 
72 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 79-80; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 63. 
73 Penner The Law of Trusts 68-69. 
74 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 359-360. 
75 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 97-98; Penner The Law of Trusts 69-
70; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 59-60. 
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In the case of a fixed trust, where the beneficiary has a current fixed entitlement to a certain or 
ascertainable part of the income or capital of the trust fund, his interest is called an interest in 
possession. This has tax consequences as the beneficiary is entitled to a part of the trust 
fund.76 
 
A beneficiary who may or may not benefit under a discretionary trust has no interest in 
possession and generally will only be liable to tax once he has received a benefit from the 
trust. This is, of course, one of the reasons for the great popularity of discretionary trusts. 
 
2 6 Characteristics of an English law trust 
 
2 6 1 The trust 
 
A trust can be defined as an equitable obligation that relates to property. 77 A trust under 
English law does not have legal personality and is not a separate legal entity. Instead, the 
trustee, in whom the legal title to the trust property is vested, must act personally (but in his 
capacity as trustee) in respect of the trust property.78 It is therefore not correct for trustees to 
enter into an agreement as “the XYZ Trust”, but rather as “A and B as trustees of the XYZ 
Trust”.79 
 
2 6 2 The trust property 
 
A trust must relate to property. This is clear from the definition of a trust80 and the substantial 
requirement of certainty of subject matter.81 The trust property constitutes a separate fund and 
does not form part of the trustee’s personal estate. It is thus protected against claims made by 
the trustee’s private creditors. Of course, beneficiaries are also protected by virtue of having 
an equitable interest in the trust property.  
 
                                                      
76 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 98. 
77 See ch 2 para 2 4 1. 
78 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 3; Penner The Law of Trusts 32-33. 
79 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 57, where it is also stated that the 
courts are willing to construe references to a trust as references to the trustee. See in this regard T Choithram 
International SA v Pagarani (British Virgin Islands) [2000] UKPC 46 para 31.  
80 See ch 2 para 2 4 1. 
81 See ch 2 para 2 7 1 2. 
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Trust property has a ring-fenced, protected nature and will include trust assets the trustee has 
wrongfully acquired for himself. The trust fund includes the original trust property, accruals 
thereto, and property acquired in exchange for trust property (for example, if an asset is sold 
and a different asset purchased with the proceeds). Even if the trustees purchased an asset in 
breach of trust, it still forms part of the trust fund and the beneficiaries have an equitable 
interest in it.82 
 
The trustee of an English law trust must own the trust property. It is not sufficient to merely 
have control over it. Older cases and textbooks approved the notion that the trustee does not 
need to own the property but merely have to have control over it.83 The position now is that 
ownership by the trustee is required.84 There is very old authority for this point, preceding the 
older cases mentioned above.85 
 
2 6 3 The trustee 
 
The office of trustee is subject to onerous fiduciary and equitable duties. This is analysed in 
depth in chapter 3. The enforcement of these duties by the beneficiaries is at the core of the 
trust concept.86 In the well-known case of Armitage v Nurse,87 Millet LJ said the following: 
 






                                                      
82 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 9, 57; Penner The Law of Trusts 43-
44. The position of the trustee is examined in more detail in ch 3. 
83 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 8; Re Marshall's Will Trusts [1945] 1 
All ER 550 551; Green v Russell [1959] 2 All ER 525 531. In the two latter cases, references were made to older 
editions of Underhill’s work. 
84 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 8. Here it is stated that in the previous 
editions of this work, up to the 16th edition, reference was made to “control” rather than ownership. 
85 Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 245 275 where James LJ said: “A trustee is a man who is the owner of the 
property and deals with it as principal as owner and as master…”. 
86 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 57; Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
The duties of trustees are examined in more detail in ch 3. 
87 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
88 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253. There is no reference here to proprietary rights and in fact the statement 
is made in the context of obligations owed by the trustees to the beneficiaries, which must indicate personal 
rights rather than proprietary rights. See also the discussion at ch 2 paras 2 4 2, 2 4 3. 
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However, he also said: 
 
“But I do not accept the further submission that these core obligations include the 
duties of skill and care, prudence and diligence. The duty of the trustees to perform the 
trusts honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries is the minimum 
necessary to give substance to the trusts, but in my opinion it is sufficient.”89 
 
The decision in Armitage90 confirmed that a trustee of an English law trust can be exempted 
from liability for gross negligence.91 The correctness of the decision has been questioned and 
there appears to be a need for either a decision at the highest appellate level or statutory 
intervention in order to provide certainty with regard to the permissible scope of trustee 
exemption clauses.92  
 
Another development affecting the liability of trustees is in relation to the rule known as the 
Hastings-Bass rule.93 Under this rule, a court in England can, in certain circumstances, set 
aside the exercise by a trustee of a discretionary dispositive power.94 In Sieff v Fox,95 the rule 
was described as follows: 
 
“Where trustees act under a discretion given to them by the terms of the trust, in 
circumstances in which they were free to decide whether or not to exercise that 
discretion, but the effect of the exercise is different from that which they intended, the 
court will interfere with their action if it is clear that they would not have acted as they 
did had they not failed to take into account considerations which they ought to have 
taken into account, or taken into account considerations which they ought not to have 
taken into account.”96 
 
                                                      
89 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253-254. 
90 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
91 Trustees of Jersey and South African law trusts are subject to a higher standard of care. See ch 2 paras 3 5 3, 4 
3 5 3. See also the discussion regarding legislative developments in ch 2 para 2 8. 
92 Clarry (2014) 1 JGLR para 43.  
93 The rule has its origin in the English Court of Appeal case Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193. 
94  Dispositive powers refer to powers authorising the trustee to dispose of the trust fund, eg to make a 
distribution to a beneficiary. This must be distinguished from administrative powers allowing the trustee to 
manage the trust and invest the trust fund. 
95 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch). 
96 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch) para 119. 
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Although the rule was originally intended to protect beneficiaries, it has been useful for 
trustees whose actions have led to unintended (and unwanted) tax consequences, as their 
actions could be nullified without the need for the beneficiaries to sue them for negligence or 
breach of trust. The rule became unpopular with some academics, practitioners and English 
judges, as it made it relatively easy for trustees to escape the tax consequences of their 
actions. 97  A recent Supreme Court decision (which combined two cases) 98  has now 
significantly restricted the ability of trustees to rely on the rule. 
 
The above developments and their effect on the liability of trustees of English law trusts and 
the irreducible core approach will be examined further in chapter 3. 
 
2 6 4 The settlor 
 
The settlor of an English law trust cannot enforce the trust, unless he is a beneficiary or 
reserved certain rights to himself in the trust deed. If the settlor declares himself a trustee of 
his property, he retains the legal title to the trust property but disposes of his beneficial 
interest by creating an equitable interest for the beneficiaries. If the settlor transfers the assets 
to another person as trustee and is not a beneficiary of the trust, he disposes of his legal and 
equitable interest in the property and falls out of the picture.99 
 
One of the rights the settlor may reserve to himself is a right to revoke the trust. A revocable 
trust can be brought to an end by the settlor with the result that the trust property is transferred 
back to the settlor. Unless this right is expressly reserved in the trust deed, the trust would be 
irrevocable. A settlor can also reserve lesser powers to himself, such as to replace the trustee 
or to have some say in the investment of the trust fund. Reserving rights, especially the right 
to revoke the trust, may have tax and other consequences for the settlor.  100 Chapter 4 focuses 
on the effect of too much control being exercised by a settlor. 
 
 
                                                      
97 As Park J commented in Breadner v Granville-Grossman [2000] 4 All ER 705 para 61: “It cannot be right that 
whenever trustees do something which they later regret and think that they ought not to have done, they can say 
that they never did it in the first place.” 
98 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
99 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 58; Penner The Law of Trusts 24. The 
position of the settlor is examined in more detail in ch 3. 
100 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 58; Penner The Law of Trusts 24-25.  
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2 6 5 The beneficiaries 
 
The beneficiaries play an essential part in the trust relationship, being the ones who can 
enforce the trust against the trustee. Without this enforceability, a trust cannot exist.101 
 
Beneficiaries of English law trusts have equitable rights, which may be proprietary or 
personal.102 In the case of a fixed trust, the beneficiary has an equitable proprietary interest in 
the trust assets and this right can be enforced against anyone in possession of the trust 
property, unless such person purchased the legal title for value and without actual or 
constructive notice of the beneficiary’s interest. The beneficiary also has personal rights, such 
as the right to ensure proper administration of the trust, rights to information or documents 
relating to the trust, or rights in connection with breaches of trust.103 
 
In the case of a discretionary trust, the objects do not have proprietary rights because it is not 
clear whether they will benefit from the trust or not. It depends on the exercise of the trustee’s 
discretion. Such objects do have personal rights though, which mainly relate to ensuring that 
the trustee is held accountable for the obligations he owes to the beneficiaries.104 
 
2 6 6 Trusts and powers  
 
An understanding of the difference between trusts and powers as they exist in English trust 
law is important to the understanding of the issues examined in subsequent chapters, 
especially in relation to the duties and obligations of trustees, examined in chapter 3.  
 
In this context, the word trust has a specific meaning, narrower than the meaning generally 
given to that word. A trust imposes an obligation that must be performed. A power is 
discretionary and may be exercised, but does not have to be exercised.105 The same trust deed 
can impose trust obligations on the trustee and also create discretionary powers that may be 
exercised by the trustee, and it can be difficult to distinguish between the two. The importance 
of the distinction lies therein that it enables one to determine whether the trustee must act or 
                                                      
101 See ch 2 para 2 6 3. 
102 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 353; see also ch 2 para 2 4 3. 
103 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 354-359. 
104 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 359-364; see also ch 2 par 2 5 2. 
105 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 73. 
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may act. Furthermore, unexecuted trusts can (and will) be executed by the court, but powers 
will not be exercised by the court.106  
 
The distinction between trusts and powers is a traditional one. These were the two main 
classes of obligation recognised in equity. Classifying an obligation as a trust or a power has 
significant consequences, but distinguishing between the two can be difficult. It is essentially 
a matter of construction of the language used in the trust deed.107 It has been acknowledged in 
McPhail v Doulton,108 the watershed case in this regard, that the distinction between trusts and 
powers was narrow and could be artificial, and that it depended on “delicate shading”. 109  In 
practice, a competent trustee may act in the same manner whether a trust or a power is 
imposed on them. The courts nowadays have a less orthodox view and enforce fiduciary 
obligations not strictly on the distinction between trusts and powers.110  
 
2 7 Substantive requirements for the creation of a valid express trust under English law 
 
2 7 1 The three certainties 
 
As long ago as 1840, a test was devised for the validity of express trusts. This test is referred 
to as the three certainties, and was identified in Knight v Knight.111 The three certainties are: 
certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of objects.112 
 
2 7 1 1  Certainty of intention 
 
It is necessary to show that the owner of the property had the intention to subject the property 
to a trust obligation. In the case of a trust expressed in writing (the type of trust this 
dissertation is concerned with), the settlor must use language from which an intention to 
create a trust can be ascertained. It is a question of fact and depends on construction of the 
                                                      
106 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 39-40; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 73. 
107 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 83-87. 
108 McPhail v Doulton [1970] UKHL 1. 
109 McPhail v Doulton [1970] UKHL 1 10. 
110 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 87-92. 
111 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148. 
112 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 184; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 80. 
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trust deed. No specific words or phrases are required, although older authorities accepted that 
certain key words or phrases would create a trust.113  
 
If a trust deed can be interpreted in more than one way, according to a general rule of 
construction in English law, a court would prefer the one that gives effect to the purpose of 
the person drawing up the document.114 The test is not what the settlor subjectively intended, 
but what a reasonable person objectively would have concluded the settlor’s intention to be. 
An intention to create a trust may thus be inferred from the context.115 
 
Despite the fact that a document might be objectively construed as creating a valid inter vivos 
trust, a third party may allege that the trust is invalid because it is a sham. This may be 
inferred from the alleged subjective intentions of the settlor and the trustee, and from conduct 
subsequent to the creation of the trust, which may indicate that the settlor did not genuinely 
intend to create a trust, but rather to create a different set of rights and obligations.116 Sham 
trusts are examined in greater detail in chapter 4. 
  
A fundamental principle of English trust law is that a court will try to uphold a trust if it is 
able to do so. Although a stricter approach was followed in the past, the more recent 117 
tendency is to respect the settlor’s intention to create a trust. In McPhail v Doulton,118 Lord 
Wilberforce said: 
 
“[A] trust should be upheld if there is sufficient practical certainty in its definition for 
it to be carried out, if necessary with the administrative assistance of the court, 





                                                      
113 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 184-187. 
114 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 112. 
115 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 81-82. 
116 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 88-93; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 85-87. 
117 Pearson v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch). 
118 McPhail v Doulton [1970] UKHL 1. 
119 McPhail v Doulton [1970] UKHL 1 12. 
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2 7 1 2  Certainty of subject matter 
 
Although, in principle, any kind of property can be subject to a trust, a valid trust can only be 
created if specific property is identified which is intended to be subject to the trust obligation. 
It is not necessary for the purposes of this dissertation to examine this requirement in too 
much detail. There must be conceptual certainty as to the property subject to the trust, it must 
be possible to identify the trust property and, in some cases, where a trust is declared of part 
of a larger bulk of property, the trust property must be earmarked or segregated. A settlor 
cannot create a trust of property he hopes or expects to own in the future.120 
 
2 7 1 3  Certainty of objects 
 
Not considering charitable and non-charitable purpose trusts, a trust will only be valid if the 
objects are defined in such a way that the trustee (or the court, in default of the trustee) will be 
able to execute the trust according to the settlor’s intention. There must be one or more 
persons, identified with sufficient clarity, for whom the trust property is held and who can 
hold the trustee to account. Discretionary trusts often refer to a wide class of beneficiaries, 
and problems arise if it is not possible to ascertain who is within and who is outside the class 
of beneficiaries.121  
 
English law has developed different tests for fixed trusts and discretionary trusts to determine 
whether there is certainty of objects. With regard to fixed trusts, the test is whether a complete 
list of beneficiaries can be drawn up. All beneficiaries must be ascertainable at the outset or at 
least when the time comes to distribute capital or income.122 
 
Originally, the test for certainty of objects of discretionary trusts was the same as for fixed 
trusts. In McPhail v Doulton123 the House of Lords decided that the test should be similar to 
that used for certainty of objects of powers, namely that it must be possible to say of any 
                                                      
120 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 189-193; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 
88-94. 
121 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 193-196; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 
94-95. 
122 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees129; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 96. This test was confirmed in Re Gulbenkian's Settlement Trusts [1968] UKHL 5. 
123 McPhail v Doulton [1970] UKHL 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 42 
given person whether or not he is within the class. This case reached the Court of Appeal124 
and it was held that the requirement of certainty would be met if it can be said, at least with 
regard to a substantial number of objects, that they fall within the class, even if, with regard to 
a substantial number of others, it cannot be proved whether they are within or outside the 
class.125 This more sophisticated approach of the court required that there must be sufficient 
certainty in the language to enable distribution to be made to identifiable persons.126  
 
A trust must also be administratively workable. In essence this means that the definition of 
the class of beneficiaries must not be so wide as to make it impossible, or at least not 
extremely difficult and time-consuming, to ascertain who the beneficiaries are. There must be 
clear criteria to enable the trustee, or the court, to control and execute the trust.127 An example 
of an administratively unworkable trust would be “any or all or some of the inhabitants of the 
County of West Yorkshire”, a class of more than two and a half million potential 
beneficiaries.128 
 
2 7 2 The beneficiary principle  
 
Once it is clear that the three certainties are satisfied, one must determine whether the 
beneficiary principle is satisfied. A trust must have a definite object – there must be 
somebody in whose favour the court can decree performance.129 
 
Although this principle may be confused with the principle of certainty of objects and 
administrative workability, it is a separate requirement and has a distinct function. A trust for 
the relatives of the settlor may be conceptually and evidentially certain, but if none of the 
settlor’s relatives are alive there will be no one to enforce the trust and therefore the intended 
trust will fail. The transferee trustee will thus hold the assets on resulting trust for the 
transferor settlor. The principle does not require that there is an identifiable beneficiary at the 
                                                      
124 Known as Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No 2) [1973] Ch 9. 
125 It appears from the judgment that the application of the test is not as simple as it may appear, but it is outside 
the scope of this dissertation to examine this in more detail. 
126 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 130-132; Pearce et al The Law of 
Trusts and Equitable Obligations 195. 
127 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 135, 140. 
128 The case of R v District Auditor, ex parte West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council [2001] WTLR 785 
seems to be the only reported case of a trust failing as a result of administrative unworkability. 
129 This principle has its origins in the case of Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399. 
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time of creation of the trust, as long as there is an identifiable beneficiary at some point before 
expiration of the trust period.130 
 
The beneficiary principle also implies that an express trust must be a trust for persons and not 
for purposes, as a purpose cannot sue to enforce the trust.131 In certain cases decided in the 
twentieth century, the beneficiary principle has been used as a ground on its own for 
invalidating purported trusts.132 In Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts133 the principle was explained 
by reference to the division of legal proprietary rights and equitable proprietary rights. The 
legal owner of property is either under an equitable obligation or not. If he is, there must be 
someone else who must have corresponding equitable rights against the trustee, which rights 
can be enforced. If he is not under an equitable obligation, he can deal with the property as he 
wishes because he will be the legal and beneficial owner.134  
 
The existence of a trust depends on there being someone other than the trustee who has an 
equitable right to the trust property and who can enforce the trust obligations against the 
trustee.135 Once more, the importance of the obligation component of the trust comes to the 
fore. Even beneficiaries of discretionary trusts, who do not have equitable proprietary 
interests in the narrow sense, have the personal right to enforce the trust obligations against 
the trustee. 
 
In Re Denley136 and other cases137 the beneficiary principle was, however, developed to allow 
trusts that are expressed as a purpose but are, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of one or 
more individuals.  
 
                                                      
130 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 114-115. 
131  Charitable trusts are an exception to this, being enforceable by the Attorney General of the Charity 
Commission. 
132 Re Wood (deceased), Barton v Chilcott [1949] 1 All ER 1100; Re Astor's Settlement Trusts, Astor v Scholfield 
[1952] 1 All ER 1067; Re Endacott (deceased), Corpe v Endacott [1959] 3 All ER 562. 
133 Re Astor's Settlement Trusts, Astor v Scholfield [1952] 1 All ER 1067 1071. 
134 See ch 2 paras 2 4 2, 2 4 3. 
135 Penner The Law of Trusts 245-248; Re Astor's Settlement Trusts, Astor v Scholfield [1952] 1 All ER 1067 
1071. 
136 Re Denley's Trust Deed, Holman v HH Martyn & Co Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 65 69. Here the trust property was 
land that was to be maintained and used as and for the purpose of a recreation or sports ground, primarily for the 
benefit of the employees of a specific company and secondarily for the benefit of such persons as the trustees 
may allow to use the facilities. 
137 Re Lipinski's Will Trusts, Gosschalk v Levy [1977] 1 All ER 33 44; Grender v Dresden [2009] EWHC 214 
(Ch) para 18. 
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The difference may not be easily ascertainable. It is a question of construction in each case 
whether the trust is primarily for the benefit of one or more individuals, with the specifics of 
the way in which the benefit is to be enjoyed being secondary; or whether the specified 
purpose in which the assets will be involved being the essence of the gift, with the indirect 
benefit to individuals being secondary. The benefit to individuals must however not be so 
incidental and intangible that it does not give them locus standi to enforce the trust. 138 
Penner139 is of the view that these cases do not extend the scope of valid purpose trusts, but 
rather justifies the validity of such trusts as “valid trusts for persons limited by a purpose”. 
This category of trust has always been allowed by equity, the leading case, Re Sanderson’s 
Trust,140 being decided in 1857.  
 
2 7 3 Further developments regarding the substantive requirements 
 
2 7 3 1  An enforcer principle and the recognition of purpose trusts  
 
Hayton141 is of the view that there is scope for the further development of the beneficiary 
principle into an “enforcer principle”. His argument is that, provided there is an identifiable 
enforcer, appointed by or in accordance with the wishes of the settlor, who is positively 
interested in the performance of the purpose of the trust, the trust should not fail for not 
satisfying the beneficiary principle. He questions why the English courts cannot accept that 
enforceable obligations to account to an interested person are at the core of the trust 
concept, 142  whether that person is a beneficiary, an object of a power of appointment 
(someone who may benefit subject to the contingency that the trustee exercises his discretion 
in favour of the person), a new trustee, the Attorney-General of the Charity Commission (in 




                                                      
138 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 165-169. 
139 Penner The Law of Trusts 255-261. 
140 Re Sanderson's Trust (1857) 26 LJ Ch 804. 
141 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 169-172; Hayton (2001) 117 LQR 96. 
142 As recognised in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709, a landmark case where the Privy Council 
held that the rights of beneficiaries to trust documents are not based on their proprietary interests, but on the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise trusts and make trustees account for their trusteeship at the request of 
persons with sufficient interest, which would include objects of fiduciary powers.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 45 
He suggests that a trust governed by English law would then be described as: 
 
“…[A]n equitable obligation binding a person (“the trustee”) to deal with property 
owned by him as a trust fund segregated from his private property whether for the 
benefit of persons (“the beneficiaries”) of whom he may himself be one, and any one 
of whom has the right to enforce the obligation, or for the furtherance of a purpose 
which can be enforced by an enforcer provided for in the trust deed or, in the case of 
charitable purpose trusts, by operation of law.” 
 
He argues that an enforcer, like a beneficiary, would have personal and proprietary rights 
against the trustee.143 
 
Penner, 144  on the other hand, considers that this construction cannot really be treated as 
creating a true private purpose trust. His view is that the only rights under a trust are those 
that are given to specific individuals or classes of individuals by the settlor. In a worst-case 
scenario, it is not inconceivable for a trustee and enforcer to agree to split the trust money 
between them and abandon the trust’s purpose. No one else, neither a third party nor the 
court, would have any independent right to enforce any duties against the trustee. No one may 
even be aware of this scenario. No one can insist that the enforcer exercises his power to 
make the trustee apply the trust fund in furthering the purpose.  
 
Penner 145 argues further that true private purpose trusts can only be created if the law is 
changed. This would give public force to the purpose trust, so that the trust property would 
not be governed only by the private rights of individuals. He suggests that, as a result, they 
should not necessarily be called “private” purpose trusts.   
 
Many offshore jurisdictions have enacted legislation that allows non-charitable purpose trusts 
and recognises the concept of an enforcer. 146 The legislation of some jurisdictions gives the 
                                                      
143 Hayton (2001) 117 LQR 96 107-108. 
144 Penner The Law of Trusts 253-255. 
145 Penner The Law of Trusts 255. 
146 The most well-known purpose trust legislation is the Cayman STAR Trust legislation, known as the Special 
Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997. Other examples include Jersey’s purpose trust legislation, enacted by the 
Trusts (Amendment No 3) (Jersey) Law 1996. 
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court power to enforce a purpose trust at the application of any interested party, 147 while 
others subject the enforcer to a fiduciary duty to ensure that the enforcer does what he is 
supposed to do, namely to enforce the trust. 148  This type of legislation has not escaped 
criticism. 
 
It would appear that, should a decision be made to allow non-charitable purpose trusts under 
English law, a legislative change would be preferred over development through case law, as 
legislation makes it possible to provide clarity at the outset with regard to the rights and 
obligations of all parties involved. The main concern relates to the methods of ensuring that 
the enforcer keeps the trustee accountable. It may result in an artificial attempt to create an 
obligation that does not really exist. 
 
2 7 3 2  The obligation and property dimensions of the trust 
 
Parkinson149 contends that the law of trusts may be better conceptualised as a species of 
obligation rather than being understood as a form of property ownership. He admits that the 
separation of legal and equitable estates forms an essential part of the understanding of the 
English law trust and in most cases where the legal estate to property is held on trust, there is 
a corresponding equitable estate located in another person or persons. However, he cites 
various examples of trusts, especially discretionary trusts, where it is difficult to point to a 
person who has a symmetrical equitable right to the trust property vested in him. This is 
because beneficiaries of discretionary trusts do not have proprietary interests in the strict 
sense, at least not until the trustee has exercised his discretion in favour of the beneficiary.150 
 
After some consideration, he comes to the conclusion that a valid private express trust can 
exist without the symmetry of legal and equitable estates. Rather than focusing on legal and 
equitable ownership, the core of the private express trust lies in the equitable obligations in 
relation to property (which, in most, but not all, cases will also give beneficiaries 
corresponding equitable proprietary rights). The point he makes is that the interest a 
                                                      
147 This is the case in Bermuda under the Trusts (Special Provisions) Act 1989 as amended by the Trusts (Special 
Provisions) Amendment Act 1998. 
148 Such as the Trusts Law (2001 Revision), incorporating the Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997 of 
the Cayman Islands. 
149 Parkinson (2002) 61 CLJ 657. 
150 Parkinson (2002) 61 CLJ 657 658. See also ch 2 par 2 5 2. 
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beneficiary or object has in the trust property is proportionate to the protection that will be 
given to him should the trustee fail to execute the trust in the appropriate manner.151 
 
Parkinson does not agree with Hayton’s enforcer principle insofar as the enforcer has no 
particular reason to enforce the trust. He does think, however, that an obligations-based 
approach enables a better understanding of the irreducible core content of the trust idea, 
namely that there must be enforceable obligations. This implies that there must be someone 
who was intended to benefit from the trust to whom the trustee is accountable.152  
 
An analysis of the trust in terms of a species of obligation leads to further questions. Can the 
trust be seen as a contract? Does such a view bridge the divide between common law trusts 
and civil law trusts?153  
 
The first question is answered in the negative. Admittedly, recent legislation154 has made it 
possible to understand trusts created by transfer as agreements to benefit third parties, similar 
to the position in South Africa. Furthermore, the irreducible core of trustee obligations that 
cannot be amended by contract is, at least in England, very small.155 However, the trust cannot 
be equated to a contract. The relationships between settlor, trustee and beneficiary are simply 
not always contractual.156  
 
The second question is answered in the affirmative, although it is stated that common law 
trusts, being creations of equity, will always be distinguishable from trusts created in civil law 
or mixed legal systems. The proprietary significance of many trust obligations would continue 
to exist even if trusts are understood more in terms of obligation than property.157  
 
 
                                                      
151 Parkinson (2002) 61 CLJ 657 659-660. It is interesting to note that De Waal makes a similar observation in 
De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557, namely that the ratio for the dual ownership of the English trust is the 
protection of the beneficiary. He shares the view that the protection of the beneficiary does not depend on a 
symmetry of legal and equitable estates. 
152 Parkinson (2002) 61 CLJ 657 668-669. 
153 See also ch 2 para 4 3 1 1. 
154 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
155 Given that the Trustee Act 2000 allows liability for trustee negligence to be excluded. See also ch 2 para 2 8. 
156 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 64, although there is reference to a growing number of situations in 
which the dividing line between trusts and contracts are blurred. 
157 Parkinson (2002) 61 CLJ 657 670. See also ch 2 para 4 3 1 1 where the argument is examined from the South 
African angle. 
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2 7 4 Rule against perpetuities 
 
This rule forms part of a more general rule that an English law trust cannot have an illegal 
purpose. It applies to private trusts for persons, not to charitable trusts or non-charitable 
purpose trusts. The rule against an illegal purpose means that, amongst others, a trust that ties 
property up for an unlawful period or one that allows accumulation of income beyond the 
period allowed by law158 would be void.159 For the purposes of this dissertation, only the rules 
relating to the duration of a trust are relevant. 
 
The rule against perpetuities does exactly what the name implies – it prevents settlors from 
creating perpetual trusts and locking wealth away indefinitely.160 The rule requires that the 
beneficiaries’ interests in the trust property must vest in interest, and vest absolutely, within a 
certain period from the date that the trust was created. An interest is vested when it does not 
depend on the fulfilment of a prior condition, such as a beneficiary reaching a certain age, or 
the trustee exercising his discretion in favour of the beneficiary. By the end of the perpetuity 
period (also referred to as the trust period),161 the beneficiaries must be identified and their 
interests definitely determined to be theirs, so that they can require that the trustee transfers 
the trust property to them pursuant to the rule in Saunders v Vautier.162 
 
At common law, a determination was made at the time of creation of the trust and if it were 
possible that the property might vest outside the perpetuity period, the interest in that property 
would be void. The new “wait and see” rule introduced by the Perpetuities and 
                                                      
158 The accumulation period no longer applies to private trusts created after 6 April 2010. 
159 See Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 260-314 for a detailed discussion 
of all the grounds of invalidity of the expressed object. 
160 It is interesting to note that many offshore jurisdictions as well as various states in the United States of 
America (USA) have abolished the perpetuity period in recent years. Offshore jurisdictions include Jersey, 
where the perpetuity period was abolished by Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006 and Bermuda, where 
the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009 abolished the rule in all cases except in respect of Bermuda real 
estate. For the USA, see Weisbord (2015) 67 Fla L Rev 73, which questions the sensibility of removing the 
perpetuity period. 
161 At common law, the perpetuity period was determined by reference to a relevant life in being, plus twenty-
one years. In practice, for the sake of certainty, many trust deeds referred to a member of the English royal 
family as the life in being. The common law position was reformed by the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 
1964, which made it possible to specify a perpetuity period of a maximum of eighty years. The Perpetuities and 
Accumulations Act 2009 reformed the position again by introducing a single perpetuity period of 125 years for 
trusts taking effect on or after 6 April 2010. Trusts taking effect before this date will be governed either by the 
common law “lives in being plus twenty-one years” period (or if it is difficult to determine whether the lives 
have ended, a period of one hundred years), or by a fixed period of up to eighty years specified in the trust deed. 
162 Saunders v Vautier [1841] EWHC Ch J82. This rule, very briefly, enables the beneficiaries of a trust, 
provided they are all adult and sui iuris, and all in agreement, to call for the legal estate to be vested in them, in 
other words, for the assets to be distributed to them and the trust brought to an end. 
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Accumulations Act 1964 and the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009 means that an 
interest in trust property will not be treated as void until it is clear that the property must vest, 
if at all, after the end of the perpetuity period. Everything done before this point remains 
valid.163 
 
2 8 Role of legislative developments 
 
Legislation is intended to provide certainty and consistency with regard to the law. In civil 
law systems, the law is codified to a much greater extent than in common law systems, such 
as England. The extent to which legislation determines the legal position depends, of course, 
on the area of law. In the field of trust law, case law has traditionally played a more important 
role than legislation in determining the legal position. However, the role of legislation cannot 
be overlooked. Legislative change is faster and provides more certainty, and so may be the 
preferred solution for certain administrative issues, or in areas where uncertainty has hindered 
the application of the law for a prolonged period. (However, it is of course only the case that 
legislative change is faster if politicians are interested in the matter and regard it as a priority. 
There are usually few votes to be gained by reforming the law of trusts, but recently the 
public interest in the closing down of taxation loopholes may have altered this somewhat.) 
 
The predecessor to the Trustee Act 2000, the Trustee Act 1925, was intended to be an act 
consolidating previous acts164 relating to trustees so as to simplify parliamentary procedure. In 
the 75 years between the coming into force of the Trustee Act 1925 and the Trustee Act 2000, 
there was not much in the sense of legislative change with regard to trustees’ duties and 
investment powers apart from the Trustee Investments Act 1961. This was, however, a period 
of profound change in the trust industry in England and abroad. 
 
Hayton165 remarks that, during this period, the judiciary had started to adopt a more liberal and 
pragmatic approach inclined to uphold trusts, in contrast to the stricter, more conceptualist 
approach of the preceding period. During the same period, the legislature did little to develop 
the English trust heritage.  
 
                                                      
163 Penner The Law of Trusts 83-85; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 116-118. 
164 Those previous acts included the Trustee Act 1893, the Law of Property Act 1922, the Law of Property 
Amendment Act 1924 and the Law of Property Act 1925. 
165 Hayton (1990) 106 LQR 87. 
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Important changes in the practical use and application of trusts during this period include the 
nature of trusteeship and the development of new investment opportunities. Trustees were 
traditionally selected for their trustworthiness rather than for their expertise in managing 
investments and other administrative tasks. Professional trustees, many of whom operate as 
corporate enterprises specialising in the setup and administration of trusts, have by now 
become commonplace. At the same time, the opportunities for utilising trust property 
increased greatly. The investment products available to trustees grew in number and 
sophistication, helped on by the globalisation of financial markets.166 
 
Questions were being raised about the standard to be expected of paid professional trustees, 
for example in the well-known case of Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd.167  In the 
Bartlett case, which was decided in 1980, it was already being suggested that paid 
professional trustees should be judged against the standards of skill and expertise that they 
claim to possess.168 On the other hand, these professional trustees wanted more freedom in 
terms of their investment powers. The view was that professional trustees, being or, at least, 
having access to, investment experts, should not be bound to be as prudent and conservative 
in investment matters as their laymen counterparts. It also enabled trustees to generate more 
income and gains for beneficiaries, which in turn helped them attract more business. 
 
Thus, with regard to trustees’ duties, there was a need for setting standards and accountability 
beyond the traditional expectations, and with regard to trustees’ powers, there was a need for 
more liberalisation.169 
 
The policy movement towards change continued with the Law Reform Committee170 making 
recommendations for reform with regard to trustees’ powers and duties in 1982,171 and the 
Law Commission issuing a report about the same topic in 1999.172 The recommendations were 
then implemented in the form of the Trustee Act 2000. 
 
                                                      
166 Wilson Todd & Wilson's Textbook on Trusts 312-315. 
167 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
168 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139 140. 
169 Wilson Todd & Wilson's Textbook on Trusts 315-316. 
170 A committee of the English Bar Council that develops and considers proposals for law reform and submit 
views to the government and other bodies. 
171 Law Reform Committee Trustees’ Powers and Duties: Giving Trustees the Powers They Need No 146 
(1982). 
172 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999). 
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One of the main features of the Trustee Act 2000 (the 2000 Act) is that it created a uniform 
standard of care expected from trustees. Equity has always imposed a duty of care on trustees, 
but the 2000 Act provided certainty and consistency with regard to the standard of 
competence and behaviour expected of trustees. Given the context of an increasing number of 
professional trustees, the duty of care refers specifically to the standard expected of those 
professionals.173  
 
Significantly, the duty of care can be excluded by adding a provision to this extent in the trust 
deed.174 One cannot help but wonder whether this is unfairly biased towards trustees, and 
especially professional trustees who would be aware of the legislation and the ability to 
exclude the application of the duty of care. Even though the rules of equity will still apply, it 
seems counterproductive, as the 2000 Act was intended to introduce standardisation and 
consistency and a higher expectation from professional trustees, and this is potentially lost by 
allowing an exclusion of the duty of care. 
 
The other important feature of the 2000 Act is the abolition of restrictions with regard to the 
kind of investments trustees could make. A trustee may now make any kind of investment he 
would have been able to make if he were absolutely entitled to the trust assets.175 This gives 
trustees much more freedom in terms of investments, but they are still bound by the duty of 
care, and the 2000 Act also includes a number of restrictions designed to protect the trust 
property. This includes the trustee having to have regard to standard investment criteria176 and 
seeking expert investment advice in appropriate circumstances. 177  Again, the investment 
powers provided for in the 2000 Act can be restricted or excluded by the provisions of the 
trust deed.178 
 
From the trustee’s point of view, it is understandable that with the ability, and need, to make a 
wider range of investments to ensure good performance for beneficiaries, comes a higher 
degree of risk of liability for loss to the trust fund. But is the level of accountability and 
                                                      
173 Trustee Act 2000 s 1(1). This will be examined in more detail in ch 3. 
174 Trustee Act 2000 sch 1 para 7. 
175 Trustee Act 2000 s 3(1). 
176 Trustee Act 2000 s 4. 
177 Trustee Act 2000 s 5. 
178 Trustee Act 2000 s 6. 
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liability of trustees of English law trusts commensurate with the irreducible core approach?179 
This is examined further in chapter 3. 
 
2 9 The Law Commission 
 
The Law Commission of England is an independent statutory body set up by Parliament and 
created by the Law Commissions Act 1965, which sets out the functions of the Law 
Commission. The purpose of the Law Commission is to keep the law under review and 
recommend reform where this is required, so as to ensure that the law is fair, modern, simple 
and as cost-effective as possible.180 
 
Apart from the two reports mentioned below, there have been a number of projects in the area 
of trust law. In 1998, a report was published on the rules against perpetuities and excessive 
accumulations and this resulted, albeit many years later, in the recommendations for reform 
being enacted in the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009. The two projects mentioned 
below are relevant to the issues covered in this dissertation and therefore deserves more than a 
mere mention, although the projects and their practical effect will be examined in more detail 
at a later stage.181 
 
2 9 1 Report on trustees’ powers and duties 
 
This report182 reviewed the law regarding trustees’ powers to invest trust funds in the absence 
of express powers of investment in the trust deed, and also included recommendations for 
reform in the field of trust administration, including collective delegation by trustees, the use 
of nominees and custodians, and so forth. This was a joint project with the Scottish Law 
                                                      
179 See ch 2 paras 1, 2 6 3. 
180 The work of the Law Commission involves the codification of laws to make it easier for normal citizens to 
have access to the law and for courts to understand and apply the law; the consolidation of statutes with the aim 
of making it easier to find legislative information; and the repeal of old, unused statutes. The Law Commission 
also conducts research and consultations to enable it to make recommendations to Parliament. Before deciding 
which projects to take forward, the Law Commission consults with judges, lawyers, government departments, 
the business sector and the general public. The Law Commission can make recommendations about a certain 
area of law but it is up to Parliament to change the law by enacting the recommendations of the Law 
Commission. Although there is already a high rate of implementation of recommendations (more than two 
thirds), the Law Commission Act 2009 was enacted to improve the rate at which recommendations for reform 
are implemented. It creates a duty on the Lord Chancellor to report annually to Parliament on the extent to which 
the government has implemented the Law Commission’s recommendations. 
181 See ch 3 which deals with the position of trustees. 
182 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999). 
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Commission and was finalised in 1999. The recommendations in this report were 
implemented in the 2000 Act, an example of how swiftly legislative change can be 
accomplished. Some aspects of this report will be examined in chapter 3. 
 
2 9 2 Report on trustee exemption clauses  
 
This report183 dealt with clauses in trust deeds that have the effect of limiting or excluding 
liability for negligence. It recommended a non-statutory rule of practice for the trust industry, 
which should be enforced by the regulatory and professional bodies in this industry, such as 
the Law Society, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, and the 
Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP). The recommended non-statutory rule 
requires that professional trustees (generally the same as paid trustees) and drafters of trust 
deeds take reasonable steps to ensure that settlors understand the meaning and effect of 
exemption clauses if the trust instrument is intended to contain such a clause. 
 
Although some feel that such a non-statutory rule is preferable to a legislative change, it is 
unlikely to have the same practical impact. This is examined further in chapter 3. 
 
2 10 Role of the courts and case law  
 
Equity, that body of law out of which the trust was born, was itself developed through the 
courts. Historically, equity was founded on the Lord Chancellor’s discretion, exercised with 
reference to his conscience.184 In light of this, it is impossible to ignore the importance of the 
role the courts have played in the development of English trust law. 
 
Very early cases recorded the struggle between the chancery courts and the common law 
courts, which came to a head in 1615. Equity, the function of which was to soften and mollify 
the extremity of the law, prevailed.185 An unsatisfactory system had, however, developed and 
having two systems of law administered by different courts was not ideal. The solution came 
                                                      
183 Law Commission Trustee Exemption Clauses No 301 (2006). 
184 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 6; see ch 2 para 2 2 1. 
185 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 54 
in the form of legislation. The Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875 rectified the situation by fusing 
the administration of common law and equity.186  
 
Nowadays, equity is characterised as a doctrinal system. There are identifiable rules that must 
be applied strictly without judicial discretion. It was said in Re Diplock187 that, just because 
the justice of a case seems to require it, a new jurisdiction cannot be invented in order for a 
claim in equity to exist.188 
 
This does not mean that equity is immutable. In Re Hallet’s Estate189 it was acknowledged 
that the courts of chancery have not existed as long as the common law courts and that they 
have been altered, improved and refined from time to time. The older cases are therefore less 
useful than the more modern ones.190  
 
It also does not mean that there is no discretion left within equity. The court retains discretion 
in the application of equitable rules and the award of equitable remedies, and takes questions 
of justice and fairness into account in order to secure a just and fair result.191 
 
Therefore, although modern equity is built on the old cases, the underlying principles have 
been refined over the years and new remedies have been developed by equity, such as the 
order of specific performance to make a defendant perform obligations under contract.192 
 
Apart from discretion, the other important feature of equity is the prevention of 
unconscionability.193 In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington,194 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson said that the key justification for the recognition of a trust is that equity operates on 
the conscience of the owner of the legal interest.195 This is another statement that recognises 
the importance of the obligation dimension of the trust. 
                                                      
186 See ch 2 para 2 2 2. 
187 Re Diplock's Estate, Diplock v Wintle [1948] 2 All ER 318. 
188 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 6. 
189 Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696. 
190 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 6-7. 
191 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 7. 
192 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 10-11. 
193 The important question is, of course, how to determine unconscionability. Initially, this was by reference to 
the conscience of the Lord Chancellor, which led to arbitrary results. Although equity is nowadays more rule-
based, it remains unclear how unconscionability is to be determined.  
194 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 705. 
195 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 7. 
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In many areas of trust law, landmark cases have contributed greatly to the development of the 
law. This was highlighted in the preceding paragraphs. In the following two chapters, where 
the focal points of trustee duties and liabilities and settlor control will be examined in detail, 
the important and continuing role of the courts in determining and shaping substantive trust 




3 1 Introduction 
 
The Channel Island of Jersey is a British Crown Dependency. It forms part of the British 
Isles, but is not part of Great Britain or the United Kingdom. In the year 933, Jersey was 
annexed to Normandy, and became the property of England in 1066 when the Duchy of 
Normandy joined England. In 1204, the Duchy was separated from England, leaving Jersey to 
become self-governing – not part of Normandy, and not within the English legal system 
either.196  
 
Jersey therefore has a high level of autonomy with regard to jurisprudence and legislation, 
and the only law that definitely applies is legislation passed by the States of Jersey (the Jersey 
Parliament and government) and the case law of the Jersey courts. Legislation passed by the 
UK Parliament only applies in limited circumstances.197 
 
Jersey can be described as a customary law jurisdiction.198 Its law is based on the customary 
law of the Duchy of Normandy prior to 1204.199 However, after the separation of Jersey from 
the Duchy of Normandy in 1204, the legal systems started to diverge. The ancient Norman 
law remained the common law, and was separate from the law of England and Wales. 200 
However, Jersey law developed independently of Norman law, and a customary Jersey law 
                                                      
196 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 1. 
197 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 2. 
198 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 2. 
199 Kelleher (1999) 1 JLR. 
200 Southwell (1997) 3 JLR.  
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was developed. Not surprisingly, ascertaining the old customary law position, and knowing 
where to find it, is not always easy.201  
 
Apart from customary law, which has its roots in ancient Norman law, other sources of Jersey 
law are English common law and modern French civil law. Different areas of the law have 
drawn on different sources to different extents. There seems to be some disagreement as to the 
extent to which these two legal systems have assisted, and should continue to assist, the 
development of Jersey law.202 
 
For the purposes of a study of the law of trusts, it is not necessary to delve into the ancient 
history too deeply, as trusts did not feature regularly in case law until the nineteenth century. 
There is therefore very little customary Norman law relevant to trusts in Jersey.203 The extent 
to which trust law was, and still is, influenced by English law will be examined below. 
 
Jersey has its own court system. The Royal Court hears both civil and criminal matters. 
Appeals against Royal Court decisions are heard by the Jersey Court of Appeal, and from 
there, appeals go to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. The Judicial 
Committee is in fact the court of final appeal for all the UK overseas territories and Crown 
dependencies, and for certain Commonwealth countries.204 
 
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not strictly apply in Jersey, judicial precedent 
plays an important role. Practically speaking, the Royal Court is obliged to follow its own 
decisions unless they were wrong. The Jersey Court of Appeal can overturn decisions of the 
Royal Court. A decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on an appeal from 
Jersey will bind all Jersey courts. If a case is on appeal from another jurisdiction, the decision 





                                                      
201 See Kelleher (1999) 1 JLR, where this is examined in more detail with regard to the law of contract and 
Southwell (1997) 3 JLR for the more general position. 
202 Binnington (1997) 1 JLR. 
203 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 2. 
204 Anonymous http://jcpc.uk (accessed 20-01-2016). 
205 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 4-6. 
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3 2 Historical development of Jersey trust law 
 
3 2 1 Jersey customary law 
 
In relation to trusts, the only clear Jersey law available is the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, as 
amended from time to time (the TJL),206 and Jersey case law relating to Jersey trusts.  
 
In other areas of the law, the customary Jersey law, found mainly in two ancient Norman 
documents known as the Ancienne Cotume (Ancient Customs) and Cotume Reformée 
(Reformed Customs), is an important source of law, together with laws passed by the States 
of Jersey and case law. 207  In the middle of the nineteenth century, commissioners were 
appointed to enquire into the criminal law of Jersey and later, around 1860,208 into the civil 
law. This resulted in the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Civil, 
Municipal & Ecclesiastical Laws of the Island of Jersey209 (the “Civil Report”). These reports 
are relied upon to a great extent in order to ascertain customary Jersey law.210  
 
Only as from the latter part of the nineteenth century were trusts regularly the subject of court 
cases. The concept of applying funds to public or charitable purposes by gifting property to 
trustees was known in Jersey before this time, but there is a dearth of Jersey authority on 
trusts prior to this date.211  
 
Although the TJL has almost completely superseded the customary law of trusts, it is 
important to note that the TJL was never intended to be a complete codification of the Jersey 
law of trusts and, as such, there is case law predating the TJL that is still relevant today.212  
 
This was confirmed, not only in the TJL213 itself, but also in a judgment of the Royal Court 
that formed part of the litigation surrounding the Esteem Settlement,214 where the following 
was stated: 
                                                      
206 The version of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 referred to in this dissertation is the Revised Version, showing 
the law as at 1 January 2014, which incorporates all the amendments made to date.  
207 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 2. 
208 Different sources refer to different dates, all between 1859 and 1861. 
209 Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 370 398. 
210 Southwell (1997) 3 JLR. 
211 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 2-3. 
212 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 11.  
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“[T]he 1984 Law was not a codification, nor was it enacted in a vacuum. There was 
already a customary law of trusts in existence. Many of the provisions of the 1984 
Law were simply reflections of the pre-existing law or of English principles. There is 
no implication that, because a provision is included in the 1984 Law, it is something 
which did not exist beforehand.”215 
 
As one can expect, given Jersey’s importance as an offshore trust jurisdiction, there is now a 
wealth of case law postdating the TJL, and clearly this will be of more relevance in 
ascertaining the current legal position than much older cases.  
 
Looking at the development of trust law in Jersey before the coming into force of the TJL, 
whilst the influence of English law on the TJL and on Jersey jurisprudence relating to trusts 
cannot be ignored, this was an influence that mainly affected the latter part of the 
development of Jersey trust law, from the nineteenth century onwards.216  
 
In terms of the earlier development of Jersey trust law (and focusing only on trusts created 
inter vivos), two restrictions that have helped shape the law are the rules relating to Jersey 
immovable property (the property law does not recognise dual ownership rights) 217  and 
restrictions on testamentary freedom. Prior to 1984, there was no prohibition against such a 
trust being established, as long as the creation of the trust did not breach another rule of 
law.218 The TJL now expressly provides that a trust shall be invalid if it purports to apply 
directly to immovable property situated in Jersey.219 
 
Norman customary law did not prohibit inter vivos substitutions of immovable property. A 
substitution in this sense refers to the French substitution fidecommissaire, which is the direct 
successor to the Roman law fideicommissum. It can be described as an attempt to give full 
legal ownership to someone for his lifetime, with an obligation resting on him not to dispose 
                                                                                                                                                                      
213 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 1(2) which provides: “This Law shall not be construed as a codification of laws 
regarding trusts, trustees and persons interested under trusts.” 
214 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53. 
215 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 92. 
216 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 5. 
217 See ch 2 para 3 3 2. 
218 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 13. 
219 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 11(2)(a)(iii). 
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of the property, coupled with a second gift of the absolute ownership, but only in the future. If 
the first owner imposed his own substitution on the second owner, the property could become 
inalienable for another generation.220 
 
In 1560, the French King Charles IX issued an ordonnance that forbade the creation of 
substitutions (both testamentary and inter vivos) beyond the second degree removed from the 
creator, but this of course had no effect in Jersey.221 Le Geyt, a famous seventeenth-century 
Jersey lawyer, was of the view that the donor must be able to choose whom to benefit and on 
what terms, but there is no clear precedent confirming this. However, no law to forbid inter 
vivos substitutions of immovables was ever enacted in Jersey.222 
 
Trusts split up the beneficial enjoyment of immovable property in the same way as 
substitutions do, and therefore the argument was that Jersey law should not forbid inter vivos 
trusts of immovable property either. In the Civil Report, the commissioners found that there 
was no law expressly forbidding the creation of trusts inter vivos, but that trusts of 
immovables, in favour of private individuals and unconnected to public purposes, were up to 
then unknown. The commissioners recommended the enactment of a law to deal with public 
trusts of immovables, but found that the law of Jersey did not recognise trusts and declined to 
suggest a general introduction of trusts, given that it would require fundamental changes to 
the whole system of immovable property.223 
 
In 1866, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council remarked, albeit obiter, that the law of 
Jersey does not forbid the creation of trusts by inter vivos acts.224 A series of cases concerning 
private inter vivos trusts followed, some recognising the validity of inter vivos trusts of 
immovable property, others rejecting it.225 The TJL now makes the position clear. A trust 
governed by Jersey law cannot have immovable property situated in Jersey as its subject. 226 
Practically speaking, this has not been an impediment to Jersey’s success as an offshore trust 
                                                      
220 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 17, 22-23. 
221 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 23. 
222 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 24. 
223 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 24-25. 
224 Godfray v Godfray [1866] UKPC 7 18. 
225 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 25-27. Unfortunately the judgments are hard to obtain but apparently do not 
give much insight into the court’s reasoning in any event. 
226 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 11(2)(a)(iii); see also ch 2 para 3 3 2 with regard to proprietary rights in Jersey. 
Further to Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 49(2)(a)(iii) Jersey law will also regard as unenforceable a foreign trust 
that has Jersey immovable property as its subject. 
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jurisdiction, given that most settlors setting up Jersey trusts do so for the purpose of holding 
foreign assets. 
 
The development of the law relating to trusts holding movable property, or immovable 
property situated outside of Jersey, has been less controversial. Such trusts have apparently 
been accepted as valid and enforceable since the eighteenth century, whether they were for 
public or private purposes.227 An important case in which the Privy Council recognised private 
inter vivos trusts in 1866 is Godfray v Godfray.228 Of course, private trusts have enjoyed 
statutory recognition as valid and enforceable since the coming into force of the TJL.229  
 
3 2 2 Influence of English law  
 
It is clear that Jersey did not simply take over the whole of the English law of trusts without 
any adaptation. There is, however, little doubt that English trust law played (and still plays) 
an important part in the development and application of trust law in Jersey. In the matter of 
the Esteem Settlement,230 the Royal Court confirmed that the English concept of the trust was 
incorporated into Jersey customary law notwithstanding the fact that Jersey and English law 
have different roots. 
 
Two important areas where the English influence on Jersey trust law can be observed, are the 
equitable jurisdiction of the Jersey courts and the authority of English case law in the absence 
of Jersey authority on a specific point. 
 
3 2 2 1  Equitable jurisdiction of Jersey courts 
 
Jersey never knew equity as a distinct body of law, or separate courts of equity, such as exist 
in England.231 Given that the trust would not have developed, or at least not in the way it did, 
was it not for the courts of equity, one may be inclined to think that the division of law and 
equity is a prerequisite for having and sustaining a law of trusts. However, trusts flourish in 
                                                      
227 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 27. 
228 Godfray v Godfray [1866] UKPC 7 18. The statement that Jersey law does not forbid the creation of trusts by 
acts inter vivos is based on statements in the Civil Report. See ch 2 para 3 2 1. 
229 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 3. 
230 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 96. 
231 See ch 2 para 2 2. 
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many countries that do not have separate systems, or courts, of law and equity,232 and even in 
England, law and equity is now administered by the same High Court.233 
 
References to the Jersey courts having an equitable jurisdiction can be found in both 
nineteenth and twentieth-century cases.234 The Royal Court has expressly confirmed that it is a 
court of equity. However, doubt seems to exist concerning the interpretation of the word 
equity in this regard. 
 
In the case of Ex Parte Viscount Wimborne235 the court considered, seemingly for the first 
time, the extent of the application of equity in Jersey. The court stated that the Royal Court is 
a court of equity in the widest sense, but that this does not mean that it has wider powers than 
the former Chancellors of the Court of Chancery. The principles that guided the Chancellors 
were conscience, reason and good faith, and not any Chancellor’s own or other common 
opinions as to what was right and convenient.236  
 
Furthermore, the court mentioned that the conditions in the English common law courts 
which gave rise to the system of equity237 were never present in Jersey, and that equity in 
Jersey may be closer to the French equité – a just tempering or benevolent construction of 
statute law – than to the English version.238 After quoting a passage from a French legal 
dictionary, Deputy Bailiff Crill came to the conclusion that not all the principles developed in 
the English chancery courts necessarily apply in the Jersey courts. 239  Nevertheless, he 
confirmed that the Royal Court will award equitable remedies, and has done so in the past, 
when considered necessary.240 
 
This view, that equity in Jersey is closer to the broader French concept of equité than to the 
narrower interpretation of equity under English law, has been confirmed in Lane v Lane241 and 
Trollope v Jackson.242 
                                                      
232 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 1. 
233 See ch 2 para 2 2 2. 
234 See Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 7 where the cases are cited. 
235 Ex Parte Viscount Wimborne (1983) JJ 17. 
236 Ex Parte Viscount Wimborne (1983) JJ 17 19-20. 
237 See ch 2 para 2 2 1. 
238 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 8. 
239 Ex Parte Viscount Wimborne (1983) JJ 17 20-22. 
240 Ex Parte Viscount Wimborne (1983) JJ 17 22. 
241 Lane v Lane [1985-86] JLR 48. 
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A more recent case, Fiduciary Management v Sheridan,243 took a stricter view of the equitable 
jurisdiction of the Royal Court, and compared it to the English concept of equity rather than 
the French equité. The court was of the view that, as the TJL makes specific provision for a 
constructive trustee244 by reference to an established product of English jurisprudence, the 
requirements in Jersey for the establishment of a constructive trust should generally be the 
same as the requirements in England.245 
 
Therefore, even if it is difficult to define the precise nature and extent of the equitable 
jurisdiction of the Jersey courts, in practice, equitable remedies known in England, such as 
recognising constructive and resulting trusts, promissory estoppel and specific performance, 
are regularly used by the courts in Jersey.246 
 
3 2 2 2  Authority of English case law 
 
Jersey law has its roots in Norman customary law. It is therefore not surprising that in many 
areas of the law, the Jersey courts would, in the absence of earlier authority, look to French 
law for guidance. This is not the case with trust law. 
 
Given that there is only a limited number of older cases dealing with trusts, the Jersey courts 
have had to look elsewhere for guidance on points where no Jersey authority existed. This 
seems to be widely accepted.  
 
In the case of Re Malabry Investments Ltd,247 a case from 1982, Deputy Bailiff Crill said that 
none of the counsel involved in the case was able to draw his attention to any Jersey case on 
the subject of trusts.248 The case was concerned with whether a trust of certain monies had 
                                                                                                                                                                      
242 Trollope v Jackson 1990 JLR 192. 
243 Fiduciary Management v Sheridan [2002] JRC 34, a case which dealt with the recognition of constructive 
trusts in Jersey. 
244 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 33. 
245 Fiduciary Management v Sheridan [2002] JRC 34. 
246 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 9.  
247 Re Malabry Investments Ltd (1982) JJ 117. 
248 Perhaps Deputy Bailiff Crill meant that there were no Jersey cases dealing with the specific issues raised by 
this case, as clearly older Jersey case law on trust do exist. However, he clearly felt that there were no Jersey 
cases that could assist him in reaching a conclusion in this case. 
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been created, which meant that the funds represented by such trust were not available for 
distribution to the general creditors of the creator of the trust. Deputy Bailiff Crill stated: 
 
“I am satisfied, however, that the general equitable jurisdiction which the Royal Court 
has exercised particularly in recent years enables me to take note of the English 
Common Law and to find that if the concept of a Trust of the nature propounded by 
the Viscount is known to the law of Jersey then the Court may have regard to the 
principles creating such a Trust which apply under English Law.”249 
 
Given the reliance of the Jersey judiciary on English case law, it is not surprising that Jersey 
trust law has developed in such a way that it closely resembles English trust law. The TJL 
now regulates a large part of the trust law, but the legislation is based largely on the law that 
existed at the time it was drafted, and at that point in time, the influence of English law on 
Jersey trust law was already substantial. 
 
So although the TJL is not a codification of the Jersey trust law, what is regulated by the TJL 
bears close resemblance to English trust law principles. In areas that are not covered by the 
TJL, the Jersey courts continued to have recourse to English cases, especially in the years 
immediately following the coming into force of the TJL. More recently, as Jersey is building 
up its own body of case law on the subject of trusts, reliance on English trust law seems to be 
diminishing.250 
 
There is, however, still some unchartered territory. As recently as 2002 the Royal Court had 
to determine, amongst other questions, whether Jersey law recognised that the victim of fraud 
has a proprietary interest, arising under a constructive trust, in the proceeds of the fraud; 
whether Jersey law recognised the ability to trace trust assets; and, if so, which principles 
should apply.251 Tracing has in fact been allowed in earlier unreported cases,252 where it was 
stated that the court should allow tracing as part of its equitable jurisdiction to remedy fraud, 
                                                      
249 Re Malabry Investments Ltd (1982) JJ 117 118. 
250 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 28. 
251 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 70-71. 
252 Re PKT Consultants (Jersey) Ltd Royal Ct, August 1st, 1991, unreported; Royal Bank of Scotland Ltd v Khan 
Royal Ct, October 19th, 1999, unreported. 
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but in these cases full arguments on whether tracing forms part of Jersey law were not 
heard.253  
 
Without going into too much detail of the case at this point, it is clear that the court decided to 
follow only certain parts of English law. The principle of tracing was held to form part of 
Jersey law where there is an underlying proprietary interest on the part of the claimant, but 
more flexible rules than the English ones were adopted.254 Avoiding archaic and inflexible 
rules is, of course, positive for the development of a modern trust law. 
 
Furthermore, with regard to the question of whether a debt had to precede the creation of a 
trust in order for the creditor to be able to attack the validity of the trust, the court considered 
both English law and French law prior to and after the introduction of the Civil Code in 
France. The court decided to follow the older French position that the debt had to precede the 
transaction, in other words, a person who becomes a creditor of the settlor after he settled the 
trust, cannot attack the validity of the trust if the settlor subsequently becomes insolvent.255 
This, of course, makes Jersey a more attractive trust jurisdiction for settlors looking for asset 
protection against creditors, but presumably the decision was taken free of this sort of policy 
consideration.  
 
The court did feel that if it was considered necessary to depart from the existing Jersey 
customary law position, this was not a task for the judiciary and should be a legislative 
change.256 They also stated that, in the modern world where assets are more fluid and can be 
spread out over the world, thus complicating information gathering, the customary law 
principles must be applied with that in mind. Rather than a meticulous balance sheet exercise, 
the court must simply determine whether there is a close connection in time and effect 
between the disposition and the subsequent insolvency.257 The courts therefore seem willing to 
develop the trust law to adapt to the changing needs of society, but is of the view that certain 
changes are better made by legislation. 
 
                                                      
253 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 95-97. 
254 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 97-99. 
255 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 119-121. 
256 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 121. 
257 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 127. 
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In summary therefore, case law from England (and occasionally other jurisdictions) may be 
used as authority in Jersey cases where the law is unclear because it is not covered by the TJL 
and there is no previous Jersey case law dealing with the specific issue at hand. Over time, 
and as Jersey builds up its own body of case law, reliance on English law is expected to 
decrease even further. It is also clear that the Jersey courts will not follow English law if they 
feel that the English principle in question is outdated, controversial or disputed, leads to 
unfair results, or may be susceptible to change in the future. 
 
3 3 Definition of a trust 
 
3 3 1 Definition under the TJL 
 
Although this is of historical interest only and not much seems to be written about it, prior to 
the coming into force of the TJL, a trust was presumably defined in terms resembling the 
definition of an English law trust, given that the concept of the English trust was incorporated 
into Jersey customary law.258 
 
Article 2 of the TJL now defines a trust as follows: 
  
“A trust exists where a person (known as a trustee) holds or has vested in the person or 
is deemed to hold or have vested in the person property (of which the person is not the 
owner in the person’s own right) –  
(a) for the benefit of any person (known as a beneficiary) whether or not yet 
ascertained or in existence; 
(b) for any purpose which is not for the benefit only of the trustee; or 
(c) for such benefit as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and also for any such 
purpose as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (b).” 
 
Whilst this may not be the most exhaustive definition, it is not perceived as unclear. It 
contains the necessary elements of property and obligation, as also found in the definition of a 
trust under English and South African law.259  
 
                                                      
258 See ch 2 para 3 2 2. 
259 See ch 2 paras 2 4 1, 4 3 3 respectively. 
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Although the definition does not clearly state that the trustee has legal ownership of the trust 
assets, it indicates that he is not the owner of the property in his own right and that he owns it 
for the benefit of the beneficiaries or a purpose. The only logical conclusion, therefore, is that 
he has legal title. 260  Read in conjunction with article 54 of the TJL, this becomes more 
evident. It states that, unless the trustee is also a beneficiary, his interest in the trust property 
is limited to that which is necessary for the proper performance of the trust and that the trust 
property shall not be deemed to form part of the trustee’s assets. 
 
Sub-paragraph (b) of the above definition indicates that Jersey law recognises non-charitable 
purpose trusts. Although the same wording appeared in the original version of the TJL, article 
10(2)(a)(iv) of that version stated that non-charitable purpose trusts were invalid. The TJL 
was amended in 1996 to make clear provision for the recognition of non-charitable purpose 
trusts.261 The recognition of non-charitable purpose trusts is relevant in the context of the 
obligation dimension of the trust,262 and in the context of how offshore jurisdictions fashion 
their trust laws in order to attract business.263 
 
3 3 2 Distinction between legal and equitable ownership 
 
Article 11(2)(a)(iii) of the TJL clearly states that immovable property situated in Jersey 
cannot be the subject of a Jersey law trust.264 The reason for this exclusion can be found in the 
history of Jersey property law. Jersey customary law, being founded on Norman law rather 
than English law, did not recognise a division between beneficial (or equitable) and legal 
interests in Jersey immovable property.265  
 
In Flynn v Reid,266 the Royal Court considered the historical background of Jersey property 
law in some detail in an attempt to decide whether a constructive trust of immovable property 
could be possible. The court referred to the Civil Report and to the Loi (1880) sur la 
Propriété Foncière that was adopted as a result of the Civil Report, and confirmed that the 
                                                      
260 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 132.  
261 Trusts (Amendment No 3) (Jersey) Law 1996. 
262 See ch 2 para 2 7 3. 
263 See ch 1 para 2 2; ch 2 para 3 7. 
264 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 49(2)(a)(iii) provides that a foreign trust will be unenforceable in Jersey to the 
extent that it has immovable property located in Jersey as its subject matter. 
265 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 86; Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 370 398-401. 
266 Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 370. 
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starting point was that there was no distinction between legal and equitable interests in 
immovable property and that the substance of Jersey property law has remained unchanged 
for centuries.267 
 
The court conceded that it may in fact be desirable to recognise such a distinction, but if so, it 
would have to be introduced by the legislature.268 On the facts of this case, the court found 
that a constructive trust of Jersey immovable property did not arise, although they did not say 
that it was impossible in principle.269 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the important point is that, unlike English law, Jersey 
law does not recognise dual ownership of immovable property. However, as far as the rights 
or interests of beneficiaries are concerned, the TJL states that a beneficiary’s interest shall 
constitute movable property, which, subject to the terms of the trust, can be sold, transferred 
or otherwise dealt with.270 That must indicate a proprietary interest. Given that there cannot be 
a trust of Jersey immovable property, this does not seem controversial in itself. It must also 
mean, however, that Jersey recognises dual ownership of movable assets, because the TJL 
states that the trustee is the owner of the trust property, although not in his own right.271  
 
3 4 Classifications of trust 
 
Given the extent to which a Jersey trust resembles an English trust, in this paragraph reference 
is made to the corresponding English law parts of the dissertation rather than repeating the 
same information, with the differences between the two systems being emphasised. 
 
3 4 1 Express trusts and trusts arising by operation of law  
 
The position is broadly the same as in England.272 Although most trusts are express trusts, 
meaning that they are created through a voluntary act of the settlor and the trustees willingly 
accept the duties and responsibilities of trusteeship, in some cases the law imposes the 
                                                      
267 Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 370 398-399. 
268 Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 370 400-401. 
269 Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 370 402. 
270 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 10(10) and (11).  
271 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 2; see also ch 2 para 3 5 5 with regard to the rights of beneficiaries. 
272 See ch 2 para 2 5 1 for an explanation of the basic differences between express trusts and trusts arising by 
operation of law. 
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liabilities of trusteeship upon a person. 273  Trusts arising by operation of law, known as 
resulting trusts and constructive trusts, are recognised in Jersey, as they are in England.274 It is 
unclear whether a resulting or constructive trust of Jersey immovable property will be 
recognised.275 
 
3 4 2 Fixed and discretionary trusts 
 
The same distinction as in England exists between fixed and discretionary trusts.276 Article 
1(1) of the TJL makes this clear by stating that a beneficiary is a person who is either entitled 
to benefit under a trust or in whose favour the trustee may exercise discretion to distribute 
property held on trust.277  
 
In Jersey, and other offshore jurisdictions, discretionary trusts have sometimes been misused 
by only appointing one or two charities as beneficiaries in the original trust deed, without any 
intention on the part of the settlor to benefit such charities. The “real” beneficiaries are 
appointed at a later date when there is an intention to make a distribution to them.278 Such 
trusts are sometimes referred to as “blind trusts”, and may be relevant in the context of 
excessive settlor control, examined in chapter 4. 
 
3 4 3 Object trusts and purpose trusts 
 
Jersey trust law differs markedly from its English counterpart in that it recognises non-
charitable purpose trusts.279 Even though arguments have been advanced for the recognition of 
such trusts under English law, the general position is still that, unless a trust is charitable, it 
should have one or more beneficiaries as its object.280  
                                                      
273 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 60-61. 
274 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 93-99 describes the recognition of resulting and constructive trusts in Jersey. 
As these types of trust do not form part of the focus of this dissertation, they will not be examined further. 
275 Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 370. 
276 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 101. See ch 2 para 2 5 2 for the English position and ch 2 para 3 5 5 for 
more on the nature of the rights of discretionary beneficiaries under Jersey law. 
277 Note that it was held in West v Lazard Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited [1993] JLR 165 that a 
beneficiary under a discretionary trust must be either named in the trust deed or there must be some formal 
indication that he is going to have the trustee’s discretion exercised in his favour at a future date, and that it is 
not sufficient to be named in the settlor’s letter of wishes. Such a person is not an object of the trust. 
278 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 101-102. 
279 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 12. 
280 See ch 2 paras 2 7 1 3, 2 7 2, 2 7 3. An analysis of these arguments contributes to the examination of the 
obligations-based approach of understanding trusts. 
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The provisions regulating non-charitable purpose trusts were introduced in the Trusts 
(Amendment No 3) (Jersey) Law 1996 (1996 Law) and were incorporated into the TJL. There 
is a requirement for the trust deed to provide for the appointment of an enforcer, who cannot 
be a trustee, and for the appointment of a new enforcer if at any time there is no enforcer. All 
the provisions added by the 1996 Law relate to the enforcer, which seems to indicate that the 
legislator was of the view that any reservations about non-charitable purpose trusts are solved 
with the appointment of an enforcer.281 
 
This is but one example of the desire and ability of offshore jurisdictions to increase the 
attractiveness of a particular jurisdiction by way of innovative legislation. 282  It has the 
advantage of certainty and immediate change. There are, however, arguments that many 
offshore jurisdictions have gone too far in attempting to attract trust business and that the 
essence of the trust and trusteeship may come under threat.283 
 
3 5 Characteristics of a Jersey trust 
 
3 5 1 The trust 
 
A Jersey trust does not have legal personality.284 It has been described by the Royal Court as 
“essentially the same animal as is found in English law, subject to certain local 
modifications”.285 
 
3 5 2 The trust property 
 
The position with regard to trust property is similar to the position under English law. The 
trustee of an express trust must own the property subject to the trust.286 The trust property does 
not form part of the trustee’s personal estate, as confirmed in the TJL.287 This offers protection 
                                                      
281 See ch 2 para 2 7 3 1 for the English view. 
282 More examples are found in ch 2 para 3 7 2. 
283 See ch 2 para 3 7.  
284 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 175. 
285 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 90. 
286 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 2 which states “…a person (known as the trustee) holds or has vested in the 
person…property”. 
287 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 54(1)(b). 
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to the beneficiaries against claims made by the trustee’s personal creditors, although they 
generally also have the benefit of a proprietary interest in the trust property. 
 
3 5 3 The trustee 
 
The trustee of a Jersey trust has both powers and duties. The TJL288 specifies certain duties of 
trustees, which, it seems, reflects the customary law position prior to the coming into force of 
the TJL. 
 
Article 21(1) of the TJL sets the standard expected of a trustee – he must act with due 
diligence, as would a prudent person, to the best of his ability and skill, and must observe the 
utmost good faith. It is furthermore not possible to exclude liability for a trustee’s fraud, 
wilful misconduct or gross negligence in the trust deed.289 In this respect, Jersey law sets a 
higher benchmark for the standard of care expected from trustees than English law.290  
 
However, whereas in England the application of the Hastings-Bass rule in the context of 
trustee mistakes has now effectively been limited, 291 this is not the case in Jersey, where 
specific legislation has been enacted to preserve the wider application of the rule, enabling 
trustees to set certain actions aside.292 On the one hand, a high standard of care and skill is 
required of trustees and gross negligence cannot be excluded. On the other hand, certain 
trustee actions may be set aside on the ground of mistake or if certain considerations were not 
taken into account. The interaction of these rules will be examined in the following chapters. 
 
3 5 4 The settlor 
 
The TJL defines a settlor as a person who provides trust property or makes a testamentary 
disposition on trust or to a trust.293 The settlor may also be a beneficiary of the trust.294 A rule 
from Jersey customary law, known as donner et retenir ne vaut (rien), and meaning that a 
person cannot give away property and at the same time retain it, caused some uncertainty 
                                                      
288 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21-23. 
289 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 30(10).  
290 See ch 2 para 2 6 3. 
291 See ch 2 para 2 6 3. 
292 Trusts (Amendment No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013; see also ch 2 para 3 7. 
293 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 1(1). 
294 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 10(12). 
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regarding the question whether a settlor can benefit from a trust he has settled.295 The TJL 
now (although not in the original enactment) provides that the rule does not apply to any 
question regarding the validity, effect or administration of a trust, or regarding a transfer or 
other disposition of property to a trust.296 The question may still arise in relation to trusts 
created before the coming into force of the Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1989 on 21 
February 1989. 
 
Jersey, like various other offshore jurisdictions, 297  recognises trusts in which the settlor 
reserves certain powers to himself.298 A power of revocation was contained in the TJL when it 
was enacted.299 The Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006 went substantially further 
and introduced provisions enabling the settlor to retain a beneficial interest and a range of 
powers in relation to the trust, including the power to revoke the trust. 300 Such trusts are 
referred to as “settlor reserved powers trusts” or “reserved powers trusts”. 
 
Therefore, the settlor does not necessarily have to fall out of the picture after setting up the 
trust, which may give settlors the degree of comfort they need in order to part with their 
assets. The extent to which a settlor can retain powers over the trust and the trust fund, 
without jeopardising the validity of the trust, as well as the effect of the rule donner et retenir 
ne vaut in this regard, are examined in depth in chapter 4.  
 
3 5 5 The beneficiaries 
 
Although it is clear that the Jersey law of property does not recognise a division between legal 
ownership and equitable or beneficial ownership of Jersey immovable property,301 and that 
there cannot be a trust of Jersey immovable property,302 there seems to be some uncertainty 
with regard to the nature of the interest of beneficiaries in the trust property (which can be any 
                                                      
295 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 125. 
296 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 9(5). This provision was first introduced by the Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) 
Law 1989 and subsequently amended to its current form by the Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006. 
297 For example, the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007 and the Trusts (Special Provisions) Amendment Act 2014 in 
Bermuda. 
298 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 9A. 
299 This power was contained in art 36 of the original enactment of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 and is now 
contained in art 40. Presumably, a power of revocation could also be given to someone other than the settlor. 
300 This is now contained in Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 9A. 
301 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 80-88; see also ch 2 para 3 3. 
302 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 11(2)(a)(iii). 
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movable property within or outside of Jersey or any immovable property situated outside of 
Jersey).303 
 
The TJL states that the interest of a beneficiary shall constitute movable property,304 and that, 
subject to the terms of the trust, the beneficiary can deal with his interest in any manner. 305 
This seems to indicate that the interest is proprietary in nature. It is, however, hard to imagine 
that a person who may or may not benefit under a discretionary trust (referred to as an object, 
rather than a beneficiary) should have a proprietary interest that he can deal with as he 
pleases.306 Unless the trustee has already exercised his discretion in favour of the particular 
beneficiary, how would the beneficiary’s interest be quantifiable? If a discretionary 
beneficiary, a mere object of the trust, had a proprietary interest in the trust fund, it would 
negate at least some of the benefits associated with discretionary trusts, namely that there is 
no fixed interest in the trust property, which can, for example, be subjected to tax.  
 
However, the TJL defines a beneficiary as “a person entitled to benefit under a trust or in 
whose favour a discretion to distribute property held on trust may be exercised”.307 It also 
defines property as “property of any description wherever situated, and, in relation to rights 
and interests includes those rights and interests whether vested, contingent, defeasible or 
future”.308  
 
Reading these provisions309 of the TJL together, a logical conclusion is that all beneficiaries, 
whether they have a fixed entitlement or a mere hope of receiving something should the 
trustee exercise his discretion in the beneficiary’s favour, have a proprietary interest in the 
trust property. This does not seem correct. 
 
                                                      
303 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 113-115 where reference is made to the previous edition of the same work 
where it seems to have been suggested that all beneficiaries of Jersey trusts have proprietary interests in the trust 
property. See also Mubarik v Mubarak [2008] JLR 430 473-474, where reference is made to the Privy Council 
decision in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709, an Isle of Man case, where it was stated that “…on 
his own the object of a discretionary trust has no more of an assignable or transmissible interest than the object 
of a mere power.”  
304 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 10(10). 
305 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 10(11). 
306 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 113-115; Mubarik v Mubarak [2008] JLR 430 473-474. 
307 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 1(1). 
308 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 1(1). 
309 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 1(1), which defines “beneficiary” and “property” and art 10(10) and (11) which 
states that the interest of a beneficiary shall constitute movable property that he can deal with in any manner, 
subject to the terms of the trust. 
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A recent case of the Royal Court, In re Tantular,310 provides some elucidation. The question 
in this case was whether the assets of a trust could be made subject to a restraining order as 
being realisable assets, and in particular whether the defendant, a discretionary beneficiary, 
was beneficially entitled to all, or any of, the trust property.  
 
The court referred311 to English authority confirming that the beneficiary of a discretionary 
trust has only the right to be considered for the exercise of the trustee’s discretion and to 
compel due administration of the trustee’s duties. He does not have a transmissible interest. 
However, the interest is proprietary in nature as it gives him a stronger equitable title to the 
trust property than a third party with no entitlement. He can trace and recover trust property 
transferred by the trustee in breach of trust, but he can only compel the third party to reinstate 
the misapplied property to the trust fund.  He cannot require the third party to transfer the 
property directly to him. This is a proprietary interest, but it is a proprietary interest only in 
the broad sense. It is to be distinguished from an equitable proprietary interest in the narrow 
sense, which refers to equitable ownership.  
 
Reference was also made to Jersey authority312 stating that, unless and until the discretion is 
exercised in favour of a particular person, that person, although he is a beneficiary in terms of 
the TJL, does not have an individual right to call for any part of the distributable assets of the 
trust. 
 
The court therefore found that it would be incompatible with fundamental trust law principles 
to say that a beneficiary of a discretionary trust is beneficially entitled to all or indeed any of 
the assets of the trust.313 This appears to be the correct, and most sensible, position.  
 
3 5 6 Trusts and powers 
 
With regard to the trustee’s fiduciary obligations there is, as in England, a distinction between 
trusts, which oblige the trustee to act, and powers, which enable the trustee to act but do not 
impose an obligation to act on the trustee. By and large, the English position seems to be 
followed. It is not considered necessary to examine the Jersey position in more detail for the 
                                                      
310 Re Tantular 2014 (2) JLR 25. 
311 Re Tantular 2014 (2) JLR 25 34-36. 
312 Re Tantular 2014 (2) JLR 25 36.  
313 Re Tantular 2014 (2) JLR 25 37-40. 
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purposes of this dissertation, and reference is therefore made to the corresponding paragraph 
dealing with the English position.314 
 
3 5 7 Duration of the trust 
 
Although a rule against perpetuities previously existed in Jersey, this is no longer the case. 
The rule against perpetuities was aimed at preventing wealthy families from making their 
property inalienable through the use of fideicommissa or substitutions.   The use of such legal 
constructs was therefore constrained even in Roman times.315  
 
The TJL316 originally provided for a maximum duration of 100 years for trusts other than 
charitable trusts. The Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006 substituted this provision 
for one that states that, unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise, a trust may continue in 
existence for an unlimited period.317  
 
There is no rule against excessive accumulations of income in the TJL318 neither does there 
appear to ever have been such a rule in customary Jersey law.319 
 
The Jersey law relating to the duration of a trust is another example of an area of trust law that 
has developed independently from the law in England, and that may be regarded as biased in 
favour of the settlor and beneficiaries. 
 
3 6 Substantive requirements for the creation of a valid express trust under Jersey law 
 
The definition of a trust under the TJL320 contains the essential elements of a valid trust under 
Jersey law. It refers to property being held by the trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or a 
purpose. 
 
                                                      
314 See ch 2 para 2 6 6. 
315 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 15-19, 239-240. 
316 This provision was found in art 11 of the original enactment of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, and in art 15 
prior to its substitution in 2006. 
317 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 15(1). 
318 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 38. 
319 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 240-241. 
320 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 2. See also ch 2 para 3 3 1 for the wording of the definition. 
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The test for the creation of a valid express trust under English law, known as the three 
certainties,321 has been accepted in Jersey.322 This test requires that, in order for a valid trust to 
exist, there must be certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of objects. 
Should the terms of a trust be so uncertain as to render performance of the trust impossible, a 
court may declare the trust invalid, either as a whole, or to the extent of the uncertainty.323 
 
3 6 1 Certainty of intention 
 
It must be sufficiently clear that the settlor intended to create a trust. This entails the intention 
not only to create a legal relationship, but also that the legal relationship is a trust, and not 
another legal relationship such as a contract. Sometimes, precatory words – words expressing 
a wish or hope – rather than peremptory words, are used by the settlor. This may lead to 
difficulty in construing the trust deed and ascertaining whether the settlor had the necessary 
intention.324 
 
In Re Malabry Investments325 the Royal Court referred to the English case Re Kayford,326 
where it was held that specific words were not required, but that the vital question was 
whether in substance a sufficient intention to create a trust has been manifested. It is a matter 
of true interpretation of the document, rather than a matter of law.327 There does not seem to 
be agreement about whether or not extrinsic evidence as to the intention of the settlor of an 
inter vivos trust is admissible.328 
 
Should the settlor and the trustee both have the subjective intention that the deed, which 
purports to establish a trust, is, in fact, not to create the legal rights and obligations required 
for a trust, and both have the common intention to mislead, the trust would be considered a 
sham under Jersey law. It would therefore be invalid. It appears that the circumstances under 
which a trust would be considered a sham may be narrower than in England, 329  again 
benefitting the settlor.  
                                                      
321 See ch 2 para 2 7 1 for detail on this test under English law. 
322 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 76, 80, 88; Re Malabry Investments Ltd (1982) JJ 117 119, 123. 
323 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 76. 
324 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 76-77. 
325 Re Malabry Investments Ltd (1982) JJ 117 119. 
326 Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 279. 
327 Re Don Benest [1989] JLR 330 345-348. 
328 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 91. 
329 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 48-49; CI Law Trustees Limited v Minwalla [2005] JLR 359 366-367. 
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3 6 2 Certainty of subject matter 
 
Any type of property may be subject to a Jersey trust, apart from immovable property situated 
in Jersey. For a valid trust to exist, the property subject to the trust must be ascertainable.330 If 
that is not the case, a court will hold that, either the settlor did not dispose of the property or 
the trustee holds it on resulting trust for the settlor.331 
 
3 6 3 Certainty of objects 
 
The beneficiaries must be identifiable or ascertainable, as must their interests under the 
trust.332 If no beneficiary is named, even if there is a power to add beneficiaries, the trust will 
be void from the outset.333 The TJL provides guidance on this requirement in article 10(1) and 
requires a beneficiary to be identifiable by name or ascertainable by reference to a class or a 
relationship to some person, for example, the children and remoter issue of the settlor. 
 
Quite often, beneficiaries of discretionary trusts are defined by reference to a class or 
relationship, enabling the settlor to provide for successive generations. Whether a class is 
suitably defined to fulfil the requirement of certainty of objects has been the subject of 
various court cases.334 The Jersey court has expressed a willingness to try and uphold the 
validity of a trust by interpreting it as far as possible to give effect to the intention of the 
settlor. However, at the same time it has stressed the importance of careful drafting of trust 
deeds so that the beneficiaries are easily ascertainable or identifiable, as the court will allow a 
trust to fail if the subject matter or beneficiaries are uncertain, or if the trust deed is 
incoherent.335 This does not sit well with the use of blind trusts, where the charities named as 
the only beneficiaries are usually not the intended recipients of any trust assets.336 
 
Non-charitable purpose trusts are, of course, not subject to this rule.337 
                                                      
330 Re Malabry Investments Ltd (1982) JJ 117 119. 
331 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 80. 
332 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 88-89; Re Malabry Investments Ltd (1982) JJ 117 119, 124. 
333 Re Exeter Settlement [2010] JLR 170. In this case, rectification of the trust was ordered. 
334 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 103-105. Examples of cases include Meaker v Picot [1972] JJ 162; Re 
Double Happiness Trust [2002] JLR N48. 
335 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 105-106; Re Double Happiness Trust [2002] JLR N48. 
336 See ch 2 para 3 4 2. 
337 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 11(2)(a)(iv) read with art 12 of the same law. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 77 
 
3 7 Role of legislative developments 
  
3 7 1 Background 
 
In examining the role of legislative developments in Jersey (and other offshore jurisdictions), 
it needs to be borne in mind that the provision of trustee and trust administration services 
forms an integral part of the Jersey economy. Legislation always aims to provide certainty 
with regard to the law, but in this case it is also intended to attract business.  
 
It has already become apparent that legislation has played a crucial role in the development of 
Jersey trust law. A customary trust law existed prior to the coming into force of the TJL, but 
the law was unclear in many areas and, importantly, the outside world did not have 
confidence that Jersey was an established and regulated trust jurisdiction.338  
 
The enactment of the TJL was a huge step forward for Jersey. The legislation is considered as 
extremely successful, which has been proven by the fact that various other offshore 
jurisdictions, including Guernsey, Belize and Malta, have based their trust laws on that of 
Jersey.339 
 
Given that Jersey does not share England’s legal history where equitable principles led to the 
development of the trust, the law is regarded as more easily readable and understandable, 
especially to lawyers from civil law jurisdictions, such as Switzerland and Italy. However, 
practitioners from other jurisdictions have expressed concern regarding certain developments 
and whether they may be considered as too biased towards settlors. There is also uncertainty 
whether trusts taking advantage of some of the more controversial laws examined below 
would be regarded as valid in the courts of other jurisdictions.340 This is further examined in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
 
                                                      
338 Atkins (2013) 1 JGLR para 16. 
339 Atkins (2013) 1 JGLR para 1. 
340 Atkins (2013) 1 JGLR para 35. 
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Although the TJL was not meant to be a codification of the trust law in Jersey,341 it covers a 
very wide range of administrative and substantive issues, and was certainly not a piecemeal 
attempt to reform trust laws, as seen, for example, in England.342 Having said that, the TJL has 
been amended seven times between 1989 and 2018.343 This could be ascribed to the fast-
changing nature of the global trust business and Jersey’s desire to maintain its position as a 
forward-thinking and attractive trust jurisdiction. Specific developments are listed below and, 
where appropriate, discussed further in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
The TJL applies to trusts created before or after its commencement, but it does not affect the 
validity of acts done before its commencement in respect of trusts existing before it came into 
force. Neither does the TJL affect the validity of trusts arising from a document or disposition 
taking effect prior to the commencement of the TJL.344 Legal disputes concerning trusts set up 
prior to the coming into force of the TJL will, of course, decrease over time as such trusts 
come to an end, but they have been the subject of a number of cases and the TJL has been 
held to apply to such trusts.345 Some, but not all, provisions of the TJL also apply to foreign 
trusts, in other words, trusts with a governing law other than Jersey.346 
 
3 7 2 Specific developments 
 
The amendments to the TJL that are considered relevant to this dissertation are listed below. 
From this list it is evident that legislative changes are aimed at increasing Jersey’s 
competitiveness as an offshore jurisdiction. All of these developments have already been 
highlighted, and some will be examined in more depth in chapters 3 and 4. These are: 
 
(a) trustees cannot exclude liability for gross negligence in a trust deed;347 
(b) the rule donner et retenir ne vaut does not apply to Jersey trusts;348 
                                                      
341 This was confirmed in the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 1(2) and in In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and 
the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53. 
342 Atkins (2013) 1 JGLR para 16. 
343 Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1989; Trusts (Amendment No 2) (Jersey) Law 1991; Trusts (Amendment 
No 3) (Jersey) Law 1996; Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006; Trusts (Amendment No 5) (Jersey) 
Law 2012; Trusts (Amendment No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013; Trusts (Amendment No 7) (Jersey) Law 2018. The 
current revised version of the TJL contains all these amendments and is the version referred to in this 
dissertation. 
344 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 33-35; Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 58 and 59. 
345 One example is West v Lazard Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited [1993] JLR 165 204-205. 
346 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 Part 3 and 4. 
347 Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1989; see also ch 2 para 3 5 3. 
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(c) non-charitable purpose trusts are recognised as valid;349 
(d) trusts in relation to which the settlor has reserved wide-ranging powers are valid;350 
(e) trusts can continue for an unlimited period;351 and 
(f) the rule known in England as the rule in Hastings Bass is confirmed by statute.352 
 
3 8 Role of the courts and case law 
 
Jersey trust law is to a large extent regulated by the TJL. The courts have nevertheless 
contributed substantially to the development of the trust law. Prior to the coming into force of 
the TJL, the role of the courts was presumably to find and apply the customary Jersey trust 
law to the case at hand, and where this did not provide a satisfactory answer, to look to 
English authority for guidance. The customary law position was not always easy to ascertain, 
and reliance on English authority was a frequent occurrence.353 
 
Since the coming into force of the TJL in1984, the court’s role would have changed in that it 
now needs to ascertain whether a specific issue is covered by the TJL and whether this 
provides a satisfactory result. Where the issue is not covered by the TJL, the old customary 
law would still apply, and the court would first look to any Jersey authority that exists on the 
issue, and if there is none, to English law. Whilst the law of England (and other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions) will continue to play a role in the development of Jersey trust 
law, especially where Jersey law is silent on the issue in question or does not provide a 
satisfactory outcome, reliance on English case law is slowly decreasing as Jersey builds up its 
own wealth of case law on trusts.  
 
Even where Jersey law is unclear and the court may look at what an English court would have 
done in the same circumstances, the Jersey judiciary has shown the confidence not blindly to 
follow English law if that would lead to an unfair result, or if the English position has been 
                                                                                                                                                                      
348 Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1989; see also ch 2 para 3 5 4. 
349 Trusts (Amendment No 3) (Jersey) Law 1996; further refinements were made in the Trusts (Amendment No 
5) (Jersey) Law 2012; see also ch 2 para 3 4 3. 
350 Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006; see also ch 2 para 3 5 4. 
351 The Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006 abolished the previous trust period of a maximum of 100 
years; see also ch 2 para 3 5 7. 
352  Jersey was the first offshore jurisdiction to enact provisions of this kind in the form of the Trusts 
(Amendment No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013; see also ch 2 para 3 5 3. 
353 See eg Ex Parte Viscount Wimborne (1983) JJ 17 19, where Deputy Bailiff Crill said: “I was referred 
exclusively to English cases as if this application were being heard in the Chancery Division of the High Court.”. 
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shown to be outdated, given changes in social and economic circumstances.354 The court has 
thus demonstrated a willingness to continue to develop Jersey trust law in accordance with the 
evolving needs of society. However, the judiciary has also clearly indicated that to change the 
law in certain areas, legislative intervention would be required.355 
 
4 South Africa 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
South African law is based on Roman-Dutch law. When the Cape was settled by the Dutch 
East India Company and Jan van Riebeeck arrived in 1652, they brought with them the 
system of Roman-Dutch law. The term Roman-Dutch law refers to a system of law based on 
Roman law. Whether the legal system that was brought to South Africa was the law applied in 
the province of Holland, where Jan van Riebeeck hailed from, or whether it was the law of the 
whole of the Netherlands, or even a European ius commune based on Roman law, is 
debatable, and for the current purposes not essential to determine. What is clear is that it was 
a system of law based on Roman law, and in that sense could be distinguished from English 
(common) law, which was influenced by Roman law in a very limited manner only.356 
 
The influence of English law on the development of South African law can, however, not be 
denied. Given the political power of the English during this formative period, it may be 
considered surprising that English law did not replace Roman-Dutch law as the foundation of 
South African law altogether.357 The reasons why this did not happen fall outside the scope of 
this dissertation. 358  The fact is that many English legal principles and institutions were 
absorbed into the local legal system, including the concept of the trust, as well as the English 
court system and the stare decicis rule whereby courts are generally bound by previous 
judgments of higher courts and by its own judgments unless satisfied that it was wrong.359 
This rule has proven rather important for the development of the law of trusts in South Africa, 
                                                      
354 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 98-99, 112. 
355 Examples include In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 121 with regard 
to asset protection trusts and the effect of the insolvency of the settlor on the validity of a trust; and Flynn v Reid 
[2012] (1) JLR 370 400-401 with regard to recognising a distinction between legal and equitable interests in 
immovable property. 
356 Du Plessis and du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 16-18, 46-47. 
357 Du Plessis and du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 18, 48-49; Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 855. 
358 See Du Plessis and du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 48-50, 187. 
359 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 13. 
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which, as will become evident, has developed to a large extent through the efforts of the 
judiciary. 
 
Today, it would be fair to say that South African law is a mixture of civil and common law. 
At least since the Napoleonic age, civil law systems tend to be codified to a large extent, 
whereas Anglo-American common law systems are generally not. Law in these systems is 
mostly judge-made and, hence, more flexible.360 
 
4 2 Reception of the trust concept into South African law 
 
4 2 1 Historical context 
 
As previously explained,361 English law distinguishes between equity and common law as 
distinct but parallel bodies of law. Historically, common law was strictly rule- based, and 
equity acted as a corrective, bringing fairness and consciousness into the law. The trust was 
born out of equity.362 This type of distinction is foreign to Roman- Dutch law, where equity 
and fairness form part of the normal application of law. The same can be said for South 
African law.363 Furthermore, South African law adheres to a unitary concept of ownership, 
which means that ownership cannot be split between those holding legal title and those 
holding equitable (or beneficial) title as is possible under English law. 
 
With the British occupation of the Cape, first from 1795 to 1803, and then finally from 1806, 
it was inevitable that, not only would English legal principles and institutions be absorbed 
into South African law, but also that many of the legal practitioners stationed at the Cape 
would have been trained in English law. After the second occupation, an “aggressive policy of 
Anglicisation” 364 was followed. Although Roman-Dutch law was not abolished, a gradual 
importation of English law was envisaged. This was initially confined to the Cape, but soon 
spread further north.365  
 
                                                      
360 Du Plessis and du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 71-77. 
361 See ch 2 para 2 2. 
362 See ch 2 para 2 3. 
363 Du Plessis and du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 70. 
364 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 854. 
365 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 854-855. 
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English practitioners incorporated trusts in the Cape, and also used the terms trust and trustee 
in other documents, such as wills, land transfers and deeds of gift, so that, quite 
unintentionally, the trust became an integral part of the legal and commercial landscape.366  
 
South African judges, being trained in Roman-Dutch law, were left to interpret essentially 
English concepts. This happened despite the fact that English trust law as such was only 
partially received into South Africa.367 It is not difficult to imagine how this caused the trust, 
as used in South Africa, to acquire different characteristics from its original source, the 
English trust. Du Toit rightly points out that much of the distortion of trust terminology was 
caused by the court’s attempt to give linguistic expression to the trust in civilian terms.368 
 
The development of the trust and trust law in South Africa was clearly not in line with 
developments in England, even though it was the English concept that was originally brought 
into South Africa. This is not intended to indicate that there was something amiss with the 
development of South African trust law, but to highlight the reasons why the South African 
trust has come to be such a different creature compared to the English trust. 
 
It must be pointed out at this juncture, that similarities between the English law trust and civil 
law institutions such as the fideicommissum369 and the Treuhand370 have indeed been found. 
One could argue that it would otherwise have been very difficult for the trust to have been 
received and found workable in civil law and mixed jurisdictions. To this should be added 
that Roman-Dutch law has proved itself to be remarkably adaptable in absorbing foreign 
concepts, developing in new directions and adapting to the ever-changing needs of society. 
An inflexible, codified system of law would not have been able to go through the same 
process of absorption, but Roman- Dutch law has the advantage of having its roots in broad 
                                                      
366 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 13; Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of 
Trusts 21; Hahlo (1961) 78 SALJ 195 198-199. 
367 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 22. 
368 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 857. 
369 A fideicommissum can be described as a legal institution of Roman law whereby the owner of property 
transfers it to another person subject to it being transferred from that person to yet another person at a later stage. 
Both persons to whom the property is transferred in this chain become the full owners of the property. 
370 Treuhand is a German term and can refer to a variety of relationships between two or more parties where 
legal authority is transferred from one party to the other. This can be the result of an agreement or some other 
legal construct. It can, but does not have to, involve the transfer of ownership of property. 
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general principles and this has been very valuable in receiving the trust into South African 
law.371 
 
For many years, there was no legislative intervention to make the position of trusts in South 
Africa clear. There was only the interpretation of an essentially English legal construct by 
reference to Roman-Dutch law as it was then practiced at the Cape. This meant that, over 
many years, slowly but surely, the South African courts pragmatically developed a trust law 
that was, at least on one view, unique to South Africa. (On another view, the South African 
law of trusts is very similar indeed to the law of trusts in Scotland.)372 Unfortunately, this way 
of development also led to uncertainty and disagreement regarding a number of issues. 
 
4 2 2  Role of the courts and case law in the reception of trust law and characterisation of 
the trust 
 
Court cases dealing with trusts can be traced back as far as 1833, and in the time that 
followed, the use of trusts spread throughout South Africa. The first trust companies, being 
companies that offer trustee services in exchange for a fee, were founded in South Africa in 
the 1830s and, interestingly, appear to be some of the first of their kind worldwide.373  
 
Given that there was no trust legislation to speak of, the questions of whether to accept trusts 
into South African law and how to construe them were left to the courts. According to Hahlo 
there were three options: the courts could refuse to recognise trusts as they were not a part of 
South African law; they could take over the English law of trusts as a whole; or they could 
construe trusts in terms of Roman-Dutch doctrines known to them.374  
 
It was only in 1915 that the Appellate Division (as it was then called) had the opportunity to 
decide whether South African law could and should give effect to the trust. In Estate Kemp v 
McDonald’s Trustee375 the court, dealing with a testamentary trust drawn up by an English 
lawyer, confirmed that the English law of trusts does not form part of South African law, but 
that it does not follow that testamentary dispositions contained in a trust cannot be given 
                                                      
371 Corbett (1993) 56 THRHR 262 264. 
372 Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 2, 10. 
373 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 21-22. 
374 Hahlo (1961) 78 SALJ 195 199. 
375 Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 AD 491. 
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effect to in terms of South African law. Innes CJ said that a testamentary trust would, in the 
phraseology of South African law, be a fideicommissum even though in the case of a trust 
there is no element of personal benefit on the trustee (the fiduciary).376 This has since been 
criticised, as discussed further below. 
 
The learned judge repeatedly emphasised the separation of legal ownership from beneficial 
enjoyment as essential to the relationship that was being created377 and was of the view that 
such separation was also possible under Roman-Dutch law and, more precisely, the 
fideicommissum.378 (The comparison with a fideicommissum may have been inaccurate, but 
the importance of the separation of legal ownership and beneficial enjoyment remains valid.) 
 
Solomon JA made the important point that the trust had become so entrenched in South 
African legal and commercial practice that it would be nearly impossible to put an end to its 
use, and furthermore that there was nothing in South African law that was inconsistent with 
the concept of a trust.379 Unlike Innes CJ, he found it unnecessary to translate English legal 
and technical terms into the corresponding expressions of South African law. He took the 
view that the most important rule in constructing testamentary documents was to discover the 
intention of the testator, and that effect had to be given thereto.380 
 
Trying to explain the English trust in Roman law terms has caused confusion and distortion in 
the theory and terminology of South African trust law during its formative years.381 It took the 
Appellate Division until 1984 to review whether the above explanation of a testamentary trust 
in terms of a fideicommissum was correct.  
 
However, well before that, the court had the opportunity to deal with the characterisation of 
inter vivos trusts. This happened mainly in three landmark cases in the 1940s and 1950s, 
namely Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe, 382  Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v Smollan’s Estate383 and Crookes NO v Watson.384 
                                                      
376 Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 AD 491 499. 
377 Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 AD 491 498, 500, 502. 
378 Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 AD 491 502-503. 
379 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 13-14; Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 
AD 491 499, 508. 
380 Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 AD 491 508, 512. 
381 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 556. 
382 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656. 
383 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Smollan's Estate 1955 (3) SA 266 (A). 
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The first two cases were concerned with estate duties. Very generally, the question was 
whether certain interests of beneficiaries under an inter vivos trust can constitute vested 
proprietary interests forming part of such (deceased) beneficiary’s estate for estate duty 
purposes. In dealing with this question, however, the court found that it had to characterise 
the trust in question in order to ascertain the rights of the beneficiaries in question. 
 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 385  Watermeyer CJ referred to the 
principles of English trust law whereby beneficiaries had an equitable estate in the trust 
property. He also referred the following statement of the English academic Frederick Pollock: 
 
“Although every trust may… in this sense… include a contract, it includes so much 
more… The complex relations involved in a trust cannot be reduced to the ordinary 
elements of contract. Trust, in fact, is a legal category sui generi[s]…”386 
 
Both the statement that a trust may include a contract, but is more than just a contract, and 
that a trust is an institution sui generis, have found resonance in subsequent South African 
academic writing and in case law.387 
 
Returning to the Crewe388 judgment, Watermeyer CJ then continued to state that there was no 
reason why the problem presented by trusts in South African law should not be solved by the 
application of contractual principles.389 He referred to remarks of Innes CJ in Estate Kemp v 
McDonald’s Trustee,390 but it is submitted that the judge in that case made no reference to 
contractual principles, and merely said that testamentary dispositions in the form of trusts 
should be given effect to in terms of South African law. 
 
Watermeyer CJ went on to examine the trust deed in order to ascertain the nature of the rights 
arising under it. He stated that the trust deed was, in effect, an agreement between the settlor 
and the trustees whereby the settlor transferred certain property to the trustees and the trustees 
                                                                                                                                                                      
384 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD). 
385 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656. 
386 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656 673. 
387 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 859D; see also ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
388 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656 673. 
389 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656 673. 
390 Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 AD 491 499. 
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agreed to apply the income of the property for the benefit of third parties – it was a contract 
for the benefit of a third party, a stipulatio alteri.391 A reading of this judgment does not leave 
one with the feeling that there were compelling reasons for characterising a trust as a 
contract,392 and in fact there was and still is disagreement as to whether this was the correct 
way to account for the legal nature of the inter vivos trust in South African law.393  
 
An important consequence of a stipulatio alteri is that, until the third party (the beneficiary) 
has accepted the benefit or promise thereof, the contract may be varied or cancelled by 
agreement between the contracting parties, namely the settlor and the trustee.394 
 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Smollan’s Estate395 Van den Heever JA agreed that 
trusts inter vivos should be given effect to. He found that an essential element of a 
fideicommissum inter vivos was lacking, but that, at the same time, there seems to be a 
contract between two persons in which one stipulates a benefit for third persons. He further 
stated that difficulties arising from the requisite acceptance by the third party did not concern 
the court in casu, as the deceased beneficiary had undoubtedly accepted.396 This may have 
been a good opportunity for the court to analyse this problem but unfortunately it was not 
done. 
 
The third case, Crookes NO v Watson,397 concerned exactly this question – can a settlor (who 
is also one of the trustees and who, presumably, had some influence over the co-trustee) 
amend the trust provisions with the agreement of his co-trustee and the beneficiary who had 
already accepted a benefit under the trust, if the amendment will prejudice the rights of the 
beneficiaries who had not accepted yet and who have not agreed to the amendment?398 Again, 
the court had to examine the more fundamental question regarding the legal nature of an inter 
vivos trust in order to assess the rights of the relevant parties. 
 
                                                      
391 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656 674. 
392 This is also the view of Schreiner JA in the minority decision in Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 
294. 
393 See ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
394 Corbett (1993) 56 THRHR 262 264. 
395 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Smollan's Estate 1955 (3) SA 266 (A). 
396 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Smollan's Estate 1955 (3) SA 266 (A) 272. 
397 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD). 
398 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 284. 
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Three out of the five judges, Centlivres CJ, Van den Heever JA and Steyn JA, held that a trust 
constituted a contract between the settlor and the trustee for the benefit of a third person and 
that the settlor and trustee could agree to cancel this contract prior to acceptance by the 
beneficiary.  
 
The minority, Schreiner JA and Fagan JA, disagreed. Schreiner JA was of the view that, 
irrespective of whether an English law trust could be assimilated with, or even had its origins 
in, the fideicommissum of Roman law, the more important issue was the development of the 
modern South African law of trusts and that this should not be hampered by views regarding 
its association with other branches of South African law. He suggested that analogies with 
other portions of the law are only useful if they provide solutions that are convenient and fair 
in relation to the intentions and expectations of the parties involved.399  
 
Even more importantly, a legal instrument such as the trust should not be forced into a 
framework of another portion of the law merely in order to find a solution to the problem at 
hand. Schreiner JA admitted that an inter vivos trust was normally the outcome of a contract 
between the settlor and the trustee and that it was generally designed to benefit other persons. 
However, a contract for the benefit of a third person is in fact more than that; it is a contract 
designed to enable the third person to come in as a party to the contract with one of the other 
two parties.400 This is clearly not the intention in the case of a trust. And although the settlor 
cannot unilaterally cancel the contract (revoke the trust), it is hard to imagine that the consent 
of the trustee, whom he appointed and can probably replace, will not be forthcoming.401  
 
The issue of revocation of a trust, and the above decision, is examined further at a later 
point.402 
 
A few decades later, in Braun v Blann and Botha NNO, 403  another case involving a 
testamentary trust, Joubert JA held that a trust, in a strictly technical sense, is a legal 
institution sui generis,404 meaning “peculiar” or “the only one of its kind”.405 This is perhaps 
                                                      
399 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 290. 
400 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 291. 
401 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 292-293. 
402 See ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
403 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
404 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 859D.  
405 Hiemstra and Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary 293. 
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the closest one can come to fitting the South African trust into a mould of some kind. Joubert 
JA makes no reference to testamentary trusts when he makes this statement, and in fact the 
context in which it is made is the general reception of the English trust into South African law 
and the development of the South African law of trusts. It is therefore likely that this 
characterisation also applies to trusts created inter vivos.406 
 
It was further held that it was both historically and jurisprudentially wrong to identify the 
testamentary trust with the fideicommissum and to equate a trustee to a fiduciary.407 Before 
reaching this conclusion, Joubert JA referred to previous case law criticising Innes CJ’s 
equation of a testamentary trust with a fideicommissum.408  He refers, amongst others, to 
Estate Watkins-Pitchford v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,409 where Van den Heever JA 
suggested reconsideration of the proposition that merely because the testator did not intend to 
confer personal benefit upon his trustees, they are not prevented from being treated legally or 
technically as fiduciary heirs.410 On examination of this judgment, further instructive passages 
are found, such as:  
 
“…[T]he property covered by the disposition is not for a moment merged in his own 
estate in the manner in which property subject to fideicommissum undoubtedly vests 
for the time being in the estate of the fiduciary.”411 
 
With the judgment in the Braun412 case, it seems that the characterisation of the testamentary 
trust was settled, although future amendments and refinements were by no means excluded. 
Joubert JA said: 
 
“Our Courts have evolved and are still in the process of evolving our own law of trusts 
by adapting the trust idea to the principles of our own law.”413 
 
 
                                                      
406 See also ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
407 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 866A-B. 
408 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 865. 
409 Estate Watkins-Pitchford v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1955 (2) SA 437 (A). 
410 Estate Watkins-Pitchford v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1955 (2) SA 437 (A) 460C. 
411 Estate Watkins-Pitchford v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1955 (2) SA 437 (A) 460E. 
412 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
413 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 859F. 
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4 2 3 Conclusion 
 
Compared to the vital role the courts have played in the development of South African trust 
law, legislative intervention, further discussed below, 414 has been limited. A decision was 
taken not to codify the South African trust law. The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 
(TPCA) is the most important piece of legislation regarding trusts, and regulates only the 
registration and administration of trusts. 
 
The South African trust law of today can therefore be described as a mixture of English, 
Roman-Dutch and South African rules.415 These typically South African rules have become 
the more important component of South African trust law over time, and are continuously 
developed by the courts.416 In the Braun case417 Joubert JA said: 
 
“It is one of the functions of our law to keep pace with the requirements of changing 
conditions in our society… The approach of our Courts is to apply the principles of 
our law to the development of our law of trusts.”418 
 
This power and duty of the court to evolve the law of trusts was confirmed more recently by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker.419 
 
4 3 The trust under South African law 
 
4 3 1 Contrast with the dual ownership concept of English law 
 
4 3 1 1  Is the South African trust a real trust? 
 
At the heart of the English law trust is the division of property rights, which enables the 
trustee to hold the legal title to trust property and the beneficiary to have an equitable interest 
in trust property.420 Many authors are of the opinion that a legal system that does not recognise 
                                                      
414 See ch 2 para 4 5. 
415Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 23. 
416 The role of the courts in developing South African trust law is further discussed in ch 2 para 4 7. 
417 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
418 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 866-867. 
419 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 37. 
420 See ch 2 para 2 4 2. 
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this division of property rights cannot have as part of their law a true or proper trust. 
Examples of such authors include the famous English legal historian Maitland, and more 
current authors such as Hayton.421 This view places much emphasis on the property dimension 
of the trust.422 It also ignores the fact that, under English law, beneficiaries, or objects, of 
discretionary trusts do not acquire proprietary rights until such time as the trustee exercises 
his discretion in favour of such an object. In the meantime, the object has to rely on the 
personal rights he has against the trustee, much like the position in South Africa.423 
 
Opponents of this view argue that one can have a proper trust without it having to be based on 
a division between legal and equitable ownership. This, for example, is certainly the case with 
Scottish trusts. In an article that compares trustee duties in, amongst others, England, Jersey, 
Guernsey and South Africa, South Africa has been referred to as an “excellent example” of a 
jurisdiction that has not only embraced the trust, but made it its own by accommodating it into 
its own legal system.424 Various South African authors state that the most important function 
of dual ownership is to protect the rights and interests of trust beneficiaries.425 Furthermore, 
they argue that the protection of such interests could also be achieved in other ways.426  
 
Whether the South African trust (and trusts from other mixed jurisdictions) are real trusts 
should, according to this argument, not depend on whether the law of property of such 
jurisdictions recognise dual ownership rights, but rather whether these trusts share certain 
essential elements with their English counterpart, which affords beneficiaries a similar level 
of protection. 
 
De Waal identifies four such “core elements”, described below.427 
 
                                                      
421 See Hayton (1987) 37 ICLQ 260 262 where he refers to the South African trust as a “trust-like” institution. 
This is further examined in De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 550-552. 
422 See ch 2 para 2 4 1 where the property component and obligation component are discussed. It is noteworthy 
though that Hayton has more recently been arguing that more weight should be given to the obligation 
component of the trust, as is clear from ch 2 para 2 7 3 2. 
423 See ch 2 paras 2 4 2, 2 4 3. 
424 Clarry (2014) 1 JGLR paras 28, 30. See also generally Valsan Trusts and Patrimonies. 
425 Looking back at the development of equity as a body of law, this seems to be correct. Equity was developed 
by the Courts of Chancery to protect the cestui que use, the forerunner of the beneficiary of today, as described 
in ch 2 para 2 3. 
426 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 14; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557. This is 
also confirmed in Clarry (2014) 1 JGLR para 29 where it is suggested that a higher standard of care is expected 
of trustees in South Africa than in England and that beneficiaries of South African trusts are therefore better 
protected than their English counterparts, despite the latter having an equitable interest in the trust property. 
427 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557. 
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(a) The trustee is in a fiduciary position vis à vis the trust beneficiaries. Although English 
law and South African law are not similar in all detailed aspects of a trustee’s 
fiduciary duties, the essence of the duty is the same – the trustee owes a duty of care 
towards the beneficiaries in the way he administers and deals with the trust property.428 
Should the trustee breach this general fiduciary obligation or any of the more specific 
duties imposed by the applicable trust law or the provisions of the trust deed, it 
constitutes a breach of trust and, in both jurisdictions, the basic rule (although the 
remedies may differ) is that the trustee personally must make good the loss to the 
beneficiaries.429  
 
(b) There is some sort of separation of estates. Under English law, the trustee holds the 
legal title to the trust property while the beneficiaries, at least the beneficiaries of fixed 
trusts, have an equitable proprietary interest. The trust assets effectively have two 
owners. In South Africa, the separation is on a different level. The trustee has full 
ownership of the trust assets, but the assets are held in a separate estate, the trust 
estate. His personal assets are held in his private estate. This separation is confirmed 
in the TPCA.430 As a result, the beneficiaries are protected, at least in theory, in the 
event of the insolvency of the trustee.431 
 
(c) The continuity of the trust fund is ensured. If a trust asset has been sold or exchanged, 
the proceeds or replacement asset would therefore also form part of the trust. In South 
African trust law, real subrogation applies in the event of the lawful replacement of 
trust assets, but not when trust assets were unlawfully replaced, for example where the 
trustee sells a trust asset in breach of trust. In such a case, the beneficiary can claim 
the profit made by the trustee in a restitutionary action for unjust enrichment. English 
trust law has developed complex “tracing” rules whereby beneficiaries, as a result of 
their equitable title to the trust assets, can follow such assets into the hands of third 
parties. It also recognises the concept of constructive trusts, whereby a trust can be 
imposed by the court as a result of the conduct of the trustee, and here tracing is 
important. The same result is therefore achieved by different means.432 
                                                      
428 See ch 2 para 2 6 for the English position and ch 2 para 4 3 5 for the South African position. 
429 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557-559. 
430 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 12. 
431 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 559-564. 
432 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 564-565. 
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(d) The trustee holds an office, in other words, there is a public element not found in 
contractual relationships, agency relationships and other relationships sometimes 
compared to trusts. A court will, if requested and if appropriate, interfere in the 
administration and execution of trusts if the trustee does not carry out his duties 
properly. South African law has developed specific duties for trustees, which reflect 
that trusteeship is an office. For example, trusts must be registered with the Master of 
the High Court and a person can only act as trustee if the Master’s written 
authorisation has been obtained.433 English law imposes less official control but also 
recognises the court’s supervisory role in the administration of trusts. 434  It can 
therefore be said to be an element common to South African and English trust law.435  
 
English law recognises two dimensions of the definition of a trust – a property dimension and 
an obligation dimension.436 The core elements defined above are centred around the property 
dimension. It may, however, be useful to consider the South African trust from the obligation 
angle as well. The obligation dimension of the English trust refers to the personal obligations 
of the trustee to manage the property in the exclusive interest of the beneficiaries.437 Some, but 
not all, explanations of the obligation dimension focus on it being an equitable obligation, and 
the beneficiaries having equitable interests in the property to which the trustee’s obligation 
relates.  438 
 
More recently, Hayton439 has argued for an “enforcer principle” which would allow a non-
charitable purpose trust to be regarded as a valid trust by an English court, even though such 
trust does not fulfil the beneficiary principle. The beneficiary principle of English trust law 
requires a non-charitable trust to have a beneficiary in whose favour the court can decree 
performance.440 
 
                                                      
433 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 4(1) and 6(1). 
434 As recognised in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709.  
435 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 565-567. 
436 See ch 2 para 2 4 1. 
437 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 42. 
438 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 56. 
439 Hayton (2001) 117 LQR 96. See ch 2 para 2 7 3 1 for a discussion of the enforcer principle. 
440 See ch 2 para 2 7 2. 
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In making this argument, Hayton relies on the importance of the obligation dimension of the 
trust. He proposes a “new” definition of a trust governed by English law, which is similar to 
his definition referred to earlier in this dissertation,441 but which also includes trusts for the 
furtherance of non-charitable purposes, as recognised by the legislation of many offshore 
jurisdictions. For the present purposes the relevant part of this definition is: 
 
“[A]n equitable obligation binding a person (“the trustee”) to deal with property 
owned by him as a trust fund segregated from his private patrimony whether for the 
benefit of persons (“the beneficiaries”) of whom he may himself by one, and any one 
of whom has the right to enforce the obligation…”.442 
 
Hayton continues to say that the beneficiary (or enforcer, as the case may be) has personal 
rights against the trustee to ensure that the trustee makes good any loss occasioned to the trust 
fund by any breach of trust, while also having proprietary rights against the trustee and, in 
certain circumstances, a third party in possession of the whole or a part of the trust fund.443 
 
This definition is not free from the terminology associated with the division between legal 
and beneficial ownership. However, an “equitable obligation” may well be described as an 
obligation based on the conscience of the trustee. Is that so different from the obligation 
conferred on the trustee of a South African trust? It is suggested that the elements of this 
definition, namely the equitable obligation of the trustee, the separate trust estate or 
patrimony, and the existence of beneficiaries who can enforce the trust, are not inconsistent 
with a valid South African trust. 
 
Other authors have also placed emphasis on the importance of the obligation dimension of the 
trust in recent years. There is an argument that an obligations-based approach (rather than a 
property- or ownership-based approach) is better able to identify the irreducible core content 
of the trust idea, namely that there must be enforceable obligations.444 
 
This notion of the trust as an obligation could open the way for eradicating the division 
between the common law and civil law understandings of the trust, as it does not rely on the 
                                                      
441 See ch 2 para 2 4 1. 
442 Hayton (2001) 117 LQR 96 107. 
443 Hayton (2001) 117 LQR 96 108. 
444 Parkinson (2002) 61 CLJ 657 668-669. 
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division between legal and equitable ownership.445 In fact, the definition of the trust in the 
Hague Convention 446  places more emphasis on the obligations of trusteeship than on the 
interests of the beneficiaries. The suggestion is that the position of the beneficiaries depends 
more on whether the trustee takes his fiduciary obligations seriously, than on the proprietary 
rights of the beneficiaries. 
 
Therefore, although the South African and the English trust differ in certain fundamental, 
theoretical aspects, one can argue that sufficient commonality exists for South African trusts 
to be treated as proper trusts, and this dissertation will proceed on that basis. 
 
4 3 1 2  Separation of ownership or control from enjoyment 
 
In addition to offering protection to beneficiaries, the essential feature of an English trust, 
namely that legal ownership and beneficial ownership are divided, also leads naturally to a 
separation of ownership or control from enjoyment of the trust property. The importance of 
the principle of separation is evident in South African trust law as well,447 and is sometimes 
described as the core idea of the trust.448 In Braun v Blann and Botha449 Joubert JA quoted 
from an unpublished doctoral dissertation on the reception of the English law trust in civil law 
and confirmed his agreement with the following: 
 
“The essence of the trust is the separation of titular from beneficial rights over 
property.”450 
 
The duties and standard of care expected from a trustee, his independence, as well as his 
liability to the beneficiaries, all flow from this separation. It should also mean that the settlor 
and beneficiaries do not have control over the trust property or the trustee.  
 
Although this implies that the trustee is not also a beneficiary of the trust, this is not 
necessarily always the case, as long as the sole trustee is not also the sole beneficiary.451 
                                                      
445 Parkinson (2002) 61 CLJ 657 669-670. 
446 Art 2 Hague Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. 
447  Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 17; Hahlo (1961) 78 SALJ 195; Badenhorst v 
Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) paras 9-11; Thorpe v Trittenwein [2006] SCA 30 (RSA) para 17. 
448 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 19, 22. 
449 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 865. 
450 Ryan The Reception of the Trust in Civil Law Cambridge (1959) 232. 
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However, enjoyment and control should be functionally separate so as to avoid abuse of the 
trust.452 On the assumption that there is separation of ownership and enjoyment and that this 
results in trusts being administered properly, the South African courts and legislature have 
allowed trusts to develop relatively autonomous and without the same level of formality and 
scrutiny attracted by companies and other legal entities. 453  Chapter 4 will examine the 
increasing number of trusts where this functional separation is lacking and which, therefore, 
leads to an abuse of the trust form. 
 
4 3 2 Legal nature of inter vivos trusts 
 
Two questions appear relevant in the enquiry as to the legal nature of inter vivos trusts under 
South African law. Is a trust relationship a contractual relationship? And is a trust a separate 
legal entity? These questions have vexed academics and the judiciary for decades.454  
 
4 3 2 1  Is the South African trust a contract? 
 
A trust under English law is not a contract.455 In South Africa, although the trust concept was 
imported from England, English law as such was not. It has been illustrated that this has led to 
difficulties and uncertainty in many aspects related to trusts. One such issue is whether a trust 
can be construed as a contract or not.  
 
Following much uncertainty, around the middle of the previous century, the courts came to 
the conclusion that a trust inter vivos is created by way of a stipulatio alteri: a contract 
between the settlor (the stipulans) and the trustee (the promittens) for the benefit of the 
beneficiary (the third party).456 This is another example of how the courts have managed to 
accommodate essentially English trust concepts in South African law. There does not appear 
to be agreement on whether this was the correct way to account for the legal nature of the 
inter vivos trust in South African law, but this is now largely historical. Examples of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
451 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 11. 
452 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 17.  
453 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 19-20; Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 
(2) SA 77 (SCA) para 23. 
454 As examined in ch 2 para 4 2 2. 
455 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 42-43; see also ch 2 para 2 4 1. 
456  Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656; Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
Smollan's Estate 1955 (3) SA 266 (A); Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD). 
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objections to this view include that, in a contractual obligation under a stipulatio alteri, there 
is no fiduciary obligation as in the case of trusts; that the third party is meant to take the place 
of one of the contracting parties, which does not happen in a trust; and that the proper 
execution of a stipulatio alteri is not subject to the control and supervision of the court, as is 
the case with a trust.457 
 
Despite these objections, the status of an inter vivos trust as a stipulatio alteri was confirmed 
by the South African Law Commission.458 This does not imply that a trust can be equated with 
a stipulatio alteri in all respects, as confirmed by the court in Doyle v Board of Executors.459 It 
may be possible to explain certain aspects, especially those relating to the creation, variation 
or revocation460 of a trust, in contractual terms. The terms of the trust deed are often agreed 
between the settlor and the trustee, and the amendment of the terms thereof may require 
agreement as well.  
 
On the other hand, many other aspects of a trust clearly do not fit the contractual mould, such 
as the fiduciary duties and obligations owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust. 461 
These duties and obligations are essential to the very existence of a trust, but are not regulated 
by contractual principles. A successor trustee would also not have been a party to the original 
“contract” with the settlor. It would therefore be difficult to state with certainty that under 
South African law, the trust itself is regarded as a contract.462  
 
A solution that has met with judicial acceptance is to regard a trust inter vivos as an institution 






                                                      
457 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 18; Corbett (1993) 56 THRHR 262 264-265. This 
was examined in more detail in ch 2 para 4 2 2. 
458 SA Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts (1987). 
459 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
460 The revocation of an inter vivos trust is examined in ch 3. 
461 Hahlo (1961) 78 SALJ 195 204. 
462 See Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 19-20 who shares the same view. 
463 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 859D; Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) 
para 8. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97 
4 3 2 2  Is the South African trust a legal entity? 
 
Whereas it is unequivocally clear that an English law trust is not a separate legal entity, the 
point is still being debated in South Africa. It seems that the debate originated from 
uncertainty about the ownership of the trust property. In English law the trustee owns the 
legal estate in the trust property and the beneficiaries have an equitable interest in the 
property, which gives them the protection they need should the trustee mismanage the trust 
property. In South African law the trustee has full ownership of the trust property (apart from 
the, more rare, case of the bewind trust464).  
 
A theoretical basis for the protection of the beneficiaries was found in the common law 
position where the trustee owns two separate estates. This position has subsequently been 
confirmed in legislation.465 An alternative view, focusing on the obligation dimension of the 
trust rather than the property dimension, could be that the protection of the beneficiaries is 
based on the accountability of the trustees. 
 
Confirming that the trustee owns two estates – one made up of his privately owned assets and 
the other made up of the assets forming part of the trust – may, however, lead to the 
conclusion that a trust is a separate estate and has legal personality.466 Adding to the confusion 
is the fact that, for certain purposes, legislation and case law consider a trust a juristic person 
and thus treats it as a separate legal entity. Examples of this include certain sections of the 
taxation Acts, the fact that a trust created by contract can be sequestrated, and registration 
practices with regard to immovable property.467  
 
In Ex Parte Milton NO, 468 it was held that the sequestration of an “administrative” trust 
created by contract should be allowed, even if a trust does not strictly speaking possess legal 
personality. The reasons for the court’s decision were twofold. First, the definition of 
“debtor” in the Insolvency Act469 was wide enough for a trust to be regarded as a “debtor in 
the usual sense of the word” – it has the ability to hold property separate from its members, 
                                                      
464 See ch 2 para 4 3 3. 
465 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 12. 
466 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 563. 
467 De Waal and Theron (1991) 3 TSAR 499; De Waal (1993) 56 THRHR 1. 
468 Ex Parte Milton NO 1959 (3) SA 347 (SR). This is a case from Southern Rhodesia, which, for judicial 
purposes, formed part of South Africa at the time of the decision. 
469 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 s 2. 
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similar to an unincorporated club, as the trustee holds the assets in his capacity as trustee and 
so there must be a separate trust estate to which creditors would look in the case of claims. 
Secondly, legal personality is not a prerequisite for sequestration given that the estate of a 
partnership can be sequestrated under the Insolvency Act.470  
 
In Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Summerly471 the court followed the decision in 
Milton472 and confirmed that a trust is not a corporate body and thus is not excluded from the 
definition of “debtor”. However, the court went on to state that a trust does possess legal 
personality in certain respects.473 Unfortunately the court did not clarify this statement.  
 
However, the current position, which seems to be widely accepted, is that a trust is not a 
separate legal person, and that ownership of the trust assets vest in the trustee, not in the trust 
itself. This was confirmed in CIR v MacNeillie’s Estate474 and referred to with approval in 
Braun v Blann and Botha NNO.475  
 
It has been suggested that, in order to answer the question of the legal nature of a South 
African trust with certainty, legislation should provide that trusts should be clothed with legal 
personality.476 This may create a further divide between the South African trust and its English 
counterpart, but may be outweighed by the benefit of certainty. 
 
4 3 3 Current definition 
 
Although the word “trust” can also be used in a wide sense, this dissertation is concerned with 
what is known in South African law as a trust in the narrow or strict sense. A trust in the wide 
sense refers to any relationship where someone is bound to hold or administer property on 
behalf of another or for an impersonal object and not for his own benefit, but where that 
person acts in a private capacity and does not hold an office.477 
                                                      
470 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
471 Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Summerly 1984 (1) SA 160 (W). 
472 Ex Parte Milton NO 1959 (3) SA 347 (SR). 
473 Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Summerly 1984 (1) SA 160 (W) 163. 
474 CIR v MacNeillie's Estate 1961 (3) SA 833 (A) 840F-G. 
475 Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
476 De Waal and Theron (1991) 3 TSAR 499; De Waal (1993) 56 THRHR 1; Joubert v Van Rensburg 2001 (1) 
SA 753 (W) 766-772. 
477 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 1-4. Examples of such relationships are curators of 
persons with a mental disability, executors of deceased estates, as agents holding money for the principals. 
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A trust in the narrow sense is a specific instance of the genus trust in the wide sense. Such a 
trust exists when the settlor (the creator of the trust) has handed over or is bound to hand over 
to another (the trustee) the control of property which, or the proceeds of which, is to be 
administered or disposed of by the trustee for the benefit of a person or persons other than the 
trustee (the beneficiaries) or for an impersonal object. A fiduciary obligation is created.478 
This definition clearly contains the two dimensions of the trust: property and obligation. 
 
Furthermore, one of the fundamental features of the trust, namely the separation of ownership 
or control over property from the enjoyment of the property, is clear from this definition. 
 
An authoritative statutory definition of the trust was introduced with the TPCA. According to 
section 1: 
 
“ ‘[T]rust’ means the arrangement through which the ownership in property of one 
person is by virtue of a trust instrument made over or bequeathed –  
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or 
disposed of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit 
of the person or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the 
achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument; or 
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed 
under the control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed 
of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the 
person or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the 
achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument, 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by 
any person as executor, tutor or curator in terms of the provisions of the 
Administration of Estates Act479…”480 
 
Two types of trust are envisaged by this definition. The first is the normal arrangement of a 
trust where the trustee owns the trust assets. The second is the so-called bewind trust, where 
                                                      
478 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 4; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 2. 
479 Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965. 
480 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 1. 
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the beneficiaries own the trust property, but the trustee has the power to control and dispose 
of the trust property. The bewind trust is derived from similar arrangements under Roman-
Dutch and modern Dutch law whereby an administrator or bewindhebber is appointed to 
control property owned by another person.481  
 
Although the bewind trust is an accepted part of South African trust law, it is not encountered 
very commonly in practice,482 and is also not covered by this dissertation.  
 
As the TPCA regulates administrative control over trust property and is not a codification of 
South African trust law as such, definitions provided by the judiciary have over the years also 
played an important role in clarifying the concepts of trust and trustee. 
 
Important examples of such contributions span the last century. Already in 1915, in Estate 
Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee,483 it was stated that the underlying conception of a trust is that, 
while legal dominium is vested in the trustee, the trustee has no beneficial (or equitable) 
interest in the trust property and is bound to hold and apply the property for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries or the achievement of a special purpose. In 2005, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker484 confirmed that the separation of ownership 
(or control) from enjoyment constitutes the core idea of the trust. The court also stated that the 
guiding principle for the court’s major decisions over the last century is that the trustee has to 
safeguard the interests of others. He occupies an office and has to exercise fiduciary 
responsibility over the trust property on behalf of and in the interests of another.485  
 
4 3 4 Classifications of trust 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be on private inter vivos trusts created 
expressly and documented in a trust deed or instrument. Testamentary trusts and public trusts 
such as charitable trusts or pension fund trusts are therefore not covered.  
 
                                                      
481 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 6; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 4. 
482 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 7-9. 
483 Estate Kemp v McDonald's Trustee 1915 AD 491. 
484 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
485 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 19-20. 
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Unlike English law, South African law does not recognise the unintentional creation of trusts. 
Resulting and constructive trusts, which arise by operation of law, therefore do not form part 
of South African law.  
 
The following classifications are not exhaustive. Furthermore, one trust can fall under more 
than one of the categories. 
 
4 3 4 1  Vested trusts and discretionary trusts 
 
Private express trusts taking effect inter vivos can be categorised as either vested (or vesting) 
trusts or discretionary trusts.  
 
A vested or vesting trust refers to a trust where the beneficiaries have vested rights to the 
income or capital of the trust fund, and the trustee does not have discretion as to whether to 
make distributions of income or capital, or to which beneficiaries to make such distributions. 
Although the ownership of the assets still vests in the trustee, the right to receive income or 
capital (or both) is vested in the beneficiary.  
 
The word vested in this sense therefore implies a distinction between what is certain and what 
is conditional.486 In reality, the word vested is not intended to aid a comparison of different 
classes of rights, but rather to distinguish a right from a chance or a possibility of a right. 
However, the expressions vested right and conditional or contingent right are well known and 
will be used in this dissertation as well, although a contingent or conditional right is, strictly 
speaking, not a right.  
 
A vested right does not necessarily equate to ownership of or dominium in the property, or 
even immediate enjoyment thereof, and may be a mere personal right.487 It is therefore not 
quite the same as the equitable proprietary interest of the beneficiary of a fixed trust under 
English law. The right is, however, immediate (or definite) insofar as it does not depend on a 
contingency such as the beneficiary reaching a certain age. Should the beneficiary die or 
                                                      
486 Jewish Colonial Trust v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 163 175-176. 
487 Greenberg v Estate Greenberg 1955 (3) SA 361 (A) 364-365. 
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become insolvent before the income or capital accrues to him, the right to receive the same 
will pass to his estate.488 
 
By contrast, a discretionary trust refers to a trust where the trustee has discretion with regard 
to the distribution of income and capital to the beneficiaries. Unlike the beneficiary with a 
vested interest, the discretionary beneficiary does not have a vested right in relation to the 
trust property, but has a mere contingent right. In Stern and Ruskin NO v Appleson489 Millin J 
stated that a contingent right is: 
 
“something that may ripen into a vested interest on the happening of an event, but it 
must be such that the happening of the event, without more, gives the vested 
interest.”490  
 
The beneficiary with a contingent right has a mere hope or spes that the trustee will apply 
trust property to his benefit. A right is contingent only if the trustee has discretion to decide 
whether to distribute income or capital to the beneficiary, or discretion as to the amount to be 
distributed. If the trustee has discretion only with regard to the manner in which to apply 
income or capital for the benefit of a beneficiary, that beneficiary still has a vested right in the 
income or capital. 491  So although the trust may be described as discretionary, such a 
beneficiary has a vested right and not a contingent right. Having a contingent as opposed to a 
vested right has certain tax and other advantages, as no entitlement to the property can be said 
to form part of the beneficiary’s taxable estate.  
 
4 3 4 2  Business trusts 
 
In South Africa, a category of trust known as business or trading trusts has developed and has 
been extremely popular in recent decades. It should be mentioned that trusts have been used 
to own businesses for much longer than this, and that this use of trusts is well known in other 
jurisdictions as well. Where such a trust is set up by individuals and have as ultimate 
                                                      
488 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 556-557; Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in 
South Africa 5-6. 
489 Stern and Ruskin NO v Appleson 1951 (3) SA 800 (W). 
490 Stern and Ruskin NO v Appleson 1951 (3) SA 800 (W) 805. It must be more than the mere possibility of 
acquiring something in the future. This quote was also referred to with approval in Wasserman v Sackstein NO 
1980 (2) SA 536 (O) 540. 
491 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 556-558. 
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beneficiaries family members of the settlor, it is a private express trust taking effect inter 
vivos and as such it is not clear that different rules should apply to these trusts in principle.  
 
A combination of factors has led to this type of trust acquiring a somewhat notorious status in 
South Africa. A precise definition of a business trust is difficult, but the distinguishing feature 
seems to be that such trusts have as principal purpose the carrying on of business for profit, 
including the owning or letting of immovable property, and distributing the profit among the 
beneficiaries, as opposed to the protection and conservation of assets.492 
 
One of the factors that has led to the particular status of business trusts in South Africa is the 
level of trustee liability. Under South African law the extent of a trustee’s liability to 
beneficiaries and trust creditors is limited to the trust fund, unless he held himself out as 
undertaking personal responsibility. Trustees under English law are in a more vulnerable 
position than South African trustees who have, in effect, limited liability akin to that of a 
company director.493  
 
Trusts are, however, not subject to the same level of statutory regulation as companies and 
other corporate entities. Audited financial statements are, for example, not required. There 
are, or at least were, many tax-related advantages of using trusts as opposed to companies, 
although this has decreased over the years as the legislature is trying to clamp down on the 
abuse of trusts. It is more difficult for third parties to discover the terms of a trust and the 
details of the trustees than to obtain information about a company and its directors, making it 
easier to maintain confidentiality as to the interests and operations involved in a trust.494 
 
It is clear from the above that there is much more flexibility and less regulation in the use of 
trusts when compared to a company, partnership or close corporation. One only needs to look 
at the index to the Companies Act495 to see that this is the case. 
 
Under the previous Companies Act,496 it could be said that trustees had more onerous duties 
than directors. The TPCA requires a trustee to act with the care, diligence and skill that can 
                                                      
492 Honiball and Olivier The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa 303; Wunsh (1986) 103 SALJ 561. 
493 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 26-28. 
494 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 91-95; Wunsh (1986) 103 SALJ 561 562-563, 568-570. 
495 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
496 Companies Act 61 of 1973. This act was repealed by Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 224(1). 
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reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of another. 497  In the past, 
company directors were merely expected to maintain the standard it would be reasonable to 
observe in the management of their own affairs.498 Under the new Companies Act,499 directors 
must act in good faith and for a proper purpose; in the best interests of the company; and with 
the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying 
out the relevant functions in relation to the company and having the general knowledge, skill 
and experience of that director.500 This is definitely a higher standard, especially in the case of 
professional directors. The standard of care required of trustees may therefore not be so 
different to those of company directors any longer. 
 
Apart from their statutory duties, trustees are also in a fiduciary position and must be able to 
account to the beneficiaries for their proper execution of the trust. This accountability lies at 
the heart of the trust, and encourages both diligence and independence on the part of the 
trustee.501  
 
Thus it appears that the relative autonomous development of the trust and the greater 
flexibility that it offers have been countenanced by the legislature and courts precisely for this 
reason. Because of the trustee’s fiduciary position and accountability, and the separation of 
ownership or control over the assets from the enjoyment thereof, a trust will under normal (or 
perhaps rather ideal) circumstances be properly governed, and third parties dealing with the 
trustees will be adequately protected. 502 Unfortunately, in the last few decades, numerous 
cases have come before the courts where business trusts were being abused. No objection 
exists against the use of trusts for business purposes per se. The objection is against the lack 
of separation between ownership or control on the one hand and enjoyment on the other hand. 
 
The particular advantages offered by trusts and the fact that less formalities are required in 
comparison to corporate entities, may explain why a large proportion of cases involving abuse 
of the trust concern trusts that own businesses. More specifically, it often is a trust involving a 
small circle of family members (rather than “public” business trusts), where the trustees and 
                                                      
497 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(1). 
498 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 93.  
499 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
500 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 76(3). 
501 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 19-22. This is also a principle of 
English trust law, see Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 and ch 2 para 2 6 3. 
502 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 23-24. 
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beneficiaries are essentially the same persons, or where the beneficiaries exercise control over 
the trustees. 503  Not surprisingly, questions regarding the need for separate regulation of 
business trusts are being raised.  
 
Business trusts and the particular opportunities for abuse will be examined in more detail in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
 
4 3 5 Characteristics of a South African trust 
 
4 3 5 1  The trust 
 
The South African trust, an arrangement that has its roots in English law but has been adapted 
by the South African courts and legislature over the years, share many essential features with 
its forefather, the English trust. This has been highlighted in the examination of whether a 
South African trust is a “proper” trust.504  
 
This view is confirmed when comparing the main characteristics of the South African trust 
with those of the English trust, 505 as stated by influential academics in both jurisdictions. 
Although differences exist, there are by far more common features. 
 
A South African trust is not a legal person, unless a statute declares that for a certain purpose, 
for example income tax, the trust is to be regarded as a separate legal entity. It can be 
described as an institution sui generis.506 A trust under English law is never a legal entity, 
although some taxation statutes operate as if the body of trustees were a legal entity. 
 
4 3 5 2  The trust property 
 
Ownership of the trust property vests in the trustee, apart from the rather uncommon case of 
the bewind trust, where the trustee controls the trust property, but the beneficiaries are the 
                                                      
503 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 95-96; Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 
(2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 24-26. See also Wunsh (1986) 103 SALJ 561 575-576, where he discusses certain United 
States decisions where beneficiaries retained control over the trustees and were held liable for the debts of the 
trust. 
504 See ch 2 para 4 3 1. 
505 See ch 2 para 2 6. 
506 See ch 2 para 4 2 2. 
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owners thereof.507 This is different to the position under English law where it is now clear that 
the trustee must always be the owner of the trust property as well as having control over it.508 
 
For a valid South African trust to exist, the settlor must have handed over, or be bound to 
hand over, ownership and control of the trust property to the trustee. The trustee must be able 
to administer the trust property free from the settlor’s control.509 The issue of control is an 
important focus of the dissertation and will be returned to in chapter 4.  
 
The trustee is vested with two separate estates: the trust estate and the trustee’s personal or 
private estate. The ring-fencing of trust property has been laid down in the TPCA510 and is 
now an accepted principle of South African trust law. One of the most important results of 
this is that the beneficiary, although having a mere personal right against the trustee (as 
opposed to the proprietary right of the beneficiary of an English law trust), is protected in the 
event of the trustee’s insolvency. Generally speaking, the trustee’s private creditors have to 
claim against his private estate, and the beneficiaries have to claim against the trust estate.511  
 
The concept of real subrogation applies to trust property to ensure the continuity of the trust 
fund. If an asset is lawfully disposed of, the proceeds or the replacement asset also form part 
of the trust fund.512   
 
4 3 5 3  The trustee 
 
A trustee is in a fiduciary position and has the power and duty to manage, employ or dispose 
of the trust property in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument and applicable 
legislation. As a result of this fiduciary duty, the trustee can be held to account if he does not 
fulfil these duties in good faith.513 There is also a statutory duty of care requiring trustees to 
                                                      
507 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 6-7; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 9. 
508 See ch 2 para 2 6. 
509 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 34-35; Ex Parte Leandy 1973 (4) SA 363 (N) 368, 
where the judge found that, given that the settlor did not interfere with the trustee’s administration for eight years 
after setting up the trust, he clearly gave up control and therefore the judge did not have an objection to him 
being appointed a co-trustee with two others. 
510 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 12. 
511 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 28; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 560-562. 
512 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 10; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 564. 
513 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 11; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 10; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557-559. 
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act with the care, diligence and skill that can reasonably be expected of a person who 
manages the affairs of another. 514 Furthermore, a trust deed cannot exempt a trustee from 
liability if he fails to fulfil the statutory duty of care.515 
 
There is a requirement for the trustee to have a degree of independence, although the extent of 
such independence has not been clarified with any certainty and may be described as a matter 
of degree. In Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal516 four persons founded a trust of which 
they were the only beneficiaries and also four out of five trustees. The other trustee was a 
corporate entity. Although the fifth trustee was stated to be the executive trustee carrying out 
the powers and duties of the trustees, a majority of the other four trustees could remove the 
fifth trustee. 
 
Despite these facts pointing to a lack of independence, Muller J found that the trust was valid. 
He argued that neither of the settlors acting alone could revoke the trust and that there was a 
“multiplicity of parties”. He said that the trust fund was a common fund held at least in part 
for the benefit of someone else.517 
 
The compatibility of the trustee’s independence with the settlor’s power to unilaterally revoke 
the trust has been questioned, and has not been finally settled by the judiciary.518 The right of 
the settlor to revoke the trust and the degree of independence of the trustees are examined in 
more detail in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
The trustee acts in an official capacity and trusteeship is an office. Although trusts, especially 
the type examined in this dissertation, are normally created by individuals, there is a public 
element insofar as the Master of the High Court and the courts themselves play a supervisory 
role and may, on request, interfere to ensure proper administration of trusts. 519  There is, 
however, more detailed control over the actions of executors of deceased estates than the 
actions of trustees of inter vivos trusts.520 
                                                      
514 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(1). 
515 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(2). 
516 Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N). 
517 Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N) 408. This decision is questioned by Wunsh 
(1986) 103 SALJ 561 566. 
518 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 11, 89-91, 492-493. 
519 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 11-12; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 10; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 565-567. 
520 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 20. 
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4 3 5 4  The settlor 
 
In most cases, the requirement for the settlor to give up control is fulfilled by virtue of the 
transfer of ownership. The settlor cannot remain the sole owner of the trust property, but can 
be a co-trustee. He must therefore divest himself of at least some part of the legal proprietary 
power over the trust property. Should the settlor as co-trustee subsequently become the sole 
trustee (for example due to the death of the other trustee), the trust will not be extinguished 
unless the settlor is also the sole beneficiary.521 The settlor’s ownership of the trust property 
will only be in his official capacity as trustee and subject to the limitations imposed by the 
terms of the trust.  
 
The settlor (just like anyone else) therefore cannot be both the only trustee and the only 
beneficiary of the trust. Essentially, there must be at least some element of holding or 
administering property for a person or object other than the trustee.522 
 
The settlor may retain a power to vary or revoke the trust during his lifetime. It appears that 
the settlor would need the consent of the trustee to do this. Some argue that allowing 
revocation or variation without trustee consent interferes with the trustee’s independence, in 
the same way as being bound by the instructions of the settlor interferes with the trustee’s 
independence.523 The extent to which a settlor can unilaterally revoke or vary the terms of a 







                                                      
521 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 6. The position in England is the same, see ch 2 para 2 4 
3. In the recent case of Groeschke v Trustee, Groeschke & Others 2013 (3) SA 254 (GSJ) para 31-32 Bester AJ 
held that although a trust cannot be validly created if the sole trustee is also the sole beneficiary, a trust would 
not fail if, as a result of intervening circumstances, the sole trustee is left as sole beneficiary, although it would 
be undesirable. The judge relied on the judgment in Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 
(SCA). 
522 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 6, 11. 
523 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 89-91, 492-493, 503-506. 
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4 3 5 5  The beneficiaries 
 
The fundamental right of beneficiaries is to insist on proper administration of the trust so that 
the beneficiaries can enjoy the benefits to which they are actually or potentially entitled. 524 
This is similar to the position in other jurisdictions. 
 
In general, beneficiaries of South African trusts do not have real rights in the trust property 
(or proprietary rights, to use the English terminology), but only personal rights against the 
trustee. The trustee, who owns the trust property, can therefore deal with the trust property in 
any way provided it is done within the terms of the trust and not in breach of trust. The 
beneficiaries are protected to some extent by virtue of the fact that the trust property does not 
form part of the trustee’s personal estate. The beneficiaries only compete with creditors of the 
trust, not with the trustee’s personal creditors. This does not make the beneficiary’s right 
proprietary, but it does afford better protection and make it more valuable.525 
 
Another distinction from English law is that a beneficiary of a South African trust must accept 
the benefit in order to obtain an indefeasible right under the trust. There seems to be some 
disagreement about the role played by the acceptance of benefits. The requirement stems from 
the characterisation of an inter vivos trust, or at least the creation of such a trust, as a contract 
for the benefit of a third party.526 Under the law relating to contracts for the benefit of third 
parties, until the third party (the beneficiary) has accepted the benefit or promise thereof, the 
contract may be varied or cancelled by the other parties (the settlor and trustee).527  
 
This seems contrary to the obligation dimension of the trust, which does not originate from 
contractual principles, but rather from the fiduciary duty of the trustee towards the 
beneficiaries. It implies that someone must be able to hold the trustee to account. This right to 
require performance of the trust clearly lies with the beneficiaries. It is submitted that this 
right should not be subject to acceptance on the part of the beneficiary. This would, for 
example, be in accordance with Scots law, with which South African trust law shares 
numerous similarities. 
                                                      
524 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 556; see ch 2 para 4 3 4 1 for the different interests 
arising under different types of trusts. 
525 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 558-559. 
526 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 498-501; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles 
and Practice 116-118. 
527 See ch 2 para 4 2 2. 
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4 3 5 6  Duration of the trust 
 
In South Africa, there is no rule against perpetuities, in contrast with the position in 
England.528 It appears that a trust under South African law can exist for an indefinite period, 
and further that there is no time limit within which the interests of capital beneficiaries must 
vest. Clearly, there is much sense in the argument that the freedom given to settlors in this 
respect should be limited. Locking wealth away for many generations may cause social and 
economic problems. Suggestions have been made for a periodic capital transfer tax, not unlike 
that found in England with regard to certain discretionary trusts, but others argue that a 
statutory rule setting a time limit for vesting would be preferable.529 
 
4 4 Substantive requirements for the creation of a valid express trust under South African 
law 
 
4 4 1 Intention 
 
A settlor needs to illustrate a clear and unambiguous intention to create a trust. This is 
because creating a trust over property imposes a burden on the property, namely that the 
property must be administered according to the terms and provisions of the trust deed.530 It 
must also be clear that the intention was to create a trust and not another legal construct, such 
as a partnership or an agency.531 
 
Importantly, the intention to create an inter vivos trust must be shared by the settlor and the 
intended trustee.532 What this means is that no-one can be forced to be a trustee against his 
will. 
 
Whether the settlor had the intention to create a trust will be inferred from the circumstances. 
Factors to be taken into account include the words that are used, the formality of the 
arrangement, and what the usual practice is. In general, when interpreting a trust deed, the 
                                                      
528 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 125-127; see ch 2 para 2 7 4 for the English position. 
529 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 601. 
530 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 118. 
531 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 28. 
532 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 119; see also ch 2 para 4 4 2. 
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rules applicable to the interpretation of written contracts are used.533 As far as the wording of 
the trust instrument is concerned, peremptory language is preferable to precatory words, such 
as wish or desire. However, although using peremptory words like trust or trustee does 
indicate an intention to create a trust, it is not necessarily conclusive, as the circumstances 
may clearly indicate that a different arrangement was intended.534  
 
The use of precatory words may lead to confusion and has been dealt with in many court 
cases.535 The interpretation of such trust deeds can be dealt with in two possible ways. Either 
one tries to ascertain what the words mean as used by the testator, or one tries to ascertain 
what the testator meant by using those words.536 South African courts have generally followed 
the second approach and therefore, in summary, it can be said that precatory words may or 
may not create a trust, depending on the circumstances.537 
 
If the document does not express the intention of the founder correctly, rectification of the 
trust deed may be applied for by the settlor, trustee or other interested party. The settlor’s 
intention at the time of creation of the trust will be decisive.538 
 
Under South African law, trusts cannot be created unintentionally. Resulting trusts and 
constructive trusts form part of the English law of trusts and arise by operation of law. These 
types of trust have not been received in South Africa, mainly because South African law 
offers sufficient remedies in case of unjust enrichment.539  
 
4 4 2 Obligation 
 
In addition to the settlor having an intention to create a trust, this intention must be expressed 
in a manner appropriate to create an obligation. The intention must be contained in a form apt 
to create a legal obligation.540 The different sources of trusts constitute the requisite modes: A 
                                                      
533 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 268. 
534 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 119; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 28. 
535 See Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 119-127 for a discussion of these cases. 
536 Harter v Epstein 1953 (1) AllSA 273 (A) 280. Although this case concerned a testamentary trust, according 
to Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 120 it also applies to inter vivos trusts. 
537 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 120, 127. 
538 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 268-269. 
539 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 128-136; see ch 2 para 2 5. 
540 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 137-138. 
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testamentary trust must be contained in a will, and an inter vivos trust generally in a written 
agreement. Such a trust may also be created orally, but the trust and its creation will then be 
governed by common law, and the TPCA541 will not apply to it.542 Other modes include a court 
order, statute or treaty.543 The focus will remain on private inter vivos trusts created expressly. 
 
It is only sensible to reduce a trust to writing so as to avoid disputes about the terms thereof, 
and to provide proof of the intention to create a binding obligation and avoid challenges to its 
existence in the first place.544 
 
The obligation that is created is either the obligation on the trustee to administer the trust 
property in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, or the obligation on the settlor to take 
the necessary steps to ensure that the property will be administered by a trustee, mostly by 
transferring the property to the trustee.545 This will depend on the circumstances and whether 
or not a trustee has already been appointed and taken office. The absence of a validly 
appointed trustee therefore does not preclude the creation of a valid trust, as long as the 
obligation exists to create a trust and transfer the property to a trustee.546  
 
However, given the view that a trust inter vivos is created by way of a stipulatio alteri,547 it 
would be necessary for a trustee to have been appointed and to have accepted the appointment 
at the time of execution of the contract, in this case the trust deed.548 
  
Unlike the position in England, an inter vivos trust cannot be created unilaterally under South 
African law. In other words, a trust cannot be “declared”. The reason provided is that a person 
cannot during his lifetime unilaterally sequester a portion of his estate and dedicate it to 
certain ends.549 The agreement of at least one fellow trustee is required, which conforms to the 
                                                      
541 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 1, which defines “trust“ with reference to “trust instrument“, being a 
written agreement, testamentary writing or court order creating a trust. 
542 Unless it was reduced to writing afterwards. 
543 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 137-140; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles 
and Practice 28-29. 
544 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 140. 
545 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 138. 
546 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 138; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 29-30. 
547 See ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
548 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 176; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 30. 
549 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 298. 
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characterisation of an inter vivos trust as a stipulatio alteri.550 One may ask whether this is 
very different to a settlor transacting with a trustee who will be paid and therefore may not 
have an incentive to disagree with the settlor, or where the settlor is one of the trustees and 
controls the co-trustees, as in the Goodricke case.551 
 
4 4 3 Property 
 
The trust property, which could be any type of asset or group of assets, must be defined or 
identifiable with reasonable certainty.552 Although virtually any type of asset can be subject to 
a trust, the property must be determined with reasonable certainty in order to create a valid 
trust. In the event that the description of the trust property is unclear, any ambiguity will be 
resolved, in the case of an inter vivos trust, by having regard to any admissible intrinsic or 
extrinsic evidence.553 
 
In case of doubt, the extent of trust property will be determined having regard to how much is 
needed to fulfil the purpose of the trust. Discretion can also be conferred on the trustee to 
determine the amount of the trust property, provided however that objective criteria were 
provided by the settlor.554  
 
There is no requirement for the trustees to own all of the trust property at the inception of the 
trust, so that the settlor is able to transfer additional property to the trust subsequent to its 
creation. The same applies to transfers by third parties. It has been decided by the Appellate 
Division (as it was then known) in Deedat v The Master555 that, as long as the property is duly 




                                                      
550 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 38-39. 
551 Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N). 
552 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 1 defines trust property as “movable or immovable property and 
includes contingent interests in property which in accordance with the provisions of a trust instrument are to be 
administered or disposed of by a trustee”. 
553 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 146-148; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles 
and Practice 30. 
554 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 149-150. 
555 Deedat v The Master 1995 (2) SA 377 (A). 
556 Deedat v The Master 1995 (2) SA 377 (A) 384-385. 
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4 4 4 Object 
 
A further requirement for a valid trust is that the trust object must be sufficiently certain. 
South African law recognises trusts for the benefit of persons as well as trusts for impersonal 
objects. A trust intended to benefit persons can be for one or more named or ascertainable 
persons or one or more named or ascertainable classes of person, including legal persons. If 
the person or class is not named or ascertainable, the trust will fail for want of a certain 
object.557 
 
A trust may also have an impersonal object. In most cases the object will be charitable, but it 
appears that South African law does not necessarily prohibit non-charitable purpose trusts, 
which is the position in England. 558  Charitable trusts, which are not covered in this 
dissertation, receive a more benevolent construction in terms of their object because of the 
public element involved, and therefore the same precision in the description of the object is 
not required. There seems to be disagreement on whether all trusts for the public benefit are to 
be construed as charitable. Some take a narrow view, requiring benefit to the underprivileged 
or a connection to religion. The better view seems to be that human excellence, for example, 
in science, or the promotion of natural beauty, also benefits the public.559 
 
The more difficult question relates to objects that are clearly non-charitable and impersonal. 
Honoré mentions the fact that in English law, the rule against perpetuities560 militates against 
such non-charitable purpose trusts, but that this should not preclude such trusts from being 
recognised as valid by South African law.561  
 
Under English law, another objection against this type of trust is the absence of someone to 
enforce the trust or, to use English terminology, someone with an equitable right to the trust 
property who can enforce the trust obligations against the trustee.562 In the case of a trust for 
human beneficiaries, the beneficiaries will hold the trustee to account if he does not fulfil his 
duties with the necessary care and skill. In the case of charitable trusts, the Attorney-General 
                                                      
557 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 151. 
558 See ch 2 paras 2 7 2, 2 7 3. Arguments have been advanced for recognising non-charitable purpose trusts in 
England as discussed in para 2 7 3 1. 
559 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 161-167. 
560 See ch 2 para 2 7 4. 
561 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 170. 
562 This is known as the beneficiary principle, see ch 2 para 2 7 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 115 
of the Charity Commission is able to enforce the trust. The position in South African law 
should be similar. It should be considered whether a trustee in such a case will be held to 
account by any person or organisation in the event of a breach of trust. Can a valid trust exist 
in the absence of accountability of the trustee? 
 
Arguably, the categories of trust mentioned by Honoré would (at least on an English 
interpretation) fall either in the category of trusts for individual beneficiaries, trusts for 
charitable purposes, or “valid trusts for persons limited by a purpose”.563 There is no mention 
of the type of non-charitable purpose trust recognised by many offshore jurisdictions but not, 
as yet, by English law. These trusts often have as their sole purpose the holding of shares in a 
private trustee company, or some other passive holding function. Law in an offshore 
jurisdiction often allows the appointment of an enforcer, which, in theory, overcomes the 
objection that no one can enforce the trust, but this may be construed as artificial.564  
 
4 4 5 Legality 
 
The final substantive requirement for the creation of a valid trust is that the trust object must 
be lawful. If the object of a trust is illegal, contrary to public policy or contra bonos mores, it 
is unlawful and the trust would not be valid.565  Illegality may be easier to identify than a 
conflict with public policy or public morality, partly because the latter are not constant, 
unchanging concepts. An example of this is the changed attitude towards the racially 
discriminatory allocation of trust benefits, mostly found in charitable testamentary trusts. 
While such provisions were in the past accepted by the courts, recent case law indicates a 
change in attitude.566 
 
There does not appear to be many decided cases where the trust object was found to be 
unlawful. One example of illegality is a trust created to give a beneficial interest to an 
                                                      
563 See ch 2 para 2 7 2. 
564 See ch 2 para 3 4 3. 
565 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 32. 
566 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 32-33. See also Minister of Education v Syfrets 
Trust Ltd NO 2006 (4) SA 205 (C), where it was held that provisions discriminating on the grounds of gender 
and race in a charitable testamentary trust was contrary to public policy (even if it was not so at the time the will 
was executed) and have to be struck out of the will. Note that the trust itself was not held to be invalid; the court 
was not asked to consider whether the trust object was rendered unlawful as a result of the discriminatory 
provisions. A trust inter vivos has not come under scrutiny in this regard yet, but it may well lead to a similar 
result. 
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insolvent person, depriving the insolvent’s creditors from that interest. 567 This is clearly a 
fraud on the insolvency law (and many jurisdictions have enacted statutory provisions to 
prohibit trusts set up to avoid creditors). 
 
A recent case has drawn attention to the distinction between a trust’s object and its purpose.568 
In Peterson NO v Claassen 569  the court found that a trust with a lawful object may 
nevertheless have an unlawful purpose. Unlike an unlawful object, an unlawful purpose does 
not invalidate the trust. The judge was of the view that there is a considerable difference 
between the object and purpose of a trust, and that the purpose cannot in all circumstances be 
equated to the object of the trust. The object is openly proclaimed and ascertainable by parties 
dealing with the trust. A trust with a lawful object, such as benefiting the children of the 
settlor, may nevertheless have an unlawful purpose, and this will normally be “jealously 
guarded by those who harbour such purpose”.570 
 
The words ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ may be considered to mean the same thing in ordinary, non-
trust parlance. If one looks at the English law requirement of certainty of objects (a 
requirement for a valid trust)571 it becomes clear that, at least in English law, the object of a 
trust is either to benefit one or more persons, mostly individuals, or it is to further a purpose, 
quite often a charitable one. Thus, in some cases the object of the trust is a purpose.  
 
4 4 6 Further requirements? 
 
Du Toit572 mentions two possible additional requirements, namely the absence of control by 
the founder, and functional separation between a trustee’s control over the trust property and 
the benefit derived from such control. Both these points have been touched on already, and 
will be examined in more detail in chapter 4. These requirements may indeed be covered by 
the requirements of intention and obligation. 
                                                      
567 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 172. 
568 Peterson NO v Claassen 2006 (5) SA 191 (C). See also Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 32. 
569 Peterson NO v Claassen 2006 (5) SA 191 (C). 
570 Peterson NO v Claassen 2006 (5) SA 191 (C) paras 16-17. In this case, the trusts in question were said to 
have as their purpose placing assets beyond the reach of creditors. Could the validity of the trusts or the 
transactions have been attacked on another ground? Although the published judgment does not indicate who the 
beneficiaries of the trust were, it likely included the close family members of the sole trustee. Can this case also 
fall in the category of abuse of the trust form by excessive settlor or beneficiary control? 
571 See ch 2 para 2 7 1 3. 
572 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 34-36. 
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4 5 Role of legislative developments 
 
Although much can be said for the certainty provided by legislation, it is clear that most of 
South African trust law is judge-made. Apart from the taxation of trusts, legislative 
intervention has been minimal.  
 
The Trust Moneys Protection Act573 provided directives regarding the furnishing of security 
by trustees, and was the first statute dealing with trusts in the strict sense. Chapter 3 of the 
Administration of Estates Act574 (which never came into operation) attempted to provide for 
the issue of letters of administratorship to trustees. Both these Acts were repealed by the 
TPCA, which is the most important legislative document in the field of trusts.575 
 
After many years of developing mainly through the courts, in the 1980s the Law Commission 
considered whether to codify the law of trusts. Although many fundamental issues were dealt 
with by the courts, there was disagreement with regard to some of the solutions, and a feeling 
that some of the problematic issues could not be solved by the judiciary. 576  Legislative 
intervention was considered by some as the most appropriate solution 577  and the Law 
Commission played a vital part in this process.578 
 
A decision against total codification, and the increased state control it brings, was taken. The 
result is that the TPCA regulates only the registration and administration of trusts, and not 
their formation as such. Many problems related to trusts have therefore to be addressed 
without reference to the TPCA, although there seemed to be consensus that less state control 
is preferable.  
 
It has been stated that one of the main aims of the TPCA is the establishment of firmer control 
over trustees and their management of the trust by the Master of the High Court.579 This seems 
                                                      
573 Trust Moneys Protection Act 34 of 1934. 
574 Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965. 
575 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 21. 
576 And the fact that the judiciary did not always feel that it was their task to change the law. See Crookes NO v 
Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 287 as an example. 
577 Corbett (1993) 56 THRHR 262 267. 
578 See ch 2 para 4 6. 
579 Corbett (1993) 56 THRHR 262 267. 
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to be correct. The TPCA has also been held to protect the interests of the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the trust.580 
 
If one looks at the length of the TPCA and the issues it regulates, it is apparent that it 
regulates only limited aspects of trusts. These include the definition of a trust, trustee, trust 
instrument and trust property.581  
 
The duty to act with care, diligence and skill was a confirmation of the existing common law 
position. However, the limitation on excluding this duty in the trust deed582 constitutes one of 
the main innovations.583  (The provision presumably leaves some room for interpretation by 
the courts.) There seems to have been doubt regarding the existence of a fiduciary duty of 
trustees given the contractual nature of creation of an inter vivos trust. Making the duty of 
care an obligatory legal requirement had the advantage of clarifying any uncertainty about 
whether trustees had a fiduciary duty or not.584  
 
Of crucial importance in the South African context is the statutory confirmation of separation 
of trust property from the personal estate of the trustee,585 as this protects beneficiaries in the 
absence of a proprietary interest in the trust property.586 
 
Another important provision, which presumably confirms the pre-existing common law 
position, is that the Master of the High Court can request a trustee to account to the Master for 
his administration and disposal of trust property. 587  The trustee’s duty to account to the 
beneficiaries for his stewardship of the trust has been said to be one of the main features of 
the trust.588 
 
                                                      
580 Kropman NO v Nysschen 1999 (2) SA 567 (T) 576. 
581 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 1. 
582 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9. 
583 Wunsh (1988) De Rebus 547 550-552. This is further examined in ch 3. 
584 Schoenblum Multistate and Multinational Estate Planning §18-13. 
585 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 11-12; see also Wunsh (1988) De Rebus 547 550-551. 
586 See ch 2 paras 4 3 1, 4 3 2 2. 
587 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 16. 
588 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 11. 
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The powers of the court to vary the provision of trusts and to order the termination of trusts 
have also been confirmed. 589  These powers existed under common law, but have been 
substantially enlarged.590 
 
Many of the other provisions can be described as more administrative in nature. Although it is 
important to regulate such issues, these provisions do not necessarily contribute to more 
certainty regarding substantive trust issues. 
 
4 6 The South African Law Commission 
 
The South African Law Commission was constituted by the South African Law Reform 
Commission Act.591 The objects of the commission are to do research with reference to all 
branches of the law in order to make recommendations to the government for the 
development, improvement, modernisation or reform of the law.592  
 
Two documents are of importance in the trust sphere, both of these leading to the enactment 
of the TPCA; firstly, a working paper on the law of trusts593 and, secondly, a project report 
regarding the revision of trust law.594 
 
It was clear from the working paper that no revision of trust law in its totality was considered 
necessary, but rather more detailed regulation of the control over trust property. Issues that 
were considered in this working paper included the question of whether, on insolvency of the 
trustee, the trust property forms part of the insolvent estate of the trustee. As there was 
uncertainty regarding this issue, it was, rightly, felt that there was a need for statutory 
regulation. A balance had to be struck between the interests of the trust beneficiaries and the 
personal creditors of the trustee. 595 
 
                                                      
589 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 13. 
590 Corbett (1993) 56 THRHR 262 268. 
591 South African Law Reform Commission Act 19 of 1973. This act was previously called the South African 
Law Commission Act 19 of 1973. The title was amended by Judicial Matters Amendment Act 55 of 2002 s 8. 
592 Anonymous http://justice.gov.za (accessed 26-11-2015). 
593 SA Law Commission Working Paper 3 Law of Trusts (1984). 
594 SA Law Commission Report Regarding Revision of Trust Law, Project 9 (1987). 
595 This was dealt with by way of Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 12. 
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Other issues included the need for the courts to have the power or discretion to vary the 
provision of trust deeds and the need for trustees to consent to amendments to a trust deed, 
given the classification of an inter vivos trust, or at least the creation thereof, as a stipulatio 
alteri. 
 
A few vexed issues were not dealt with in the TPCA, such as whether trusts should have legal 
personality, and whether business or trading trusts should be regulated separately, given that 
they seem to offer the benefit of limited liability without the regulation related to corporate 
entities.596 
 
4 7 Role of the courts and case law 
 
The role of the judiciary in shaping and developing the trust law in South Africa has already 
become clear. To a large extent, the courts have defined what a trust is under South African 
law, especially where it was felt that divergence from the English rules was desirable. 
Considering the extent of the issues that have been dealt with by legislation,597 there is no 
doubt that the majority of trust law is judge-made. 
 
The preceding paragraphs have highlighted certain cases that were vital to the development of 
the law of trusts in South Africa. The judiciary’s view that the trust law is not fully developed 
and, like any other field of law, is not static, is also clear. The judiciary appears to feel a duty 
continually to develop South African trust law. 
 
Although it is accepted that certain areas of trust law would best be altered by way of 
legislation (for example the question of whether trusts should be irrevocable upon entering 
into the trust deed and transferring the property to the trustee598), the courts do play a more 
active role in the development of South African trust law. A relevant and recent example is 
the way the courts are dealing with the issues surrounding abuse of the trust form by trying to 
define the circumstances in which a court will ignore or look through a trust and suggesting 
appropriate and equitable (just) remedies in such cases.599  
                                                      
596 Wunsh (1988) De Rebus 547 547-548. 
597 See ch 2 para 4 5. 
598 Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD) 287. 
599 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 34. See ch 4 para 4 3 for a discussion 
of other relevant cases. 





A few significant themes are present throughout the examination of the historical 
development and current state of trust law in England, Jersey and South Africa. These themes, 
which appear to cross the jurisdictional divide, will be referred to in this dissertation as ‘core 
values’ and can be summarised as follows: 
 
5 1 Analysis in terms of obligation rather than property 
 
Trusts can be analysed in terms of property or in terms of obligation. Both these dimensions 
are essential to the existence of a trust. Although some would argue that it is an academic 
question whether trusts are analysed in terms of property or in terms of obligation, it appears 
that an obligations-based approach has certain practical advantages. This includes offering a 
better explanation of civil law trusts where no equitable proprietary rights exist. It also 
supports the importance of the irreducible core approach by placing emphasis on the 
obligations of the trustee towards the beneficiaries.  
 
5 2 The irreducible core of the trust 
 
An irreducible core of duties is owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries. This relates to the 
fiduciary obligations of the trustee, the standard of care expected of him in fulfilling these 
obligations, and the penalties for non-fulfilment of these duties.  
 
The standard of care and the ability to exclude liability differs from one jurisdiction to the 
next, and it may be that more focus on the irreducible core approach may add weight to the 
argument that trustees should be subjected to higher standards of care and should not be able 
to escape liability too easily. This would be relevant not only in the case of professional 
trustees who charge for their services and hold themselves out as experts, but also in the 
situation where family members of the settlor, who may benefit from the trust themselves, 
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5 3 Accountability of the trustee 
 
In all three jurisdictions, in order for a valid trust to exist, the beneficiaries (or someone else) 
must be able to enforce the trust and hold the trustee to account for the fulfilment of his 
duties. Without this accountability, imposing onerous duties and obligations on a trustee has 
little meaning or substance.  
 
The ability to create non-charitable purpose trusts in offshore jurisdictions threatens this 
accountability, as although an enforcer is able to hold the trustee to account, there is doubt 
regarding the enforcer’s incentives to do so. 
 
5 4 Overarching fiduciary duty to act in best interest of beneficiaries 
 
A trustee has an overarching duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries of the trust. 
The fiduciary nature of the trustee’s position is examined in detail in chapter 3, but it is 
already evident that, more than anything else, a trustee has to put the interests of the 
beneficiaries first.  
 
5 5 Separation of ownership/control and enjoyment  
 
Although not all three jurisdictions recognise dual ownership rights, all three do recognise 
that there should be a functional separation between the ownership and control of the trust 
property by the trustee, and the enjoyment thereof by the beneficiaries. Enjoyment in this 
sense refers to being able to benefit from the trust assets, but does not always indicate a 
proprietary right. The right of the beneficiary may also be personal. It has been shown that 
this does not necessarily mean that the beneficiary is in a worse position than if he had a 
proprietary right. In South Africa, this separation between control and enjoyment is often 
referred to as the “core idea” of the trust, from which many consequences flow, including the 
accountability of trustees. 
 
5 6 Separation of trust assets 
 
In all three jurisdictions, the assets donated by the settlor to the trustee no longer form part of 
the settlor’s estate. Neither do these assets form part of the trustee’s personal estate. Although 
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a trust is not a separate entity, the assets forming the subject matter of the trust are ring-
fenced. In South Africa, a separate trust estate is more clearly recognised than in England and 
Jersey, but the principle is that the trust assets are held separately and protected from claims 
made against the trustee personally. 
 
The following two chapters will illustrate how the themes summarised above can have an 
important bearing on the focal points of this dissertation. Chapter 3 examines the duties and 
liabilities of a trustee and to what extent liability can be excluded by the terms of the trust and 
chapter 4 the phenomenon of excessive settlor control and the consequences thereof.  









“The main duty of a trustee is to commit judicious breaches of trust.”1 
 
This chapter is concerned with the duties or obligations owed by trustees of an express inter 
vivos trust to the beneficiaries of such a trust. The focus will not be on individual, specific 
duties2 although such duties, often described in detail in the trust deed, are essential to the 
office of trustee. These specific duties are a result of the overarching, more general obligation 
to manage the trust fund in the best interest of the beneficiaries.3  
 
According to Hayton, the fundamental duty of a trustee includes acting within the terms of the 
trust, while at the same time acting with undivided loyalty and exclusively in the best interests 
of the beneficiaries and with the appropriate level of care, unless ousted by the terms of the 
trust deed.4 It will become clear that (apart from the ability to exclude the duty of care) this is 
an apt description for the fundamental duties of trustees in all three jurisdictions under review. 
It encapsulates the three main strands of a trustee’s core duties – the terms of the trust deed, 
fiduciary duties and the duty of care. 
 
Given the context of this dissertation and specifically the topic of the following chapter, the 
focus will be on those duties that form the antithesis of relinquishing control to the settlor. 
The focus will therefore be on fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill (which is not 
considered a fiduciary duty in all jurisdictions) and specifically how this duty relates to the 
vital task of investing the trust fund.  
                                                      
1 This quote is credited to a 19th century English judge. See Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 251. It may be an 
exaggeration, but the relevance and irony of the quote will become clear. 
2 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 673-924 describes these duties in great 
depth, including the duty to act impartially between beneficiaries, duties concerning acceptance of the trust 
property, delegation of powers and so forth. 
3 According to Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1508 the trustees have numerous powers and duties for the purpose 
of the overriding obligation to preserve and safeguard the trust property, and in exercising these powers and 
duties have to bear in mind their general duty to exercise care to the extent that they are not relieved of this duty. 
4 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 125 
 
Subsequent to analysing the core duties of a trustee, a conclusion will be drawn in the next 
chapters as to whether an abuse of trust is, at least in certain circumstances, effectively the 
result of a breach of trust on the part of the trustee. 
 
As alluded to at the end of chapter 2, certain core values pervade the discussion in this 
dissertation. These core values are: 
 
(a) a focus on an obligations-based approach (rather than a property-based approach), 
being an approach that analyses the rights of beneficiaries in terms of the duties owed 
to them by the trustees rather than their interest in the trust property; 
(b) the content of the irreducible core of a trust, in other words, the absolute minimum 
duties that need to be fulfilled in order to constitute a trust;  
(c) the importance of the accountability of the trustee towards the beneficiaries of the 
trust; 
(d) the overarching fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries of the 
trust, a topic closely aligned with the irreducible core of the trust; 
(e) the separation of ownership and control of the trust property from the enjoyment 
thereof, indicating that dealing with the trust fund is the duty of the trustee and not the 
settlor or beneficiaries; and 
(f) the separation of the trust assets from the trustee’s personal assets. 
 
These core values will form the framework against which the legal developments in the 
different jurisdictions will be considered in this chapter and will be referred to where relevant 
(some of these themes being more relevant in the next chapter). 
 
A comparative study will be made of the legal status quo in the three chosen jurisdictions, 
England, Jersey (and some other offshore jurisdictions) and South Africa, including an 
examination of developments driven by case law and legislation. Parallels will be drawn and 
an attempt will be made to identify developments from which South African trust law, being 
comparatively new, can learn. 
 
As a first step, the position of the trustee as a fiduciary, the nature of fiduciary duties and their 
relationship to the core principles of trusteeship will be examined. Another fundamental 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 126 
aspect of the role of a trustee is the duty of care and skill. The duty of care covers many areas 
of trusteeship and, in fact, refers not to a singular duty but to a standard that regulates the 
manner in which trustees perform their duties. It is because of the duty of care that not only 
positive actions, such as misapplication of the trust fund, can be a breach of trust, but also 
omissions, such as failing to monitor the performance of trust investments.5 This duty existed 
in common law and has been entrenched in legislation in most trust jurisdictions. The 
background to this legislation will be studied briefly to give insight into what the statutory 
duty was set out to achieve in each of the jurisdictions. The required standard is, at least 
prima facie, not the same in all trust jurisdictions and the effect of this on the protection of 
beneficiaries and on the trust industry itself will be highlighted.  
 
Not surprisingly, the duties and obligations of a trustee are of most practical importance when 
those duties are not fulfilled so that there is a breach of trust and, as is frequently the case, a 
trustee is attempting to escape liability or accountability for his action or inaction. As a trust is 
not a legal entity, the trustee is personally liable for breaches of trust. It has been stated before 
that if the trustee is not accountable to the beneficiaries, then there is no trust.6 Therefore, the 
consequences of a trustee not fulfilling the duties imposed on him will be studied as a next 
step.  
 
A comparative study will be made of the concept of breach of trust. The remedies available to 
beneficiaries and third parties dealing with a trustee will not form part of the dissertation, 
although it will be appropriate to refer to the remedies at certain stages. Instead, the aim is to 
characterise the essential trustee duties and obligations as well as the circumstances that cause 
a breach of those duties, with a view to drawing a conclusion regarding the nature of an abuse 
of trust. Such abuse is regularly the result of a settlor (who may also be a beneficiary) 
exercising excessive control over a trust and its assets. The question arises as to who should 
be accountable to the beneficiaries in such circumstances. With whom do the fiduciary 
responsibilities lie if the trustee has abdicated those duties? And if there is no one accountable 
to the beneficiaries, is there still a trust? These questions will be examined further in chapters 
4 and 5. 
 
                                                      
5 Clarry (2014) 12 TQR 31 para 5. 
6 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253. In this respect the duties of trustees are vital in determining what the 
trustees are being held accountable for. 
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The widening of trustees’ investment powers from the 1980s onwards resulted in the area of 
trust investments becoming increasingly complex. Even where the trustee is a professional 
person, he cannot be expected to be an investment specialist. As a result, trustees have 
increasingly been relying on investment advisers and managers to take care of trust 
investments. This increasing complexity brought with it increased risks, and a comparison 
will be made of how the different jurisdictions dealt with this issue. 
 
Another focus point will be the ability of a trustee to rescind incorrect or inadequate trustee 
decisions, achieved in England and in certain offshore jurisdictions under a rule known as the 
rule in Hasting-Bass,7 and the attitude of courts and legislators towards this development. The 
extent to which this rule has been used (and, according to many commentators, abused) by 
trustees to escape the consequences of certain actions, coupled with the reaction of the 
offshore world to a recent judicial limitation of this rule in England, makes for an interesting 
development in the context of this dissertation. Although no similar rule exists under South 
African law, interesting parallels can be drawn with regard to issues surrounding trustee 
liability for wrongdoing. 
 
Finally, a study will be made of the legal attitude towards the extent of trustee exoneration 
clauses in the three jurisdictions under review. The standard against which trustees are or 
should be judged has been examined in great detail in reports of law commissions, case law 
and commentary thereon. In England, although the position is much debated, it is currently 
possible for a trustee to exclude liability for gross negligence, whereas this is not the case in 
Jersey (and many other offshore jurisdictions) and South Africa. In South Africa, a trustee is 
in fact liable for ordinary negligence as well. The overriding question is whether the 
possibility to exclude liability for gross negligence is in conflict with the core duties of a 
trustee or, stated differently, with the irreducible core of the trust. How far can the boundaries 
of acceptable trustee behaviour be pushed?  
 
Varying approaches in the different jurisdictions and the theoretical underpinnings of each 
approach will be examined. In order to have a holistic overview, other factors that impact 
upon trustee liability will also be considered, as will the demands of settlor freedom and 
pressures resulting from the financial importance of the trust industry in each of the 
                                                      
7 The rule has its origins in the case of Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[1974] 2 All ER 193. 
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jurisdictions. This point is particularly important in the context of the following chapters 
where the relationship between trustee liability and settlor control will be examined further. 
  
2 Fundamental trustee duties and obligations 
 
2 1 England 
 
2 1 1 The trustee as a fiduciary 
 
The position under English law is clear. A trustee is a fiduciary.8 Trustees are not the only 
examples of fiduciaries, although the relationship of trustee and beneficiary can be described 
as the archetypal or leading fiduciary relationship, and the characterisation has subsequently 
been used to describe other types of relationship as fiduciary as well.9  
 
Despite the unequivocal statement that a trustee is a fiduciary, there does not seem to be a 
widely accepted definition of the term fiduciary under English law.10 Underhill and Hayton 
list the following characteristics:  
 
(a) the fiduciary has undertaken to act in the interests of the principal;  
(b) as part of this arrangement the fiduciary has powers and discretions that can be used to 
affect the interest of the principal in a legal or practical sense;  
(c) the principal is vulnerable to an abuse by the fiduciary of his position as such; and 
(d) the principal has not agreed, as a person of full capacity who is fully informed, to 
allow the fiduciary to use his powers and discretions in the furtherance of the 
fiduciary’s own interests.11 
 
Underhill and Hayton explain that a transition from fiduciary disabilities to fiduciary duties 
has led to much of the uncertainty today. The origins of fiduciary duties can be found in 
equitable rules that prevented a fiduciary from acting in a specific way rather than requiring 
                                                      
8 Hudson Equity and Trusts 52. 
9 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 37; Hudson Equity and Trusts 53; Pettit 
Equity and the Law of Trusts 436. Other examples of fiduciaries include estate agents, solicitors, discretionary 
portfolio managers and company directors. 
10 Hudson Equity and Trusts 593; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 479. 
11 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 37. 
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him to perform certain duties. Analysing fiduciary obligations as disabilities rather than duties 
does indeed contribute to a better understanding of the concept.12  
 
Thus, for example, where a trustee who made unauthorised profits is directed to account for it, 
this is not a monetary award resulting from his wrongdoing, but rather an order that gives 
effect to the rule that a fiduciary is disabled from retaining unauthorised profits.13 
 
The authors further explain that the principle that a trustee owes negative fiduciary duties to 
beneficiaries was developed by the Courts of Chancery and has been part of English law since 
the early 18th century.14 However, it is only since the late 20th century that a different way of 
thinking pervaded the courts and these fiduciary disabilities were rephrased as a duty on a 
trustee not to promote his personal interest in circumstances where there is a conflict, or a real 
or substantial possibility of conflict, between the personal interests of the trustee and those of 
his principal.15  
 
Turning to more recent attempts to define fiduciary duties, Millet LJ provided the following 
definition in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew, 16  a case regarding actions of a 
solicitor in the same transaction acting for both mortgagor and mortgagee, but which has been 
very influential in English trust law: 
 
“A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a 
particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and 
confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. 
The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core 
liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a 
profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his 
interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or for the benefit of a third 
person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an 
                                                      
12 As explained later in ch 3 para 2 1 3 the duty of care is not considered a fiduciary duty under English law and 
not part of the irreducible core duties of trustees either. Could this have anything to do with the origin of 
fiduciary duties as fiduciary disabilities, i.e. a negative rather than a positive duty? 
13 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 512. 
14 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 514. 
15 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 513. 
16 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
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exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They 
are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.”17 
 
Returning to the meaning of the word fiduciary, Hudson explains that the etymology of the 
word indicates connections with the notions of faith, belief, confidence and trust.18 Given the 
trust and confidence placed in someone who acts in a fiduciary capacity, it is not surprising 
that strict rules governing fiduciary behaviour have been developed by equity and common 
law. The fiduciary is subject to the rights of the person who places trust in them (in the trust 
context, the beneficiary, whose rights have been examined),19 and is the one taking on onerous 
obligations. 
 
Penner states that the ideas of discretion and (avoidance of) conflict of interest, in other words 
to act exclusively in the interests of his principal, lie at the heart of the fiduciary relationship. 
The fiduciary has to act only in the interest of the persons on whose behalf he is acting and 
must not allow any conflict of interest between his or someone else’s interests and the 
interests of the principal.20 
 
Underhill and Hayton confirm this view. However, according to the authors the exclusivity is 
not concerned with undivided loyalty in the usual sense, but refers instead to a “deliberative 
exclusivity”, meaning that the trustee does not necessarily have to have the same subjective 
outlook as his principal, but he must deliberately exclude his own and any other parties’ 
interests from consideration in exercising his judgment.21  
 
                                                      
17 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698 711-712. Although Millett LJ admitted that 
the list is not exhaustive and that there may be other obligations that are fiduciary in nature, the characteristics 
listed here may have been focused specifically on the facts in casu, which involved a situation of conflict with a 
fiduciary acting for two principals. In the (still) leading (but criticised) English case on the permissible extent of 
trustee exemption clauses, Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241, which will be studied later in this chapter, Millet LJ 
built on his findings in the Mothew judgment to find that a trustee under an English law trust can be exempted 
from gross negligence, a concept that relates to the duty of care, which is not considered a fiduciary duty under 
English law. 
18 Hudson Equity and Trusts 594.  
19 See ch 2 para 2 6 5. 
20 Penner The Law of Trusts 22-23. This is examined below. 
21 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 511-512. 
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According to Virgo, who agrees that the identification of fiduciary relationships and duties are 
fraught with difficulties, a fiduciary relationship is one of trust and confidence,22 echoing 
Hudson’s findings above. 
 
It appears that a fiduciary is not subject to fiduciary duties because he is a fiduciary, but rather 
that, because he is subject to fiduciary duties, he is a fiduciary.23 
 
2 1 2 Fiduciary duties 
 
2 1 2 1  General 
 
What then is meant by the term fiduciary duty?24 
 
Firstly, not all fiduciaries owe the same duties or obligations in the same type of 
circumstances, and even in the case of trustees it seems hard to define the fiduciary duties of a 
trustee without regard to the circumstances of each specific case.25 Another view is that there 
is one fiduciary duty, comprising a number of overlapping obligations focused on loyalty and 
faithfulness, and being the defining duty of trusteeship.26  
 
A trustee, being a fiduciary, is liable for all loss suffered by the beneficiary, not only for 
contractual or tortious loss (although, as discussed below, the liability of a trustee may be 
limited by the trust deed).27 Being in a fiduciary position carries with it greater responsibility28 
than, for example, being in a simple contractual relationship, where the liability of the parties 
will always be limited to the terms of the contract. This is because public policy requires 
                                                      
22 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 479-480. 
23 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 479; Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 
698 712. 
24 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 510 explains that the term fiduciary 
duty is used in two different but overlapping senses. The first refers to the duty to avoid conflict, discussed 
below. The second meaning is a looser reference to duties owed by trustees or other fiduciaries, and can refer 
either to the duty to avoid conflict or, confusingly, also to the general duty to comply with the terms of authority 
applicable to the trustee when dealing with the trust property. This is what Millet LJ referred to in Bristol & West 
Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698 when he stated that it was inappropriate to apply the expression 
fiduciary duty to the obligation of a trustee to act with proper skill and care in the discharge of his duties.  
25 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 517; Hudson Equity and Trusts 596. 
26 Watt Trusts and Equity 322. 
27 Hudson Equity and Trusts 595-596. 
28 Watt Trusts and Equity 323-324. Public policy requires rigorous enforcement of fiduciary duties. 
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rigorous enforcement of fiduciary duties.29 Where a contract exists between the parties to a 
fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary relationship creates different duties and obligations than 
those arising by virtue of the contract.30 Furthermore, the threshold for a fiduciary being liable 
for loss is lower than that applying to a person who does not act in a fiduciary capacity.31  
 
Crucially, not all duties owed by a fiduciary to his principal are fiduciary in nature. In the case 
of a trustee, a distinction should be made between the peremptory fiduciary duties of no profit 
and no conflict of interest, and the prescriptive duties such as the non-fiduciary duty of care 
and skill.32 Both these categories are discussed below. 
 
Admitting that uncertainty exists regarding the exact meaning of fiduciary duties, in the 
Mothew33 case, Millet LJ stated: 
 
“The term ‘fiduciary duty’ is properly confined to those duties which are peculiar to 
fiduciaries and the breach of which attracts legal consequences differing from those 
consequent upon the breach of other duties. Unless the expression is so limited it is 
lacking in practical utility. In this sense it is obvious that not every breach of duty by a 
fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty.”34 
 
He also stated: 
 
“Breach of fiduciary obligation, therefore, connotes disloyalty or infidelity. Mere 
incompetence is not enough. A servant who loyally does his incompetent best for his 
master is not unfaithful and is not guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty.”35 
 
These dicta confirm that breaching the duty of care, which, as explained below, is non-
fiduciary, for example by acting negligently or incompetently, is not the same as breaching a 
                                                      
29 Watt Trusts and Equity 323-324. 
30 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership) [1994] 2 All ER 806 821-822.  
31 Hudson Equity and Trusts 604. 
32 See ch 3 para 2 1 3 for a discussion of the duty of care. 
33 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
34 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698 710. In reaching this conclusion, Millett LJ 
refers to and endorses Canadian and Australian case law to the same effect. 
35 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698 712. 
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fiduciary duty. In this case, the solicitor was found guilty of a breach of the duty of care, but 
not of breach of fiduciary duty.36  
 
Resonance is found in academic writing for the proposition that the overriding duties of 
loyalty, good faith and faithfulness constitute the origin of those specific duties that can be 
described as fiduciary duties.37 A fiduciary power, as opposed to a personal power, cannot be 
exercised in the fiduciary’s own interest, echoing the fiduciary duty of no conflict.38  
 
Fiduciary duties flow from a fiduciary relationship, and also come to an end when the 
relationship comes to an end. However, the scope of the duties, although generally determined 
by the type of fiduciary relationship, can be limited contractually (in the case of trusts this 
would be by virtue of provisions in the trust deed). Thus, the scope of fiduciary duties can 
have a contractual source and the extent and nature of the duties can be amended 
contractually.39 
 
2 1 2 2  Recognised fiduciary duties: no conflict and no profit 
 
The core fiduciary duties making up the obligation of loyalty are the duty of no conflict and 
the duty of no profit.40 A trustee, being in a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiaries of a 
trust he administers, owes these fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, although he also owes 
the beneficiaries other duties that cannot be described as fiduciary in nature, such as the duty 





                                                      
36 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698 717-718. 
37 For example, Watt Trusts and Equity 322 where it is stated that “The fiduciary duty comprises a number of 
overlapping obligations concerned to promote loyalty or faithfulness. It is the defining duty of trusteeship.”; 
Hudson Equity and Trusts 596 where it is stated that “Such an atomisation of fiduciary obligations into particular 
factual circumstances contributes to our difficulty in defining precisely what is meant by labeling someone a 
fiduciary. We return to the general ideas of good faith and loyalty outlined above for a more general 
understanding of what it means to be a fiduciary.” 
38 Hudson Equity and Trusts 126-137. 
39 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 517-519. 
40 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 510; Penner The Law of Trusts 399-
404. 
41 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 480-481. 
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(a) No conflict 
 
The duty of no conflict prohibits a fiduciary whose interests conflict with those of his 
principal from preferring his own interest above that of his principal, and also requires a 
fiduciary to avoid situations where his personal interests (or those of his other principals) 
conflict with the interests of his principal. (In the context of trusts, the beneficiaries of the 
trust would be the trustee’s principals.) Actual conflict is not required to establish a breach of 
this duty; the existence of potential conflict is sufficient.42  
 
The no conflict rule encompasses two further rules, namely the self-dealing rule and the fair-
dealing rule. 43  Pettit describes these rules in terms of the disability of the trustee to the 
purchase trust property or an equitable interest therein, the purpose of the rules being to 
prevent the trustee from abusing his position or profiting (unduly) from the trust.44 
 
The self-dealing rule provides that a fiduciary is not allowed to deal on behalf of himself and 
the principal in the same transaction.45 Such a transaction can be set aside.46 Limitations exist, 
and it is clear that conflicts may be authorised or acquiesced to.47  
 
The fair-dealing rule operates by requiring a fiduciary who transacts with his principal to 
show that he did not abuse his position as fiduciary, that he made full disclosure to the 
principal and that the transaction was fair and honest, for example because the best price was 
                                                      
42 Hudson Equity and Trusts 329; Penner The Law of Trusts 399; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 495-
496; Watt Trusts and Equity 327-329. Penner explains the rule by saying that, based on equitable principles, if a 
transaction entered into by a fiduciary turns out to be made in conflict of interest, the transaction can be set aside. 
Somewhat confusingly, Penner cites the case of Boardman v Phipps [1972] 2 AC 46 as an example of breach of 
the no conflict rule, whereas Hudson Equity and Trusts 331-332 describes it as an example of the no profit rule. 
Clearly the rules are closely related. 
43 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 510, 886-899. 
44 Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts 442-446. See also Tito v Waddell (No. 2) [1977] 3 All ER 129 246-247 
where Megarry VC agreed that equity subjects trustees to particular disabilities where the self-dealing and fair-
dealing rules are concerned.  
45 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 497-499. This would clearly create a conflict in that, if the trustee 
wishes to sell trust property to himself in his personal capacity, his personal interest would be to obtain the 
lowest price, whereas as trustee he should be concerned with obtaining the best price for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries. 
46 Hudson Equity and Trusts 332; Penner The Law of Trusts 421-422. 
47  Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 896. In Sargeant v National 
Westminster Bank plc (1990) 61 P&CR 518, which dealt with a testamentary trust, the trust deed allowed 
trustees to purchase trust assets notwithstanding that they were trustees and the Court of Appeal upheld this 
ability, notwithstanding that it puts the trustees in a position of conflict of interest.  
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obtained for the principal.48 If this is not done, the transaction is voidable and can be set 
aside.49 The rule operates less strictly than the self-dealing rule,50 as it does not involve a 
trustee selling to himself but rather involves two real parties. 51 
 
(b) No profit 
 
The second of the fundamental fiduciary duties is the no profit rule. At first glance, this rule 
may appear to be difficult to distinguish from the no conflict rule. It prohibits the fiduciary 
from obtaining a benefit, either for himself or for a third party, by virtue of his position as 
fiduciary, unless full disclosure has been made to the principal and he has given his consent. 52 
This would include the case of a trust deed providing that a trustee can charge for his 
services.53  
 
In fact, the rule may be better described as a rule against unauthorised profits, given that most 
trustees nowadays are professionals and therefore are being paid out of the trust fund and 
because there may be other instances where the beneficiaries consent to the trustee’s retention 
of a profit.54 
 
Unless an exception applies, the rule operates strictly. 55 It applies even where the trustee 
makes a profit for the beneficiaries that they would not otherwise have obtained and where 
there was no question of the trustee acting dishonestly.56  
                                                      
48 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 898; Tito v Waddell (No. 2) [1977] 3 
All ER 129 241. 
49 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 499-500. An example would be where the trustee purchases a 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust. The beneficiary would be able to set the transaction aside, unless the trustee 
can prove that the transaction was fair. 
50 Watt Trusts and Equity 330. 
51 Penner The Law of Trusts 422. 
52 Hudson Equity and Trusts 330-332; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 503-504. 
53 Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts 438-442. There is no rule as such preventing trustees from being paid but 
the onus is on the trustee to show either a provision in the trust deed or a provision of general law to the effect 
that he can charge for his services as trustee. 
54 Penner The Law of Trusts 411-415.  
55 Watt Trusts and Equity 338-346. 
56 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 510. This happened in Boardman v 
Phipps [1972] 2 AC 46, where the solicitor acting for the trustees of a family trust purchased a majority 
shareholding in a company in which the trustees have invested but that has been performing poorly in recent 
years. It would not have been prudent for the trustees to make a further investment and he decided to do so in his 
own name instead. However, he did not obtain the consent of all the trustees. His intention was that, once he and 
the trustees had control over the company, they would improve the profitability of the company and thereby 
benefit the beneficiaries. A large profit was realised, for the trustees and for the solicitor personally, and 
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Many modern trust deeds authorise the trustee to breach these rules, for example where the 
trustee company forms part of a bigger banking group that provides banking services to the 
trust and earns fees and commissions as a result. This is but one example of how the practical 
requirements of the modern trust industry do not always go hand in hand with the age-old 
institution of the trust. This is considered further below.57 
 
2 1 3 The duty of care 
 
The fiduciary duties of a trustee under English law were briefly examined above. Clearly 
there are many other duties and obligations that rest on the shoulders of a trustee, and the fact 
that these are not fiduciary in nature does not indicate that they are less important. The most 
important non-fiduciary trustee duty is arguably the duty of care.58 
 
In Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew59 Millett LJ confirmed that the duty of care is 
not fiduciary in nature: 
 
“It is similarly inappropriate to apply the expression [fiduciary duty] to the obligation 
of a trustee or other fiduciary to use proper skill and care in the discharge of his 
duties.”60 
 
A few years later, in Armitage v Nurse 61  the same judge held that the irreducible core 
obligations owed by a trustee to the beneficiaries do not include the duty of care, skill, 
prudence and diligence.62 
 
Whereas fiduciary duties are concerned with undivided loyalty on the part of the trustee, the 
duty of care relates to the care and skill expected of a trustee in managing the trust and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
although he had the interests of the trust and its beneficiaries at heart in making the investment, the majority of 
the House of Lords held that he was holding his personal profit on constructive trust for the beneficiaries.  
57 See ch 3 para 2 4. 
58 Hudson Equity and Trusts 313. 
59 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
60 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698 710. 
61 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
62 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253-254. Millett LJ also said that it would be sufficient if a trustee fulfilled 
the duty to perform the trusts honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Presumably he 
intended to equate these duties to the fiduciary duties of a trustee. 
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assets belonging to it. It is probably most relevant in the context of trustee investment of the 
trust fund, but applies in other cases as well. 
 
In exercising any non-fiduciary trustee duty, for example the duty of care with regard to 
making investments, the fiduciary duties of loyalty (such as not to make an unauthorised 
profit or not to act in a manner in which the trustee’s interests conflict with those of the 
beneficiaries) are inextricably part of the exercise. It is, however, possible to commit a breach 
of fiduciary duty whilst exercising, and fulfilling, the duty of care.63 The converse is also true 
– a trustee who is incompetent but attempts honestly and loyally to do the best for the 
beneficiaries does not breach his fiduciary duty but may breach his duty of care.64 
 
2 1 3 1  Common law duty of care and skill 
 
The general duty of care and prudence has existed under common law (or in equity) for more 
than a century65 before it was enshrined in the Trustee Act 200066 (2000 Act). At the time the 
2000 Act was being negotiated, the general equitable duty of care was not yet laid down with 
precision and was regarded as a developing duty.67 
 
Case law from the 19th century indicates that the common law duty of care and skill centred 
around what an ordinary prudent man of business would have done in the management of his 
own affairs, and who, when selecting investments, had to consider that he was acting for 
someone he felt morally obliged to provide for. 68  Given this moral duty, no speculative 
investments were allowed and safety had to come first.69 Such a test is objective and does not 
take account of the skills or expertise of the particular trustee. 
                                                      
63 Watt Trusts and Equity 354, where the example is used of a trustee making an unauthorised but prudent 
investment in his own business using money belonging to the trust. 
64 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698 712. 
65 Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1508-1511; Watt Trusts and Equity 354. 
66 Trustee Act 2000 s 1. 
67 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 787. 
68 Hudson Equity and Trusts 320; Cowan v Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750 762, where reference is made to the 
older case of Learoyd v Whiteley (1887) 12 App Cas 727. In the latter case, it was held that a trustee must take 
such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he had to make an investment on behalf of someone to whom 
he owed a moral obligation. 
69 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 787-788; Hudson Equity and Trusts 
324; Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 422-425; Speight v Gaunt (1883) 22 Ch. D. 727; Learoyd v 
Whiteley (1887) 12 App Cas 727, where it was held at 733 that “…it is the duty of a trustee to confine himself to 
the class of investments which are permitted by the trust, and likewise to avoid all investments of that class 
which are attended with hazard.” However, in Re Godfrey (1883) 23 Ch D 483 493 the court noted that prudent 
businessmen do incur risk as part of their business. 
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During the 20th century it was recognised that a prudent degree of risk could be accepted, but 
it had to be distinguished from the type of risk that constituted a hazard. If a trustee who acted 
honestly and reasonably competent and with reasonable prudence made an error of judgment, 
it was considered unjust to hold him liable.70 Even in the relatively modern case of Nestle v 
Westminster Bank plc,71 a case concerning the narrowness of the range of equities the trustee 
invested in, the prudent investor rule was used and it was held that preserving a trust fund is 
always more important than advancing, or growing, it. 72  The court admitted that what a 
prudent man should do at any given time depends to a large extent on the prevailing economic 
and financial conditions, and would not necessarily be the same as that which a judge 50 or 
100 years ago would have held to be a prudent investment. This case was an extreme 
example, as the trust existed for a very long time (since 1922 and the judgment was given in 
1994), a period during which the investment world changed dramatically.73 
 
Even under the common law duty of care it was recognised that a paid trustee should 
generally be held to a higher standard of diligence and knowledge than an unpaid trustee.74 An 
important case signalling a further change in approach in so far as professional trustees are 
concerned was Bartlett v Barclays Bank.75  
 
The trustee in question held a controlling interest in a company that made hazardous and 
speculative investments. These investments caused a substantial loss to the trust fund, as the 
shares of the holding company plummeted in value. The court felt that a prudent man of 
business would have safeguarded his investment by taking action if he became aware of 
certain facts in relation to the company and would not have been content merely to receive the 
information a shareholder normally receives at annual general meetings of the company.76  
 
                                                      
70 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139 150. 
71 Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118  
72 Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118 140-142. The standard of prudence was referred 
to in this case as “undemanding” and the bank, in its capacity as trustee (not as investment expert), was not 
found guilty of a breach of trust resulting in loss. 
73 Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118 126-134. 
74 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 787; Re Waterman's Will Trusts 
[1952] 2 All ER 1054 1055. 
75 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
76 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139 150-151. 
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It was held that a higher standard of care, thus higher than the prudent man of business 
standard, should be expected of a corporate trustee that carries on a specialised business of 
trust administration, that has specially trained staff and holds itself out as having specialist 
skills and expertise, a standard that cannot be expected of ordinary prudent persons who act, 
often unpaid and out of a sense of moral or family duty, as trustees.77 It appears as if the 
requirements of this higher standard have never been examined in case law, so that there is no 
guidance as to how strictly this will be applied.78 Even in the Bartlett79 case it was found that 
both standards were breached and there was no need to analyse the requirements of a higher 
standard, apart from saying that a trustees must be liable for loss caused by the trustee’s 
neglect to exercise the special care and skill it professes to have.80 One can expect much to 
depend on the circumstances of the specific case. 
 
It is worth noting that, as a result of the decision in Bartlett,81 many English law and offshore82 
trust deeds now contain so-called anti-Bartlett clauses, allowing the trustee not to interfere in 
the management of companies in which he invests on behalf of the trust, unless he has actual 
knowledge of dishonesty on the part of the directors or officers of such companies.83 Here we 
see another example of how the modern trust industry adapts to take account of judicial or 
legislative developments that are not in line with current reality, in this case by having an 
impact on the ability of a trustee to partake in investment opportunities without incurring too 
much risk.  
 
As mentioned above, in Armitage v Nurse,84 Millett LJ held that the duty of skill and care, 
prudence and diligence, is not part of the irreducible core obligations of the trustee. In his 
view the core obligations only include the duty to perform the trusts honestly and in good 
faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries.85  
                                                      
77 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 424-425; Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 
139 152. 
78 Penner The Law of Trusts 289-290. 
79 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139 153. 
80 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139 152. 
81 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
82 Although many offshore jurisdictions, including Jersey, do not allow the blanket exclusion of the duty of care. 
83 A typical clause may read: The trustees need not interfere in the management or conduct of any company even 
if they hold shares or securities giving them control of the company and in particular in the absence of actual 
notice of dishonesty on the part of the directors of the company the trustees may leave the conduct of the 
business of the company to its directors and need not require any information to which any other shareholder 
would not be entitled. 
84 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
85 Hudson Equity and Trusts 325; Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253-254. 
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To say that the requirement of prudence is not a core trustee obligation goes against previous 
case law and waters down the concept of an irreducible core of trusteeship. It is, however, 
explained as an attempt by Millet LJ to avoid setting the standard expected of a trustee too 
high, thereby discouraging individuals and corporations from taking on trusteeship. The same 
may be said of the industry-driven reaction to Bartlett,86 intended to effectively negate the 
effect of the judgment so as to ease the pressure on trustees. This is especially relevant in the 
modern and highly technical world of financial investments where a trustee needs more 
freedom to make high-yielding and fast-growing investments that, inevitably, carry a higher 
degree of risk.87 
 
2 1 3 2  Background to the statutory duty of care 
 
This explanation of Millet LJ’s thinking fits in well with what is understood to have been the 
general mood at the time. The statutory duty of care enacted by the 2000 Act was the result of 
a clear desire on the part of practitioners, trustees and academics to modernise the ability of a 
trustee to invest and manage the trust fund with fewer restrictions.88 As in other jurisdictions, 
the flexibility of the trust idea meant that it was developed primarily by the judiciary and not 
by the legislature. However, the legislation that did exist was becoming more and more 
outdated, and by the 1980s there was a clear understanding that the principles relating to the 
powers and duties of trustees had to be modernised, particularly in relation to investments. 89 
The statutory duty of care was a reaction to the widening of trustee powers, an attempt to 
afford protection to the beneficiaries of a trust who would be exposed to more investment 
risk. 
 
Given the fast-paced development of global financial markets during this period, the trustee 
investment powers, contained mainly in the Trustee Act 1925 and the Trustee Investments 
Act 1961, were considered too restrictive.90 Although it was possible to include more liberal 
                                                      
86 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
87 Hudson Equity and Trusts 324-325. 
88 Hayton (1990) 106 LQR 87; Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 2-4. 
89 Hayton (1990) 106 LQR 87 87-96. 
90 In Trustees of the British Museum v Attorney General [1984] 1 All ER 337 it was held at 342-343 that, given 
the greatly changed circumstances of the last 20 years, trustee powers of investment should be revised and 
extended, but as a counter to that there should be provisions for advice and control. Furthermore, the size of the 
trust fund may be relevant in so far as a larger trust fund may justify a wider range of investments and greater 
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investment powers in the trust deed, this was, for various reasons, not always done. Trustees 
in the 1980s and 1990s operated in a totally different investment environment compared to 
their counterparts in the early 1900s, but were not able to take full advantage of the 
investment opportunities on offer in order to do the best they could for the trust 
beneficiaries.91  
 
Another changing factor was that trustees were, more often than not, paid professionals or 
trust corporations, and not the typical traditional trustee who, even if he was a professional 
such as a solicitor or accountant, was selected for his utmost good faith, and often had a 
personal relationship with the settlor or beneficiaries. This led to a reconsideration of the 
traditional governance applicable to trustees, which was now considered out of date, and 
formed a foundation for the reform achieved by the 2000 Act.92 
 
The focus of this discussion will be on investment powers as the main driver for change, 
although it should be borne in mind that other powers and duties were also at stake in the 
consideration of a statutory duty of care.93 
 
2 1 3 3  Role of the Law Commission 
 
The Law Commission published a report entitled Trustees’ Powers and Duties in 1999.94 This 
report sets out the background and reasoning to the introduction of a statutory duty of care. 
The recommendation that a trustee should have wider powers of investment, in fact the same 
powers as an absolute beneficial owner of property, was countered by a further 
recommendation to safeguard the position of beneficiaries.95 An absolute owner of property 
may, if he wishes, invest in highly speculative or depreciating investments. This may not be 
appropriate for a trustee, given that he has a moral duty towards the beneficiaries, who are 
entitled to the enjoyment of the property, and the trustee therefore needs to exercise his 
powers in their best interest. In order to take this into account, a recommendation was made to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
risks than a smaller fund, and the object of the trust, whether there is a greater need for income generation or 
capital preservation, for example, would be very important.    
91 Penner The Law of Trusts 284-285; Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 1, 4, 12. 
92 Wilson Todd & Wilson's Textbook on Trusts 312-313. 
93  Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 1. Other issues that placed unnecessary 
constraints on trustees included the limited ability to delegate fiduciary discretions and to hold property through 
nominees and custodians. 
94 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999). 
95 Clements and Abass Complete Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 361-363. 
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introduce statutory duties, such as ensuring the diversification of assets, having in place an 
investment policy and requiring a trustee to obtain and consider proper advice in appropriate 
circumstances.96 
 
Moreover, it was recommended that the specific safeguards mentioned in the report, also in 
relation to other trustee powers, should be underpinned by a more general statutory duty of 
care that should apply whenever a trustee carries out any functions covered by the report.97 As 
discussed above, trustees were already subject to a common law duty of care in the exercise 
of investment and other powers. The introduction of a statutory duty was not intended to 
change the common law duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, but presumably 
there was a feeling that a stronger message underpinned by legislation had to be given to 
trustees.  
 
Importantly, the decision whether to exercise their discretion would remain a matter for the 
trustee, but once a trustee has decided to exercise a discretionary function that is subject to the 
new duty, the manner in which it is exercised had to comply with the new duty of care.98 If the 
power were not subject to the statutory duty of care, the common law duty of care would still 
apply.  
 
The Law Commission considered five standards against which the conduct of a trustee could 
be measured. This ranged from a mere duty to act in good faith, to being vicariously liable for 
the acts and defaults of the trustee’s agents, two extreme opposites.99 It was felt that the new 
duty should have regard to the skills of the particular trustee and to the circumstances of the 
trust in question, introducing a subjective element. As an important regulator of trustee 
conduct, it had to set a robust standard, but also be flexible enough to allow a professional 
trustee to be held to a higher standard than a non-professional trustee.100  
 
The solution was to recommend that every trustee should be required to exercise such care 
and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances. If the trustee has, or holds himself out as 
having, special knowledge or experience, this shall be taken into account in judging the 
                                                      
96 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 22-25. 
97 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 36. 
98 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 460; Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 
36-37. 
99 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 40-41. 
100 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 42. 
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trustee, as will any special knowledge or experience that can reasonably be expected of a 
person acting in a professional trustee capacity.101  
 
The Law Commission report discussed above was part of a policy movement that, coupled 
with dissatisfaction with the relevance of the law relating to trustee powers and duties, led to 
the enactment of the 2000 Act. Although many see the statutory duty of care as the 
centrepiece of the 2000 Act, the duty has always existed, as discussed above. However, the 
statutory duty, signifying a duty to take care to avoid causing injury or loss, was now 
considered to be uniform and was meant to improve certainty and consistency regarding the 
standard of competence and behaviour expected of trustees, given the increase in professional 
trustees and the changing context within which trustees operated.102 
 
2 1 3 4  Statutory duty of care 
 
The wording of the statutory duty103 implies that its application is limited to the exercise of 
certain powers by a trustee, rather than affecting the process of consideration whether to 
exercise a power or not. Very importantly, it is possible to exclude the application of the duty 
of care by an appropriate clause in the trust deed,104 as discussed below. 
 
Some take the view that there is little difference between the standard imposed by the 
common law duty of care and the statutory duty of care and the consensus is that only a rare 
case would turn on the difference between the common law duty and the statutory duty in any 
event.105  
 
Previously the test was what a prudent person of business would have done in administering 
his own affairs, but there was no differentiation between a professional and lay trustee.106 The 
                                                      
101 Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties No 260 (1999) 42-43. 
102 Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts 400-401; Wilson Todd & Wilson's Textbook on Trusts 313-314. 
103 Trustee Act 2000 s 1(1) reads “Whenever the duty under this subsection applies to a trustee, he must exercise 
such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard in particular to (a) any special knowledge 
or experience that he has or holds himself out as having, and (b) if he acts as trustee in the course of a business 
or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a person acting in the 
course of that kind of business or profession.” and sch 1 para 2 lists the circumstances where the duty applies, 
including any exercise of investment powers, the purchasing of land, appointing agents, nominees and 
custodians and so forth.  
104 Trustee Act 2000 sch 1 para 7. 
105 Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1511-1513. 
106 Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1514. 
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inclusion in the statute of a reference to what is reasonable in the circumstances can be 
interpreted to be raising the standard for a professional trustee,107 or, on the other hand, that a 
lay trustee with limited business knowledge would be subject to a lower standard as he can 
assert that he acted reasonably in the circumstances even if a prudent person of business 
would not have acted in the same way. This could mean that negligence claims against lay 
trustees would be easier to defend.108 
 
Underhill and Hayton’s view is that the wording of the statutory duty, “to exercise such care 
and skill as is necessary in the circumstances”, includes consideration of the fact that the 
trustee is not acting for himself when making investments and also of the fact whether he is 
paid or not. Special knowledge or experience that is objectively reasonable to expect of a 
person acting in the course of that kind of business or profession would be taken into account. 
Thus it imposes an objective minimum standard on trustees, accountants and other paid 
professionals acting as trustees, but the standard is raised further if the trustee holds himself 
out as having special knowledge or expertise, which would be the case with trust 
companies.109 
 
Neither view has yet been confirmed by case law and it is submitted that the question is open 
to interpretation. Even if the two tests were effectively identical, it would be extraordinary if 
an exclusion of the statutory duty of care in the trust deed also implied an exclusion of the 
common law duty that has existed for such a long time.110  
 
2 1 4 Ability to exclude duty of care 
 
Significantly, although being crowned the centrepiece of the 2000 Act, the duty of care can be 
excluded by the terms of a particular trust deed.111 Although a trustee would presumably still 
be subject to the common law duty of care, it does detract, at least at face value, from the 
importance attributed to the statutory duty of care. 
 
                                                      
107 Watt Trusts and Equity 355-356. 
108 Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1515. 
109 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 788. 
110 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 427. 
111 Trustee Act 2000 sch 1 s 7. 
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The ability to exclude this duty is seemingly in line with comments made about the Armitage 
judgment,112 namely a sense that the judiciary was conscious of not setting the standard of 
trustee conduct so high as to discourage the taking up of the office of trustee. The requirement 
of prudence had existed in common law for a long time, but Hudson explains that the 2000 
Act has changed the ordinary obligations of a trustee from being based on prudence to being 
based on reasonableness, which implies a lower standard.113 The common law duty of care 
demanded that a trustee must always act in the best interest of the beneficiaries,114 indicating a 
positive obligation to do something. The new duty of care is judged by a more subjective test 
based on reasonableness in the circumstances and only applies to the categories of power 
described in the 2000 Act. This may indeed seem like a lowering of the standard of care. 
 
 Penner, on the other hand, describes the approach of the 2000 Act as a prudent investor 
approach – the trustee has very broad powers of investment but a duty of care is imposed to 
ensure that the power is exercised in a prudent manner.115 Watt also makes reference to the 
explanatory notes to the 2000 Act,116 stating that the statutory duty of care merely codifies, or 
makes explicit, the common law duty, which uses prudence as a measure of trustee conduct. 
However, as mentioned, the 2000 Act itself makes no reference to prudence and the 
explanatory notes are not binding.  
 
Watt is in favour of an argument that what is “reasonable in the circumstances”, refers to the 
same level of care and skill as is required by prudence,117 presumably because there is a clear 
reference to a higher standard being expected of professional trustees who hold themselves 
out as experienced. A duty of prudence implies cautiousness, whereas a trustee who is only 
expected to act reasonable may take more risks, but the trustee would still be subject to the 
safeguards built into the 2000 Act.  
 
Taking more investment risk may be appropriate and in the interest of the beneficiaries in 
certain cases, although not in all. At this point the subjective element becomes useful in 
giving trustees more freedom in appropriate circumstances.118 Coupled with the possibility of 
                                                      
112 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
113 Hudson Equity and Trusts 326. 
114 Cowan v Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750 760. 
115 Penner The Law of Trusts 284-286. 
116 Watt Trusts and Equity 356-357. 
117 Watt Trusts and Equity 357. 
118 Hudson Equity and Trusts 326-327. 
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excluding liability for certain trustee actions, this signals a more liberal environment for 
trustees. It may well be argued that this is required in the modern financial world, but the 
corollary seems to be an erosion of the irreducible core of the trust.119  
 
2 2 Offshore: Jersey 
 
2 2 1 The trustee as a fiduciary and the fiduciary duties of a trustee 
 
Not much is written about the customary law position of the trustee, but English law on the 
fiduciary obligations owed by a trustee to beneficiaries has been held to apply equally under 
Jersey law.  
 
In Re Don Benest,120 a case that dealt with the validity of a testamentary trust, the testatrix left 
property to the public officers of a church parish for the benefit of poor people in that parish. 
In the context of fiduciary duties, the court held that the officers already owed fiduciary duties 
to the parish at large, but that the testatrix wanted to impose more specific duties towards poor 
members of the parish when dealing with the property she left. A separate trust was thus 
created for the benefit of poor members of the parish. The court was referred to the 14th 
edition of Underhill & Hayton’s Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees and the explanation 
contained therein of a fiduciary relationship. This was cited with approval and read as 
follows: 
 
“A fiduciary relationship exists whenever there is a relationship of confidence such 
that equity imposes duties or disabilities upon the person in whom confidence is 
reposed (the fiduciary) in order to prevent possible abuse of the confidence…Where a 
fiduciary qua fiduciary does have vested in him – or under his control – property, such 
property has the essential characteristic of trust property in that it cannot be used or 
disposed of by the fiduciary for his own benefit but must be used or disposed of for 
the benefit of other persons.”121 
 
                                                      
119 See ch 3 para 2 4. 
120 Re Don Benest [1989] JLR 330. 
121 Re Don Benest [1989] JLR 330 336-337. 
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In the Matter of the E, L, O and R Trusts122 dealt with conflict of interest on the part of a 
trustee. Here the Royal Court held that the nature of the fiduciary duty of a trustee under 
Jersey law is as set out by Millet LJ in the Mothew123 case. No earlier Jersey case law was 
referred to. 
 
The court set out its own summary of the fiduciary duty, using extracts from the Mothew124 
judgment. The court summarised the fiduciary duty as follows: 
 
“(i) The expression “fiduciary duty” is properly confined to those duties which are 
peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of which attracts legal consequences 
differing from those consequent upon the breach of other duties. For example, 
the obligation of a trustee (who is undoubtedly a fiduciary) to use proper skill 
and care in the discharge of his duties is not a fiduciary duty nor is the duty of 
a director (who undoubtedly owes fiduciary obligations to his company) to 
exercise skill and care in the performance of his duties. 
 
(ii) A fiduciary duty is one which is special to fiduciaries which attracts those 
remedies which are peculiar to the equitable jurisdiction and are primarily 
restitutionary or restorative rather than compensatory. A fiduciary is someone 
who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in 
circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. 
 
(iii) The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The 
principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary.”125 
 
More recently, in Crociani v Crociani,126 the Royal Court confirmed that a trustee has a duty 
of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries and must put those interests above his personal 
interests or any conflicting duties he may have. Reference was again made to English 
                                                      
122 In the Matter of the E, L, O and R Trusts; BA, SA and HA v Verite Trust Company Limited, Appleby Trust 
(Jersey) Limited and James [2008] JLR 360. 
123 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
124 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
125 In the Matter of the E, L, O and R Trusts; BA, SA and HA v Verite Trust Company Limited, Appleby Trust 
(Jersey) Limited and James [2008] JLR 360 374. 
126 Crociani v Crociani [2015] JRC 178. 
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academic writing, signifying that the approach is closely aligned to that of English law and 
also, more generally, that English trust law still plays an important role in Jersey.   
 
The Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 (TJL), the most important legislation governing trusts and 
trustees in Jersey, does not specifically refer to fiduciary duties, although it deals with other 
trustee duties, described below. The TJL does refer to the need for a trustee to observe the 
utmost good faith,127 thereby giving confirmation to the role of a trustee as a fiduciary.128 
 
Furthermore, article 21(4) of the TJL provides that a trustee shall not, unless permitted by the 
court, the TJL or the terms of the trust, profit from his trusteeship, cause or permit another 
person to profit therefrom, or enter into a transaction on the trustee’s own account which may 
result in a profit. This is clearly a reference to the no profit rule of English law, a rule that is 
recognised as one of the fundamental fiduciary duties.129 
 
It has been held that discretionary beneficiaries have standing to sue for breaches of trust and 
that the relief can include reconstitution of the trust fund where loss was caused by a trustee’s 
breach of trust.130 Although it was not explicitly stated, one can deduce that a trustee owes 
fiduciary duties not only to beneficiaries with vested interests, but also to those with 
contingent interests. 
 
Based on the limited Jersey case law and academic writing available, it is submitted that the 
general position with regard to the fiduciary duties of a trustee is substantially the same as in 
England. 
 
2 2 2 Trustee duties under customary law and the duty to act en bon père de famille 
 
One of the most important recent Privy Council judgments dealing with the liability of a 
trustee for breach of trust, and the extent to which such liability can be excluded, dealt with a 
                                                      
127 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21(1)(b). 
128 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 166. 
129 See ch 3 para 2 1 2 2. 
130 Freeman v Ansbacher Trustees (Jesey) Limited [2009 JLR 1] 14-18, where reliance was placed on the Privy 
Council decision in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709 that the type of interest a beneficiary has in 
the trust property is not the most important deciding factor when it comes to protection of beneficiaries’ rights 
(in this case the disclosure of information regarding the trust), and that the court has inherent jurisdiction to 
supervise and, where required, to interfere in the administration of trusts.  
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Guernsey law trust. The principal question was whether Guernsey law, prior to the enactment 
of a statutory provision prohibiting the exclusion of liability for gross negligence, allowed a 
trustee to be exempted from such liability. The judgment in Spread Trustee Company Limited 
v Hutcheson131 has been analysed in detail on various occasions and has implications wider 
than Guernsey. It will be analysed in greater detail as part of the examination of trustee 
exemption clauses.132  
 
For the present purposes, the background of the duty of care is relevant and some 
comparisons will be drawn with Guernsey law.  
 
Like Jersey, it is a British Crown Dependency, and it shares many other characteristics with 
Jersey.133 The earlier development of trust law in the two jurisdictions followed a similar 
pattern, both having Norman customary law as the origin of its common law, although, more 
recently, legislation in the two jurisdictions have not necessarily developed in tandem, as 
discussed below.  
 
The historical basis of the Guernsey customary law relating to the duty of care seems more 
certain than that of Jersey law. It is widely accepted that a trustee is required to act en bon 
père de famille both under Guernsey customary and statutory trust law.134 The concept of a 
bon père de famille was imported from Norman law, which played a similar part in the 
development of Jersey trust law,135 and the Normans appeared to have taken the concept from 
the Roman concept of bonus paterfamilias.136 It is referred to in case law unrelated to trusts as 
well, for example in the context of the liability of a guardian ad litem of a minor. It has been 
held that a person so appointed is under the same obligation as a tuteur (another fiduciary 
position) at customary law to act as a bon père de famille in relation to the interests of the 
minor.137 
 
                                                      
131 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13. 
132 See ch 3 paras 5 1, 5 2 2. 
133 See ch 2 para 3 1. 
134 See Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007 s 22 for the statutory position; the customary law position is described in 
Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 paras 139, 145, 176. 
135 See ch 2 paras 3 1, 3 2 1. 
136 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 19. 
137 Payne (a minor) by Kendall (guardian ad litem) v Pirunico Trustees (Jersey) Limited [2001 JLR 1]. 
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Obiter remarks in Jersey case law138 indicate that although the duty was incorporated into the 
duties of a trustee in the Trusts (Guernsey Law)139 but not expressly into the TJL provisions 
dealing with trustee duties,140 the TJL was not intended as a codification of the pre-existing 
customary trust law in Jersey and therefore one can argue that the bon pére duty formed part 
of Jersey customary law. As a result it would apply to a Jersey trustee, especially in relation to 
family trusts where there are minor children involved. Even though the duty may not add 
much to the statutory duties of a Jersey trustee, it has a “powerful paternalistic element”.141 An 
example of the recognition by Jersey law of the paternalistic nature of trustee powers can be 
found in the well-known litigation regarding the Esteem Settlement.142 
 
Further confirmation that the bon père duty formed part of Jersey customary law can be found 
in Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services,143 where 
Commissioner Hamon stated: 
 
“The standards that this court expects are high. It has always been so for anyone who 
holds himself in a fiduciary position, whether as trustee in the modern concept or in 
the “pre-trust concept of a bon père de famille”.144  
 
It is not clear whether this duty, literally meaning to act like a good father, is effectively the 
same as the prudent man of business test under English law. The majority of the Privy 
Council in Spread145 was of the view that the two tests were essentially the same and that the 
duty is as set out in the Bartlett146 judgment. However, it may be argued that a prudent man of 
business would be prepared to take more risks than a bon père de famille and therefore that a 
lower standard of care is required from a prudent man of business than from a bon père de 
                                                      
138 In re A&B, re C Trust [2012] JRC 086B (unreported). 
139 Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007 s 18(1). 
140 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21. 
141 In re A&B, re C Trust [2012] JRC 086B (unreported) 
142 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust 2001 JLR 7 para 38, where the trustee was 
allowed to exercise a power of advancement for the benefit of the beneficiary by paying off a debt of the 
beneficiary against the beneficiary’s wishes. 
143 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276 (which was later taken on appeal in Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v 
Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352). 
144 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276 290. 
145 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13. The two judges who wrote the minority 
judgments did not agree and felt that the duty to act en bon père de famille was clearly fiduciary and thus could 
be differentiated from the English duty of care, see para 176-177. 
146 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
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famille. 147 Futhermore, the duty to act en bon pére de famille is clearly categorised as a 
fiduciary duty, at least in Guernsey,148 whereas the duty of care under English law is not.  
 
As in England, it is accepted in Jersey that a professional trustee should be held to a higher 
standard than an ordinary lay trustee.149 In Midland Bank150 the judge approved Lightman J’s 
judgment in Bartlett,151 as follows: 
 
“There is, in our view, a higher duty imposed on those who…claim a long and 
detailed expertise in the field in which they practise.”152 
 
The duties of a trustee under Jersey customary law were, at least according to the Royal Court 
in the Esteem153 judgment, substantially the same as the position under the TJL. The nature of 
trustee duties was used in this case merely to illustrate the wider point that there was a 
customary law of trusts in existence, and unfortunately no further references were made to the 
customary law duties of a trustee.  
 
The duty to act en bon père de famille provides insight into the development of Jersey and 
Guernsey trust law and, assuming it does in fact indicate a higher standard of care, may 
explain why these jurisdictions do not allow the exclusion of the duty of care or the 
exemption from liability for gross negligence.154 It has indeed been suggested that, at least in 
Jersey and Guernsey, the accountability of an offshore trustee towards beneficiaries is higher 
than those of the trustee of an English law trust.155  
 
                                                      
147 Shearman and Pearce (2011) 23 DLJ 181 189-190 where it is stated that for this reason the prudent man of 
business test was qualified by adding that the standard is that which would apply when he acts for the benefit of 
other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide. Looking at it this way, the two tests may not be so 
different. 
148 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 177; Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007 s 22 
for the statutory position. 
149 West v Lazard Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited [1993] JLR 165 180-181; Midland Bank Trust 
Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension Services 1994 JLR 276 290-
291. 
150 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276. 
151 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
152 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276 290. The court referred to West v Lazard Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited [1993] 
JLR 165, where reference was made to Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
153 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement and the No. 52 Trust [2002] JLR 53 92. 
154 See ch 3 para 5 2 1. 
155 Clarry (2014) 12 TQR 31. 
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2 2 3 Statutory duty of care 
 
Article 21(1) of the TJL sets out the expected standard of trustee behaviour, which applies to 
all trustee duties and the exercise of all powers and discretions vested in a trustee. It states that 
a trustee shall: 
 
 “(a) act –  
(i) with due diligence, 
(ii) as would a prudent person, 
(iii) to the best of the trustee’s ability and skill; and 
(b) observe the utmost good faith.” 
 
In contrast to the English position, the trustee shall administer the trust in accordance with its 
terms, but always subject to the provisions of the TJL.156 The standard set out above can 
therefore not be excluded by the terms of the trust deed in the way that the English law 
statutory duty of care can be excluded. Furthermore, the standard of care applies to the 
exercise of all powers and discretions of trustees, and not only to a defined list of powers such 
as the statutory duty of care in English law.157  
 
There is no specific reference in the TJL to a paid or professional trustee being held to a 
higher standard of care such as that found in the Trustee Act 2000,158 but the words “to the 
best of the trustee’s ability and skill”159 do inject a subjective element into the standard. The 
degree of care expected of a professional trustee has also been held to be higher in case law 
postdating the TJL.160 
 
Other more specific duties are provided for as well, such as the duty to keep accurate accounts 
of the trustee’s trusteeship,161 and to keep trust property separate from the trustee’s personal 
property,162 although these are not examined here. 
                                                      
156 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21(2). 
157 See ch 3 para 2 1 4. 
158 See ch 3 para 2 1 3 4. 
159 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21(1). 
160  For example in Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v 
Federated Pension Services 1994 JLR 276. 
161 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21(5). 
162 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21(6). 
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2 3 South Africa 
 
2 3 1 The trustee as a fiduciary 
 
As in England and Jersey, there is no doubt that a trustee occupies a fiduciary position,163 the 
trustee-beneficiary relationship being but one example of fiduciary relationship under South 
African law. Tutors, executors, guardians and company directors are all examples of persons 
acting in a fiduciary role. Not all fiduciaries are therefore trustees, but all trustees are 
fiduciaries. However, a fiduciary obligation is only one of the elements of trusteeship.164  
 
De Waal defines a fiduciary by reference to English writers, indicating that the concept has 
the same meaning under South African law, namely “someone who undertakes to act for or on 
behalf of another in some particular matter or matters”. This undertaking obliges the fiduciary 
to act “selflessly and with undivided loyalty” in the interests of the other person.165 
 
2 3 2 Fiduciary duties 
 
The fiduciary duty of a trustee arises from the office of trustee and not from the document 
constituting the trust instrument.166 In Doyle v Board of Executors167 Slomowitz AJ, following 
de Waal’s reasoning above, said the following: 
 
“…[I]t seems to me unquestionable that a trustee occupies a fiduciary office. By virtue 
of this alone he owes the utmost good faith towards all beneficiaries…”168 
 
Defining fiduciary duties has, however, proven to be an elusive goal. First, there is the 
question of whether there is only one fiduciary duty or a number of different fiduciary duties. 
                                                      
163 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 80-83; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557; Du 
Toit (2007) Stell LR 469 471; Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) 813. 
164 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 557. 
165 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 558 and see specifically fn 58 and 59 thereof. See ch 3 para 2 1 2 1 for the 
duty of loyalty under English law. 
166 De Waal (1998) TSAR 326 331; Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 469 471.  
167 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
168 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) 813. 
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Case law refers to both.169 It has even been said that the fiduciary duty does not have a clearly 
defined meaning.170  
 
Unlike the English position where there appears to be no doubt that the trustee stands in a 
fiduciary position vis-à-vis the beneficiaries of the trust, it has been proposed in South African 
law that the counterpart in the fiduciary relationship is the trust property.171 
 
However, the more correct view, which corresponds with English law, must be that one party, 
the trustee, stands in a position of confidence and good faith towards another party, the 
beneficiary. The representative nature of a person’s status and his duty to account for the 
profits he acquired in that capacity have been referred to as an “unmistakable beacon” that the 
person stood in a fiduciary relationship, a position of confidence and good faith, towards the 
other party.172 
 
It is unsurprising that the English law principles of loyalty and good faith find resonance in 
the South African law on fiduciaries, given the context of the development of South African 
trust law and the vast influence of English law.173   
 
The Appellate Division analysed fiduciary duties in a landmark decision in Robinson v 
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd.174 The facts concerned the fiduciary relationship 
between a company and its director, but the judgment refers to the general concept of a 
fiduciary relationship and the analysis has not been challenged in nearly a century, a 
testament to its clarity and correctness.175 
 
In Robinson v Randfontein Estates176 Innes CJ said the following: 
 
“Where one man stands to another in a position of confidence involving a duty to 
protect the interests of that other, he is not allowed to make a secret profit at the 
                                                      
169 Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 469 472, where examples are mentioned. 
170 Hofer v Kevitt 1996 (2) SA 402 407, where reference is made to Canadian law. See ch 3 para 2 1 2 1 where a 
similar uncertainty in defining fiduciary duties under English law is discussed. 
171 Louw v Coetzee [2003] 1 All SA 34 (SCA) 39. 
172 Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) 465 (SCA) 477-478. 
173 See ch 2 paras 4 2 1, 4 2 2. 
174 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168. 
175 Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) 465 (SCA) 478. 
176 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168. 
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other’s expense or place himself in a position where his interests conflict with his 
duty. The principle underlies an extensive field of legal relationship.”177 
 
He further held that although the terminology is that of English law, the principle underlying 
it is not foreign to South African law.  
 
“For it stands upon the broad doctrine that a man, who stands in a position of trust 
towards another, cannot, in matters affected by that position, advance his own interests 
(e.g., by making a profit) at that other’s expense.”178 
 
He referred to a “breach of faith” when describing an action contrary to that which the 
fiduciary is obliged to do.179 In addition, he confirmed that the English doctrine was adopted 
in older case law and should also be adopted by the court in casu.180 
 
Further confirmation can be found in more recent case law. In Jowell v Bramwell-Jones181 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal expressed the view that it is the duty of a fiduciary to avoid a 
conflict of interest as far as possible. The mere fact that a transaction is in favour of the 
trustee (who, in this case, was also one of the beneficiaries) does not necessarily mean that 
there was a breach of trust, but a transaction of this kind will be subject to much closer 
scrutiny.182 
 
The concepts good faith, confidence, undivided loyalty and the idea of avoiding conflicts of 
interest are all found in English law.183 It is thus clear that the principles against unauthorised 
profits and conflicts of interest, flowing from the requirements of undivided loyalty, good 
                                                      
177 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 177-178. 
178 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 179. 
179 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 179. 
180 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 180. 
181 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA). 
182 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA) 284-288. In this case the court found that there was a 
breach of fiduciary duty but it was not connected to the loss claimed for, and the trustee was therefore not liable. 
The case is discussed later. 
183 See ch 3 paras 2 1 1, 2 1 2. 
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faith and confidence, 184 have made their way into South African case law as a result of a 
reliance on English legal principles.185  
 
It has been suggested that South African case law has in fact gone further than importing 
English concepts and has extended the fiduciary duty beyond the English duty of loyalty, 
given that, as discussed below, the duty of care is considered a fiduciary duty under South 
African trust law.186  
 
Du Toit proposes that the fiduciary duty of a trustee under South African law is a single but 
multi-faceted duty. 187  Different components of this duty are important in different 
circumstances.188 The elements of this duty are, according to him: 
 
(a) the duty of care;  
(b) the duty of impartiality;  
(c) the duty of accountability; and 
(d) the duty of independence.189  
 
The duty of care is examined in detail below.190  
 
The duty of impartiality involves avoiding a conflict of interest between the trustee’s personal 
interests and the interests of the beneficiaries and not making an unauthorised profit from his 
position as trustee. These duties are undoubtedly recognised as fiduciary by English law, 
falling under the umbrella of the duty of loyalty.191 
 
The importance of a trustee being accountable to the beneficiaries was examined in the 
previous chapter – to insist on proper administration of the trust assets is a fundamental right 
                                                      
184 See ch 3 para 2 1 2 2. 
185 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 81-82; De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 558; 
Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 177-180; Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) 
Ltd 2004 (3) 465 (SCA) 481. 
186 Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 469 472-473. 
187 See ch 3 para 2 1 2 for a similar view in English law. 
188 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 82; Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 469 473. 
189 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 82-83. 
190 See ch 3 para 2 3 3. 
191 See ch 3 para 2 1 2 2 for the English duties of no conflict and no profit. 
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of a beneficiary.192 In fact, it forms part of the irreducible core of the trust (a concept that 
spans across jurisdictions), namely that someone must be in a position to enforce the trust and 
hold the trustee to account for the fulfilment of his duties.193 As such, describing this duty as 
fiduciary makes sense.  
 
The duty of independence refers to the decision-making process of the trustee and the 
importance of the trustee reaching an informed decision independent of the influences of the 
settlor and beneficiaries. This will be analysed in more detail in the following chapter in the 
context of settlor control over a trust. Classifying the duty of independence as fiduciary 
appears at least to give it more weight and supports the conclusion that, at least in certain 
circumstances, an abuse of the trust which results from excessive settlor control (in other 
words, lack of trustee independence) could in South African law be equated to a breach of 
fiduciary duty or a breach of trust on the part of the trustee. This issue is examined further in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Given that beneficiaries with discretionary or contingent as opposed to vested interests have 
to accept their interest in a trust in order to obtain an indefeasible right under the trust,194 it has 
been argued by some that the fiduciary duty of a trustee does not extend to such beneficiaries 
if they have not accepted a benefit under the trust. In Doyle v Board of Executors195 this was 
held to be wrong. Although theoretically an inter vivos trust under South African law is 
created by way of contract (a stipulatio alteri or contract for the benefit of a third),196 it is 
widely accepted that not all aspects of the trust can be analysed by way of contractual 
principles or, as stated in Doyle,197 the contractual analysis has “limits beyond which it cannot 
be pressed”.198 
 
It was thus held that the fiduciary duty of utmost good faith extends to all beneficiaries, 
whether their interests are vested or potential. 199  This reinforces the importance of the 
fiduciary duty of a trustee under South African law. Reference was made to Gross v Pentz,200 
                                                      
192 See ch 2 para 4 3 5 5. 
193 See ch 2 para 5 1. 
194 See ch 2 para 4 3 5 5. 
195 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
196 See ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
197 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
198 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) 812. 
199 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) 813. 
200 Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) 628. 
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where it was stated that even contingent beneficiaries have a vested interest in the proper 
administration of the trust. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Jowell v 
Bramwell-Jones.201 In casu, the income beneficiary was also the trustee. The trust held shares 
in a holding company that in turn made further investments. The value of the holding 
company was thus dependent on the performance of the underlying investments and as a 
result the trustee had a duty to exercise her voting powers in a manner consistent with her 
fiduciary duty towards the capital beneficiaries. The court clearly indicated that the trustee 
had a fiduciary duty towards the capital beneficiaries even though they would only be able to 
benefit after her death. The trustee’s duty was therefore more than mere preservation of the 
assets.202  
 
2 3 3  The common law duty of care 
 
Although recognised as an important trustee duty, the duty of care and skill, prudence and 
diligence, is not considered fiduciary in nature under English law. 203  It has been given 
statutory recognition, but can be excluded by the terms of the trust. 
 
The position in South Africa is different. It has been described as the most important aspect of 
the fiduciary duty of a trustee 204  and as one of three main principles governing the 
administration of a trust, alongside the duty to give effect to the terms of the trust and to 
exercise an independent discretion.205 The duty of care, although now contained in statute,206 
also existed at common law, by analogy to the responsibility of other fiduciary office 
holders.207  
 
The common law duty of care has been linked to the Roman-Dutch concept of acting as a 
bonus et diligens paterfamilias.208 In Sackville West v Nourse,209 Kotzé JA considered Roman 
                                                      
201 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA). 
202 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA) 284. 
203 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 243-254; see ch 3 para 2 1 3. 
204 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 91. 
205 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 262. The importance of the trustee exercising an 
independent discretion is further examined in ch 4 in the context of excessive control by a settlor. 
206 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(1). 
207 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 262. In Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 
459 (T) an analogy was drawn with the relationship between a tutor and his ward. 
208 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 90-91; Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 469 473; Sackville 
West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 534. See also the discussion of the duty of trustees of Guernsey trusts to act en bon 
père de famille described in ch 3 para 2 2 1. This concept seems to have certain similarities with the bonus et 
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law rules relating to a tutor dealing with the property of his ward in evaluating the 
responsibility of a trustee in the investment of the trust fund. No previous decisions of a South 
African court were available on this point, and instead he referred to various Roman law 
commentators and Dutch jurists.210 He said the following: 
 
“The standard of care to be observed is accordingly not that which an ordinary man 
generally observes in the management of his own affairs, but that of the prudent and 
careful man; or, to use the technical expression of the Roman law, that of the bonus et 
diligens paterfamilias.”211 
 
The duty to act as a bonus et diligens paterfamilias also involves acting with the utmost good 
faith (a recognised element of the fiduciary duty), in the best interest of the beneficiaries and, 
importantly, avoiding any uncertainty or risk.212 
 
Whether the actual practical standard of the South African common law duty of care is higher 
in practice than that under English law is debatable. The difference seems to turn on the care 
exercised in the management of one’s own affairs as opposed to the management of the 
affairs of another for whom one is morally obliged to provide, and as a result the level of risk 
that is deemed acceptable.213 In Sackville-West v Nourse214 Solomon ACJ held: 
 
“…[O]ne of the circumstances to be considered by a trustee is that he is dealing not 
with his own money, but that of the trust. Greater care and caution are required of him 
in the latter case than in the former.”215 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
diligens paterfamilias concept – both entail a familial or paternalistic relationship, a sense of moral duty. 
Although a moral obligation is also referred to in earlier English case law in relation to the duty of care and skill, 
as discussed in ch 3 para 2 1 3 1, later case law refers to the prudent man of business standard, which, according 
to some, implies a lower standard of care. The statutory duty discussed in ch 3 para 2 1 3 4 requires 
reasonableness rather than prudence, another perceived lowering of standards, according to some. 
209 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516. 
210 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 533-534. 
211 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 534. 
212 Du Toit (2007) Stell LR 469 473; Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 534, where references are made to 
Roman-Dutch scholarly writing. The common law duty of care under English law similarly focused on the 
avoidance of risk. See ch 2 para 2 1 3 1. 
213 De Waal (2000) 117 SALJ 548 559.  
214 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516. 
215 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 519-520 where Solomon ACJ also refers to similar dicta from 19th 
century English case law. 
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Kotzé JA held in the same case: 
 
“We may accordingly conclude that the rule of our law is that a person in a fiduciary 
position, like a trustee, is obliged, in dealing with and investing the money of the 
beneficiary, to observe due care and diligence, and not to expose it in any way to any 
business risks. In principle our law agrees with that of England.”216 
 
Although, as discussed below, it has been accepted that the avoidance of all risk is outdated in 
the modern investment world,217 the mere observance of good faith does not excuse a trustee 
from liability for breach of trust – he must act with scrupulous care and prudence in making 
investments.218   
 
Boyce NO v Bloem219 was an example of the application of the common law duty of care by 
the South African courts. The case concerned a testamentary trust and the negligence of the 
trustees in wrongfully paying out trust money. Reference was made to English case law for 
the proposition that no higher degree of diligence is required when acting as trustee than 
where a man of ordinary prudence manages his own affairs, and the court stated that to be the 
law in South Africa as well.220  
 
Roberts AJ found that this is not inconsistent with the writings of Roman-Dutch scholars 
dealing with analogous cases concerning negligence. He also confirmed the need for all the 
relevant circumstances to be taken into account in order to determine the exact degree of care 
expected of a trustee in any given scenario.221 The judge considered English case law to aid an 
understanding of whether and what type of mitigating factors should excuse a trustee for not 
taking action to protect or recover trust assets.222 Even if the trustees acted honestly, one must 
ask whether he also acted reasonably in the circumstances.223  
 
                                                      
216 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 535. 
217 See ch 3 para 2 3 5.  
218 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 263; Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 527-528, 
535-536, where it was stated that the trustees’ bona fides were not questioned but they were, regardless, held 
responsible for the loss of a risky investment; Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 865-866. 
219 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T). 
220 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 866. 
221 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 865-867. 
222 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 867-868. 
223 The requirement of reasonableness is also found in the English statutory duty of care, see ch 3 para 2 1 3 4. 
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In casu, the trustees had to recover a debt owed to the trust. The judge found that the trustees 
were negligent in not taking more active steps in recovering the debt, admitting that there may 
be cases where, because of a reasonable belief that payment will not be obtained despite their 
best efforts, the trustees would be excused for not taking action to enforce payment. In this 
case, however, they were found guilty of negligence and had to make good the loss.224 
 
 2 3 4 The statutory duty of care 
 
Section 9(1) of the Trust Property Control Act225 (TPCA) gives statutory recognition to the 
trustee’s duty of care and provides as follows: 
 
“A trustee shall in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his powers act 
with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who 
manages the affairs of another.”226 
 
Section 9(2) provides that any provision in a trust deed that exempts a trustee from or 
indemnifies him against liability for a breach of trust brought about by a failure to observe 
this standard, would be void.227 This is examined further below.228 
 
The reference in section 9(1) to the affairs of another person is consistent with the common 
law duty of care as described above, implying a moral obligation or paternalistic element. 
Unlike the English statute,229 no reference is made to a higher standard being expected of 
professional trustees, nor is a subjective element relating to the specific trustee included as in 
Jersey.230  
 
Even if this were to indicate a lower standard for professional trustees, many trustees in South 
Africa are lay persons on whom the moral obligation of looking after another person’s 
property should weigh heavily. On the other hand, settlors are often co-trustees, complicating 
                                                      
224 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 867-868. 
225 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
226 Although the introduction of the statutory duty was in fact merely a confirmation of the existing common law 
duty, the prohibition on excluding the duty of care in the trust deed in Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 
s9(2) was an innovation, as explained in ch 2  para 4 5.  
227 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(2). 
228 See ch 3 para 5 3. 
229 Trustee Act 2000 s 1(1). 
230 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 21(1). 
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the fiduciary relationship and infringing on the required separation of control and enjoyment, 
as discussed in chapter 4. However, the law in South Africa appears to be less tolerant than 
the law in England and Jersey as far as allowing trustees to escape liability for negligent 
breaches of trust is concerned, indicating that the environment in which trustees operate is not 
necessarily more liberal. 
 
Although not all case law after the coming into force of the TPCA and dealing with the duty 
of care refers to the statutory duty, some references can be found. In Administrators, Estate 
Richards v Nichol,231 the judge referred to both the common law duty of care and section 9(1) 
of the TPCA as not intended to create an inflexible limitation on the investment of the trust 
fund.232 In the context of the case, this is presumably intended to mean that a trustee does not 
have to avoid all risk in order to fulfil his duty of care, even if it was previously thought to be 
a requirement. This case is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Another case where reference was made to the statutory duty of care is Tijmstra v Blunt-
Mackenzie.233 An application was made to remove one of the trustees of a family trust who 
was dealing with the trust assets as if they were his own. Section 20(1) of the TPCA allows 
removal of a trustee if it is in the interest of the trust and its beneficiaries. Reference was also 
made to section 9(1) of the TPCA. The court considered that mala fides was not required for 
the removal of a trustee.234 The court relied on section 9(1) of the TPCA in assessing the 
trustee’s behaviour, but also discussed the common law fiduciary duties of trustees, including 
the duty of care.235 It was held that the trustee in question did not act as a bonus et diligens 
paterfamilias in selling certain trust assets and transferring trust funds to his own bank 
account. It appears this decision was reached on the basis that the errant trustee did not fulfil 
either the common law duty of care or the statutory duty of care. 
 
2 3 5 Investment of the trust fund 
 
Investing the trust fund is one of the most important functions of a trustee. In order to do so, 
trustees are given specific investment powers. No fixed list of authorised trustee investments 
                                                      
231 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA). 
232 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA) 558. 
233 Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 459 (T). 
234 Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 459 (T) 472. 
235 Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 459 (T) 472-474. 
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exists under South African law, but it was traditionally required of a trustee to avoid any 
element of risk.236 This limitation has its origin in the trustee’s fiduciary position as a bonus et 
diligens paterfamilias, someone who had to adhere to a higher standard of care than a person 
looking after his own affairs.237 
 
As examined above, the statutory duty of care was enacted in England around the same time 
as trustees’ powers of investment were widened.238 As possibilities opened up for trustees to 
invest trust funds in a wider variety of more complicated investments carrying a higher degree 
of risk, it was considered that beneficiaries needed additional protection, although at common 
law a duty of care did already exist. 
 
Around the same time as the liberalisation of trustees’ investment powers in England, in 1999 
a judgment from the Supreme Court of Appeal signalled a similar change in approach in 
South Africa. In Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol239 the highest court in South Africa 
recognised that a trustee should have more freedom in selecting trust investments. This 
change in thinking was brought about, as in England, by changes in the investment 
opportunities available, but also by the ravaging effect inflation in South Africa was having 
on the value of assets over time.240 
 
Preserving capital in real terms, which is also the only way of ensuring sufficient income, 
involves some element of risk. Taking on risk was previously forbidden, unless specific 
provision to the contrary was made in the trust deed. Taking risks was also not always 
necessary in the past, as only preservation of the original capital was required. Many trustees 
have therefore confined themselves to very conservative investments where capital was 
preserved, but did not necessarily grow or produce much income.241  
 
                                                      
236 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 298-299; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles 
and Practice 87-88; Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 519-522, 535-536; Administrators, Estate Richards v 
Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA) 557. 
237 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 533-536. 
238 See ch 3 para 2 1 3 2. 
239 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA). 
240 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA) 558. The court also referred to earlier 
cases, from 1965 onwards, where wider investment powers were granted by the courts. 
241 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 300; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice 88. 
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The court made the point that, in the prevailing financial environment, such conservative 
investments were not necessarily prudent, although prima facie they appeared to be. Scott JA 
held: 
 
“But whether or not an investment can be said to have been prudent or made with due 
care and diligence is a question which can only be decided on the facts of each 
particular case…; and circumstances change. An investment considered prudent in 
earlier times may rightfully be regarded as quite imprudent in the context of modern 
conditions.”242 
 
The increased acceptance of risk brought about by this change in thinking does not mean, 
however, that a trustee was now free to ignore the duty of care and invest trust funds in any 
way he pleased. The court in the Nichol243 case recognised this and added a word of caution to 
remind trustees of the need to exercise due diligence and care, to avoid speculative 
investments and to diversify and balance a portfolio of investments. Having said that, the 
extent to which a trustee can invest in riskier asset classes, such as shares traded on a stock 
exchange, and still be considered to be acting prudently would depend on the facts of each 
case and will include considerations such as the size of the trust fund and the needs of 
different classes of beneficiaries.244  
 
This widening of trustees’ investment powers with the concomitant reminder of the duty of 
care imposed on trustees is reminiscent of the development in England, although there the 
change was brought about by the legislator rather than the judiciary. The statutory duty of 
care and the widening of investment powers were both introduced in the Trustee Act 2000. In 
South Africa, the statutory duty of care had existed since the introduction of the TPCA in 
1987, thus long before the judicial relaxation of restrictions on trustee investments. This duty 





                                                      
242 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA) 557. 
243 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA). 
244 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA) 558. 
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2 4 Conclusion and comparison  
 
The general content and importance of a trustee’s fiduciary duties seem to be broadly similar 
in the jurisdictions under review and revolves around the concepts of loyalty, good faith, 
confidence and an avoidance of conflicts. The same can be said for the duty of care, at least as 
far as its practical implementation is concerned. However, theoretical differences do abound, 
focused on whether the duty of care denotes a paternalistic element or not, whether it requires 
prudence or reasonableness and whether the test is objective or subjective, thereby expecting 
more of paid professional trustees. 
 
An important distinction is that the duty of care is considered a fiduciary duty under South 
African law, whereas it is clearly not regarded as fiduciary under English law. It is not 
entirely clear whether the duty of care, or the customary law concept of acting as a bon pére 
de famille, is regarded as a fiduciary duty under Jersey law, but the bon pére duty does appear 
to add to the duty of care a certain gravitas beyond the confines of statute. 
 
Imposing onerous duties on trustees is in line with the core values referred to before.245 A trust 
cannot exist if the trustee does not have certain duties towards the beneficiaries and if the 
beneficiaries cannot hold the trustee to account for the performance of those duties. The 
quality of the beneficiaries’ right to do so is directly related to the quality of the performance 
expected of the trustee. 
 
However, there are signs that the fiduciary obligations of a trustee, the duty of care expected 
of a trustee, the irreducible core of the trust – all of the special features that make the trust 
what it is and has been for hundreds of years – are increasingly losing importance to make 
way for more commerciality. This is evident in the possibility under English law of excluding 
the statutory duty of care (albeit that this may not be a frequent practical occurrence), the ease 
with which trustee liability can be excluded and the inclusion in trust deeds of provisions that 
allow trustees not to be involved in the business of companies they own, to name a few 
examples.246  
 
                                                      
245 See ch 2 para 5; ch 3 para 1. 
246 The concept of reservation of powers to the settlor or someone other than the trustee is also relevant in this 
context and is analysed in ch 4. 
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Certain fiduciary duties, such as allowing conflicts of interest or retention of profits, can also 
be overridden in the trust deed, particularly where the trustee is a corporate entity forming 
part of a bigger financial services group that offers additional services other than trusteeship. 
One could argue that loss to a trust fund nowadays is more likely to be caused by a lack of 
care and skill in investing the trust fund, but the importance of the fiduciary duties cannot be 
overemphasised. Hudson agrees with this and warns that the institution of the trust may 
become increasingly assimilated with other common law obligations such as the contract.247  
 
The overriding principle of an irreducible core of obligations on which the trust is based, 
discussed at the end of the previous chapter,248 seems at times to be flagrantly disregarded.  
 
It raises questions such as whether the trust, a centuries-old legal institution, is able to cope 
with the fast changing social and economic environment in which we now live. The trust is 
undisputedly a very flexible concept, but does too much flexibility and change mean that the 
core of the trust, that which gives it its edge over other legal concepts, is being lost? This is 
also relevant in the context of an increased desire for settlor freedom and for control over the 
trust assets by settlors and beneficiaries alike, as examined in chapter 4. Trustees, settlors and 
beneficiaries all seem to want to have the best of both worlds – can the trust survive this 
onslaught? This question is evaluated in chapter 5. 
 
3 Breach of trust  
 
3 1 England 
 
3 1 1 Definition of breach of trust 
 
Defining a breach of trust has never been straightforward. A distinction can be made in 
English law between breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duties, although they are often 
both referred to simply as “breach of trust”, and many authors, commentators and judges do 
not make this distinction. 249  This can lead to some confusion as there are different 
requirements for liability and different remedies. 
                                                      
247 Hudson Equity and Trusts 373-376. 
248 See ch 2 para 5. 
249 Penner The Law of Trusts 319-320. 
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Although a breach of trust can take many forms, it will be either a breach of or failure to 
comply with an express term of the trust deed or a breach of an obligation imposed on trustees 
by the general law applicable to trusts, meaning the 2000 Act or the common law.250 It is, in 
other words, any act or failure to act that is contrary to the trustee’s duties.251 In Armitage v 
Nurse252 Millett LJ gave the following useful summary of the forms that a breach of trust can 
take: 
 
“Breaches of trust are of many different kinds. A breach of trust may be deliberate or 
inadvertent; it may consist of an actual misappropriation or misapplication of the trust 
property or merely of an investment or other dealing which is outside the trustees’ 
powers; it may consist of a failure to carry out a positive obligation of the trustees or 
merely of a want of skill and care on their part in the management of the trust 
property; it may be injurious to the interests of the beneficiaries or be actually to their 
benefit. By consciously acting beyond their powers…the trustees may deliberately 
commit a breach of trust; but if they do so in good faith and in the honest belief that 
they are acting in the interest of the beneficiaries their conduct is not fraudulent. So a 
deliberate breach of trust is not necessarily fraudulent.”253 
 
Breaching any duty or obligation owed by the trustee will therefore result in a breach of trust. 
English law does not require dishonesty, negligence or wrongful intent for there to be a 
breach of trust.254 
 
A breach of fiduciary duty is just what the term suggests – a breach by the trustee of his 
fiduciary duties, namely the no conflict or no profit rules. An example would be where a 
trustee who is authorised by the trust deed to invest in real estate, sells his own real estate to 
the trust. Doing so does not breach the terms of the trust, but because he is a fiduciary, he is 
not allowed to act when such a conflict exists, and so the act would be a breach of fiduciary 
duty.  
 
                                                      
250 Hudson Equity and Trusts 740-741; Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1858. 
251 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 1145-1146. 
252 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
253 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 251.  
254 Hudson Equity and Trusts 741-742. 
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Breaches of trust, strictly speaking, refer to other breaches by a trustee of duties owed to 
beneficiaries that are peculiar to his position as trustee, such as the duty of care and skill or 
duties in relation to the administration of the trust or the distribution of trust assets, but which 
are not fiduciary in nature. A trustee that invests the trust fund in a negligent way may be 
guilty of a breach of trust, but unless he acted in breach of the no conflict or no profit rule, 
there would be no breach of fiduciary duty.255   
 
Hayton and Virgo both explain that breaches of trust (as opposed to breaches of fiduciary 
duty) are either (a) the result of an unauthorised, or ultra vires, action, such as misapplication 
of the trust fund or acting in conflict of interest, or (b) an inadequate action, which is doing 
something intra vires, but doing it in a suboptimal way, for instance failing to apply the 
required care and skill. Liability for unauthorised transactions is strict, similar to the position 
in relation to breaches of fiduciary duties. The beneficiaries do not have to prove a breach, 
loss or a causal link between the two. The trustee must restore the trust property or, if this is 
not possible, a money substitute. In the case of inadequate actions, fault on the part of the 
trustee must be proved, normally in the form of negligence, to establish liability. The trustee 
must pay reparation to make good the harm caused to the trust and the measure of his liability 
is therefore the loss actually suffered by the beneficiaries.256 
 
3 1 2 Requirements for establishing liability for breach of trust 
 
The topic of breach of trust is closely related to that of remedies, a topic that will not be 
examined in this dissertation. However, it is worth noting that the remedy depends on the type 
of breach, and that there appears to be disagreement in academic circles as to the appropriate 
remedy in each case. This may have to do with the difficulties in defining and categorising 
breaches of trust, and also as a result of the differences between equity and common law, 
explored in chapter 2.257 
 
                                                      
255 Penner The Law of Trusts 319-320; Virgo The Principles of Equity & Trusts 560-561. 
256 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 1047-1048; Virgo The Principles of 
Equity & Trusts 561. See also Pearce et al Pearce & Stevens' Trusts and Equitable Obligations 812-815, 855-
857, where he explains that a trustee is always liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. Because he committed an 
equitable wrong, the beneficiaries can recover either restitution or equitable compensation. A trustee who acted 
ultra vires, outside the scope of his powers, is also strictly liable. However, in the case of a breach of the duty of 
care, a trustee would not be strictly liable, but if the trustee failed to exercise the expected standard of care, that 
of a prudent man of business, and this has caused a loss to the trust, he would be liable to make good the loss. 
257 See ch 2 para 2 2 2. 
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Despite the importance of the accountability of the trustee towards the beneficiaries, which 
forms part of the irreducible core of trusteeship, one can imagine situations where vexatious 
beneficiaries may institute proceedings against trustees who had not caused a loss to the trust 
fund. Therefore, modern English trust law stipulates that a trustee who committed a breach of 
trust falling in the intra vires but inadequate category is not always liable to make good his 
breach of trust. If there is no loss the trustee is not liable, and if there is a loss but it cannot be 
causally linked to the trustee’s breach of trust, the trustee is not liable to make good the 
loss.258 A trustee can therefore escape liability for an imprudent or improper investment that 
turns out to perform well, and even for investments made with the knowledge that they are 
unauthorised, as long as no loss is caused thereby.259 
 
Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc260 is an important case regarding liability for breach 
of the duty of care. It set the bar for negligent breach of trust concerning investments at 
imprudence or unfairness (incompetence or idleness being insufficient), and also confirmed 
that, apart from proving a breach of trust, the claimant must show that the breach caused a 
loss to the trust fund. Thus, there are three elements for liability: breach of trust, loss and 
causation.261 
 
In casu, the trustee was a professional corporate body. It had misinterpreted the investment 
powers given to it under the terms of the trust and therefore reduced the trust fund’s exposure 
to equities without taking legal advice on the point. It also failed to conduct regular reviews of 
the performance of the investments. The trust fund remained invested for a long period of 
around 60 years and although it did grow, the beneficiary claimed that if the trust fund were 
properly invested it would have been worth five times as much. The Court of Appeal held that 
the mere incompetence and idleness of the trustee was not in and of itself a breach of trust. 
Only if the incompetence can be shown to have caused the trustee to take decisions that 
caused a quantifiable loss to the trust would there be a breach of trust. The court admitted that 
                                                      
258 Hudson Equity and Trusts 741-743. 
259 Watt Trusts & Equity 421. See also Hudson Equity and Trusts 743-745, who suggests that this was not the 
traditional approach that favoured strict liability for all breaches and would have meant that the beneficiaries 
were able to sue the trustee for a technical breach of trust, even if the result of the breach was an increase in the 
value of the trust fund. It is not clear whether Hudson refers here to breaches of trust or breaches of fiduciary 
duty, or both, but the case law he refers to, Target Holdings v Redferns [1995] 3 All ER 785, dealt with 
negligence, so presumably he refers to the intra vires but inadequate category of breach of trust. 
260 Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118 The case was also discussed in ch 2 para 2 1 3 1 
in the context of the common law duty of care. 
261 Watt Trusts & Equity 408-409; Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118 133-134. 
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this was a heavy burden on a claimant, but still found it right to hold that the trustee did not 
commit a breach of trust. 262  Remarkably, the court admitted that the trustee did not act 
conscientiously, fairly and carefully, but found that there was no loss arising from a breach of 
trust for which the trustees must compensate the trust fund.263  
 
It may well be argued that such incompetence on the part of a paid professional trustee should 
in and of itself constitute a breach of trust. Although it is said that a paid professional trustee 
is held to a high objective standard of prudence, this judgment negates that requirement by 
placing a very heavy onus on the claimant. Proving that a trustee’s action or inaction caused a 
quantifiable loss to the trust fund is invariably very difficult when considering the 
uncertainties of the investment process and the performance of investments, especially 
company shares, over many years.  
 
The Court of Appeal may have been trying to balance the interests of beneficiaries with the 
need to encourage trusteeship. Creating a more liberal environment for trustee investments 
and making it safer for a trustee to invest trust funds in asset classes carrying higher degrees 
of risk enables a trustee to generate higher returns, which benefits the beneficiaries, without 
having to take on increased risk of liability.264 A similar forgiving attitude towards trustees 
can be found in the judgment in Armitage v Nurse265 with regard to the acceptable scope of 
trustee exculpation clauses, discussed later.266  
 
The modern approach to liability for breach of trust was confirmed by the House of Lords in 
Target Holdings v Redferns.267 This approach requires not only that the beneficiaries must 
have suffered a loss, but also that there must have been a causal link between the trustee’s 
breach of trust and the loss. Although the Target Holdings268 case did not concern an express 
inter vivos trust, but rather a case of solicitors holding client money on trust in their client 
account, it is well recognised as setting out the accepted law on liability for breach of trust 
based on negligence.269 In this case, although the solicitors did commit a breach of trust, it was 
                                                      
262 Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118 133-134. 
263 Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118 139. 
264 Watt Trusts & Equity 410. 
265 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
266 See ch 3 para 5 1. 
267 Target Holdings v Redferns [1995] 3 All ER 785. 
268 Target Holdings v Redferns [1995] 3 All ER 785. 
269 In other words, not relating to unauthorised transactions or breach of fiduciary duty. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 171 
not their breach of trust that led to the claimant’s loss, but rather a breach of trust on the part 
of another party who absconded with the money and could not be found. That was the reason 
the claimant tried to sue the solicitors, but because its loss was not caused by the solicitors’ 
breach of trust, it could not claim compensation from the solicitors.270 
 
If no loss flows directly from the breach of trust, the trustee committing that breach can 
therefore not be liable for breach of trust. Moreover, the beneficiary must be able to prove the 
loss.271  
 
When the breach of trust concerns the investment of the trust fund, as it so often does, there 
are particular difficulties in proving loss. The generation of a small gain may still be 
characterised as a loss, if the beneficiary can show that other trust funds that are subject to the 
same restrictions have generated higher returns. On the other hand, a reduction in the value of 
the trust fund during a financial crisis may not be a breach of trust, because the beneficiary 
cannot prove that the loss is the result of fault or breach of duty on the part of the trustee.272  
 
3 2 Offshore: Jersey  
 
3 2 1 Definition of breach of trust 
 
Breach of trust is clearly defined in Jersey law, and it appears that the legislators were not 
troubled by the same doubts as English judges and commentators. 
 
Article 1(1) of the TJL states: 
 
“ [B]reach of trust” means a breach of any duty imposed on a trustee by this Law or by 
the terms of the trust[.]”273 
                                                      
270 Hudson Equity and Trusts 744-747; Target Holdings v Redferns [1995] 3 All ER 785 784. 
271 Hudson Equity and Trusts 746. 
272 Hudson Equity and Trusts 747. In Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118 the appellant 
had to prove that a prudent trustee, knowing of the scope of the investment power of the bank and periodically 
reviewing the investment, would have invested it in a way that would have made it worth more than it was in the 
instant case. It was held at 141-142 that this was not proved and that therefore the trustee did not commit a 
breach of trust that resulted in a loss. It was said that the trustee was not so much to be judged by success as by 
the absence of proven default. 
273 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 1(1). This is similar to the definition under English law, although there is no 
statutory definition under English law. 
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Not only is the term “breach of trust” defined by statute; many other issues are also statutorily 
regulated, as examined below. It appears that Jersey law would define breaches of both 
fiduciary duties and non-fiduciary duties as breaches of trust. 
 
No mental element is required and a trustee can therefore act in breach of trust without 
knowing that he is acting wrongly.274 It is not unusual for a trustee in an offshore jurisdiction, 
including Jersey, to seek directions from the court in case of uncertainty, thereby protecting 
himself from breach of trust claims.275 
 
Not much has been written about how breaches of trust were defined under the common law, 
prior to the enactment of the TJL. However, the 1980 case of Cutner v Green and Trustees of 
the Marc Bolan Charitable Trust276 provides some insight. Much of the judgment concerned 
procedural matters and the judgment of the lower court has not been reported. There may 
have been more discussion there regarding what constitutes a breach of trust. The Court of 
Appeal simply stated that a breach of trust occurred and that the trustee had to make it good. 
The trustee in this case invested trust money without the required consent. The speculative 
investments made by the trustee caused loss to the trust fund and the trustee conceded liability 
on this point. Another part of the trust fund was paid into an account unrelated to the trust, but 
the trustee denied knowledge about this payment. He claimed that he was not liable in respect 
of the interest lost on that part of the fund. The court, however, found that because he failed to 
account for the funds, he was liable.277  
 
In fact, the trustee was liable not only for simple interest, but for what the trust fund would 
have earned if it was properly invested, in other words, had no breach of trust been 
committed. The award given was therefore for interest (or profit) lost. The court commented 
that it was nothing more than fair that a defaulting trustee should make good in full any loss, 
including any interest that would have been earned on the trust fund had he done his duty 
properly.278 
 
                                                      
274 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 219. 
275 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 220. 
276 Cutner v Green and Trustees of the Marc Bolan Charitable Trust [1980] JJ 269. 
277 Cutner v Green and Trustees of the Marc Bolan Charitable Trust [1980] JJ 269 276-277. 
278 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 221; Cutner v Green and Trustees of the Marc Bolan Charitable Trust 
[1980] JJ 269 278. 
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Despite lack of detailed arguments, the direction the court was taking is clear. 
 
3 2 2 Requirements for establishing liability for breach of trust 
 
Article 30 of the TJL deals with liability for breach of trust and provides: 
 
“30(1) Subject to this Law and the terms of the trust, a trustee shall be liable for a 
breach of trust committed by the trustee or in which the trustee has concurred. 
30(2) A trustee who is liable for a breach of trust shall be liable for –  
(a) the loss or depreciation in value of the trust property resulting from such 
breach; and 
(b) the profit, if any, which would have accrued to the trust property if there had 
been no such breach.”279 
 
In Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services280 the Royal 
Court said the following: 
 
“…[I]t seems to us that a failure to perform a duty may still lead to an action for a 
breach of trust even though there has not been a loss. If that is so, then the position in 
Jersey may be different to the position in England…”281 
 
This creates the impression that Jersey law does not require loss to establish liability for 
breach of trust.282 It is not clear whether that is correct. In casu there was a substantial loss and 
the court did not have to examine this issue too deeply. The trustee failed to invest the trust 
fund on the stock market due to the mistaken belief that it did not have the power to do so. 
The trustee did not take legal advice and simply placed the money on deposit, which turned 
out to be less profitable to the pension fund than investing it on the stock exchange would 
have been. These comments were therefore made in the context of whether the beneficiaries 
would also have complained if the stock market had fallen. The “loss” that the court said may 
not be required is therefore simply a failure of the benchmark to perform as it normally would 
                                                      
279 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 30(1) and 30(2). 
280 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276. 
281 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276 290. 
282 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 220-221. 
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– if it did perform normally, there would have been a gap between the performance of the 
investment made in breach of trust and the investment in the benchmark asset, in this case the 
stock market. 
 
In the Midland Bank case,283 the fact that the trustee did not take professional advice was a 
major contributor to the conclusion that it had committed a breach of trust.284  
 
Another Jersey case dealing with breach of trust is Freeman v Ansbacher Trustees (Jersey) 
Limited.285 The case dealt, on the one hand, with the locus standi of a discretionary beneficiary 
to sue for breach of trust and, on the other hand, with the liability of a trustee for breach of 
trust in the shape of mismanagement of the trust fund. 
 
The facts were that the trust fund was invested in one company that constituted the only 
significant asset of the trust. Employees of the trustee were also directors of the company for 
a substantial period of time. The company made investments, described as hazardous, in land 
with uncertain title and the worldwide rights to sell certain software products.286  
 
It was alleged that the trustee committed a breach of trust by not exercising the duties of care 
and skill required of a professional trustee in managing the affairs and investments of a trust, 
that the trustee did not ensure it had such information about the affairs of the company as a 
director can be expected to have, and that as a result it failed to safeguard the trust assets and 
protect the interests of the beneficiaries in the way that a professional trustee should have 
done, thereby causing a loss to the trust fund. The original claim was for negligence. Because 
liability for negligence can be excluded under Jersey law (and was excluded in this case) but 
liability for gross negligence cannot be excluded (as discussed below), the claim was 
amended to one of gross negligence. The court found that whether certain behaviour can be 
categorised as gross negligence is a value judgment to be applied by the court – “a label to 
denote the degree of culpability involved”.287 
                                                      
283 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276. 
284 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276 291-293. The court said at 293 “The breach was the failure of FPS to hand over the fund 
on an erroneous assumption of fact. The erroneous assumption of fact could have been cured by obtaining legal 
advice.” 
285 Freeman v Ansbacher Trustees (Jesey) Limited [2009 JLR 1]. 
286 Freeman v Ansbacher Trustees (Jesey) Limited [2009 JLR 1] 8-10. 
287 Freeman v Ansbacher Trustees (Jesey) Limited [2009 JLR 1] 25. 
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A more recent case of interest is Nautilus Trustee Limited v Zedra Trustees (Jersey) 
Limited.288 The judgment dealt with preliminary issues of striking out certain parts of the 
plaintiff’s claim (which was mostly refused) and at the time of writing the case has not 
progressed to trial yet, or the judgment has not been published yet. The trust fund in this case 
was mainly invested in structured loan notes issued by a bank connected with the trustee. The 
allegations of breach of trust included failure to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, 
failure to preserve or enhance the value of the trust property and conflicts of interest (as the 
trustee belonged to the same group of companies as the bank where the trust fund was kept 
and invested).289 The duty of no conflict is a fiduciary duty and thus confirms the assumption 
that Jersey law does not distinguish a different category of breach of fiduciary duty, but rather 
treats it as a breach of trust. 
 
The defendant relied on the English case AIB Group (UK) Plc v Redler & Co Solicitors290 for 
the assertion that there is a requirement for loss to have flowed directly from the breach of 
trust. The AIB Group judgment291 confirmed the judgment in Target Holdings v Redferns,292 
discussed earlier. There was a question as to causation of the loss in this case as the regulatory 
notices on the bank notes, which is said to have caused the loss in their value, were only 
issued after the bank notes matured. It was argued that it was the financial crisis that started in 
2008 that caused the loss and not regulatory findings on the banks that issued the loan 
notes.293 
 
The judge pointed out that when the case progresses to trial, thought should be given by the 
plaintiff as to what its loss might be. The plaintiff received shares in another bank on maturity 
of the bank notes and the price of these shares have since fluctuated. Evidence would be 




                                                      
288 Nautilus Trustee Limited v Zedra Trustees (Jersey) Limited [2016] JRC 233. 
289 Nautilus Trustee Limited v Zedra Trustees (Jersey) Limited [2016] JRC 233 paras 2-8. 
290 AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58. 
291 AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58. 
292 Target Holdings v Redferns [1995] 3 All ER 785. 
293 Nautilus Trustee Limited v Zedra Trustees (Jersey) Limited [2016] JRC 233 paras 53-56. 
294 Nautilus Trustee Limited v Zedra Trustees (Jersey) Limited [2016] JRC 233 para 123. 
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3 3 South Africa 
 
3 3 1 Definition of breach of trust 
 
South African law explains breach of trust by reference to the trustee’s duty of care. The duty 
of care is generally described as a fiduciary duty, or, stated differently, the duty of care is 
considered an aspect of the fiduciary duty of a trustee. It is, in fact, considered an integral part 
of the fiduciary duty – the trustee’s performance is measured against the standard expected by 
the duty of care.295 As a result, the view is that a breach of trust is equated to a breach of 
fiduciary duty under South African law.296 References to breach of fiduciary duty have been 
found in case law, where it was also referred to as a breach of trust.297 Breach of fiduciary 
duty would therefore seem to fall under the umbrella of breach of trust.  
 
Where a trustee fails to meet the required standard of care, he is therefore considered to be 
breaching his fiduciary duty or committing a breach of trust.298  
 
In Gross v Pentz,299 a case concerned with the locus standi of a contingent beneficiary to sue 
the trustee for breach of trust, the trustee caused economic loss to the trust by negligently 
failing to ascertain the true value of the asset that was to be sold by the trust.300 The trustee 
was authorised by the terms of the trust to sell the particular asset, but he negligently failed to 
apply the necessary care in determining the true market value of the asset, as a result of which 
it was sold for less than it was worth. Corbett CJ referred to Sackville West v Nourse301 as 
establishing the legal foundations for the liability of a trustee for maladministration of a 
trust.302 In this case the court found that the trustee acted negligently, even if no mala fides 
were present. Proof of negligence is required but not of dishonesty. 
 
                                                      
295 See ch 3 paras 2 3 3, 2 3 4 for the duty of care under South African law. 
296 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 103; De Waal (1998) TSAR 326 330; Olivier 
(2001) 118 SALJ 224 229. 
297 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) para 16; Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) 465 
(SCA) 478. 
298 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 362 refers to “a breach of trust or duty”, thereby 
implying that they are the same; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 103. In England, a 
breach of the duty of care would be a breach of trust but not a breach of fiduciary duty. 
299 Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A). 
300 Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) 626, where the case against the trustee was described as intentional or 
negligent maladministration of the trust. 
301 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516. 
302 Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) 626. 
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A breach of trust, however, always involves an element of wrongfulness towards one or more 
beneficiaries of the trust.303 In Jowell v Bramwell-Jones304 a lay trustee relied on the advice of 
professional financial advisors in dealing with certain investments. In this case the wrongful 
action was on the part of the advisors, who were the defendants, and who acted together with 
the trustee, who was also the income beneficiary. One of the capital beneficiaries who could 
benefit only after the death of the income beneficiary claimed that the sale of certain shares 
held by the trust was a breach of trust and caused a loss to the capital beneficiaries. The 
trustee herself also committed a breach of trust (a breach of fiduciary duty to be precise) in 
that there was a conflict between her personal interests and those of the beneficiaries. 
Although it was held that such a conflict would not automatically constitute a breach of trust 
(or fiduciary duty), such transactions will be carefully examined and in this case a breach of 
fiduciary duty was found to be present in addition to a breach of trust relating to the sale of 
the shares.305 
 
The wrongful conduct in relation to the sale of the shares was held to be on the part of the 
professional advisers. The advisers, who were professionals advertising their skill and 
knowledge, either knew or should have known that their conduct would cause damage, and 
should have taken practical steps to prevent it. They knew that the trustee was unskilled. If the 
trustee could not rely on their advice, the protection afforded to the beneficiaries was 
jeopardised.306 
 
The test to determine wrongfulness was said to revolve around whether, based on the 
circumstances of the specific case, the interests of the plaintiff (beneficiary) were infringed in 
a reasonable or unreasonable manner. Phrased differently, it depended on whether the 
defendant (the trustee or, in this case, the advisor to the trustee) had a legal duty to prevent the 
loss.307 
 
Breaching the common law or statutory duty of care is unlawful. This is important as far as 
remedies are concerned (although remedies do not form part of the focus of this dissertation) 
                                                      
303 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 365; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) 
877. 
304 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) and on appeal Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 
(SCA). 
305 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA) para 16. 
306 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) 878, 882. 
307 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) 877-878. 
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– the main civil remedy against a trustee who committed a breach of trust is an Aquilian 
action308 for pure economic loss, and in order to rely on the Aquilian action, conduct must be 
unlawful.309 This includes intentional acts or omissions, but also negligent ones. However, 
conduct that causes loss but is not at least negligent does not constitute a breach of trust.310 An 
example of this would be where a trustee invested in a diversified portfolio of shares and was 
properly authorised and advised to do so, but due to economic conditions outside the control 
of the trustee the share market suddenly crashes so that the portfolio loses value. The trustee 
would not be liable in this case, even though there is loss. 
 
A wrongful act or omission can be either negligent or intentional. Examples are plentiful and 
include making an investment where the margin between the sum invested and the value of 
the security is too narrow; 311  not taking action to recover monies due to the trust; 312  the 
negligent failure to ascertain the true value of a trust asset before it is sold; 313 mingling trust 
property with the trustee’s own property or allowing non-beneficiaries to occupy real property 
owned by the trust rent-free; lack of impartiality; and not enquiring how trust money is spent 
by co-trustees.314 Some of these breaches relate to the duty of care and skill, and some relate 
to the duties described by English law as fiduciary, namely the no conflict and no profit 
rules.315 
 
3 3 2 Requirements for establishing liability for breach of trust 
 
The obvious consequence of a breach of trust is liability of the trustee. However, a trustee 
who committed a breach of trust is not liable towards the beneficiaries if there is no loss and 
if the loss was not caused by the trustee’s breach of trust. For a successful Aquilian action all 
three requirements must therefore be fulfilled. Firstly, there must be a wrongful act on the part 
                                                      
308 The Aquilian action has its roots in Roman law and is the main delictual remedy for pure economic loss, 
whether such loss was caused intentionally or negligently. 
309 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 365. 
310 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 365. 
311 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 520-521, where it was found that the trustee, by taking on too much 
risk, acted negligently and did not fulfil the standard of care expected of a bonus et diligens paterfamilias and 
therefore had to make good the loss. 
312 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 865-871. Although the trustees alleged that they were not aware of 
the circumstances, it was found that, because they were trustees, they had a duty to ask. Ignorance was no 
defence. 
313 Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) 626. 
314 These breaches were all found to be present in Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 459 (T) 472-
476. 
315 See ch 3 para 2 1 2 2. Under South African law, these duties are all considered fiduciary in nature. 
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of the trustee, at least negligent in nature. Secondly, the trust beneficiary must have suffered a 
loss. Thirdly, there must be a causal link between the breach and the loss. 
 
The loss or damage must be actual damage sustained by the beneficiary. A beneficiary who 
can only benefit at a later stage, for example on the death of the income beneficiary or on the 
termination of the trust, cannot institute a claim before his right has vested, because it is only 
at this stage that he would be able to prove actual loss,316 as confirmed on appeal by Jowell v 
Bramwell-Jones.317  
 
Scott JA held that the appellant (the capital beneficiary) could not prove on a balance of 
probabilities that there would be a loss on termination of the trust. This is because there was 
no way of predicting what the share market would do in the future, and until such time as the 
trust terminates it would not be known whether the appellant would have suffered a loss at all. 
His action was therefore considered premature and the appeal was dismissed, although there 
clearly had been a breach of trust.318 
 
The final requirement for Aquilian liability is that of causation – the trustee’s breach of trust 
must have resulted in loss or damage. The link cannot be too remote (although it is not clear 
exactly what that means in practice and presumably the circumstances of each individual case 
will be relevant).319 
 
3 4 Conclusion and comparison 
 
The term breach of trust generally seems to encompass both breaches of fiduciary duties and 
other breaches of trust, the latter relating mostly to a breach of specific terms of the trust or a 
breach of the duty of care. English law differentiates between breaches of fiduciary duty and 
other breaches of trust more clearly than Jersey and South African law, possibly because the 
duty of care is so clearly non-fiduciary under English law. 
 
                                                      
316 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 364-365; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles 
and Practice 104. 
317 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA). 
318 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA) 284-288. 
319 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 364-365; Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles 
and Practice 104. 
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Although the fiduciary duties of a trustee, having their origin in 18th century English law, 
appear broadly similar across the jurisdictions, there are differences, at least prima facie, in 
the standard of care and skill expected of a trustee, and this of course leads to a different 
threshold for committing a breach of trust in the different jurisdictions. A trustee of whom 
only a basic level of care and skill is expected will not commit a breach of trust as easily as a 
trustee subject to a much higher standard. There are also differences within specific 
jurisdictions, especially in England and also offshore, where professional trustees are clearly 
held to a higher standard. 
 
In all three jurisdictions there is a requirement for loss having been caused by the breach of 
trust in order to attach liability to the defaulting trustee, although there is doubt about whether 
loss and causation are required in Jersey. 
 
4 The rule in Hastings Bass and its implications for the trust industry 
 
Before examining the extent to which a trustee can protect himself from liability for breach of 
trust in the jurisdictions under review, a detour will be made by looking at a particular rule of 
English law that allows, in appropriate circumstances, the setting aside of the exercise of 
certain trustee powers. The rule relates to the exercise by trustees of certain powers, but is 
also relevant in the context of trustee duties.320  
 
The rule was perceived to have been abused by trustees and its application has now been 
limited by the Supreme Court on an English appeal. Arguably, in none of the cases where the 
previous version of the rule was applied by an English or offshore court were the beneficiaries 
prejudiced. The dissatisfaction with the rule was more likely based on the leniency afforded to 
trustees who failed to properly exercise their powers, or towards advisors who gave incorrect 
advice. 
 
The development of this rule demonstrates that trustee duties are important tools in 
controlling and regulating the exercise of fiduciary powers. It also illustrates how the English 
court has taken a firm stance on a development it viewed as undesirable, and in this way has 
                                                      
320 Hudson Equity and Trusts 335-337 explains that the rule has its origin in the duty to take account of relevant 
considerations when exercising discretionary powers; Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1351 discusses the rule under 
the topic of inadequate consideration in the exercise of trustee powers. 
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contributed to the further development of trust law. The reaction of the offshore world will 
also be examined. 
 
4 1 England 
 
4 1 1 The rule in Hastings-Bass  
 
Under a rule known as the rule in Hastings-Bass, 321  courts in England can in certain 
circumstances set aside the exercise by a trustee of a discretionary dispositive power. 322 
Contextually, this rule can be regarded as a technique of controlling the power held by 
fiduciaries,323 and specifically the decision-making process of trustees.324 
 
Making uninformed decisions could, in certain circumstances, constitute a breach of trust. It 
would be an example of an intra vires act that was performed inadequately, one of the 
categories of breach of trust described above.325 
 
The Hastings-Bass rule was concerned with the duty, in exercising distributive discretions, to 
make properly informed decisions. A trustee needs to inform himself of matters relevant to 
the decision and must ignore irrelevant matters.326 However, as described below, the rule has 
taken on a life of its own and has, no doubt, been used to the advantage of trustees who were 
not sufficiently careful.  
                                                      
321 The rule has its origins in the English Court of Appeal case Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193. 
322 Dispositive powers refer to powers authorising trustees to dispose of the trust fund, eg to make a distribution 
to a beneficiary. This must be distinguished from administrative powers allowing the trustees to manage the trust 
and invest the trust fund. 
323 Nolan (2009) 68 CLJ 293 identifies three categories of techniques to control fiduciary power. The first 
concerns doctrines that define and limit the scope of a power, such as construction, the requirement of good faith 
and the doctrine of fraud on a power, and has as a result that a purported exercise of power is void. The second 
category addresses the process of decision-making and includes the self-dealing rule and the Hastings-Bass rule. 
In these cases acts are voidable but not void. The third category is concerned with the degree of competence with 
which the power was exercised – the duty of care and skill. It constitutes an indirect control as it exposes the 
fiduciary to sanctions against him personally. 
324 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 925 describes that trustees must from 
time to time consider whether to exercise distributive or managerial discretions. They have a fiduciary duty to 
make informed decisions taking into account all relevant considerations, which means exercising their discretion 
in good faith and not passively falling in with the wishes of the settlor (as will be examined in more detail in ch 
4). The exercise of the power must also be within the scope of the power and not be exercised for the trustee’s 
own benefit and the trustees must fulfil the duty of care. If these requirements have been complied with, the 
exercise of discretion cannot be challenged even if a court may consider that there was a better way of exercising 
the power. 
325 See ch 3 para 3 1 1. 
326 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 932. 
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As a first step, it is necessary to look at the history of the rule and how subsequent cases have 
widened the application thereof.  
 
The facts in Hastings-Bass327 concerned an unauthorised exercise of a power of advancement. 
The power was exercised as part of a tax saving scheme, but contrary to the trustee’s 
understanding of the law, the advancement contravened the rule against perpetuities as far as 
the beneficial interests in the capital were concerned (although the advancement of the 
interests in the income was valid). The court a quo decided that the exercise of the power was 
void and therefore the estate tax saving was not achieved.  
 
This was reversed on appeal, where the court found that the advancement was effective to 
create an interest for life in the income in favour of the settlor’s son, even though the exercise 
of the power with regard to the capital was void.328 The Court of Appeal considered that the 
aim of saving estate duty would have been first and foremost in the trustee’s mind, and that he 
would have exercised the power even if he had realised that certain indirect or contingent 
benefits (the advancement of the interests in capital) would not be able to take effect because 
they were void for perpetuity.329  
 
Buckley LJ then summarised the Court’s observations as follows: 
 
“…[W]here by the terms of a trust a trustee is given a discretion as to some matter 
under which he acts in good faith, the court should not interfere with his action 
notwithstanding that it does not have the full effect which he intended, unless (1) what 
he has achieved is unauthorised by the power conferred on him, or (2) it is clear that he 
would not have acted as he did (a) had he not taken into account considerations which 
he should not have taken into account, or (b) had he not failed to take into account 
considerations which he ought to have taken into account.”330 
 
                                                      
327 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193. 
328 Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts 414-415. 
329 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193 201-203, as 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment) 469. 
330 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193 203. 
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As discussed below, according to the Court of Appeal in Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter,331 the 
above passage does not represent the ratio decidendi of the Hastings-Bass332 decision and has 
in fact led to a misunderstanding of the effect of the decision.  
 
Instead, it is suggested that the Hastings-Bass case turned upon whether the exercise of the 
power as a whole was for the benefit of the object of the power, even if certain elements 
thereof could not take effect because of external factors such as perpetuity.333  
 
The court in Hastings-Bass said:  
 
“Had it occurred to the trustees that the ulterior trusts might all fail for perpetuity, they 
could not reasonably have thought that this could tip the scales in the weighing 
operation against the scheme. The law cannot, in our judgment, require the trustees’ 
exercise of their discretion to be treated as a nullity on the basis of an absurd 
assumption that, had they realised its true legal effect, they would have reached an 
unreasonable conclusion as the result of the weighing operation.”334 
 
If it can be so regarded, the requirement that the power should be exercised for the benefit of 
the object is satisfied and the exercise of the power is valid, even if legally flawed. If not, the 
exercise of the power is outside the scope of the power (ultra vires) and cannot take effect. It 
is thus void.335  
 
4 1 2 Subsequent cases and resulting perceptions surrounding the use of the rule 
 
Although the rule was originally intended to protect beneficiaries against having to litigate 
against their trustees, was negatively framed and had quite a narrow field of application, it has 
been expanded by subsequent cases. It became very useful for trustees whose actions have led 
                                                      
331 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment) 468-469. 
332 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193. 
333 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment) 466-467. The question has to be 
objective, namely whether what was done can be regarded as beneficial to the object of the power, even if there 
were certain defects in the exercise of the power. In weighing up the benefits of the exercise of the power with 
any adverse effects it may have, the trustees can reasonably be expected to choose the option that would be most 
beneficial to the beneficiaries in question. It would be unreasonable to ignore the trustee’s decision on the basis 
that, had they realised there would be some minor or indirect adverse effect in addition to achieving the purpose 
they had wanted (in this case a tax saving), they would not have exercised the power. 
334 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193 202. 
335 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment) 469-470, 510-511. 
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to unintended tax consequences, as their actions could be nullified without the need for the 
beneficiaries to sue them for negligence or breach of trust. It has therefore been used by 
trustees ‘against’ themselves, in circumstances where it subsequently appeared to be 
beneficial to the trustees (and mostly also to one or more of the beneficiaries, it must be 
added) to set aside one of their actions.  
 
It is undisputed that the driving force in most of these cases was tax. Where a trustee was 
given incorrect tax advice and acted on it with the result that the tax objective was not 
achieved, such an act could be reversed using the Hastings-Bass rule. The same would have 
applied where the trustee simply never considered the tax consequences, or received correct 
advice that was ignored or implemented incorrectly.336 It is not surprising that the rule became 
unpopular with some academics, practitioners and English judges given the relative ease with 
which a trustee could escape the tax consequences of his actions.337 Furthermore, it led to the 
unsatisfactory position that trustees could use the rule to avoid the tax consequences of their 
actions while other taxpayers did not have the benefit of revisiting their decisions to the same 
extent.338 
 
A very clear and useful exposition of the subsequent cases and the principles involved is 
found in the Court of Appeal’s combined judgment in Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter.339 
 
How did this happen? More than a decade after the decision in Hastings-Bass,340 the High 
Court in Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans341 developed and expanded the principle by 
holding that it was wider than mere ultra vires acts and included a failure to take account of 
relevant considerations of fact or law.  It also stated the rule in positive terms rather than the 
original negative statement.342 Walker J did not require a breach of trust on the part of the 
                                                      
336 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 934-935. 
337 Breadner v Granville-Grossman [2000] 4 All ER 705 722, where Park J commented: “It cannot be right that 
whenever trustees do something which they later regret and think that they ought not to have done, they can say 
that they never did it in the first place.”; Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment) 
510, where Longmore LJ said it was an example “of that comparatively rare instance of the law taking a 
seriously wrong turn, of that wrong turn being not infrequently acted on over a twenty year period but this court 
being able to reverse that error and put the law back on the right course.” 
338 Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1351. 
339 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment). 
340 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193. 
341 Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1991] 2 All ER 513. 
342 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 933. Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v 
Evans [1991] 2 All ER 513 concerned a pension fund trust and the validity of a deed made by the company and 
the trustees of the pension fund. It was held that the power exercised by the deed was in fact a fiduciary power, 
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trustee, and based the principle simply on a failure to properly take into account relevant 
considerations (or not take into account irrelevant considerations), however that failure may 
have occurred.343  
 
This signalled a marked difference in approach, 344  although, ironically, the rule was not 
applied in casu as the judge found that the trustee would not have acted differently even if it 
had taken the relevant considerations into account.  
 
The judgment is credited with causing judges in subsequent cases to set aside the exercise of 
trustee powers in a more proactive way,345 for example in Green v Cobham.346 In Re Barr’s 
Settlement Trusts347 a different approach was followed, requiring a breach of trust on the part 
of the trustee, and declaring that where the rule is applied, the exercise of the power is 
voidable, and not simply void.348    
 
However, the majority of cases indicated a more lenient attitude towards trustees. Sieff v 
Fox349 is an important example and is the case that shaped many offshore versions of the rule, 
as discussed below. 
 
In this case Lloyd J identified different categories of instances where an exercise by trustees 
of a discretionary power may be held to be invalid. These are: 
 
(a) a formal or procedural defect;  
(b) an exercise in a way that is not authorised by the power;  
                                                                                                                                                                      
that the trustees failed to take into account considerations they ought to have taken into account, but that, in this 
case, they would not have acted differently had they taken those considerations into account and that therefore 
the deed was valid.  
343 Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1991] 2 All ER 513 552-555. Walker J phrased the rule as follows: 
“…[T]he positive converse of a negative proposition enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Re Hastings-Bass… 
where a trustee acts under a discretion given to him by the terms of the trust, the court will interfere with his 
action if it is clear that he would not have acted as he did had he not failed to take into account considerations 
which he ought to have taken into account.” 
344 It is described by Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts 1357 as a misinterpretation of the rule.  
345 Hudson Equity and Trusts 340. 
346 Green v Cobham [2002] STC 820. 
347 Re Barr's Settlement Trusts, Abacus Trust Compay (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] 1 All ER 763. 
348 Re Barr's Settlement Trusts, Abacus Trust Compay (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] 1 All ER 763 772-774. 
349 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch). In this case the High Court judgment was given by Lloyd J, who later 
sat as a judge in the Court of Appeal in the Pitt and Futter cases, and where he took a different view as to the 
extent of the rule. It is the formulation of the rule in this case that seems to be widely upheld by offshore 
jurisdictions, possibly as it is the widest formulation of all. 
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(c) an infringement of some general rule of law such as the rule against perpetuities; (d) an 
exercise for an improper purpose, including a fraud on the power; and  
(e) an unawareness on the part of the trustees that they had a discretion to exercise.350  
 
The judge then said that the rule in Hastings-Bass adds a further category, namely where the 
trustees have failed to have regard to some relevant consideration that they ought to have 
taken into account.351 
 
He described the rule as follows:  
 
“The best formulation of the principle seems to me to be this. Where trustees act under a 
discretion given to them by the terms of the trust, in circumstances in which they are 
free to decide whether or not to exercise that discretion, but the effect of the exercise is 
different from that which they intended, the court will interfere with their action if it is 
clear that they would not have acted as they did had they not failed to take into account 
considerations which they ought to have taken into account, or taken into account 
considerations which they ought not to have taken into account.”352 
 
Lloyd J specifically said that he disagreed with Lightman J in the Barr case353 to the extent 
that, for the rule to apply, there had to be a breach of duty by the trustee, and where the rule 
applies, the exercise of the power is voidable rather than void. 354 This set the bar for the 
application of the rule much lower, and meant that it had a more wide-ranging effect. 
 
4 1 3 Judicial limitation of the rule 
 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter355  (which combined two 
cases) has now significantly restricted a trustee’s ability to rely on the rule by defining the 
                                                      
350 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 933-934. 
351 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch) para 38. 
352 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch) para 119 i). The addition of “in circumstances in which they are free to 
decide whether or not to exercise that discretion” was intended to differentiate this type of case from those where 
the trustees have to act, and in which the test is said to be whether they might (not would) have acted differently. 
353 Re Barr's Settlement Trusts, Abacus Trust Compay (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] 1 All ER 763. 
354 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch) para 119 iii) and iv). 
355 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
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field of application more narrowly.356 In fact, the limitation was already imposed by the Court 
of Appeal judgment,357 which was confirmed by the Supreme Court.  
 
The only point on which the Supreme Court judgment differed from the Court of Appeal’s, is 
in allowing the exercise of the power in one of the cases to be set aside on the grounds of 
mistake. Although this aspect will not be examined in this dissertation, it has been suggested 
that, in future, trustees may have greater resort to the doctrine of mistake, as the test for 
mistake has been slightly relaxed.  
 
Comments were also made about the fact that the development of the rule has led to trustees 
asserting and relying on their own failings, or that of their advisers, in seeking to set aside 
their decisions. In the first instance judgment of Futter v Futter358 Norris J referred to trustees 
acting in an “un-trustee-like fashion” and of wishing to take advantage of their failure to 
perform their duties in order to help beneficiaries avoid tax liabilities resulting from the 
trustees’ actions. He described the Court of Appeal decision in Hastings-Bass359 as creating a 
shield protecting trustees against an attack by the Inland Revenue on the validity of trustee 
decisions, a shield that has, however, subsequently been turned into a powerful weapon 
enabling trustees to attack their own flawed decisions.360  
 
The principle applying where a trustee acts within the scope of a power but fails to take into 
account a relevant factor he should have taken into account, was restated in a more restrictive 
way by the Court of Appeal and subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court.361 
                                                      
356 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 935; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 418. 
357 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment). 
358 Futter v Futter [2010] EWHC 449 (Ch). 
359 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193. 
360 Futter v Futter [2010] EWHC 449 (Ch) paras 1-2. 
361 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment) 487; Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] 
UKSC 26 (combined judgment) para 70 where the new approach was summarised as follows: “It seems to me 
that the principled and correct approach to these cases is that the trustees’ act is not void, but that it may be 
voidable. It will be voidable if, and only if, it can be shown to have been done in breach of fiduciary duty on the 
part of the trustees. If it is voidable, then it may be capable of being set aside at the suit of a beneficiary, but this 
would be subject to equitable defences and to the court’s discretion. The trustee’s duty to take relevant matters 
into account is a fiduciary duty, so an act done as a result of a breach of that duty is voidable. Fiscal 
considerations will often be among the relevant matters that ought to be taken into account. However, if the 
trustees seek advice (in general or in specific terms) from apparently competent advisers as to the implications of 
the course they are considering taking, and follow the advice so obtained, then, in the absence of any other basis 
for a challenge, I would hold that the trustees are not in breach of their fiduciary duty for failure to have regard 
to relevant matters if the failure occurs because it turns out that the advice given to them was materially wrong. 
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Underhill and Hayton sets out the elements of the newly defined rule as follows:362 
 
(a) a trustee acted intra vires but failed to take account of relevant matters when 
exercising a discretionary or dispositive power; 
(b) the failure amounts to a breach of duty (ignoring the effect of an exoneration 
clause); 
(c) failing to take legal advice can be a breach of duty but taking and acting on advice is 
not a breach of duty, even if the advice turned out to be wrong; 
(d) there is no rigid causation test requiring a decision as to whether the trustee would 
or might have acted differently; and 
(e) if the rule applies, the trustee’s act would be voidable and not void. 
 
The Supreme Court commented that the law has to balance the need to protect beneficiaries 
against aberrant conduct by trustees (which is the policy behind the original Hastings-Bass 
rule) against the competing interests of legal certainty and the desire not to apply too stringent 
a test in judging trustees’ decision-making.363 Protecting beneficiaries from having to institute 
proceedings against their trustees inevitably also protects those same trustees.  
 
One may query whether this limitation of the rule will lead to increased claims against 
advisers for negligence. It is arguable that the benefit of advice should be available to all 
parties who could be prejudiced by a transaction, including beneficiaries. More pressure 
should be applied on advisers not to exclude liability, or at least to limit such exclusions. 
There is a feeling that advisers tend to charge high levels of fees commensurate with the 
assumption of a certain level of risk, but without a willingness to guarantee the accuracy of 
their advice. Legislative intervention may be required. Ironically, in the context of the 
Hastings-Bass rule, it appears that it may be better not to take advice at all as that would 
likely constitute breach of trust or duty, whereas following incorrect advice will not.364 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Accordingly, in such a case I would not regard the trustees’ act, done in reliance on that advice, as being vitiated 
by the error and therefore voidable.” 
362 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 935-936. 
363 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment) para 83. 
364 Purkis (2013) 3 JGLR para 38. 
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4 2 Jersey and other offshore jurisdictions 
 
4 2 1 The rule in Hastings-Bass in Jersey prior to the Supreme Court ruling  
 
The Hastings-Bass rule was confirmed to be part of the law of Jersey in a 2002 decision of 
the Royal Court.365 Deputy Bailiff Birt considered various judgments of the English courts,366 
and came to the conclusion that the rule forms part of Jersey law. The court considered that 
the principle: 
 
“…is but a manifestation of the general principle that a trustee must act in good faith, 
responsibly and reasonably.”367  
 
The rule was held to be consistent with precedent and principle, Jersey law drawing 
substantially on English trust law principles. The court recognised that the limits of the 
principle still needed to be developed, so that a trustee cannot have every decision he regrets 
declared void, and favoured the view that the court would have to be convinced that the 
trustee would have acted differently, not merely that he might have acted differently, had he 
known the correct facts.368 
 
In another Jersey case369 that relied on the Hastings-Bass rule the court specifically said that 
there is doubt whether the principle would be invoked where bona fide third party purchasers 
for value would be prejudiced. This is an important criticism of the rule. It would lead to 
undesirable uncertainty in voluntary transactions and contractual dealings if transactions can 
be set aside because of some trustee-internal deficiency.370 The better solution in such cases 
may be to let the beneficiaries sue the trustee. However, in most of the cases where the rule 
                                                      
365 In the matter of the Green GLG Trust [2002] JLR 571. 
366 Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased), Hastings v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1974] 2 All ER 193; Mettoy 
Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1991] 2 All ER 513; Abacus Trust Company (Isle of Man) Ltd v NSPCC [2001] 
WTLR 953; Green v Cobham [2002] STC 820. 
367 In the matter of the Green GLG Trust [2002] JLR 571 para 26. 
368 In the matter of the Green GLG Trust [2002] JLR 571 paras 28-29. 
369 Seaton Trustees Limited v Morgan, in the matter of the Winton Trust [2007] JRC 206. This case considered 
the acceptance of an addition of trust funds to the trust, an administrative discretion as opposed to a dispositive 
one. The rule was held to apply equally to administrative and dispositive discretions. An argument that 
successful application of the rule should render a decision voidable rather than void was also rejected, as was the 
idea that where incorrect tax advice has been given to trustees, they should suffer the tax consequences and 
pursue their remedies against the advisers. See also Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 202-204. 
370 Seaton Trustees Limited v Morgan, in the matter of the Winton Trust [2007] JRC 206 para 12. See ch 3 para 4 
3 for similar cases in South Africa, however not based on a Hastings-Bass type of argument. 
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was relied on, the transactions affected only the trustee and the beneficiaries.  
 
The Jersey courts have generally also taken the view that fault, or a breach of duty, on the part 
of the trustee is not required in order to invoke the Hastings-Bass rule. As discussed above, 
the English court in Abacus Trust Company (Isle of Man) v Barr371 required a breach of trust 
on the part of the trustee, whereas in Sieff v Fox 372 (and many other cases) this was not 
required. The Jersey courts decided to follow the latter approach, namely that a mistake on the 
part of the trustee is sufficient, and a breach of trust or duty is not required.373 
 
A different approach was followed in In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement,374 no 
doubt influenced by the Court of Appeal judgment in Pitt and Futter.375 It was submitted in 
the B Life Interest Settlement case 376  that Jersey has its own settled principles regarding 
Hastings-Bass and that the court should depart from those principles only if satisfied that they 
are plainly wrong. The essence of this argument was that the court had thus far focused on 
protecting the interests of the beneficiaries, by preventing the need for them to sue trustees or 
professional advisers and that changing that focus would be unfair on beneficiaries. It was 
thus a policy argument. 
 
However, the Royal Court admitted that it would have followed its previous decisions was it 
not for the English Court of Appeal judgment in Pitt and Futter,377 and that, in light of that 
decision, a departure from the line of reasoning thus far followed in the Royal Court was 
inevitable. The court said that if Jersey were not going to follow the new English approach, it 
would need to demonstrate why it was continuing to follow its historic approach.378 At this 
point the appeal of the Pitt and Futter case379 to the Supreme Court was still pending and the 
Royal Court said, in no uncertain terms, that it would follow that decision, whichever way it 
went.380 This indicates that, although the Royal Court is not bound by decisions of English 
courts, apart from the Privy Council, those judgments still have a very persuasive force in 
                                                      
371 Re Barr's Settlement Trusts, Abacus Trust Compay (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] 1 All ER 763. 
372 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch). 
373 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 204-205. 
374 In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement [2013 (1) JLR 1]. 
375 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment). 
376 In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement [2013 (1) JLR 1] 27-28. 
377 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment). 
378 In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement [2013 (1) JLR 1] 29-30. 
379 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment). 
380 In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement [2013 (1) JLR 1] 34. 




Aside from indicating that it would follow the Supreme Court, the Royal Court made some 
interesting obiter remarks supporting a narrower interpretation of the Hastings-Bass rule. 
These remarks include that the rule, in its wider form, encourages sloppy decision making by 
trustees and so runs counter to the aim of proper trust administration;381 that the rule is only 
available to trustees and not to settlors or beneficiaries who partook in voluntary decisions 
that did not turn out as intended; that there are other remedies available to beneficiaries for 
breach of trust by the trustees; that if negligent advice was given it would be the trustee’s duty 
to sue the advisers and not the beneficiaries’ duty, and finally, that the Jersey law of mistake 
will provide equitable relief in the cases where it should.382  
 
This indicates a marked departure from the approach of the Royal Court up to that point, and 
is all the more interesting as, subsequent to the Supreme Court decision in Pitt and Futter,383 
the legislator in Jersey did the opposite and introduced a statutory Hastings-Bass rule in the 
wide form, as set out in Sieff v Fox.384 This is discussed below.  
 
The Royal Court heard one case after the Supreme Court decision and before the coming into 
effect of Jersey’s statutory Hastings-Bass rule. In this case, In the matter of the Onorati 
Settlement,385 the beneficiaries (and significantly not the trustee) sought relief on the basis that 
the more stringent test, as articulated by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, was 
satisfied. The facts were that one of the beneficiaries obtained tax advice as to an appointment 
to be made by the trustee, but the trustee did not ask to see this advice. This was clearly a 
breach of trust on the part of the trustee. Therefore, the higher threshold set by the Pitt and 
Futter cases 386  was reached and the Jersey court did not have to consider whether the 
previous, wider version of the rule would still apply in Jersey. The Royal Court did say this 
though:  
 
                                                      
381 According to Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 305 there is disagreement as to whether these obiter remarks 
are always applicable. In certain cases where an application was brought on the basis of the rule, the decision-
making process may have been very competent and diligent. An interpretation that the rule is only relied upon 
when trustees were not careful may thus be untrue. 
382 In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement [2013 (1) JLR 1] 33-34. 
383 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
384 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch). 
385 In the matter of the Onorati Settlement [2013] (2) JLR 324 
386 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 192 
“We propose to say nothing further on the topic, therefore, other than to say that the 
position remains open, although any party wishing to submit that Jersey law should 
continue to plough its own furrow will have to explain why the closely-reasoned 
judgments of Lord Walker and Lloyd, L.J. should not be applied.”387 
 
4 2 2 The reaction of the offshore world to Pitt v Holt and Re Futter388 
 
The reaction of offshore jurisdictions to these judgments was eagerly awaited. Being able to 
rely on the wider interpretation of the rule confers, in the eyes of many offshore practitioners, 
a competitive edge to the relevant jurisdiction. This is a telling illustration of the importance 
of the trust industry in offshore jurisdictions and of different policy approaches in onshore as 
opposed to offshore jurisdictions. Although it is sold as a protection to settlors and 
beneficiaries, by saving them the cost and time investment of having to litigate against their 
trustees or for the trustees to litigate against their advisers, there is no doubt that the ‘old’ rule 
was very valuable for trustees and effectively protected them by eliminating unwanted 
litigation against them. However, this has to be balanced against the challenges posed by the 
current political and economic climate and the importance for offshore jurisdictions to 
improve how they are perceived. It is safe to say that at least some jurisdictions appear to 
regard the offering of additional remedies for “wrongdoing” as damaging to their 
reputation.389 
 
4 2 2 1 Jersey 
 
As mentioned above, Jersey pioneered the introduction of legislation to preserve the 
Hastings-Bass rule. In effect it enacted its own version of the rule and of the jurisdiction of 
the court based on mistake in the Trusts (Amendment No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013. The rule 
applies as described in Sieff v Fox,390 so that the legislative provisions391 do not require the 
trustee to have committed a breach of trust before the court would intervene.392 The provisions 
                                                      
387 In the matter of the Onorati Settlement [2013] (2) JLR 324 331. 
388 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
389 Kosky “Trustees’ Taxing Mistakes – Offshore Perspectives on the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Pitt v 
HMRC” Clifford Chance Briefing Note (accessed 09-11-2016). 
390 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch). 
391 Contained in Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 47F and 47H. 
392 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 47H(4) reads: “It does not matter whether or not the circumstances set out in 
paragraph (3) occurred as a result of any lack of care or other fault on the part of the trustee or person exercising 
a power, or on the part of any person giving advice in relation to the exercise of the power.”  
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can be invoked even if there is an alternative remedy on the basis of mistake.  
 
This legislative confirmation393 of a liberal application of the Hastings-Bass rule stands in 
contrast to the judicial development in England where application of the rule has been limited. 
 
The provisions allow the court to declare the exercise of a power voidable and further to 
declare what the effect of the exercise of the power should be, or to declare that it is of no 
effect from the time of its exercise.394 The exercise of the power is therefore not automatically 
void ab initio. Furthermore, the test of whether the trustee would not have exercised the 
power had he been aware of the true circumstances is used rather than the less stringent might 
test, referred to above in connection with the rule in England.395 Finally, an application may be 
brought not only by a trustee but also by beneficiaries, enforcers, co-trustees or any other 
person with leave of the court.396 This may be an attempt to indicate that the rule is not solely 
in the interest of trustees. 
 
Arguments in favour of the statutory rule include the protection of trustees and, indirectly, 
maintaining good relationships with the beneficiaries. Regardless of how it is presented, it 
must have been a policy decision made in the interest of the local Jersey trust industry.397 It is 
certainly not abnormal for public policy to shape the law, but in the case of offshore 
jurisdictions, it does sometimes appear that the policy element may be given too much 
weight. This is especially so in light of the obiter remarks of the Royal Court, in the wake of 
developments in England, in In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement.398 
 
Bearing in mind the current hostile environment within which offshore jurisdictions have to 
defend their every move, and the fact that the Channel Islands trust industry claims superior 
regulation, professional excellence and expertise, one wonders whether a different approach, 
sending a different signal, may not have been preferable.399 Of course, many settlors would 
prefer to protect the interests of professional advisers (which is a consequence of a wide 
application of Hastings-Bass as there is no need to sue negligent advisers) above the interests 
                                                      
 
394 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 47H(2). 
395 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 47H(3)(b). 
396 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 47I(2). 
397 Purkis (2013) 3 JGLR paras 32-34. 
398 In the matter of the B Life Interest Settlement [2013 (1) JLR 1], as referred to above. 
399 Purkis (2013) 3 JGLR takes this same view. 
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of tax authorities. Although most reputable offshore jurisdictions, Jersey included, make 
much of the fact that they do not assist settlors and beneficiaries to avoid and much less to 
evade tax, the practical effect of the statutory rule is to allow the avoidance of an unexpected 
tax charge. 
 
It is important to bear in mind though that, although the statute enables a trustee to bring an 
application to a Jersey court on grounds that cannot be used in England after the Supreme 
Court ruling, the Jersey court still has the possibility to refuse discretionary relief, for 
example because the claimants must have accepted that there is a tax risk, or on grounds of 
public policy.400 It remains to be seen how this legislation will be applied and interpreted by 
the Jersey court.  
 
4 2 2 2 Guernsey 
 
The Guernsey courts did not have many opportunities to consider whether the Hastings-Bass 
rule formed part of Guernsey law prior to the Pitt and Futter judgment.401 The first time an 
application of this type was brought before a Guernsey court was in 2009 in Gresh v RBC 
Trust Company (Guernsey) Limited and H.M. Revenue & Customs.402 The court commented 
that although English decisions would form the starting point of such consideration, they 
would have to be considered in the light of Guernsey customary and statutory law.403 
 
A recent case 404  has given the Guernsey court the opportunity to consider this rule, the 
application having been brought on the basis of the reformulated rule subsequent to the 
Supreme Court decision in Pitt and Futter.405 Unfortunately no written judgment has been 
handed down, but the case has been reviewed by legal practitioners.406  
 
The facts include that the trustee took no UK tax advice whatsoever. This being so, the case 
fell within the ambit of the newly reformulated rule, as not considering tax consequences at 
                                                      
400 Purkis (2013) 3 JGLR para 37. 
401 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] 2 All ER 450 (combined judgment); Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] 
UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
402 Gresh v RBC Trust Company (Guernsey) Limited and H.M. Revenue and Customs 2009-10 GLR 216. 
403 Furness QC and Scott (2014) 20 T&T 871 878-879; Gresh v RBC Trust Company (Guernsey) Limited and 
H.M. Revenue and Customs 2009-10 GLR 216 234. 
404 HCS Trustees Limited v Camperio Legal and Fiduciary Services Plc (unreported). 
405 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
406 Goldstone “Analysis” Private Client Briefing (accessed 06-02-2017). 
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all (not taking advice) constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the trustee.  
 
Before coming to this conclusion, the court noted that the rule in Hastings-Bass did exist 
under Guernsey law, although, given the facts, the case did not require the court to consider 
whether the rule applied as in Jersey (not requiring a breach of trust on the part of the trustee) 
or whether Guernsey would follow the rule as reformulated by the English Supreme Court. It 
was noted, however, that although Jersey has legislated to retain the former, more widely 
formulated rule, Guernsey might not follow suit. Reference was made to the comments of the 
Jersey court in the Onorati judgment 407  indicating that Jersey should follow the English 
position, and the court felt that Guernsey would likely follow English law in this respect.  
 
This indicates a stricter approach of the Guernsey court in setting boundaries when compared 
with, for example, Jersey and Bermuda.  
 
4 2 2 3 Other offshore jurisdictions 
 
Previous Cayman decisions408 have followed the rule as described in Sieff v Fox409 and did not 
require a clear breach of trust by the trustee. Although no statutory rule has been enacted, 
comments of the judiciary indicate that the judgments of the English Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court in Pitt and Futter,410 although being regarded as persuasive, would not restrict 
the Cayman courts in granting relief from unintended and unforeseen tax consequences 
arising from erroneous decisions of trustees.411 Like their Jersey counterparts, the Cayman 
judiciary appears to consider that restricting the application of the rule and thereby reducing 
the remedies available to Cayman trustees would have an undesirable effect on the trust 
industry.412 
 
Bermuda has also recently enacted a statutory Hastings-Bass rule in the Trustee Amendment 
                                                      
407 In the matter of the Onorati Settlement [2013] (2) JLR 324. 
408 Barclays Private Bank & Trust (Cayman) Limited v Chamberlain (2004 unreported); In A v Rothschild Trust 
(Cayman) Limited [2004-05] CILR 485, new trusts created based on incorrect tax advice caused a tax charge and 
the new trusts were set aside ab initio; Re Ta-Ming Wang Trust [2010] (1) CILR 541 was a case where 
unintended Canadian tax considerations arose because of the trustee’s misunderstanding based on incorrect tax 
advice and where the Canadian tax authorities were given notice of the proceedings but did not oppose the 
proceedings. 
409 Sieff v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch). 
410 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
411 Smellie (2014) 20 T&T 1101 1108. 
412 Furness QC and Scott (2014) 20 T&T 871 879-880; Smellie (2014) 20 T&T 1101 1109. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 196 
Act, 2014.413 This is despite the fact that relatively few Hastings-Bass type applications had 
been heard by the Bermuda courts at the time of the Supreme Court decision in Pitt and 
Futter414 and despite initial reactions in 2013 that the Bermuda courts were likely to follow the 
Supreme Court decision.415 
 
In the matter of the F Trust and In the matter of the A Settlement416 is the first written decision 
of the Supreme Court of Bermuda under the new statutory Hastings-Bass rule. The court 
granted the application in both cases so that the flawed exercises of power were set aside. The 
UK tax consequences in these cases were described as “financially significant factual and 
legal considerations”.417 The court further said that the new section 47A of the Trustee Act, 
1975 gave the court an unfettered statutory discretion so that it was unnecessary to formulate 
a specific test for its exercise, and that the new statutory jurisdiction should be applied on the 
facts of each particular case. 
 
A briefing note by a leading Bermuda law firm states that the codification of the rule 
demonstrates Bermuda’s commitment to maintaining its position as a leading and competitive 
trust jurisdiction, and further that the new law offers trustees and beneficiaries of Bermuda 
trusts an attractive alternative to costly, time-consuming and uncertain litigation based on 
negligence or breach of duty claims.418 This is certainly a noble purpose but, as discussed 
above, that is not the only consequence of allowing (some might say encouraging) a wide 
application of the rule. 
 
4 3 South Africa 
 
South Africa does not have a rule similar to the Hastings-Bass rule. Honoré419 mentions, in the 
context of delegation of trustee duties and the taking of legal advice, that a trustee would not 
necessarily be protected from liability for breach of trust if he acted on legal advice that 
turned out to be wrong. Although the application of the Hastings-Bass rule does not require 
                                                      
413 Trustee Amendment Act, 2014 inserted a new s47A into the Trustee Act, 1975. 
414 Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2013] UKSC 26 (combined judgment). 
415 Kosky “Trustees’ Taxing Mistakes – Offshore Perspectives on the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Pitt v 
HMRC” Clifford Chance Briefing Note (accessed 09-11-2016). 
416 In the matter of the F Trust and In the matter of the A Settlement [2015] SC (Bda) 77 Civ. 
417 In the matter of the F Trust and In the matter of the A Settlement [2015] SC (Bda) 77 Civ para 22. 
418  Anderson “Statutory Hastings-Bass Enacted in Bermuda” Conyers Dill & Pearman News & Insights 
(accessed 09-11-2016). 
419 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 326-328. 
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the taking of legal advice, that was often the reality. Even where a trustee delegates certain 
duties or takes legal advice, he retains primary responsibility towards the beneficiaries of the 
trust and the trustee alone can make dispositive decisions. 
 
In Boyce v Bloem,420 a case concerning a testamentary trust and the negligence of the trustees 
to collect money due to the trust, it was alleged that the trustee was not aware of the true 
position and acted on the advice of lawyers. Even if this were correct, it would not under 
South African law excuse the trustee for maladministration of the trust. Old authorities were 
referred to that require a trustee to make enquiries with the result that he cannot claim 
ignorance. If a trustee neglects to know what he ought to know he cannot be excused and the 
taking of legal advice does not protect trustees.421 This implies that a stricter approach may 
have been followed in South Africa to limit the development of a rule such as the Hastings-
Bass rule, and is in accordance with the view now held in England, namely that incorrect 
advice is not an excuse. 
 
The court in Boyce v Bloem422 also referred to an old Australian case423 where it was held that 
a trustee might be relieved from liability for breach of trust if he has acted honestly and 
reasonably, but must also prove that considering all circumstances he ought fairly to be 
excused. The circumstances of each individual case are therefore of vital importance and 
simply relying on the fact that bad advice was given is not an excuse. This was held to apply 
equally in South Africa because a claim against a trustee in a case like the instant one is based 
on negligence.424 
 
The above assumes that there was a breach of trust, which is now also a requirement in 
England for application of the Hastings-Bass rule. 
 
Although there is no similar rule under South African law, there are many examples of 
trustees taking advantage of their own failure to comply with requirements of the trust deed in 
order to escape the consequences of their actions. One example would be where only two of 
three trustees sign binding legal documents and the trustees then assert that their action was 
                                                      
420 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T). 
421 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 865. 
422 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T). 
423 National Trustees Co. of Australasia Ltd v General Finance Co. of Australasia Ltd 1905 AC 373, a judgment 
of the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria. 
424 Boyce NO v Bloem 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) 865-866. 
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void and that they are not bound because of this breach of trust.425 This type of argument 
normally arises in defence to an action against trustees by the counter party and is examined 
in the next chapter from the perspective of abuse of the trust and the consequences for third 
parties dealing with trusts. Comments have also been made by the Jersey judiciary regarding 
the undesirability of allowing uncertainty in dealings with third parties because of trustee-
internal deficiencies, or in cases where distributions have already been made by beneficiaries 
(and possibly spent by them) based on incorrect documents.426  
 
5 The extent of trustee exoneration clauses 
 
5 1 England 
 
Having considered the concept of breach of trust and when a trustee will be liable for a 
breach, the focus now turns to defences against such liability, and specifically clauses in trust 
deeds exempting a trustee from liability or limiting the extent to which a trustee is liable. 
 
There are various defences against breach of trust. The lack of a causal link between the 
breach and the loss to the trust fund was already discussed. An innocent co-trustee is not 
vicariously liable for the actions of his co-trustee.427 Other defences include the failure by a 
beneficiary to minimise his own loss and limit the trustee’s liability, or where beneficiaries 
formally agree to release the trustee from liability. Legislation also provides a defence. Where 
a trustee acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused in the circumstances, a 
court may relieve him from liability either wholly or partly.428 The onus of proving that the 
trustee acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused for the breach is on the 
trustee. It is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case and there is no 
hard and fast rule.429 
 
Another method of defence, and the one that will be examined here, is exclusion or limitation 
of liability provided for in the trust deed itself. There is old authority for the ability of a settlor 
                                                      
425 Nieuwoudt NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) and Land and Agricultural Bank of 
SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) are examples of cases where the trustees alleged they were not bound to a 
contract because the required number of trustees were not party thereto or did not consent.  
426 See ch 3 para 4 2 1. 
427 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 1186-1187. 
428 Trustee Act 1925 s 61. 
429 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 1219-1227. 
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to limit the liability of his trustee, provided that the trustee had acted in good faith and that the 
exclusion or limitation of liability was included in the trust deed.430 Such clauses are generally 
referred to as trustee exemption or trustee exoneration clauses. They curtail the consequences 
that would normally arise on a breach of trust and are to be distinguished from clauses that 
exclude or modify the underlying duty itself so that liability for breach of trust does not arise 
in the first place.431 
 
Exoneration clauses are now standard in trust deeds governed by English law and trustees can 
exclude liability for everything apart from fraud or wilful wrongdoing.432 This means that, 
provided that the necessary exoneration clause appears in the trust deed, a trustee need not be 
liable for negligence, including gross negligence. Even the new statutory duty of care in 
section 1 of the Trustee Act 2000 can be excluded by the trust instrument, which, some argue, 
has the effect of lowering the standard of care required from a trustee.433 
 
Dishonest breaches of trust cannot be exempted. Dishonest breaches include fraud but also 
actions or omissions made in the knowledge that they are not in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries, or without the honest belief that they are in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries. It also includes the situation where a trustee recklessly does not care whether 
his actions or omissions are in the best interests of the beneficiaries, or where a trustee relies 
on the existence of an exoneration clause to justify what he is proposing to do. Finally, wilful 
misconduct is also a dishonest breach that cannot be excluded.434 Negligence is not included 
in dishonesty. 
 
On the other hand, one can imagine situations where a trustee acts honestly and in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries, but still, even deliberately, commits a breach of trust because, 
for example, what he is doing is against an outdated term of the trust deed. This would not be 
dishonest or fraudulent.435 Whether a trustee acted fraudulently or dishonestly would therefore 
depend on whether the trustee purported to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries or 
                                                      
430 Wilkins v Hogg (1861) 31 LJ Ch 41 where it was found that a clause exonerating trustees from liability for 
failure to perform their duties was not contrary to the idea of trusteeship. 
431 Hudson Equity and Trusts 365-366; Clarry (2014) 12 TQR 31 para 46. 
432 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 806-807. 
433 Pearce et al The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 873. 
434 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 808; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
& Trusts 563-565; Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
435 In Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 251 Millet LJ repeated a well-known quote “The main duty of a trustee is 
to commit judicious breaches of trust.” 
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whether he acted in his own or a third party’s best interest.436 
 
The leading case on this matter is the Court of Appeal decision in Armitage v Nurse.437 The 
plaintiff was the principal beneficiary of a trust, the trustees of which committed breaches of 
trust in relation to the appointment of a company to farm land forming part of the trust fund, a 
failure to properly supervise the company’s management of the land, a failure to enquire into 
a drastic fall in the value of the land before being sold and a failure to obtain payment of 
interest in respect of a loan made to the plaintiff’s mother.438 In this case the exculpation 
clause was drafted as follows: 
 
“No trustee shall be liable for any loss or damage which may happen to Paula’s fund or 
any part thereof or the income thereof at any time or from any cause whatsoever unless 
such loss or damage shall be caused by his own actual fraud.”439 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that a breach of trust committed recklessly or wilfully, such 
as the breach in this case, constitutes equitable fraud, even if it does not constitute actual 
fraud. The concept of equitable fraud is wider, referring to a misuse of a trust power but not 
necessarily dishonesty, and affords the court more discretion as far as remedies are 
concerned.440  
 
Millett LJ held that the phrase “actual fraud” used in the clause quoted above means exactly 
that and not constructive fraud or equitable fraud. He found that the clause successfully 
excludes liability for breach of trust in the absence of a dishonest intention on the part of the 
trustee. Dishonesty or fraud requires an intention to pursue a particular course of action, either 
knowing or being recklessly indifferent as to whether it is contrary to the best interests of the 
beneficiaries. Without such an intention, there is no dishonesty and therefore no fraud.441  
 
According to Millet LJ the test for dishonesty had to be a subjective one. He went on to say 
that the clause exempts the trustee from liability for loss or damage to the trust property: 
 
                                                      
436 Virgo The Principles of Equity & Trusts 564. 
437 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
438 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 249. 
439 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 250. 
440 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 250-252. 
441 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 250-251. 
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“…[N]o matter how indolent, imprudent, lacking in diligence, negligent or willful he 
may have been, so long as he has not acted dishonestly.” 442 
 
Although this may be true on a strict interpretation of the words of the relevant clause, it 
seems extraordinary for a trustee, acting in a fiduciary capacity, to be held to such a low 
standard. This is discussed in more detail below. However, in casu the clause was found not 
be repugnant or contrary to public policy, despite academic argument to the contrary.443 
 
The possibility of excluding liability for wilful default and gross negligence was also 
discussed. Wilful default means a deliberate breach of trust. If the trustee consciously takes 
the risk of loss or is recklessly indifferent about it (thereby committing a deliberate breach of 
trust), but he does so in good faith and in the belief that the risk should be taken in the interest 
of the beneficiaries (so not being dishonest), then Millet LJ held that he could still be 
protected by a clause that excludes liability for wilful default.444 
 
As far as gross negligence is concerned, it was alleged by the plaintiff’s counsel that 
excluding liability for gross negligence was repugnant to the concept of a trust or against 
public policy. Although Millett LJ agreed that there is an irreducible core of obligations owed 
by the trustee to the beneficiaries and that this must be enforceable by the beneficiaries 
against the trustee in order for a trust to exist, he did not agree that the core obligations 
included the duties of care and skill, prudence and diligence. The minimum duty to perform 
the trusts honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries was, in his view, 
sufficient.445 This is quite a small core indeed. 
 
He also pointed out that common law systems, as opposed to civil or mixed systems, do not 
distinguish between ordinary negligence and gross negligence. The difference is said to be 
merely one of degree.446  
 
Since only negligence was alleged and not fraud, it was held that the exemption clause in this 
case was effective to exclude the trustees’ liability for breach of trust.   
                                                      
442 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 251. 
443 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253. 
444 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 252. 
445 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253-254. 
446 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 254. 
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However, Millett LJ commented per curiam that: 
 
“…it must be acknowledged that the view is widely held that these clauses have gone 
too far, and that trustees who charge for their services and who, as professional men, 
would not dream of excluding liability for ordinary professional negligence should not 
be able to rely on a trustee exemption clause excluding liability for gross negligence”.447  
 
Millet LJ referred to Jersey legislation to this effect, and said that such a change in English 
law would have to be brought about by Parliament and with the benefit of wide consultation 
with interested bodies. He therefore clearly did not feel that it was in the hands of the 
judiciary to make new law in this respect.448 
  
There have been many judgments on the scope of trustee exemption clauses subsequent to 
Armitage v Nurse,449 but none that changed the position fundamentally. Certain glosses have 
however been added, indicating that many hold the view that these clauses are too lenient 
towards trustees, particularly professional and paid trustees.  
 
First, in Bogg v Raper,450 which in principle approved the position in Armitage,451 the trustee 
was sued for failing to supervise the activities of a business owned by the trust. An 
exoneration clause excluded his liability for any loss provided he acted in good faith. The 
trustee was not held liable. It was, however, held that if there were any uncertainty as to 
construction of such a clause, it would be construed restrictively against the trustee. It was 
also said that the validity of the clause (drafted by a solicitor-trustee) would depend on 
whether the settlor has been properly advised as to the effect of the clause.452  
 
In Wight v Olswang,453 the Court of Appeal similarly held that clauses exempting solicitor-
trustees (who drafted the provisions) had to be interpreted restrictively. In this case there were 
two different exoneration clauses and it was held that, given the ambiguity, the trustee could 
                                                      
447 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 256. 
448 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 256. 
449 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
450 Bogg v Raper (1998/99) 1 ITELR 267. 
451 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
452 Hudson Equity and Trusts 370; Bogg v Raper (1998/99) 1 ITELR 267. 
453 Wight v Olswang (No 2) (1999/2000) 2 ITELR 689. 
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not rely on either clause.454 This may imply an attempt to mitigate an unfair advantage that 
professional trustees may be perceived to have in this regard. 
 
Another important case is Walker v Stones, 455  where the Court of Appeal introduced an 
objective test for dishonesty in the case of a professional trustee. Referring to the subjective 
test in Armitage456 of what a trustee believed to be in the interest of the beneficiaries, he 
disagreed with this, at least in the case of a solicitor-trustee (which may be taken as a 
reference to a professional trustee). In such cases the test should be qualified so that, if the 
trustee’s so-called honest belief is so unreasonable that, objectively speaking, no reasonable 
trustee-solicitor could have believed that what he was doing was in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries, he would be regarded as having acted dishonestly. The judge accepted that the 
test for honesty may vary depending on the “role and calling” of the trustee. In this case, the 
trustees were solicitors and therefore professionals.457  
 
The judge also indicated that, in his view, the fact that Millett LJ did not follow the objective 
test for dishonesty as set out in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan,458 did not indicate that he 
considered the two tests to be irreconcilable.  
 
With regard to Millet LJ’s dictum that a trustee is not dishonest provided that he acted in good 
faith and in the honest belief that it was in the best interest of the beneficiaries, the judge in 
Walker v Stones459 made the following comment: 
 
“I think it most unlikely that he would have intended this dictum to apply in a case 
where a solicitor-trustee’s perception of the interests of the beneficiaries was so 
unreasonable that no reasonable solicitor-trustee could have held such belief. Indeed in 
my opinion such a construction of the clause could well render it inconsistent with the 
                                                      
454 Davies and Virgo Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 742; Hudson Equity and Trusts 370.  
455 Walker v Stones [2000] 4 All ER 412. 
456 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
457 Walker v Stones [2000] 4 All ER 412 443-444. 
458 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995]  3 All ER 97. Here the facts were that an insolvent travel agency 
owed money to an airline. The airline attempted to obtain a remedy from the agent’s principal and shareholder. 
This was therefore a case of secondary or accessory liability, but the judge in Walker v Stones [2000] 4 All ER 
412 found that the Privy Council comment applied equally to cases of primary or direct liability and to the 
exoneration clauses under review in that case. 
459 Walker v Stones [2000] 4 All ER 412. 
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very existence of an effective trust.”460 
 
Walker461 may therefore be regarded as sending a very subtle signal that the test in Armitage462 
was too biased towards trustees. 
 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had the opportunity to consider the law relating 
to trustee exoneration clauses in Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson.463 This was 
an appeal from the Guernsey Court of Appeal and the offshore elements thereof will be 
considered below. However, the Privy Council had to interpret the English law position in 
order to determine its effect on pre-statutory Guernsey law, and therefore the case is highly 
relevant from an English point of view as well. 
 
A tight majority (three to two) held that the position is as set out in the Armitage464 case, 
thereby endorsing the status quo. 465  Excluding gross negligence is not considered to be 
contrary to public policy.466 There was, however, disagreement as to some of the points raised 
by Millet LJ. One example is the statement that English law does, in certain contexts, 
distinguish between ordinary negligence and gross negligence.467 
 
The court considered whether Millet LJ’s limitation of the irreducible core obligations to 
acting honestly and in good faith (and not extending it to acting without gross negligence) 
was correct, and made reference to the distinction he drew between the fiduciary duties of a 
trustee and the duty of care.468 Under English law, the duty of care is not a fiduciary duty, 
unlike other jurisdictions where it is. Presumably it is the duty of care that would prevent a 
trustee from acting in a grossly negligent manner.469  
 
The Board of the Privy Council said in no uncertain terms that, if it was desired, a public 
policy rule that liability for gross negligence cannot be excluded, would best be left to 
                                                      
460 Walker v Stones [2000] 4 All ER 412 445. 
461 Walker v Stones [2000] 4 All ER 412. 
462 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
463 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13. 
464 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
465 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 57. 
466 Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts 519. 
467 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 paras 50-51. 
468 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 60.  
469 This may simply point to the fact that, under English law, liability for breach of fiduciary duties cannot be 
excluded whereas it can be excluded for non-fiduciary duties. 
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legislators. The court described doing so as intervening in private arrangements and affecting 
the freedom of trustees and settlors to arrange their relationships, something best left to 
legislators.470 
 
There were two dissenting judgments. Lady Hale, who gave one of them, pointed out that, if 
the appeal succeeded, which it did, the Board would have upheld the Armitage decision in 
Guernsey law, even though the Supreme Court on an English appeal has never had an 
opportunity to decide whether that case was correctly decided under English law. 471 Lord 
Kerr, a judge from Northern Ireland, gave the other dissenting judgment and said: 
 
“If…the placing of reliance on a responsible person to manage property so as to 
promote the interests of the beneficiaries of a trust is central to the concept of 
trusteeship, denying trustees the opportunity to avoid liability for their gross negligence 
seems to be entirely in keeping with that essential aim.”472  
 
So much for the case law. Are trustee exoneration clauses really contrary to the irreducible 
core of the trust? 
 
Although many commentators and practitioners feel that more should have been done to 
restrict the use of exoneration clauses, the law in England remains as set out in the Armitage473 
case, although in practice a higher standard of care may be required of a professional trustee.  
 
An aptly worded clause can thus protect a trustee from liability for any breach apart from a 
dishonest one. This is not regarded as repugnant to the irreducible core of trusteeship and 
excluding liability for gross negligence is not contrary to public policy, although many would 
disagree and the position may in future be challenged. In Spread,474 no English cases were 
cited that distinguished normal or ordinary negligence from gross negligence. The court, 
however, considered that such a distinction cannot be made and that in the modern world 
                                                      
470 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 111. Millet LJ made a similar comment 
in Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 256. 
471 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 129. 
472 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 180. See also Hudson Equity and Trusts 
372-373, where the author agrees with this statement and describes the Armitage decision as an opiate on the 
professionalism of trustees and on their consciences. 
473 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
474 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13. 
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exemption from negligence is common both in the contractual and trust contexts.475  
 
A conflict clearly exists. On the one hand there is a desire to maintain the attractiveness of the 
office of professional trustee by limiting liability and allowing a trustee the freedom to draft 
trust deeds to suit his needs. This, to some extent, assimilates the fiduciary nature of the trust 
relationship to a contractual relationship.476 On the other hand there is the more traditional 
view of the office of trustee as someone who should exhibit the utmost good faith and be 
accountable for proper administration of the trust. If the standard of proper administration 
falls below a certain minimum, the right of beneficiaries to hold the trustee to account 
similarly loses meaning. 477 
 
The 2000 Act presented an opportunity to introduce measures to restrict the use of exemption 
clauses, if this was considered necessary, but this was not done.478 There were concerns about 
the lack of restriction on the use of exemption clauses and the effect this would have on the 
protection offered to beneficiaries. As a result, the matter was referred to the Law 
Commission for a thorough examination. The Report entitled “Trustee Exemption Clauses” 
referred to an earlier consultation paper by the Trust Law Committee in 1999, which proposed 
that a paid trustee should not be able to rely on clauses excluding liability for negligence, at 
least not in circumstances where the trustee could not prove that the settlor received 
independent advice on the meaning of the clause.479 
 
The Law Commission did recommend the adoption of a rule of practice whereby a paid 
trustee or trust drafter should take reasonable steps to ensure that the settlor is aware of the 
meaning and effect of an exoneration clause before execution of the trust deed,480 but this is 
viewed by some as a “somewhat toothless proposal”.481 The Law Commission explained the 
difficulties of legislating against trustee exemption provisions, and also the advantage of a 
                                                      
475 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 807. 
476 Hudson Equity and Trusts 375. 
477  Hildyard Prudence and Vituperative Epithets (2012) unpublished paper prepared for Chancery Bar 
Association Annual Conference (accessed 31-01-2017). 
478 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 809. The Trustee Act 2000 is said to 
have adopted a “permissive approach” to modern trusteeship by conferring wide powers on trustees and 
controlling their conduct through the statutory duty of care (although this can be excluded). 
479 Law Commission Trustee Exemption Clauses No 301 (2006) 9-10. 
480 Law Commission Trustee Exemption Clauses No 301 (2006) 84. 
481 Hudson Equity and Trusts 377. 
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rule of practice as an alternative, “softer” approach. 482  An analysis of the wide-ranging 
consultation undertaken did not clearly point in one or the other direction. The consultation 
indicated that a reputable trustee would usually obtain settlor consent to an exemption clause, 
but agreed that it is unacceptable that many settlors appear to be unaware of such a clause.483 
This undermines the settlor autonomy argument, because any exercise of autonomy works 
best when the settlor is well informed. 
 
However, a statutory requirement that a trustee must disclose such a clause to the settlor prior 
to entering into the trust in order to be able to rely thereon was rejected.484  
 
A rule of practice, which should be complied with as a matter of professional conduct, was 
considered a better approach to ameliorating the problem. It is stated to apply both to 
professionals who draft trust deeds and to paid trustees. There is no non-legislative regulation 
of trustees in England and no requirement for trustees to register or be licensed to act as 
trustee. However, the rule of practice was considered to be able to govern the majority of 
trustees through the adoption of the rule by regulatory bodies such as the Law Society, to 
which many trustees would be subject, and trust organisations such as the Society of Trust 
and Estate Practitioners (STEP). STEP did in fact produce a rule to this effect, but it is unclear 
whether any other bodies or organisations did the same. The Report also stated that voluntary 
compliance with the rule would assist a trustee in marketing itself, and that best practice will 
“seep into the consciousness of the trust industry”. Given the increasing competition in this 
market and the importance of an untarnished reputation, it is expected that professional 
trustees would comply with the rule.485  
 
 
                                                      
482  Law Commission Trustee Exemption Clauses No 301 (2006) 11-13. The arguments against legislative 
regulation included the protection of settlor autonomy and thereby flexibility of trusts; the protection of trustees; 
the cost and difficulty in obtaining professional indemnity insurance; increased reluctance on the part of trustees 
to exercise discretionary powers; the different uses to which trusts are put, with beneficiaries of (unregulated) 
private family trusts being in the greatest need of protection; and that the extent of the reliance on such clauses 
and therefore the extent of the problem was unclear. 
483 Law Commission Trustee Exemption Clauses No 301 (2006) 12-14. 
484 Law Commission Trustee Exemption Clauses No 301 (2006) 61-67. Reasons for this included the additional 
time and cost for the settlor to obtain independent advice. Of course, the legislation would not have to require 
independent legal advice, but if trustees were not able to rely on an exemption clause if it was not brought to the 
settlor’s attention, they would likely still insist on independent advice being obtained by the settlor. It might also 
be difficult to prove, many years later, that such a clause was in fact brought to the attention of the settlor prior to 
signing the trust deed, and in cases where trustees retired and new trustees took over, there may be uncertainty 
about what was done years ago. 
485 Law Commission Trustee Exemption Clauses No 301 (2006) 68-73, 80-81. 
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5 2 Offshore: Jersey and other jurisdictions 
 
5 2 1 Jersey 
 
The approach taken in Jersey differs from the English position as far as it concerns a trustee 
who acted in a grossly negligent manner. Article 30(10) of the TJL provides: 
 
“Nothing in the terms of a trust shall relieve, release or exonerate a trustee from 
liability for breach of trust arising from the trustee’s own fraud, wilful misconduct or 
gross negligence.” 
 
When the TJL originally came into force in 1984, the relevant provision was: 
 
“Subject to the terms of the trust, a trustee shall not be liable…(b) for any loss to the 
trust property unless such loss is due to (i) his wilful default, act or concurrence, or (ii) 
his neglect or failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent such loss.”486 
 
The current article 30(10) substituted the above provision in 1989 when the TJL was first 
amended.487 An explanatory note to the draft amendment confirmed that the opportunity was 
taken to clarify that the terms of a trust cannot relieve, release or exonerate a trustee from 
liability for breach of trust arising from his own fraud, wilful misconduct or gross negligence.  
 
This indicates that the amendment did not constitute a significant change to the pre-existing 
law in Jersey, 488  in other words, that it was not possible to exclude liability for gross 
negligence under Jersey customary law either, although confirmation of the position under 
Jersey customary law is hard to find. 
 
As discussed, there seems to be different opinions as to whether English law recognises the 
concept of gross negligence, which can be described as “a serious or flagrant degree of 
negligence, negligence which goes beyond ordinary negligence – something approaching 
                                                      
486 The original unamended version of Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 26(9). 
487 Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1989. 
488 Clarry (2014) 12 TQR 31 para 15. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 209 
recklessness”. 489  Liability for mere incompetence, falling short of gross negligence, can 
therefore lawfully be excluded by the terms of a Jersey trust deed, but nothing more.490 
 
The most important Jersey case relating to the extent to which a trustee can exclude liability 
for breach of trust is the Jersey Court of Appeal judgment in Midland Bank Trust Company 
(Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services.491 The slightly earlier case of West v Lazard 
Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited492 is also relevant.  
 
Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services, 493  also 
considered earlier,494 concerned a pension scheme set up for employees of the States of Jersey. 
The funds were not invested as profitably as it should have been. The trustee mistakenly 
believed that it did not have the power to transfer the funds to a new manager without a 
certain agreement in place. No advice was taken. It turned out that the agreement was not 
necessary and upon realising this, the trustee transferred the funds fairly quickly. However, 
the funds did remain on a deposit account for a period of time, during which time it was less 
profitable than it would have been if properly invested.  
 
The court in the first instance judgment found that a breach of trust had been committed, but 
that liability of the trustee was excluded by a clause in the trust deed as the trustee did not act 
deliberately or in a grossly negligent manner. The appeal in 1995 concerned the validity of the 
exclusion clause. The court made the point that a trust deed is not a contract, and the 
beneficiaries, although they had no contract with the trustee, were owed fiduciary duties by 
the trustee that went far beyond the usual obligations found in a contract. The trustee in casu 
was a paid professional trustee holding itself out to have superior knowledge and thus the 
court held that a higher standard of care was expected of it. For these reasons, the court felt it 
had to take a very restrictive view of the trustee exoneration clause.495  
 
                                                      
489 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services Ltd [1995] JLR 352 392-394.  
490 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 231. 
491 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352. 
492 West v Lazard Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited [1993] JLR 165. 
493 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, Establishment Committee and Day v Federated Pension 
Services 1994 JLR 276. 
494 See ch 3 para 3 2 2. 
495 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352 372-374, 381-
385. 
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After a review of cases from Scotland, England, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, the 
court turned to Jersey law. The only Jersey case in point that was cited to the court is West v 
Lazard Brothers.496 In this case, a clause that purported to exclude the trustee’s liability in all 
cases except for fraud was held to be inconsistent with the TJL. The court added that it was 
void as being repugnant to the fundamental concept of a trust.497 The court in Midland Bank498 
did not agree that a clause exempting a trustee from liability for gross negligence was void for 
reasons of public policy or repugnancy to the nature of a trust, despite having cited case law 
and authority from other jurisdictions, referred to above, that both support and contradict that 
view.499  
 
In Midland Bank,500 the court provided a summary of the principles to be applied in Jersey 
law. Firstly, there is no general rule under Jersey law, apart from the provisions of the TJL, 
that prevents a trustee from inserting provisions into a trust deed excluding liability for breach 
of trust, although liability for fraud cannot be excluded. This may indicate the pre-statutory 
position as allowing exclusion of liability for gross negligence, but is overridden, as far as the 
legislation is concerned, by the third point below. Secondly, the construction of such clauses 
must be at least as restrictive as under English law. Thirdly, such clauses are subject to the 
restrictions in the TJL.501 Mention was also made of the fact that professional, paid trustees 
are subject to a higher standard of care, as held in Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Company 
Limited.502 One could argue that article 21(1)(a)(iii) of the TJL confirms this by referring to 
the ability and skill of the particular trustee.  
 
The court did not have to decide whether the tests for wilful misconduct or recklessness were 
satisfied in casu, but did find that the trustee was guilty of gross negligence, for which it 
ought to be liable. Thus the judgment of the court a quo was reversed and the trustee was held 
to be liable under the terms of the trust as it was not protected by the exoneration clause. 
Gross negligence was held, contrary to what the court a quo said, not to require a certain mens 
rea, intentional disregard of danger or recklessness. It simply means serious, extreme or 
                                                      
496 West v Lazard Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited [1993] JLR 165. 
497 West v Lazard Brothers and Company (Jersey) Limited [1993] JLR 165 286-292. 
498 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352. 
499 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352 374-380. 
500 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352. 
501 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352 381. 
502 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139 152. 
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flagrant negligence, a very marked departure from the standards of responsible and competent 
people.503  
 
5 2 2 Guernsey 
 
By virtue of article 39(7) and (8) of the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007 (TGL), a trustee cannot 
be excused for a breach of trust caused by his own fraud, wilful misconduct or gross 
negligence. The wording is very similar to that of the TJL. Similar to the position in Jersey, 
when the TGL first came into force in 1989, gross negligence was not mentioned, only fraud 
and wilful misconduct. In 1990, the words “or gross negligence” were added.504 
 
The question of pre-TGL law in Guernsey came to the fore in Spread Trustee Company 
Limited v Hutcheson,505 a Guernsey case that went to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, also discussed above in the context of English law.  
 
Although prior to 1989 there were no decisions of a Guernsey court dealing with this issue, 
the Board held that it was accepted that liability for fraud or wilful misconduct could not be 
excluded, but that liability for negligence could lawfully be excluded. The question was 
whether it was also lawful in the case of gross negligence.506 
 
The Board looked at the background to the coming into force of the TGL, namely a desire to 
confirm the validity of trusts in Guernsey and to dispel any uncertainty that may exist in 
relation to trusts in Guernsey (in other words, to state the law as it stood), and at the wide 
consultation process that preceded this.507 The Board held that the duty of a Guernsey trustee 
to act en bon père de famille508 was to be assimilated with a duty to act as a prudent man of 
business. That duty is to act as a reasonable and prudent trustee would act, with reasonable 
care and skill, and in the case of a professional trustee a particular type of care and skill is 
required.509  
 
                                                      
503 Midland Bank Trust Company (Jersey) Limited v Federated Pension Services 1995 JLR 352 391-395. 
504 Trusts (Amendment) (Guernsey) Law 1990 s 1(f). 
505 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 
506 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 12. 
507 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 paras 14-16. 
508 See ch 3 para 2 2 1. 
509 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 20. 
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The Board did not accept the argument that the omission of the words “or gross negligence” 
from the original TGL was a mistake. In deciding this point, the Board looked at the 
surrounding facts at the time of the amendment in 1990. The Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) 
Law 1989 was passed only 11 months after the original TGL, and the 1990 amendment of the 
TGL followed quickly on the heels of the Jersey amendment in 1989. The Board concluded 
that the 1990 amendment was a result of the amendments made in Jersey in 1989. 
Furthermore, if the omission of gross negligence from the original TGL was not a mistake, it 
must be regarded that the original provision (allowing exclusion of liability for negligence 
including gross negligence) stated the position under Guernsey customary law prior to the 
coming into force of the TGL.510 
 
Lord Kerr, the Northern Irish judge who wrote one of the dissenting judgments, felt that the 
fundamental obligation of a trustee under Guernsey law to act en bon père de famille was 
incompatible with exempting a trustee from gross negligence in the administration of a 
trust.511  
 
Despite the finding in the Spread case512 with regard to the customary law position, it is 
undisputed that Guernsey decided, shortly after the coming into force of the TGL, that the 
position it wanted to take as a jurisdiction is that a trustee cannot exclude liability for breach 
of trust which results from gross negligence, and this has been the Guernsey position ever 
since. 
 
A recent Guernsey case concerning gross negligence and exoneration clauses is Jefcoate v 
Spread Trustee Company Limited.513 The trustee sold assets at an undervalue, causing a loss of 
millions of pounds. It was alleged that the sale was made in breach of the trustee’s fiduciary 
duties and amounted to gross negligence, as the trustee failed to take the proper steps to 
ascertain the true value of the assets and safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries. The 
trustee therefore did not act like a bon père de famille. The trustee claimed that it did not act 
fraudulently or in a grossly negligent manner and that it was protected by an exoneration 
clause. The court found that the trustee failed to carry out the duties of skill and care, but that 
there was no fraud, dishonesty or deliberate breach of duty. However, in the circumstances of 
                                                      
510 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 paras 21-34. 
511 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13 para 177. 
512 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13. 
513 Jefcoate v Spread Trustee Company Limited GRC Judgment 42/2014. 
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the case, the failure to carry out the duties of skill and care was so serious as to amount to 
gross negligence and therefore the trustee could not rely on the exoneration clause or any 
other relief. The trustee was held liable for its gross negligence. 
 
5 2 3 Other offshore jurisdictions 
 
The law in Bermuda is that a trustee is liable for deliberate, reckless or negligent breaches of 
an equitable duty (although no definition is given in the legislation of the phrase equitable 
duty) and such liability cannot be excluded.514 This means that a trustee cannot escape liability 
for gross negligence, and possibly not for ordinary negligence either. 
 
In the Cayman Islands, the position is that only liability for wilful default (in England known 
as a deliberate breach of trust) cannot be excluded, indicating, it seems, that liability for gross 
negligence can be excluded.515 
 
5 3 South Africa 
 
Section 9(2) of the TPCA stipulates the following: 
 
“Any provision contained in a trust instrument shall be void in so far as it would have 
the effect of exempting a trustee from or indemnifying him against liability for breach 
of trust where he fails to show the degree of care, diligence and skill required in 
subsection (1).”516 
 
This would militate even against a clause exonerating a trustee from liability for ordinary 
negligence.517 
 
Uncertainty existed with regard to whether section 9(2) applied to trusts already in existence 
at the date the TPCA came into force, namely 31 March 1989. It was previously thought that 
it would only apply to trust deeds that took or take effect on or after this date.518  
                                                      
514 Trustee Act, 1975 s 22(1). 
515 Trusts Law (2011 Revision) s 47. 
516 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(1) provides that “[a] trustee shall in the performance of his duties 
and the execution of his powers act with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a 
person who manages the affairs of another.”. 
517 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 105. 
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The current view is that, except in cases of a breach or omission that took place before 31 
March 1989, section 9(2) applies to exemptions and indemnities in force at that date. Thus, 
the protection of a trustee who committed a breach of trust prior to this date is not affected, 
but provisions contrary to section 9(2) that were in existence when the TPCA came into force 
are invalidated by virtue of section 9(2).519 
 
The common law position, prior to the coming into force of the TPCA, was uncertain. It 
would appear that it was possible to exclude liability for ordinary negligence or dubious 
errors of judgment by a trustee, but not for intentional wrongdoing (dolus). Exemption clauses 
were indeed used in practice prior to the coming into force of the TPCA.520  
 
It appears that such clauses were also considered ineffectual with regard to gross negligence 
(culpa lata), because it was thought that different considerations should apply to trusts than to 
contracts.521 Some argue that a party to a contract can validly exempt himself from gross 
negligence522 and, therefore, given that under South African law the trust deed of an inter 
vivos trust is seen as a contract between the settlor and the trustee, a settlor can decide on the 
ambit of exemption offered to the trustee.  
 
Although this is a rather controversial argument in conflict with the TPCA, it follows that 
there would be no public policy consideration against exemption clauses in trust deeds 
extending to gross negligence, as long as there was no dishonesty, fraud or recklessness on 
the part of the trustee.523 This appears similar to the position under English law, where liability 
for dishonesty or fraud cannot be excluded. Although of course the trust is not considered a 
contract under English law, it is acknowledged that in the case of an express inter vivos trust, 
the terms are mostly agreed between the settlor and the trustee.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
518 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 369, where reference is made to the fourth edition of the 
book. 
519 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 370. 
520 See Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 (5) SA 674 (T) 677, where a trust, created shortly before the coming 
into force of the TPCA, excluded liability save in cases of dishonesty or gross negligence. 
521 Government of the RSA v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) 806-807. 
522 Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 15. 
523 Cameron et al Honoré 371. 
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Honoré’s view is that section 9(2) should not rule out exemption for negligence short of 
wilful wrongdoing as this may discourage potential trustees, especially lay persons, who may 
not be able to obtain insurance easily or inexpensively, from taking up the office of trustee.524 
Wunsh shares this concern. In an article525 published shortly after the coming into force of the 
TPCA, he points out that trustees who accepted trusteeship before section 9(2) of the TPCA 
became effective, may well have done so on the basis that an exemption clause in the trust 
deed protected them from claims based on negligence. Such clauses would now be ineffective 
and in that sense the law operates retrospectively.  
 
Furthermore, a trustee who is liable for negligence would require more substantial 
remuneration than was generally the case, at least with individual trustees, in South Africa, 
and the possibility of being exposed to vexatious claims for alleged negligence may prevent 
many people from taking up trusteeship in the first place. Finally, he points out that settlors 
and testators should be free to determine whether the trustees they appoint should be liable for 
negligence or not.526  
 
Wunsh agrees, however, that invalidating an exemption from liability for gross negligence 
may be appropriate, and states that there is no doubt that liability for fraud or other intentional 
wrongdoing cannot be excluded.527 His argument is therefore against liability for negligence. 
Such a level of liability does indeed set a high standard compared to other jurisdictions and 
may have other unintended consequences, as pointed out by Honoré.528 
 
However, in practice the position is as set out by section 9(2) of the TPCA so that any clause 
exempting a trustee from liability (for breach of trust) would be void. The only protection 
against this would be taking out insurance against the trustee’s negligence or default.529 This 
certainly seems to be a stricter view than that taken in England where liability for gross 
                                                      
524 Cameron et al Honoré 371. 
525 Wunsh (1988) De Rebus 547. 
526 Wunsh (1988) De Rebus 547 550. Similar concerns have been raised in England in the context of the duty of 
care and in support of allowing the exclusion of liability for gross negligence. See ch 3 para 5 1. 
527 Wunsh (1988) De Rebus 547 550. 
528 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 371. 
529 Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 106 mentions that the Trust Property Control Act 
57 of 1988 s 9(2) would not invalidate such insurance as it does not originate from a provision in the trust deed. 
However, query whether it would invalidate a provision in the trust deed in terms of which insurance premiums 
are to be paid out of the trust fund. 
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negligence can be excluded and even stricter than Jersey and Guernsey where liability for 
ordinary negligence (although not gross negligence) can be excluded. 
 
5 4 Conclusion and comparison 
 
There appears to be two camps in the argument regarding trustee exoneration clauses. On the 
one hand there are those, who shall be referred to as the traditionalists, who believe that a 
trustee, as a fiduciary, is subject to onerous obligations towards the beneficiaries and should 
not be able to escape liability for gross negligence, or, as in South Africa, not even for 
ordinary negligence. The trustee’s main duty is to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries 
and if he does not take scrupulous care, he will be held liable for any loss suffered.  
 
On the other hand are the more liberal modernists, who focus on the current financial and 
socio-economic environment in which trustees operate. Trustees are able to invest in a wide 
range of complex assets and beneficiaries expect returns in line with what they could have 
made on their personal assets. This camp argues that if a trustee was subject to such onerous 
duties and standards of behaviour and had no way of protecting himself against liability 
(particularly liability for gross negligence), the office of trustee would become unenviable 
indeed.  
 
It is certainly true that a more litigious society, the perils of complex investments, volatile 
financial markets, and a wave of regulatory requirements are making life increasingly difficult 
for trustees, whether corporate or individual, offering them opportunities for wrongdoing 
whichever way they turn. 
 
These two camps would have fairly divergent views of the irreducible core of the trust as 
referred to in Armitage v Nurse.530 In casu it was held that the irreducible core obligations 
owed by trustees to beneficiaries do not include the duty of care, skill, prudence and 
diligence. This sets the bar very low, especially given the provenance of the trust as an 
institution and the fiduciary position of trustees. 
 
                                                      
530 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
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Changing political, social, economic and financial circumstances have shaped the trust into 
what it is today, as opposed to what it was a few centuries, or even just a hundred years, ago. 
Perhaps it is exactly the flexibility of the trust concept that has led to it being used for 
purposes it was never intended for and to the current tension between regarding the trust as a 
bundle of rights and obligations and regarding it as a commercial investment vehicle. 
 
The following chapter examines the role of settlors exercising excessive control over the trust 
and the property held on the terms thereof.  While control was traditionally the domain of the 
trustee on the basis that there should be a separation between ownership and control of the 
assets and the enjoyment thereof, the changes referred to above have led to increased 
involvement by settlors. The relationship between this development and the liability of 
trustees, specifically the level of liability trustees are willing to accept in such cases, will form 
part of the discussion in chapter 5.  





EXCESSIVE SETTLOR CONTROL: INVALIDITY, SHAM  




1 1 Context and research theme 
 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of settlor control over a trust and the consequences of 
excessive control. Excessive control can affect validly constituted trusts but can also, in 
certain circumstances, lead to the invalidity of a trust. A situation where a settlor exercises 
excessive control over a valid trust will be described in this chapter as an abuse of trust, 
although there is a range of factual scenarios that can lead to a finding that a trust has been 
abused, just as different circumstances can lead to invalidity of a trust. However, for the 
purposes of a clear comparative study, this chapter focuses only on control by the settlor 
(although he may in certain circumstances also wear the hat of a co-trustee.)  
 
It is important to note at the outset that the question of invalidity of a trust (including sham 
trusts) should be differentiated from that of abuse of the trust. Generally speaking, where the 
settlor lacks the necessary intention to create a valid trust (other than a bare trust), no valid 
trust will come into existence. If the settlor creates the impression of setting up a trust but in 
reality intends to create a different relationship, and if the trustee shares this intention, the 
trust deed will be a simulation or sham, and a valid trust will not be created either.1 
 
On the other hand, where a trust was validly constituted, but due to a shortcoming in the 
management of the trust and its assets, the protection offered by the trust may be lost and the 
ordinary consequences of the trust may be disregarded. This is what is referred to as an abuse 
of the trust, or a debasement of the trust, and the remedy as going behind the trust form or 
piercing or piercing or lifting the veneer of the trust. This means that there has to be a valid 
                                                      
1 This chapter does not deal with instances where trusts or transfer into trusts are voidable, by virtue of statutory 
provisions, because it unfairly prejudices another party. This can be done under insolvency or matrimonial 
legislation, and such cases often feature a settlor wishing to retain control of trust assets. See in this regard Pettit 
Equity and the Law of Trusts 237-242.  
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trust to start with, as there is otherwise nothing to go behind.2 Going behind the trust form has 
also been described in South Africa as ignoring the separation between the trustee’s estate and 
that of the trust or relaxing the general principles of South African trust law.3 Conflicting 
judgments in the South African context raise questions about the circumstances under which a 
court will go behind a trust and what the effect thereof will be.4 
 
Apart from the theoretical differences between an invalid trust and a sham trust and the abuse 
of a valid trust, there is also a difference in the consequences – what happens to the trust 
assets on a successful claim of sham or invalidity as opposed to going behind the trust form. 
Generally speaking, if a valid trust does not come into existence, the settlor would be 
regarded as not having divested himself of the ownership of the trust assets and will remain 
the owner. An abuse of the trust, on the other hand, if it leads to a court going behind the trust 
or lifting the veneer of the trust, could mean that the assets are distributed to a spouse or 
creditor or made available to tax authorities. The court will take into account all relevant facts 
and circumstances and weigh up competing interests. In such a case, the purpose of trust is 
not fulfilled, but neither does the settlor get the assets back. 5 This equitable approach shows 
flexibility and pragmatism – two trademarks of the development of the trust in the first place. 
 
This chapter focuses on the circumstances where excessive control may be found to exist. As 
part of this study, the theoretical basis for a successful claim of sham, invalidity or abuse of 
trust due to excessive settlor control will be examined. Where the controlling settlor is also a 
beneficiary, it can be explained as the result of a lack of separation between control and 
enjoyment. However, where the controlling settlor is not a beneficiary, this analysis is not 
satisfactory. Other explanations may be a breach of trust or a lack of independence on the part 
of the trustee, or a breach of the separation between the trust estate and the trustee’s private 
estate. 
 
The issue is approached from different angles in different jurisdictions, mainly because of the 
variety of roles a settlor can typically play in such jurisdictions, such as co-trustee and 
                                                      
2 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1085-1086 prefers to refer to an abuse of the trust and going behind the trust 
as the remedy. Van der Linde (2012) 75 THRHR 371 373, 376-377 refers to the debasement of the core idea of 
the trust and is of the view that describing the remedy as piercing the veneer of the trust is unproblematic as long 
as it is kept in mind that the trust is not a separate person or entity. 
3 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 509. 
4 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 510. 
5 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1096-1097. 
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protector.6 However, the substantive issue remains the same: can a valid trust exist if someone 
who is not an independent trustee, and in particular if it is the person who contributed the 
assets to the trust in the first place, exercises substantial control over the trust? What is 
required for the settlor to divest himself of the equitable interest in the trust property or, in 
South African terms, what is required to constitute a separate trust estate? If a valid trust 
comes into existence, how extensive can the control over the trust and its assets be without 
affecting the protection offered by the trust and altering the consequences that normally flow 
from a trust? 
 
Once again, the essential characteristics and requirements of a trust referred to throughout this 
dissertation – the core values – are highly relevant and will assist in the examination of these 
issues. These core values involve the following: 
 
(a) the advantages of analysing a trust from the perspective of obligations rather than 
property;  
(b) there is an irreducible core of duties that must be present in order to have a valid trust; 
(c) the trustee must be accountable to the beneficiaries; 
(d) the trustee has an overriding fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries; 
(e) the importance of separation between control and enjoyment of trust property; and 
(f) the separation of the trust assets from the trustee’s personal estate.7 
 
1 2 Practical relevance 
 
Given the wide variety of uses to which the trust is put, and the global prevalence of this 
centuries old device, a study of excessive settlor control, when this leads to an invalid trust or 
an abuse of the trust, is highly relevant. The use (and abuse) of trusts has never been under 
more scrutiny than at present. This includes scrutiny by national tax authorities who seek to 
expand their tax base by clamping down on the advantages offered by trusts, but also by 
various supra-national bodies seeking to increase transparency in an attempt to prevent (or at 
                                                      
6 In South African case law dealing with abuse of the trust form, trusts are sometimes referred to as the alter ego 
of the trustee, whereas in England such trusts are often referred to as the alter ego of the settlor. At first glance, 
this may seem to indicate different issues, but the reason is simply that the settlor is often a co-trustee in the 
South African context, but less so in the English and offshore context.  
7 See ch 2 para 5; ch 3 para 1. 
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least reduce) tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorist financing. This was discussed in 
chapter 1.8 
 
Disrespect for the accepted boundaries of trust law eases the task of a party seeking access to 
assets held in a trust. In the examples mentioned above, that is, of course, not a bad thing. 
 
For many years, however, trusts have been used all over the world for perfectly legitimate 
reasons such as succession planning, protecting wealthy families from the risk of kidnappings 
and state expropriation, the continuous management of family business, ring-fencing assets 
for different family members and looking after wealth for persons who are not able to do so 
themselves because of some incapacity, be it age or mental incapacity.  
 
Typically, in these types of scenarios, there is no doubt in anyone’s mind that the overriding 
duty of the trustee is to look after the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The 
settlor may or may not retain some involvement or influence, but his intention, generally 
speaking, is that after his death the trust will continue to be run as it was during his lifetime 
and that the trustee should continue to look after the beneficiaries’ interests.  
 
If, on the other hand, the settlor’s main objective is to use the trust as a vehicle for his 
personal investments or businesses, and/or to protect his assets from a creditor or a divorcing 
spouse, he will often have different expectations of his role in the management of the trust 
and of the trustee’s duty towards the beneficiaries. The position of the beneficiaries of such a 
trust may indeed be precarious. This is explained further below.9 
 
Certain objectives, especially asset or divorce protection and tax relief, require the settlor to 
step back and cease control of the trust assets even more than others. The protection offered 
by a trust is generally much stronger if the settlor has very limited powers. However, many 
settlors wish to have the benefits of a trust without sacrificing control over the trust assets. 
 
Examples of where a finding of an invalid trust or abuse of trust due to excessive settlor 
control may be relevant include: 
 
                                                      
8 See ch 1 para 2 2 2. 
9 See ch 4 paras 3 1, 3 2 5. 
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(a) a tax authority claiming that trust assets in fact belong to the settlor, who treated the 
assets as his own, and not to the trustee, resulting in the assets forming part of the 
settlor’s estate for tax purposes; 
 
(b) a claim for redistribution of assets on divorce where one party to the divorce is either a 
settlor, beneficiary or trustee of a trust and can be shown to have a right to the trust 
assets (or own the assets beneficially) or who exercises excessive control over the 
assets or the trustee;10 
 
(c) a creditor obtaining judgment against a debtor who claims not to beneficially own any 
assets as he gave them away to a trustee, but who continues to control the assets as if 
he is the legal owner thereof; and 
 
(d) aggrieved beneficiaries claiming against a trustee who made investments at the 
direction of the settlor, without exercising his own discretion and judgment, which 
resulted in a loss to the trust fund. 
 
Practical examples of these types of scenarios will be evident in the case law review later in 
this chapter.11  
 
1 3 Structure of the chapter and content of final chapter 
 
As a first step, a brief summary will be made across the jurisdictions under review of the 
traditional role of the settlor and the requirement for certainty of intention on the settlor’s part. 
As part of this, the circumstances in which a trust will be considered a sham will also be 
explained. 
 
Thereafter, the increased demand for control by settlors as well as the reasons therefor will be 
discussed. This is followed by an explanation of various methods available to settlors who 
                                                      
10 Divorce courts in England seem to have a slightly different approach in that trust assets may be taken into 
account even when no control as such has been found, but it is clear that the trustee would follow the 
settlor’s/beneficiary’s wishes with regard to distributions. A distinction should, however, be made between 
“judicial encouragement” to trustees and “undue pressure” being exercised on them to make assets available.  
11 See ch 4 para 4. 
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wish to retain control, ranging from a degree of influence over investments to total control of 
the assets. 
 
Logically, the important question that follows is how much control a settlor can retain without 
invalidating the trust, or otherwise jeopardising the effectiveness thereof. In this part of the 
chapter, case law and academic commentary from England, offshore jurisdictions and South 
Africa will be examined and an attempt will be made to distill common principles therefrom. 
 
The question of whether the boundaries of the traditional trust are being pushed too far will 
also be examined, both in chapters 4 and 5. There are indications that the trust is changing 
from a relationship based on loyalty and trust – in which the care exercised by the trustee is of 
utmost importance in the furtherance of the beneficiaries’ interests – into a vehicle for 
investment, ideally controlled, at least to some extent, by the settlor, and in which the trustee 
wishes to limit his liability as far as possible. The traditional common law trust is not 
necessarily the most suitable institution to achieve this, but is easily created and to a large 
degree unregulated, making it susceptible to abuse. 
 
In chapter 5, a comparison will be drawn between the position in South Africa and the 
relevant foreign jurisdictions with a view to ascertaining whether any of the foreign 
developments in the field of settlor control and trustee liability can aid the further 
development of South African trust law.  
 
2 Traditional role of the settlor and requirement of certainty of intention 
 
2 1 Role of the settlor where a valid trust was created 
 
2 1 1 England 
 
The English concept of legal and equitable interests in property entails that equitable 
proprietary rights in property must be created specifically, for example by the creation of an 
express inter vivos trust. Once an equitable interest in property has been created, the same 
person cannot be the legal and equitable owner of the property.12  
                                                      
12 See ch 2 para 2 4 3. 
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The settlor, having transferred the assets in question to another person as trustee, has disposed 
of his legal and equitable interest in the property. To the extent that he is not a beneficiary and 
did not reserve any powers to himself under the terms of the trust deed, he falls out of the 
picture at this point.13 He can merely expect that the trustee will consider any wishes he 
communicates to the trustee.14 
 
The settlor of an English law trust can reserve certain powers to himself, including the power 
to revoke the transfer of assets to the trust15 and the power to appoint new trustees, and may 
even appoint himself as investment manager to the trust. If he wishes to retain any powers 
over the assets he has given away, he needs to provide for that in the trust deed.16  
 
However, in most cases, reserving wide powers to the settlor would defeat the objective of 
creating a trust in the first place.17 If it can be demonstrated that the trust assets did not in 
reality leave the settlor’s sphere of wealth or influence, that he did not create an equitable 
interest in the property and divested himself of that interest, the protection offered by a trust 
(tax relief, asset protection, succession planning and so forth) would be lost. In any event, it is 
clear that English law does not know specific reserved powers legislation of the kind found in 
most offshore jurisdictions.18 If the settlor does not part with the beneficial interest in the trust 
property, the trust is likely to be regarded as a bare trust so that the assets would remain part 






                                                      
13 Re Astor's Settlement Trusts, Astor v Scholfield [1952] 1 All ER 1067; see also ch 2 para 2 6 4. 
14 Russen (2013) 20 Journal of International Tax, Trust and Corporate Planning 239 242. 
15 The power of revocation has to be an express term of the trust deed. It does not derive from the settlor’s 
position as the person who transferred the assets to the trustee. In fact, once he has given the trust assets to the 
trustee, the settlor typically has no say over the way the trust is administered. 
16 Expressly reserving such powers in the trust deed is preferable to the situation where the trust deed is silent on 
this point, but the settlor still exercises certain powers. This may invite an allegation that the trust relationship is 
not what the trust deed suggests it to be, possibly leading to an argument of sham, discussed below. 
17 Thomas and Hayton in The International Trust 597. 
18 See ch 2 para 2 6 4. 
19 Hudson Equity and Trusts 214, 924; Penner The Law of Trusts 25-26; Tey (2009) 21 SAcLJ 517 518-519, 524-
527. This was also illustrated in the recent High Court judgment JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v 
Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch). 
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2 1 2 Offshore: Jersey 
 
Jersey law recognises dual ownership of movable assets although not of immovable Jersey 
property.20 Jersey statute specifically states that the trustee is the owner of the trust property, 
but not in his own right. 21  The position is therefore substantially similar to the English 
position.  
 
An old rule of Jersey customary law known as donner et retenir ne vaut (rien) provided that a 
settlor cannot give away property and at the same time retain it. A situation where the settlor 
retains the power to dispose freely of the property he transferred to the trustee, or where he 
remains in possession of it, would have fallen foul of this rule and the disposition of property 
would have been void.22 The Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 (TJL) now provides, pursuant to a 
1989 amendment,23 that this rule does not apply to questions regarding the validity, effect or 
administration of a trust or the transfer of assets to a trust.24 The TJL also provides that a 
settlor may be a beneficiary of a trust of which he is the settlor.25  
 
Furthermore, although it was always possible under the TJL for the settlor to revoke a trust, in 
2006 specific legislation was enacted allowing a settlor to reserve to himself extensive powers 
over the trust and its assets.26 This is examined in more detail below. The path that Jersey and 
other offshore jurisdictions have followed with regard to increasing settlor powers is clearly 
geared towards attracting business to their vital financial service industries and plays neatly 
into the increased demand for settlor control discussed below.27 
 
2 1 3 South Africa 
 
South African law does not recognise the concept of dual ownership of property. In English 
law, conferring on beneficiaries an equitable interest in property is intended to protect and 
                                                      
20 See ch 2 para 3 3 2. 
21 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 2. 
22 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 125-126; Abdel Rahman v Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited and 
Others [1991] JLR 103. 
23 Trusts (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1989. 
24 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 9(5); see ch 2 para 3 5 4. 
25 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 10(12). 
26 Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006; see ch 2 para 3 5 4. 
27 Hudson Equity and Trusts 918-920; see also ch 4 para 3 1. 
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enhance their position and interest vis à vis the trust property. 28  Not recognising split 
ownership does not mean that South African law does not offer protection to trust 
beneficiaries.  
 
Protection for the beneficiaries flows, as examined in chapter 3, from the fiduciary position 
and duties of a trustee (including the duty to take possession and ownership of the trust 
property), 29  the separation of the trust estate from the trustee’s personal estate, and the 
principle of separation of control and enjoyment of trust assets.30 This principle has been held 
to be the essence of the trust under South African law. Although it does not prevent a settlor 
from being a beneficiary (as long as he is not the sole beneficiary and also the sole trustee), 
there should be a functional separation between the control over the trust property and the 
enjoyment thereof. 31 
 
South African law allows a settlor to vary or revoke a trust during his lifetime, unless the trust 
deed provides otherwise. The power to vary the trust can also be given to the trustee and 
limitations can be placed thereon. South African trust law, unlike its English or Jersey 
counterparts, requires the trustee to consent to a revocation or variation of the trust by the 
settlor. This is the result of how South African law views inter vivos trust creation, namely 
that it is a contract for the benefit of a third party.32  
 
Moreover, revocation and variation are allowed only insofar as beneficiaries have not yet 
accepted benefit under the trust, unless they consent thereto.33 Thus, the power of the settlor to 
revoke the trust is much curtailed in comparison to the position under English or Jersey law. 
South African law also does not specifically provide for the reservation of investment and 
other powers to a settlor in the way that offshore trust laws frequently do. 
 
The reality is, however, that many settlors of South African law trusts act as co-trustees (or 
even sole trustees). This is particularly true of closely-knit family trusts, where the settlor 
and/or the settlor’s spouse and issue are the principal beneficiaries under the trust. This, of 
                                                      
28 See ch 2 para 2 4 2. 
29 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 270-276. The bewind trust, where the trustee does not 
own the trust property, is not relevant here. 
30 See ch 2 paras 4 3 1 1, 4 3 1 2. 
31 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 2. 
32 See ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
33 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 492-497; Crookes NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (AD). 
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course, offers an alternative way of exercising control over the trust assets – in the settlor’s 
capacity as co-trustee. Clearly, this has consequences for the independence of the body of 
trustees. This is examined further below. 
 
2 2 Valid trusts, invalid trusts and sham trusts 
 
Chapter 2 also highlighted the need for certainty of intention on the part of the settlor. In order 
to establish a valid trust, it has to be clear (amongst other things) that the owner of the 
property had the intention to subject the property to a trust obligation – in other words, that he 
intended to create a trust and not another type of legal relationship or entity.34 If the settlor and 
trustee both lacked the intention to create a trust, despite the appearance of the documentation, 
the trust would be a sham and therefore invalid.35 This could be the case, for example, if both 
parties intended that the settlor rather than the trustee will control the trust assets, but the trust 
deed purports to create a normal discretionary trust. 
 
Although certain instances of excessive settlor control would also qualify as sham trusts, not 
all cases would. The definition of a sham trust is a narrow one and a finding of sham requires 
extreme facts.36 This does not prevent the incorrect use of the term sham trust to refer to trusts 
where the settlor retains influence or control, but where there is a valid trust and no common 
intention to create something other than a trust at the outset. 
 
2 2 1 England 
 
In order to find a trust deed a sham, the subjective intention of the settlor and the trustee at the 
time of the creation of the trust, as well their subsequent conduct, would be relevant. It is 
important to stress, however, that the intention at the time of creation of the trust is relevant.37  
 
                                                      
34 See ch 2 paras 2 7 1 1, 3 6 1, 4 4 1. 
35 It is submitted that if the only party who did not have the intention to create a trust is the settlor, the trust is not 
a sham, but a valid trust would nevertheless not come into existence, as there is no certainty of intention on the 
part of the settlor. If the settlor intended to create a valid trust according to the provisions of the deed, but the 
trustee for some reason did not share this intention, then the trust would not be a sham either, but would be valid 
as the settlor had the required intention. This is, however, unlikely to occur. 
36 Russen (2013) 20 Journal of International Tax, Trust and Corporate Planning 239 243. 
37 Hayton et al Underhill and Hayton Law relating to Trusts and Trustees 88-93; Virgo The Principles of Equity 
and Trusts 93-94. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 228 
The classic English case on sham is Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd.38 
Diplock LJ defined a sham as follows: 
 
“…[I]t means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are 
intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating 
between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual rights and 
obligations (if any) which the parties intended to create…for acts or documents to be a 
‘sham’, with whatever legal consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto 
must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal 
rights or obligations which they give the appearance of creating...”39 
 
Importantly, there has to be a subjective intention to deceive others – to create a false or 
misleading appearance – and both parties have to share this intention.40 In the case of a trust, 
those parties would be the settlor and the trustee. In the case where the settlor is also the sole 
trustee, his intention alone is relevant.41  
 
Reckless indifference (as opposed to mere indifference without a reckless attitude) as to the 
intention of the settlor would qualify as a shamming intention on the part of the trustee.42 This 
would refer to a situation where the trustee enters into a trust deed without knowing or caring 
about what he signed, or without making enquiries as to the settlor’s intentions.43 Such a 
trustee would be considered to have the required shamming intention. 
 
There is no requirement for dishonesty or fraud,44 although it appears to be accepted that a 
sham involves a degree of dishonesty.45 This may be because there has to be an intention to 
mislead and it is not difficult to see how this can be regarded as dishonest in general layman 
terms. 
                                                      
38 Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 518 as confirmed more recently in Hitch v 
Stone (Inspector of Taxes) [2001] STC 214 and A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam). 
39 Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 518 528. 
40 Hudson Equity and Trusts 94; Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 518 528-529 
as recently affirmed in A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 33, 43. 
41 Midland Bank plc v Wyatt [1995] 1 FLR 696, where a husband declared a trust of the family home in favour of 
his wife and children, but never told anyone about it and continued to deal with the property as if it was his own. 
The declaration of trust was found to be void and unenforceable and the judge considered it a pretence or a 
sham. See also Pearce et al Pearce & Stevens' Trusts and Equitable Obligations 154. 
42 Midland Bank plc v Wyatt [1995] 1 FLR 696; A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 50-52. 
43 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras149-150, 435. 
44 Virgo The Principles of Equity & Trusts 93. 
45 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) para 53. 
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Once a valid trust exists, it cannot be turned into a sham.46 However, where the trustee of a 
validly created trust simply obeys the settlor’s directions or instructions (in cases where the 
relevant power is not reserved to the settlor in the trust deed) without applying his mind and 
independently considering the interests of the beneficiaries, although not turning the trust into 
a sham, the trustee breaches one of his fundamental duties as trustee. 47 This is discussed 
further below. 
 
2 2 2 Offshore: Jersey 
 
The requirement of English law as to certainty of the settlor’s intention applies also in 
Jersey.48 Furthermore, if the settlor and trustee both had the intention to create something 
other than a trust, despite appearing to create a trust, so that there is a common intention to 
mislead, the trust would be a sham and invalid.49 The position in Jersey with regard to sham 
trusts is largely the same as in England, including that recklessly going along with the 
settlor’s intention to mislead would qualify as a subjective shamming intention on the part of 
the trustee.50 However, it has been argued that the requirements for finding a sham trust may 
be stricter in Jersey.51 A landmark Jersey judgment in the litigation regarding the Esteem 
Settlement52 dealt with settlor control, sham trusts and piercing the veil, and will be examined 
in detail below. 
  
2 2 3 South Africa 
 
In order to create a valid trust, the settlor must illustrate a clear and unambiguous intention to 
create a trust, and not another type of legal relationship.53 The intention to create a trust may 
be absent because the trustee is not sufficiently independent, for example where the settlor is 
also a trustee and perhaps a beneficiary of the trust. In such a case, the substance over form 
principle will apply so that the transaction would be construed for what it really is according 
                                                      
46 Virgo The Principles of Equity & Trusts 93-94; A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) para 42. 
47 Thomas and Hayton in The International Trust 605. 
48 See ch 2 para 3 6 1. 
49 See ch 2 para 3 6 1. 
50 CI Law Trustees Limited v Minwalla [2005] JLR 359 367. 
51 See ch 2 para 3 6 1. 
52 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188]. 
53 See ch 2 para 4 4 1. See also Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 519-520. 
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to the intention of the parties. This could be an agency relationship or a partnership, to name a 
few examples. A trust would therefore not come into existence in such a case.54  
 
South African authority on sham trusts is scarce, most of the case law dealing with sham or 
simulations being in the context of tax law. A recent Supreme Court of Appeal case 
concerning sham or simulation is Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC.55 Here 
the court summarised South African case law on simulated transactions, including the 
following “classic statement”56 contained in Zandberg v Van Zyl:57     
 
“Not infrequently, however (either to secure some advantage which otherwise the law 
would not give, or to escape some disability which otherwise the law would impose), 
the parties to a transaction endeavor to conceal its real character. ... The Court must be 
satisfied that there is a real intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs from the 
simulated intention. … The inquiry, therefore, is in each case one of fact, for the right 
solution of which no general rule can be laid down.”58 
 
In Roshcon,59 the Supreme Court of Appeal restated this general principle as follows: 
 
“Whether a particular transaction is a simulated transaction is therefore a question of 
its genuineness. If it is genuine the court will give effect to it and, if not, the court will 
give effect to the underlying transaction that it conceals. And whether it is genuine 
will depend on a consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
transaction.”60 
 
Unlike English law, it appears that South African law may attach more weight to dishonesty.61 
However, one can argue that an intention to mislead – required under English law – is 
dishonest, even if not called by that name. Furthermore, both parties must have the intention 
                                                      
54 Cameron et al Honoré's South African Law of Trusts 137. Van der Linde (2012) 75 THRHR 371 388 raises the 
interesting question of whether, where trustee and settlor are the same person, a shamming intention on the part 
of that person (who may be wearing two hats but is still the same person) means the trust is a sham. 
55 Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 2014 (4) SA 319. 
56 Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 2014 (4) SA 319 para 23. 
57 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302. 
58 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 309. 
59 Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 2014 (4) SA 319. 
60 Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 2014 (4) SA 319 para 27. 
61 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 516. 
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to mislead – it is not sufficient, as in English law, for one party to merely go along, albeit 
recklessly, with the shammer. 62  There is, however, no requirement that the disguised 
transaction must be designed to evade tax or have some other improper purpose.63  
 
3 Settlor control over the trust 
 
3 1 Reasons for and consequences of increased demand for settlor control 
 
In a thought-provoking piece about the future of the trust, Waters gives a detailed explanation 
of how the use of the trust has evolved over the years.64 Although written with reference to 
England and offshore jurisdictions, many of the themes are also relevant in the South African 
context. The writer explains that until the latter part of the 19th century, trusts were 
predominantly used for the holding and disposition of individual wealth within the family, 
such as real estate, securities, cash, works of art, jewelry, furniture and so on. These 
settlements were, in the opinion of Waters, very similar in nature to the trusts of mediaeval 
times. Towards the end of the 19th century, trusts were also used outside the family in 
commercial deals and to own businesses. In all these cases, the classic elements of the trust 
were present, namely a transfer of title to the trustee, a segregated trust estate, one or more 
beneficiaries and enforcement of the trust by the beneficiaries who could demand that the 
trustee accounts for his administration and management of the trust.65  
 
These trusts typically provided for fixed successive beneficial interests, meaning that the 
position of beneficiaries was very secure. In fact, conferring extensive discretion upon a 
trustee was considered inappropriate. Trustee powers were generally much more limited than 
is the case with today’s flexible trust deeds, as discussed below.66 
 
Also relevant in this context are the profound changes in the type of investment opportunities 
available to investors, including trustees. This played an important part in the liberalisation of 
trustee investment powers, the standard of care expected of a trustee and liability issues, as 
                                                      
62 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 519. 
63 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Bros & Hudson Ltd 1941 AD 369 395-396 as confirmed in 
Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 2014 (4) SA 319 paras 28-32. 
64 Waters in The International Trust 837-889. 
65 Waters in The International Trust 844-845. 
66 Waters in The International Trust 848-849; see also ch 4 para 3 2 5 regarding the use of letters of wishes. 
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discussed in chapter 3.67 Investors have been able to become more personally and directly 
involved with the management of their financial investments. Wealthy individuals, especially 
those who have built up successful businesses, are often very knowledgeable when it comes 
to investments and demand to be more involved in managing their wealth. If they have 
generated their wealth over a prolonged period, they may well be reluctant to forego this 
involvement even if, at the same time, they also desire the benefits offered by a trust. 
 
Another factor in this evolution was tax. From the 1970s onwards, high levels of taxation in 
many mainland jurisdictions led to a desire on the part of wealth owners to mitigate or, even 
better, avoid taxation of gifts, income or capital gains. Tax efficiency became one of the 
predominant objectives when establishing a trust. This desire also affected the way trust deeds 
were drafted and the type of eventualities it had to cater for.68 Many of the terms we now 
consider standard (at least in English and offshore trust deeds) would have been frowned 
upon 50 or 60 years ago. Examples of such provisions would include the following: 
 
(a) the power to remove the trustee with or without cause, exercisable by the settlor, a 
beneficiary or a protector. One might ask whether this affects the trustee’s attitude in 
discharging his duties, and who the trustee feels he needs to answer to; 
 
(b) the ability to settle a trust with a nominal capital amount and add assets at a later point 
as and when it becomes possible or attractive. It is furthermore possible for someone 
other than the true economic settlor to contribute the initial capital and be indicated as 
the settlor in the trust deed; 
 
(c) the ability to add and remove discretionary beneficiaries seemingly at will. This 
makes the beneficiary’s position and status much more tenuous. Given that it is up to 
the beneficiaries of a trust to hold the trustee to account, this development clearly has 
an effect on the accountability of the trustee. One may ask whether the trustee is now 
accountable to the settlor (who can remove him), as the settlor may be the only person 
involved with the trust from start to finish; 
 
                                                      
67 See ch 3 paras 2 1 3 2, 2 1 3 3, 2 3 5. 
68 Waters in The International Trust 849. 
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(d) the ability for the trustee to amend or terminate the trust or to “decant” assets from 
one trust to another. This creates the impression that the trust is a “neutral vehicle” to 
be used in future as circumstances dictate; and 
 
(e) the reservation of extensive powers, if not by the settlor himself (for reasons 
discussed below) then by a protector or advisor appointed by the settlor.69 
 
Another important aspect of this development is that trusts have become increasingly popular 
outside of common law jurisdictions. Settlors from a civil law background often have a very 
limited understanding of the characteristics of a trust and may feel uncomfortable with the 
idea of transferring ownership and control of their assets to a trustee in another jurisdiction. 
The offshore trust company, trying to sell its services to the unsuspecting settlor, may also 
paint a slightly different picture of how the trust will be managed in practice in the hope that 
this makes their trustee services more attractive than a competitor’s. If this misunderstanding 
is never corrected for fear of losing the business, the situation only worsens over time. 
 
It is testament to the flexibility of the trust that it was able to accommodate so many changes 
over time, taking account of social and economic developments in different jurisdictions. 
However, Waters comes to a similar conclusion as that drawn towards the end of chapter 3, 70 
namely that trust practice today seems more concerned with the needs and wishes of the 
settlor than the position and protection of the trust beneficiaries.71 At the same time, trustees 
are increasingly concerned with liability issues. Modern trust drafting takes all of this into 
account and aims to be everything for everybody.72  
 
Two questions arise. Are practitioners and drafters conceiving a new idea of what a trust is 
and, if so, what exactly is that idea, both conceptually and practically? Secondly, as 
previously mentioned, the question is how far the boundaries of the accepted trust concept can 
be pushed, how far it allows settlor autonomy to go, without the trust concept “crumbling 
                                                      
69 Waters in The International Trust 850-853. 
70 See ch 3 para 5 4. 
71 Waters in The International Trust 854. See also Tey (2009) 21 SAcLJ 517 where similar concerns are raised 
and where modern trusts are described at 520 as “investment tools aimed at enhancing the value of financial 
assets”. 
72  Similar arguments regarding the modern use of the discretionary trust are made in Smith “Massively 
Discretionary Trusts” Current Legal Problems (accessed 20-11-2017). 
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instead into a jumble of ideas that has no convincing conceptual state” 73  or becoming 
assimilated with contract or agency.74 
 
These are, of course, academic questions that may not be a daily concern for the trust 
practitioner, but over time these concerns seep into the consciousness of judges, as is already 
apparent in certain cases examined in this chapter. Given that trust law is to a large extent 
judge-made, this may have an effect on the way judges develop trust law. Alternatively, it 
may be argued that legislation is required to eliminate doctrinal uncertainties. This could 
either create a distinct vehicle, more suited to the needs discussed above, or it could take away 
much of the flexibility offered by the traditional common law trust.75  
 
3 2 How can a settlor obtain control? 
 
3 2 1 Reserved powers trusts 
 
Once he has settled the trust, the settlor’s ongoing role is limited, as explained above. It is, 
however, also clear that, for a variety of reasons, many settlors would like to have more 
control and some in fact insist on it. To deal with this conundrum, many offshore jurisdictions 
have enacted so-called reserved powers legislation over the last few decades. The Jersey 
legislation is examined in detail, although many other traditional offshore jurisdictions and 
US states 76  have introduced very similar legislation. 77  This type of legislation has two 
principal aims. The first is to ensure that a trust in which the settlor reserved wide powers is 
not invalid (or a sham) because there was no intention (or no common intention) to create a 
                                                      
73 Waters in The International Trust 854. 
74 Waters in The International Trust 888; see also ch 2 para 2 4 1. 
75 Waters in The International Trust 888-889. 
76 One example is Nevada’s directed trust legislation, allowing the trustee to be directed as to investments or 
distributions or both, pursuant to the Nevada Revised Statutes ch 163.553-163.556. A “trust adviser” is 
empowered to direct the trustee in relation to the exercise of certain powers, and the trustee becomes an 
“excluded fiduciary” whose liability is severely limited. Other states include Delaware, Alaska and South 
Dakota. 
77 Examples, apart from Jersey, include Bermuda’s Trusts (Special Provisions) Amendment Act 2014 which 
expressly allows the reservation of any and all of the listed powers; the Cayman Islands Trusts Law (2011 
Revision) s 14 which was recently amended by The Trusts (Amendment) Law, 2016 s 5 to make it clear that any 
or all of the powers contained in the legislation can be reserved without invalidating the trust; Guernsey’s Trusts 
(Guernsey) Law 2007 s 15 which also provides for reservation of “all or any” of the listed powers; and 
Singapore’s Trustees Act (Chapter 337) revised edition 2005 s90(5) which provides that a trust shall not be 
invalid if a settlor reserves to himself any or all powers of investment or asset management – this is more limited 
than other jurisdicitions as it only relates to investments. 
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trust in the first place, or considered testamentary because the settlor in fact wishes to control 
the assets during his lifetime and hand over control to the trustee only after his death.78  
 
The second aim of reserved powers legislation is to limit the liability of the trustee of such a 
trust. A trustee who is obliged to administer the trust fund at the whim of the settlor 
exercising his reserved powers would not wish to be liable to the beneficiaries if it turns out 
that they suffered a loss as a result of such exercise. 79  Some jurisdictions, for example 
Singapore, have not gone as far as absolving the trustee from all liability where the power 
exercised was one reserved to the settlor (or someone else), but many offshore jurisdictions 
have made this part of their law.80 In most cases it would thus be clear that, at least according 
to the governing law of the trust, the trustee will not be liable for the consequences of the 
exercise by the settlor of powers typically belonging to the trustee.  
 
Nonetheless, serious questions arise with regard to such trusts. These questions mainly 
revolve around: 
 
(a) whether reserved powers legislation pushes the boundaries of trust law too far, the 
question being whether a valid trust can exist where the trustee retains very few or 
virtually no fiduciary duties towards the beneficiaries;81 and  
 
(b)  whether such a trust would be recognised as valid and effective for its purposes by a 
court in another jurisdiction, for example where the settlor is resident or the trust 
assets are located. This is important given that the residence of settlors of offshore 
trusts and the location of the assets are rarely in the same offshore jurisdiction.  
 
The Jersey reserved powers legislation will be examined in detail, although the position in 
most of the offshore jurisdictions is very similar.  
 
 
                                                      
78 Thomas and Hayton in The International Trust 608-614; In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons 
dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ is an example of 
a finding of a testamentary intention. These trusts were set up in 1976, well before any of the offshore reserved 
powers legislation was enacted. The case is discussed in ch 4 para 4 2 4 1.  
79 The liability of a trustee for breach of trust was examined in ch 3 para 3. 
80 Anonymous “Reserved Powers Trusts Examined” Collas Crill Update (accessed 12-05-2017). 
81 An irreducible core of trustee obligations is required in order to have a trust. See ch 2 para 5 2. 
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3 2 1 1  Jersey reserved powers trust legislation 
 
The Jersey reserved powers legislation was introduced by the Trusts (Amendment No. 4) 
(Jersey) Law 2006, which now forms part of the Trusts (Jersey) Law (TJL),82 and provides as 
follows in article 9A: 
 
“(1) The reservation or grant by a settlor of a trust of –  
(a) any beneficial interest in the trust property; or 
(b) any of the powers mentioned in paragraph (2), 
shall not affect the validity of the trust nor delay the trust taking effect.”83 
 
The powers listed in article 9A(2) of the TJL are: 
 
(a) to revoke, vary or amend the terms of the trust; 
(b) to advance, appoint, pay or apply income or capital of the trust property or to give 
directions to do so; 
(c) to act as a director or officer of a company wholly or partly owned by the trust or to 
give directions for the appointment or removal of such a director; 
(d) to give binding directions to the trustee with regard to dealing with the trust property 
or the exercise of any powers or rights arising from the property; 
(e) to appoint or remove a trustee, beneficiary or other person holding a power, discretion 
or right in connection with the trust or the trust property; 
(f) to appoint or remove an investment manager or investment adviser; 
(g) to change the proper law of the trust; 
(h) to restrict the exercise of any powers or discretions of a trustee by requiring the 
consent of the settlor or another person in order to exercise such powers or discretions. 
 
Article 9A(3) of the TJL then goes on to state that a trustee who acts in accordance with the 




                                                      
82 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984. 
83 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 9A(1). 
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3 2 1 2  Proposals for amendment of Jersey reserved powers trust legislation 
 
In 2016, the States of Jersey issued a Consultation paper entitled Proposed Amendments to the 
Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 84  (consultation paper). The responses were summarised in a 
Consultation Response and Policy Paper (response paper).85 The response paper stated the 
Jersey Government’s wish to preserve the integrity and reputation of the TJL (and presumably 
of Jersey as an offshore trust jurisdiction) but at the same time to develop it in view of 
industry demands to ensure that prospective settlors have “maximum flexibility” but “within 
an appropriate and legitimate framework”.86  
 
Not all of the proposed amendments received positive responses. One example of a proposed 
amendment that will not go ahead is the insertion of words in article 9A(1)(a) of the TJL 
enabling a settlor to reserve the whole of the beneficial interest in the trust property. As such a 
reservation could be seen to come close to reserving absolute ownership with the result that 
other jurisdictions might view the trust as illusory, this amendment was considered 
undesirable.87 
 
However, on the other hand, the proposed amendment to article 9A(1)(b) of the TJL to make 
it clear that a settlor may reserve all, as opposed to just some, of the powers listed in article 
9A(2) of the TJL will go ahead.88 It has been noted that, where assets are held outside Jersey, 
this amendment in itself cannot prevent a challenge in the foreign jurisdiction.89  
 
The issue of whether a trust deed can state whether a reserved power is personal or fiduciary 
received a mixed response. The point was made that if powers that are ordinarily fiduciary 
become exercisable by settlors without the constraints attached to fiduciary powers, it would 
damage Jersey’s reputation as a leading trust jurisdiction. A legislative presumption was 
considered undesirable. The view was that it should remain possible to specify in a trust deed 
                                                      
84 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 (2016).  
85 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016). 
86 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016) 2.  
87 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016) 
11.  
88 This is already the case in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and Guernsey, as explained in ch 4 fn 77. Since 
writing this chapter, the Trusts (Amendment No 7) (Jersey) Law 2018 has been enacted, which does indeed 
provide for this amendment in art 4. 
89 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016) 
11.  
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whether a reserved power is fiduciary or personal, but that this should ultimately remain 
subject to determination by the court taking into account the terms of the trust deed and the 
circumstances of each case.90 
 
Another proposed change relates to the question of whether the trustee should owe any 
residual duty to the beneficiaries (including the duty to observe the utmost good faith) where 
the settlor reserved powers to himself.91 The consultation paper stated that the Jersey Finance 
Trusts Law Working Group opposed the suggested amendment on reputational grounds. Their 
view was that an automatic abdication of any responsibility on the part of the trustee would be 
unacceptable.92  
 
Some respondents argued that, given the wording of article 9A(3) of the TJL, the trustee only 
has the duty to check that a reserved power was exercised by the correct person and that the 
direction was not ultra vires, but that the trustee has no duty to monitor what happens after 
the direction was implemented. However, most respondents to the consultation paper were of 
the view that certain residual duties exist under recognised trust law principles and that it 
would be inappropriate to remove these residual duties automatically (although the trust deed 
can still provide for their removal). This amendment will therefore not go ahead.93  
 
The final proposed amendment is the insertion of a presumption that, unless specified to be a 
will, a trust will take effect immediately.94 This was considered to be a welcome addition, in 
line with the reserved powers legislation of other offshore jurisdictions, and one that would 
provide greater certainty by putting beyond doubt the validity of an inter vivos trust 
containing extensive reserved powers that does not comply with the formalities applicable to 
the settlor for the execution of testamentary dispositions.95  
 
                                                      
90 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016) 
13-14.  
91 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016) 
12-15.  
92 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 (2016) 23. 
93 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016) 
12-15. 
94 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 (2016) 46-48. This is provided for in 
the Trusts (Amendment No 7) (Jersey) Law 2018 art 4. 
95 States of Jersey Proposed Amendments to the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: Response and Policy Paper (2016) 
23.  
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In summary, there appears to be a tacit admission that reserved powers trusts, whilst 
invaluable to an offshore jurisdiction like Jersey, can be harmful to a jurisdiction’s reputation. 
Furthermore, concerns remain about the effectiveness of these trusts outside the governing 
law’s jurisdiction. For these reasons, certain amendments were considered too drastic, 
although some of them are already in effect in other jurisdictions. 
 
Furthermore, regulatory oversight requirements now apply in many offshore jurisdictions as a 
result of supra-national moves aimed at reducing money laundering and increasing tax 
transparency. As a result of these regulations, many offshore trustees are required to have 
professional oversight over assets or transactions that, according to the terms of the trust deed, 
are not under their control. 
 
The efficacy of the reservation of powers by settlors will be examined below as part of the 
case law study as well as in chapter 5. 
 
3 2 2 Private trust companies  
 
Another method whereby a settlor can effectively retain a relatively high level of control is 
through the use of a so-called private or family trust company (PTC). A PTC is what the 
name says – a corporate entity, authorised to act as trustee, but acting as trustee only for 
members of one family or another limited group of individuals. 96  Although offshore 
legislation and regulation require an entity acting as trustee to be licensed as such in the 
relevant jurisdiction, certain exemptions from this requirement enable PTCs to exist.97 PTCs 
can exist in a number of jurisdictions and the set-up and treatment of these companies differ 
slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 
PTCs are normally owned by a purpose trust98 or a foundation, rather than by the settlor 
directly, for the obvious reason that legal ownership of the trust assets would otherwise be 
attributed to the settlor.99 
                                                      
96 Anonymous “The Use of Private Trust Companies” Ogier Publications (accessed 19-05-2017). 
97 Examples of jurisdictions that allow PTCs include Jersey through the Financial Services (Trust Company 
Business (Exemptions)) (Jersey) Order 2000 as amended by the Financial Services (Trust Company Business 
(Exemptions)) (Jersey) Order 2009; the Cayman Islands Private Trust Companies Regulations, 2008; Bermuda, 
through the Trusts (Regulation of Trust Business) Act 2001. See Ytterberg and Weller (2010) 36 ACTEC Law 
Journal 501 for an interesting analysis of the use of PTCs in the United States. Similar issues are at stake there. 
98 See ch 2 para 2 7 3 1 regarding purpose trusts. 
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A PTC brings with it an increase in costs, but for settlors of substantial wealth the cost is not 
prohibitive. It can be particularly helpful where the trust assets are made up of a family 
business that will benefit from ongoing family involvement, but that brings with it the 
difficulty of not being able to diversify the trust assets. A professional trustee may be 
unwilling to take on such a trust.100 
 
PTCs have become very popular because of the possibility of affording control to settlors. In 
essence, it buys the settlor, or someone close to him, a seat on the board of directors of the 
trustee company. It is therefore not unlike the case of a settlor acting as co-trustee, examined 
below in the South African context. However, the addition of a corporate layer adds 
protection for a settlor serving on the board.  
 
Many jurisdictions require that a licensed trust company must carry out the administration of 
the PTC. Even where it is not a requirement, a PTC and the underlying trust of which it is the 
trustee, would normally still be administered by a professional trust company. There will 
usually be at least one director representing the corporate trustee that does the day-to-day 
administration and accounting. Advisors or other people chosen by the settlor, or the settlor 
himself, typically make up the other directors.  
 
Provided the other directors can be shown not to be subservient to the settlor, the use of a 
PTC should not of itself jeopardise the integrity of the trust. The independence of the body of 
trustees must, however, be uncompromised by the involvement of the settlor. 
 
Similar to the reserved trust situation, the corporate trustee providing a director and carrying 
out administrative functions would want to ensure that it is properly indemnified for its role 
and that the consequences of a breach of trust by the PTC are not visited upon it. Directors of 
the PTC would have the ordinary duties and liabilities of company directors under the laws of 
the jurisdiction involved.101 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
99 Anonymous “The Use of Private Trust Companies” Ogier Publications (accessed 19-05-2017). 
100 Anonymous “The Use of Private Trust Companies” Ogier Publications (accessed 19-05-2017). 
101 Anonymous “The Use of Private Trust Companies” Ogier Publications (accessed 19-05-2017). 
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The Pugachev case102 examined below is an example of where the board of the PTC was 
found not to be independent of the settlor. 
 
3 2 3 Settlor as co-trustee 
 
Although relatively uncommon, but not unheard of, in the offshore world, it is fairly 
uncontroversial for a settlor of an express inter vivos family trust in onshore jurisdictions to 
act as a co-trustee. This is a regular phenomenon in South Africa, where no reserved powers 
legislation as found in offshore jurisdictions exists. The other trustees may be individuals – 
family members, friends, advisors – or corporate trustees.  
 
A settlor acting as trustee or co-trustee is not in itself problematic under South African law.103 
As long as the other trustee or trustees bring sufficient independence to the body of trustees 
and the settlor cannot be said to have control over trustee decisions, there should be no 
question of abuse of the trust. There is, however, doubt regarding the question of how much 
trustee independence is required and how rigorously this requirement is enforced under South 
African law.104  
 
A trustee is subject to strict fiduciary duties and has to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries. In order to exercise his duties properly, the trustee has to exercise his powers 
independently. In cases where the trustee is also the settlor or one of the beneficiaries, 
illustrating such independence is not a simple feat.  
 
It also complicates fulfilment of the essential requirement of separation between ownership or 
control of the assets and enjoyment thereof.105 In South Africa, this has been held to be the 
core idea of the trust. 106  Van der Linde and Lombard argue that where the trustees and 
beneficiaries are the same, there is no de iure separation between control and enjoyment and 
therefore the trust is invalid.107 Furthermore, the existence of a separate trust estate, distinct 
                                                      
102 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch). 
103 See ch 2 para 4 3 5 4. 
104 This was discussed in ch 2 para 4 3 5 3. 
105 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 2. 
106 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 19, 22. 
107 Van der Linde and Lombard (2007) 2 De Jure 429 438. 
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from the trustee’s personal estate,108 can be jeopardised by this dual role of trustee and settlor. 
This is a theme that is evident in many of the South African cases under review later in this 
chapter.  
 
3 2 4 Protectors 
 
The popularity of protectors of offshore trusts has been on the increase for a number of years 
and is, in fact, now fairly common. Although protectors have been known in Scots law for 
centuries, in the common law world the concept was more or less unheard of until 20 or 30 
years ago. There is no technical meaning to the term – a person fulfilling the typical role of a 
protector could also be called an advisor – and there does not seem to be much in the sense of 
legislation dealing with this fairly modern creation of trust practice.109  
 
The main purpose of a protector is to guard the interests of the beneficiaries by providing a 
system of ‘checks and balances’ and overseeing the performance of his duties by the trustee. 
A protector may have trustee-like powers, but it is an office clearly separate from that of the 
trustee.  
 
Absent any legislative provisions forming part of the governing law of the trust, the office of 
protector must be created and provided for in the trust deed. The initial protector can be 
appointed by the settlor or someone else, although it will most often be the settlor. Most trust 
deeds provide for the appointment of a successor protector, and some deeds deal with 
situations where no protector is in office. These types of provisions point towards the 
protector holding an office and strengthens the argument that he must be subject to fiduciary 
duties. 
 
However, a settlor appointing himself, or a person who is subservient to the settlor, as 
protector and granting the protector far-reaching powers, could be seen as simply another way 
for a settlor to exercise influence or control over the trustee over and above acceptable levels. 
Such a protector would most likely protect the settlor’s interests rather than the beneficiaries’, 
                                                      
108 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 1 for the importance of this in the South African context where there is no division of 
legal and equitable ownership. 
109 The Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 does not refer to a protector by name, but art 24(3) provides as follows: “The 
terms of a trust may require a trustee to obtain the consent of some other person before exercising a power or a 
discretion.” Furthermore art 24(4) reads: “A person who consents as provided in paragraph (3) shall not by 
virtue of so doing be deemed to be a trustee.” Note that this refers only to consent powers. 
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and these are not necessarily aligned. A protector whose interests conflict with those of the 
beneficiaries may be removed from office.110 
 
The powers that can be given to a protector cover a wide range. Perhaps the most common is 
the power to remove the trustee and appoint a new trustee in his place. Depending on the 
settlor’s circumstances, it is a right that he could reserve to himself, but very often the 
reservation of any rights or powers to himself has a detrimental effect on the settlor’s tax 
planning or asset protection purposes. In these circumstances, it can be helpful to give this 
power to another person so as to limit the settlor’s role. Often, however, the protector is 
someone the settlor knows and trusts, or it can be a corporate entity indirectly controlled by 
the settlor. The settlor then appears not to have any influence, but in reality he does, or can, 
influence the trustee – through the protector.  
 
A protector can also have the power to veto certain trustee decisions (in other words, the 
trustee cannot exercise the power without the consent of the protector – this is sometimes 
referred to as a negative power). Powers subject to veto often include the addition or removal 
of a beneficiary, the making of distributions (or certain types or levels of distributions) or a 
change in the governing law of the trust. Certain trust deeds may give the protector the right 
to exercise these powers himself, rather than to have a veto on the trustee’s decisions.111  
 
Depending on the extent and nature of the powers given to a protector, there may be a risk of 
the protector being considered a quasi trustee. This is especially true if a protector, in reality, 
has to consent to most trustee actions. It also unduly hampers administration of the trust by 
the trustee. If the powers can be described to be fiduciary in nature, the protector must have 
concomitant liability in order to safeguard the position of the trust’s beneficiaries. Some argue 
that an analysis of the protector’s role under English law points to a protector being a 
trustee.112 
 
In an article analysing the nature of protector powers and whether a protector can properly be 
considered a fiduciary, Conaglen and Weaver argue that a definitive answer to this question is 
                                                      
110 This happened in In the matter of the V R Family Trust [2009] JRC 109, where at paras 29-32 the Jersey 
Royal Court held that beneficiaries were entitled to require that a protector with fiduciary powers made decisions 
independent of any private interest or competing duty, just as they can expect of a trustee.  
111 Anonymous “To Protect and Serve: Understanding the Mercurial Role of a Protector” Collas Crill Factsheets 
(accessed 17-05-2017). 
112 Hudson Equity and Trusts 922-924. 
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virtually impossible.113 The reasons are, firstly, that the concept of a fiduciary is a nebulous 
one and, secondly, that protectors can hold a wide range of powers and positions.  
 
The examination of the law surrounding fiduciaries and fiduciary duties in chapter 3 114 
indicated that not all fiduciaries owe the same duties or obligations in the same type of 
circumstances. The range of powers that can be conferred on a protector was discussed 
immediately above. Because there is no settled legal description of the term protector and 
because a protector can have such a wide range of roles, the authors observe that, “absent 
specific context, it signifies little more than that a person who is not the (or a) trustee has been 
granted a power affecting the operation of the trust”.115  
 
One therefore has to ask whether a particular power held by a particular protector is held in a 
fiduciary capacity. Because the office and powers of a protector must be specified in the trust 
deed, determining whether a power is fiduciary becomes a matter of construction of the trust 
deed.116 Hudson favours the view that a protector is indeed a trustee. If a protector can veto a 
decision of the trustee (or, in fact, make a decision regarding the trust), he must be acting with 
a power equivalent to that of a trustee and therefore has to act in the interest of the 
beneficiaries.117  
 
As noted earlier, fiduciary powers (in the context of trusts) have to be exercised for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust, whereas a personal power can be exercised for the 
benefit of the power holder himself – he is not subject to a fiduciary duty when he exercises 
the power.118 The importance of the question is clear: if a protector does not have to exercise a 
particular power for the benefit of the trust’s beneficiaries, he is not accountable to them for 
the way the power is exercised. If the power is one that would normally be exercised by a 
trustee, it reduces the protection offered to beneficiaries.  
 
                                                      
113Conaglen and Weaver (2012) 18 T&T 17. 
114 See ch 3 paras 2 1 1, 2 1 2, 2 2 1, 2 2 2, 2 3 1, 2 3 2. 
115 Conaglen and Weaver (2012) 18 T&T 17 20. 
116 Penner The Law of Trusts 78; Conaglen and Weaver (2012) 18 T&T 17 30-35; In the matter of the Bird 
Charitble Trust and the Bird Purpose Trust [2008] JRC 013 para 82; JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank 
v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 167. 
117 Hudson Equity and Trusts 922-923. 
118 Hudson Equity and Trusts 135; see ch 3 para 2 1 2 1. 
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A number of cases have considered the nature of protector powers. There appears to be a 
consistent approach under offshore law with regard to the power to appoint and remove 
trustees, namely that it has to be exercised in good faith in the interest of the beneficiaries as a 
whole – it is thus a fiduciary power.119 A power to give or withhold consent to the exercise by 
the trustee of his dispositive powers, or a power to amend the trust, can be personal or 
fiduciary. For example, where the protector is also a beneficiary, the power of veto may have 
been given to the protector to protect his interest as a beneficiary and thus is a personal 
power.120 
 
It is submitted that the argument that a protector is a trustee may be correct where the 
protector has wide-ranging powers of a fiduciary nature, and where he is able to intervene in 
and overturn decisions of the trustee. However, it is difficult to defend that argument where a 
protector’s only power is to replace the trustee, a power that could also be given to the settlor 
or a beneficiary in appropriate circumstances, or to veto the exercise of dispositive powers 
over a certain monetary limit for minor beneficiaries. Much, therefore, seems to depend on 
the extent and nature of the powers given to the protector. On the other hand, if the protector’s 
powers are wide-ranging and clearly fiduciary in nature, but the trust deed states that he is not 
a fiduciary and exonerates him from all liability, except perhaps for fraud and wilful 
misconduct, this affects the quality of the protection and accountability offered to 
beneficiaries.  
 
3 2 5 Letters of wishes 
 
With the rise of the fully discretionary trust,121 especially in offshore jurisdictions, the need 
arose for settlors to put in writing their actual wishes for the destination of the trust assets. 
Providing a letter of wishes is now a standard part of setting up an offshore discretionary 
trust, although some settlors prefer not to provide one for the reasons set out below.  
 
In practice, a letter of wishes is a very useful tool for a trustee of a discretionary trust, 
especially after the death of the settlor. However, it is not legally binding and the trustees are 
                                                      
119 Von Knieriem v Bermuda Trust Company Limited [1994] Bda LR 50; In the matter of the Bird Charitble 
Trust and the Bird Purpose Trust [2008] JRC 013 para 92; In the matter of Jasmine Trustees Limited and in the 
matter of the Piedmont Trust [2015] JRC 196 para 33. 
120 Rawson Trust Co Ltd v Perlman [1990] 1 Butterworths OCM 31. 
121 See  ch 4 para 3 1. 
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not obliged to follow it.122 In an article entitled Massively Discretionary Trusts, Smith argues 
that, in some extreme cases, the trustee’s dispositive discretions are so wide that without a 
letter of wishes the trustee would not know how to exercise this discretion. Such trust deeds, 
mostly governed by the law of an offshore jurisdiction, may allow the trustee to remove 
beneficiaries and appoint additional beneficiaries, so that the beneficiaries named in the 
original trust deed have very little hope of receiving anything from the trust. This affects their 
ability to hold the trustee to account.123 
 
Where trust deeds provide scant information about who should benefit, letters of wishes are 
imperative. Although, generally speaking, these letters are not binding, they sometimes 
contain the real wishes of the settlor. If these real wishes are different to what the terms of the 
trust provide, this may indicate that the trust is in fact a sham. If the trustee intends to 
administer the trust in accordance with a letter of wishes that contradicts the trust deed, a 
finding of sham would indeed be appropriate.124 
 
Smith goes as far as saying: 
 
“…[M]assively discretionary trusts are a kind of deformation of the trust device.”125 
 
He argues that although the trust is a flexible institution, certain features need to be present – 
the trust needs a beneficiary and the trustee must be accountable to the beneficiary. This is 
trite law. Although the settlor’s wishes are important, the legal relationship between the 
trustee and the beneficiary is, or should be, at the heart of the trust.126 This argument comes 
back to the observation that a type of trust is developing where the interests of the 
beneficiaries are less important than the wishes and investment objectives of the settlor.127 
 
Care should therefore be taken in the drafting of trust deeds and letters of wishes. If the terms 
of the trust are such that the trustees, or another power holder, can effectively defeat the 
interests of the named beneficiaries, and the letter of wishes indicates who should really 
                                                      
122 Penner The Law of Trusts 195. 
123 Smith “Massively Discretionary Trusts” Current Legal Problems (accessed 20-11-2017) 1, 19-20, 24. 
124 Smith “Massively Discretionary Trusts” Current Legal Problems (accessed 20-11-2017) 25. 
125 Smith “Massively Discretionary Trusts” Current Legal Problems (accessed 20-11-2017) 31. 
126 Smith “Massively Discretionary Trusts” Current Legal Problems (accessed 20-11-2017) 32. 
127 See ch 4 para 3 1. 
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benefit, the terms of the letter of wishes may be found to be imperative. This may support a 
finding of sham or, at the least, prejudice the planning objectives of the settlor. 
 
4 Excessive settlor control and the consequences thereof: a review of case law  
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
The review in this part of the chapter will seek to identify the circumstances in which a court 
will find that a settlor exercises excessive control over a trust and to ascertain the 
consequences thereof.  
 
Uncertainties abound. In determining excessive control, how much of the irreducible core of 
the trust must remain? To what extent should there be a separation between ownership or 
control of the trust assets and the enjoyment thereof? Is an abuse of trust, at least in certain 
circumstances, the result of a breach by the trustee of his fiduciary (and other) duties? Are 
there different thresholds in different jurisdictions for finding that a trust is invalid, or that a 
valid trust has been abused and should be ignored? Or is there a consistency to the approach 
of judges that overrides theoretical legal differences? How useful are company law concepts 
such as “piercing the veil”? What is the judicial appetite for testing the “true thickness of the 
veil between the settlor and his trust”128 and, ultimately, for ignoring this veil as opposed to 
upholding valid trusts despite certain shortcomings? 
 
The trust is praised as a flexible arrangement born out of equity. It is possible that this 
translates into more flexible remedies, aimed at fairness, being available to protect 








                                                      
128 Russen (2013) 20 Journal of International Tax, Trust and Corporate Planning 239 244. 
129 Russen (2013) 20 Journal of International Tax, Trust and Corporate Planning 239 241. 
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4 2 England and offshore jurisdictions 
 
4 2 1 General remarks 
 
The case law in this section includes cases heard by English judges relating to trusts governed 
by English law and also various offshore laws, as well as cases heard by offshore courts. 
These will be compared to South African judgments, analysed in the next section.  
 
The following dictum from Minwalla v Minwalla,130 where the English High Court held a 
Jersey trust to be a sham, sets the scene: 
 
“…[T]he approach which those involved should expect of the court where it appears 
that an off-shore trust with its professional trustees and associated companies with 
their sometimes cipher directors have been woven together to create a shroud that is 
designed to bury the husband’s resources from view. Should the court respect the legal 
structure of that screen? Or, if it becomes apparent that the husband himself pierces 
the veil as and when it suits him, should the trustees and directors be surprised that a 
court… will strain to see through the smoke and will set the structure aside so as to 
treat the resources wholly his? For that is what he and they should expect where 
fairness to both spouses depends so crucially on an accurate understanding… of the 
realities of each party’s economy.”131 
 
A reading of the case law leaves one with the impression that, although there may not be any 
hard-and-fast rules, the judiciary is intent on taking all the facts and circumstances of a case 
into account to ensure a fair outcome and to prevent the misuse of the trust concept to the 
detriment of others, be they beneficiaries, tax authorities or spouses or creditors of the settlor. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a reluctance to ignore validly established trusts completely. 
 
The cases discussed below were selectively identified and analysed with a view to 
highlighting aspects relevant to the overriding theme of this dissertation. 
 
                                                      
130 Minwalla v Minwalla and DM Investments SA, Midfield Management SA and CI Law Trustees Ltd [2004] 
EWHC 2823 (Fam). 
131 Minwalla v Minwalla and DM Investments SA, Midfield Management SA and CI Law Trustees Ltd [2004] 
EWHC 2823 (Fam) para 1. 
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4 2 2 Case law dealing with claims by third parties or creditors 
 
4 2 2 1  Shalson v Russo132  
 
This is an example of a case where, despite a fairly high level of settlor control, the court did 
not consider it appropriate to “pierce the veil” of the trust and declare that the assets actually 
belong to the settlor. 133  Before dealing with the piercing issue, the court dismissed the 
alternative claim that the trust was a sham, because the trustee was not a knowing party to the 
sham.134  
 
Mr Russo, the settlor of the trust in question, committed fraud against various third parties 
who sought to challenge the trust in order to have their debts repaid.135 The trust was created 
under Jersey law and had a wide class of beneficiaries, all being family members of Mr 
Russo. The trustee had wide powers of investment, provided that the trust fund had to be 
invested initially, and preferably continuously, with a specific company. 136  Nearly three 
quarters of the shares of this company were held in the trust although it was at all material 
times under the de facto control of Mr Russo.137   
 
The court went through various transactions of the trust in great detail.138 This illustrated that 
the settlor did indeed at times deal with the trust assets of his own volition. 139 However, 
looking at various pieces of correspondence between the settlor and the trustee, and 
considering the fact that the trustee reviewed documentation relating to proposed transactions 
and made internal notes relating thereto, the judge found that the trustee did not simply 
respond to every request of the settlor.140 The evidence showed that the employees of the 
trustee company applied their own independent minds as to whether certain transactions were 
appropriate,141 that transactions were reversed where the trustee did not agree to them,142 and 
                                                      
132 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch). 
133 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) para 217. 
134 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) para 215. 
135 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) para 192. 
136 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) para 184. 
137 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 4, 10-13. 
138 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 192-208. 
139 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 195, 204-205. 
140 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 194. 
141 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 193, 196-198. 
142 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 195. 
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that although Mr Russo may have been driving transactions, the trustee involved itself in what 
he was doing, wanting to be “kept in the picture”.143 
 
The court acknowledged that the settlor played a major part in the operations of the 
companies owned by the trust, but had to bear in mind that he was the appointed investment 
advisor to the trust, which gave him the authority to take the actions in question.144 The result 
may have been different if he was not the appointed investment advisor. This highlights the 
importance of documenting an arrangement as it really is. The court found that the trust was 
not under his effective control and that the trustee did not allow him to run the trust. The 
trustee did its best to control the trust affairs, although the settlor was often “one step ahead of 
the trustee”.145  
 
This judgment appears to allow a fair amount of settlor control, but it has to be borne in mind 
that the settlor was officially appointed to deal with the investment of the trust fund. As long 
as it can be evidenced that the trustee applied independent judgement (perhaps not even all 
the time), it appears he would not be considered to have abdicated his fiduciary duties. 
Importantly, the judgment also indicates a willingness on the part of the judiciary to uphold 
validly constituted trusts. 
 
4 2 2 2  The litigation surrounding the Esteem Settlement146 
 
A well-known and much cited Jersey case dealing with reservation of powers by a settlor is 
the litigation surrounding the Esteem Settlement. 147  The settlor of the trusts in question 
defrauded his employer of substantial sums. The English High Court gave judgment against 
him for an amount of approximately US$800,000,000. Some of the funds paid into various 
Jersey trusts were stolen from the companies of which he was chairman. Various applications 
were brought in Jersey and as a result the trusts were stripped of the assets relating to the 
fraud.  
                                                      
143 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 198-199. 
144 A trustee who appoints the settlor as investment advisor needs to be mindful, of course, of liability issues 
should the investments underperform. At the very least, the settlor needs to be sufficiently qualified and 
experienced and the trustee needs to monitor investment performance, perhaps even more as it would have done 
with a professional investment advisor. 
145 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch) paras 216-217. 
146 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188]. 
147In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188]. 
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The judgment under consideration here concerned only the “clean” assets that were left in the 
trusts. The plaintiffs sought to recover these assets on the basis that either the trusts were 
invalid because they were shams or infringed the principle of donner et retenir ne vaut148 or 
alternatively that they were valid initially, but should be declared invalid or unenforceable 
because the settlor had substantial or effective control over the trust. This is referred to as the 
claim to lift or pierce the veil of the trust. There were two other heads of claim, but they are 




The allegations of sham and breach of the maxim donner et retenir ne vaut were considered 
first. If one of these claims were successful, there was never a valid trust and the other heads 
of claim would be irrelevant. Only the sham claim is discussed here. 
 
The Jersey Royal Court referred to the classic English cases defining and dealing with 
sham.150 The plaintiffs did not agree that a common intention was required – this was, they 
said, because a trust was essentially a unilateral transaction. The court analysed Jersey and 
English case law and concluded that the settlor and trustee had to share the requisite intention 
to mislead for a trust to be considered a sham under Jersey law.151 
 
There was some discussion about the nature of the intention required and specifically whether 
dishonesty was required to constitute a sham. The court concluded that there must be an 
intention to mislead and this may be regarded as dishonesty, depending on one’s definition of 
dishonesty. The court found, with reference to earlier English case law, that the trustee must 
share the settlor’s intention, but that simply going along with the “shammer” would qualify as 
the required intention if the trustee acts in a reckless manner. This would generally refer to a 
trustee signing a trust deed without knowing or caring about what he is signing.152 
 
 
                                                      
148 See ch 2 para 3 5 4. 
149 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 211. 
150 See ch 4 para 2 2 1. 
151 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 213-221. 
152 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 221-223. 
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(b) Piercing the veil of the trust 
 
The court then continued to examine the claim that the veil of the trust should be pierced. This 
claim was based on the fact that the settlor had substantive and effective control over the trust. 
(From the judgment it appears that the terms of the trust deed did not reserve specific powers 
to the settlor. The control in question was de facto.) It was claimed that this fact, coupled with 
the settlor’s misuse of the trust, should allow the veil of the trust and/or underlying company 
to be lifted and the assets of the trust treated as if they belonged to the settlor, allowing the 
plaintiffs to enforce the judgment against those assets.153 
 
The plaintiffs argued that even though there were no previous cases where a court in Jersey 
(or England) had pierced the veil of a trust to enable a creditor to have recourse to assets held 
in a hitherto valid trust, it was a logical development of the law on piercing the veil of 
companies. They argued that the court should take this step.154 
 
The court analysed the limited case law where the veil of a company was in fact pierced in a 
final (as opposed to interlocutory) decision of the court and agreed that two elements had to 
be present: the control over the company must be such that the controller is able to compel the 
company to act in the manner it did, and the act complained of must involve some illegality or 
impropriety. The result of these two factors is that the company’s action masks or conceals 
the action of the controller.155 
 
The plaintiffs argued that these requirements were fulfilled. The trust assets were at all 
relevant times under the substantial or effective control of the settlor and the requisite 
impropriety or misuse was present – the settlor stole funds and attempted to defeat his 
creditors and keep his assets out of their reach.156  
 
                                                      
153 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 188-189. 
154 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 227-228. The court looked briefly at the law on 
piercing the veil of companies and found that a distinction should be made between piercing, which refers to 
treating the rights or liabilities or activities of a company as those of its shareholders, and lifting, which means to 
look behind the veil or to have regard for the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose. What was 
intended in this case was therefore piercing the veil. 
155 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 228-231. 
156 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 232. 
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In the end, the court did not consider it appropriate to apply the concept of a veil to trusts.157 
In addition, it has to be borne in mind that the beneficiaries have the entire beneficial interest 
in the trust property (at least under English and Jersey law). There has to be a good reason 
why a court should decide not to enforce a trust, but to order instead that the trustees should 
hold the full beneficial interest in the trust assets not for the beneficiaries, but for the settlor so 
as to be available to his creditors. 158 Such an analysis is, of course, more complicated in 
circumstances where the settlor is a beneficiary or if one considers the modern drafting of 
trust deeds where the position of the discretionary beneficiary is, at least on the face of the 
trust deed, fairly tenuous.159  
 
The court found it unsurprising that the plaintiffs could find no precedent for depriving the 
beneficiaries of their beneficial interest in circumstances where it was the trustee who did not 
properly fulfil the obligations imposed on him by law. Unless the trust deed provides for 
control being exercised by the settlor, if he does so it is unlawful and the court would not 
enforce such control or give effect to the breach of trust by the trustee.160  
 
In this regard, the court said the following: 
 
“… [T]rustees who allow a third party such as a settlor to assume substantial and 
effective control would have abdicated their fiduciary duties and would be in breach 
of trust.”161  
 
It was thus determined that substantial and effective control coupled with misuse does not 
entitle a court to pierce the veil of a valid trust and ignore its terms.162 The court referred to the 
fact that the TJL confirms this principle: a Jersey trust will be valid unless it falls within 
certain narrow exceptions.163 The plaintiffs argued that piercing the veil and transferring the 
beneficial interest in the assets to the settlor was not the same as negating the validity of the 
trust. The court did not accept this argument and was of the view that, if a valid trust existed, 
                                                      
157 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 236-237. 
158 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 237-238. 
159 See ch 4 para 3 1. 
160 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 239-240. 
161 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 239-240. 
162 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 240.  
163 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 240-241. The Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 art 10(2) 
stipulates the exceptions. They are concerned with unlawfulness, immorality, public policy, uncertainty and 
trusts created under duress, fraud and so on. The court found that none of these exceptions were present. 
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it would be altogether inconsistent with the recognition and enforcement of the trust to order 
that the assets should be transferred not to the beneficiaries but to the settlor164 (who could, of 
course, also be a beneficiary, which may complicate this argument).  
 
The court then helpfully continued to analyse the level of control that a settlor would have to 
exercise in order for a court to decide to pierce the veil, in case it was found that they were 
wrong in holding that piercing the veil of a trust is not possible in law.165 The court found that 
most of the case law to which they were referred, required the level of control of a controlling 
shareholder. Although the phrase substantial and effective control was used in some of these 
cases, they concerned interlocutory relief and the court felt that for a final order of piercing 
the veil, complete control would be required.166  
 
The defining question in determining complete control is not whether the trustee always goes 
along with the settlor’s requests, but whether the trustee does so without applying his mind, 
without exercising a bona fide discretion. That does not mean that every decision of the 
trustee has to be the right one or a wise one, but that it has to be reached in the manner 
described. Such a trustee cannot be said to have abdicated his fiduciary duties and be under 
the control of the settlor.167 
 
On a consideration of the evidence of the case, the court found that the settlor did not control 
the trust. The court considered a wide range of transactions in great detail. Although it was 
clear that the trustees in casu did at times feel under pressure to agree to certain actions, they 
were able to prove that they considered the proposed transactions in light of tax advice and 
that they were willing to postpone action until they had consulted with their advisers.168 With 
regard to agreeing to make distributions to the settlor, the court found that although the 
trustees paid great attention to the settlor’s views, they did not feel bound by those views.169 
 
                                                      
164 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 241. 
165 In JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) the court similarly 
examined an alternative claim of sham despite finding that the trusts were invalid for other reasons, indicating 
that this is a novel area of the law. 
166 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 244-245. 
167 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 248. 
168 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 294-303. 
169 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 384. The court found that the trustees only followed 
the wishes of the settlor without applying their mind in one of the many transactions they reviewed. 
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Finally, the court made some observations about the balance between the freedom to dispose 
of one’s property, on the one hand, and the interests of creditors, on the other hand. Each 
jurisdiction deals with this differently, but in Jersey there are a number of remedies available 
to creditors. The court felt unable to invent a new cause of action that would upset this 
balance. Given the importance of certainty in transactions and the importance of the trust 
industry to Jersey as a jurisdiction, the court felt that this would be a matter requiring 
legislative intervention.170 
 
Given that much of modern Jersey trust law is statute made, this is perhaps not a surprising 
stance taken by the court. However, even in England and South Africa, where trust law is 
mostly developed by the judiciary, judges seem to be hesitant to make new law in this respect.  
 
4 2 2 3  TMSF v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Limited171 
 
A further judgment regarding settlor’s powers over offshore trusts, this time from the Privy 
Council, is TMSF v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Limited.172 The issue at 
stake was whether the court should appoint receivers over the settlor’s power of revocation in 
relation to trusts established by him in the Cayman Islands. Judgment was given against the 
settlor in Turkey for the misappropriation of funds from various banks, which TMSF was 
established to restructure and administer.  
 
TMSF then discovered that the settlor has divested himself of all his assets, having transferred 
the same to two Cayman Islands discretionary trusts. The settlor and his wife were the 
beneficiaries of these trusts and he had a power of revocation that would enable him to revest 
in himself sufficient assets to satisfy a large portion of the judgment debt. 173 It therefore 
sought the appointment of a receiver over the power of revocation. 
 
The settlor opposed the remedy sought by TMSF on the basis, generally speaking, that a 
receiver by way of equitable execution could only be appointed over property and the power 
                                                      
170 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 387. 
171 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17. 
172 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17. 
173 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
paras 1-4. 
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of revocation was not property.174 The court of first instance and the Cayman Court of Appeal 
both ruled in favour of the settlor and refused to afford TMSF this remedy. Treating a power 
of this nature as property would, according to the first judgment, “strike at the very heart of 
the trust concept”.175 The Court of Appeal held that it did not have jurisdiction as a matter of 
law to appoint receivers by way of equitable execution over a power of revocation in a trust, 
but even if it had, because the settlor had been made bankrupt in Turkey, the natural person to 
get the settlor’s assets would be his trustee in bankruptcy, rather than TMSF as a single 
creditor.176 It concluded that such a development, namely that a certain type of power should 
be considered property, has always been and must continue to be a duty of the legislature 
rather than the judiciary. However, it did not agree with the court a quo’s statement that it 
would strike at the very heart of the trust concept.177 
 
The Privy Council’s analysis highlighted the important issue of the fiduciary or personal 
nature of the power in question. The Council referred to instances where general powers, 
being powers that the power holder can exercise for his own benefit without the consent of 
another, have been treated as giving rise to proprietary rights. Context is important, and the 
fundamental distinction between power and property has not prevailed in all circumstances. 178 
Another important factor is whether the power can be delegated. In this context, the 
distinction between fiduciary and general powers is crucial. Where the power holder does not 
owe a duty of trust to another, the power is so wide as to be tantamount to ownership and can 
thus be delegated.179  
 
The Privy Council concluded that, in view of the demands of justice and because the 
jurisdiction to appoint receivers by way of equitable execution was open to incremental 
development to apply old principles to new situations, the jurisdiction should in this case be 
exercised. It held that the power of revocation was such that, in equity and in the 
                                                      
174 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
para 7. 
175 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
para 21. 
176 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
paras 22-23. 
177 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
para 25. 
178 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
paras 41-46. 
179 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
paras 51-53. 
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circumstances of this case, the settlor’s rights could be regarded as tantamount to ownership. 
He was, therefore, ordered to assign or delegate the power of revocation to the receivers.180 
 
4 2 2 4  Mezhprom Bank v Pugachev181 
 
In this recent landmark judgment regarding settlor control, the English High Court found that 
the economic settlor, Mr Pugachev, failed to set up valid trusts. By way of background, Mr 
Pugachev initially used a company, referred to as OPK, to hold some of his very valuable 
assets, including the Russian Mezhprom Bank, which he founded. Mezhprom Bank collapsed 
after the 2008 financial crisis and criminal investigations were opened against Mr Pugachev 
for misappropriation of the bank’s funds. He fled to England in January 2011.  
 
Shortly afterwards, he established five discretionary trusts. The trusts were all subject to New 
Zealand law, but it was not disputed that, for all relevant purposes, New Zealand law was the 
same as English law. 
 
Each trust had a newly incorporated New Zealand company, therefore a private trust 
company, 182  as trustee. The directors of these companies were a number of individuals 
working for and controlled by Mr Pugachev, as well as a Mr Patterson, a New Zealand 
solicitor who also drafted the trust deeds, apparently based on the trust deed used in Mr 
Pugachev’s previous OPK structure.  
 
In July 2014, a worldwide freezing order was made against Mr Pugachev. This referred to any 
asset which he had the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were his 
own. The effect of the judgment under discussion is that the assets held in the trusts were 
ruled to be subject to the freezing order, because Mr Pugachev retained sufficient powers to 
enable him to exercise effective control.  
 
Mezhprom Bank and its liquidator were the claimants in casu, seeking an order that the assets 
be vested in them or alternatively in such persons or a receiver as the court thought fit. The 
defendants were the representatives of the minor children of Mr Pugachev and his partner. 
                                                      
180 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17 
paras 54-62. 
181 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch). 
182 See ch 4 para 3 2 2, where private trust companies are discussed. 
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The claimant’s case had three alternative bases: the trusts were illusory, in the sense that the 
terms of the trust deeds did not divest Mr Pugachev of his beneficial interest in the trust 
assets; the trusts were shams and therefore of no effect; and the transfers into the trusts 
prejudiced the interests of his creditors and therefore breached section 423 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986.183 
 
A very important feature of the case is the terms of the five trust deeds (which were in all 
material respects the same). In the final analysis, the construction of the trust deeds was of 
vital importance and resulted in the court holding that the trust deeds were not effective to 
divest Mr Pugachev of his beneficial interest in the assets.  
 
Mr Pugachev was the true economic settlor (although each trust was in the form of a 
declaration of trust by the trustee and thus did not name him as settlor) and was also a 
member of the class of discretionary beneficiaries.  Crucially, he himself was the first 
protector of the trust. In the event of his death or disability, one of his adult sons from his first 
marriage would automatically become the protector. It was not disputed that this son was 
subservient to Mr Pugachev. Disability was defined to also include instances where he was 
rendered incapable of exercising his free will.184  
 
The powers of the protector included veto powers over a wide range of trustee powers, 
including distributions of income or capital, the investment of the trust fund, the removal of 
beneficiaries, the variation of the trust deed and so on. The protector further had the power to 
appoint additional beneficiaries and, last but not least, the power to remove the trustee with or 
without cause and appoint a new trustee.185 It was not specified in the trust deed whether these 





                                                      
183 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 70-73. Although it 
was not necessary to examine the section 423 claim, the judge said at paras 443-448 that Mr Pugachev’s real and 
substantial purpose in setting up the trusts and transferring assets to them was to defeat his creditors. Therefore, 
in the absence of the other two claims, the transfers to the trusts would in any event have been liable to be set 
aside under the Insolvency Act 1986. 
184 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 110. 
185 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 115-117. 
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(a) Illusory trust argument, or the true effect of the trusts claim 
 
The claim based on the illusory trust argument was that Mr Pugachev retained so many 
powers under the trust deeds that, on a proper construction of the deeds, he did not divest 
himself of the beneficial ownership of the assets. Birss J preferred to call this the “true effect 
of the trusts” claim rather than the illusory trust claim.186  
 
The court remarked that the analysis of the powers a person has under the trust deed (in this 
case the protector’s powers) is concerned with the effect of the deed, which entitles the court 
to construe the powers and duties as a whole in order to identify the substance of what is 
going on. Careful consideration of a trust deed may show that a settlor had effectively 
retained powers of ownership. This is not the same as an analysis of the subjective intentions 
of the parties in order to ascertain whether there was a sham.187 
 
The judge also made an interesting analysis of the use of discretionary trusts and protectors.188 
He explained how what he referred to as an unscrupulous person would be able to use a 
discretionary trust to show that he does not have ownership of or a right to the trust assets, but 
at the same time would be able to control the assets via the role of a protector. The settlor of a 
trust who is simply a member of a class of beneficiaries knows that he has no guarantee of 
receiving a distribution from the trust. That is attractive to the unscrupulous person in so far 
that he does not want to be seen as the owner of the assets. On the other hand, what is not so 
attractive is that he loses control to the trustee, who may refuse to distribute the trust assets 
back to him.  
 
This is where a protector may be useful, especially if the settlor himself can be the 
protector.189 If the unscrupulous person becomes a protector with non-fiduciary powers – in 
other words, powers that can be exercised by him selfishly in his own interest, rather than in 
the interest of the beneficiaries as a whole – he can prevent the trustee from distributing trust 
assets to anyone but himself. If the trustee is uncooperative, the unscrupulous person can 
                                                      
186 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 70-71. The judge was 
referred to case law from Bermuda and New Zealand, examined below, in support of the illusory trust argument. 
This is at paras 155-169. 
187 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 167. 
188 See also ch 4 para 3 1 regarding the modern uses of discretionary trusts. 
189 See ch 4 para 3 2 4 regarding the nature of protector powers. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 260 
easily replace him with a trustee who would be more inclined to agree with him. The judge 
found that in such a case the discretionary trust is not really a discretionary trust.190 
 
In the course of analysing the true effect of the trust deeds, the court made it clear that it was 
bound to consider the entire picture and all the surrounding facts and circumstances. The most 
important factor appears to have been Mr Pugachev’s role as protector and the wide powers 
reserved to the protector, but it was the combination of factors, the fact that he was not only 
the protector but also the settlor and a beneficiary, that led to the conclusion that his powers as 
protector were personal and not fiduciary. Mr Pugachev, through the combination of powers 
and roles he held, could ensure that none of the trust assets could be distributed to anyone but 
himself. As a result, the judge concluded that the terms of the trust deeds did not have the 




The judge proceeded to consider whether, in the event that his analysis regarding the true 
effect of the deeds was incorrect and the protector’s powers were in fact fiduciary so that Mr 
Pugachev did divest himself of the beneficial ownership of the assets, the trusts would be 
shams. A finding of sham would require a common intention of Mr Pugachev and the trustee 
to create rights and obligations different to those borne out by the trust deeds. As far as Mr 
Pugachcv’s intention was concerned,192 the judge found that he may have wanted to provide 
for his family, but only on terms that suited him. There was no indication that he wanted to 
cede control of the assets placed in the trusts and it was clear that his main objective was to 
protect the assets from creditor claims.193 
 
There was no doubt that the other individuals involved as directors and shareholders of the 
trustee companies were Mr Pugachev’s “lieutenants” and did his bidding.194 Mr Patterson was, 
however, in a different position. He was an experienced solicitor and the judge examined his 
conduct in minute detail. The judge considered that he had to ascertain not what Mr Patterson 
                                                      
190 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 173-182. 
191 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 269, 272, 275, 278. 
192 Mr Pugachev did not take part in these proceedings. The judge had to make inferences from the statements 
and evidence of the other witnesses and the surrounding circumstances as presented to the court. 
193 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 286-298. 
194 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 426. 
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thought about his role as trustee, but what Mr Patterson thought about Mr Pugachev’s position 
as protector of the trusts.195  
 
Various examples of Mr Patterson’s conduct were examined as part of this process and this 
indicated that he accepted Mr Pugachev’s role as being in control of the trust. 196  When, 
finally, there was resistance from Mr Patterson regarding a loan request on behalf of Mr 
Pugachev, the latter proceeded to exercise his protector powers to replace the trustees of all 
the trusts.197 
 
In drawing a conclusion about the sham claim, the judge had no doubt about Mr Pugachev’s 
intention to use the trusts as a pretence to mislead third parties.198 To determine the trustee’s 
intention, the conduct of Mr Patterson, the only director of the trustee companies who was not 
clearly one of Mr Pugachev’s lieutenants, was considered vital. Asked about his own 
intentions, he said that he did not intend for Mr Pugachev to have complete control. The judge 
did not accept this, given the conduct mentioned earlier.199 He found that Mr Patterson may 
not have known the settlor’s true intentions, but he could not see how a person in Mr 
Patterson’s position could reasonably infer that Mr Pugachev really wanted to relinquish 
control.200 He could have asked about Mr Pugachev’s intentions but he did not. The judge 
further said: 
 
“The best that can be said is that Mr Patterson prepared and signed these deeds 
entirely recklessly as to the settlor’s true intentions.”201 
 
                                                      
195 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 304-307. 
196 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 318-320, 338-339, 
343-349, 365-373, 376-379. The conduct investigated included a lack of trustee control over the trusts’ finances 
with Mr Pugachev being appointed a joint signatory on a bank account; Mr Patterson referring to Mr Pugachev 
as the ultimate beneficial owner in emails; Mr Patterson excluding a beneficiary of the trust on Mr Pugachev’s 
instruction without making his own enquiries; and Mr Patterson’s written opinion that the protector of the OPK 
trust deed (used as a precedent for the trust deeds in question) has ultimate control of the trust. The judge also 
referred to correspondence between Mr Patterson and Mr Pugachev’s family office prior to the establishment of 
the trusts, from which it was clear that the family office was under the impression that Mr Pugachev could do 
what he wanted in terms of amending the provisions of the trust deed, even though the power of amendment was 
vested in the trustee, albeit subject to protector consent. Mr Patterson did nothing to expel this misunderstanding. 
197 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 417-429. 
198 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 424. 
199 Specifically in relation to referring to Mr Pugachev as the ultimate beneficial owner, his opinion on the OPK 
trust deed, the removal of Alexander and the correspondence about the ability of Mr Pugachev to vary the trust 
deed. 
200 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 427-435. 
201 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 435. 
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Given the judge’s finding on the first leg of the claimant’s claim, namely that the trust deeds 
fulfilled Mr Pugachev’s real intention to retain control over the assets, he did not consider the 
trusts shams. However, given the above exposition of the intentions of the settlor and the 
trustee, the judge said that if he was wrong in his construction of the trust deeds and Mr 
Pugachev did not retain beneficial ownership of the trust assets, then the trusts were a sham, 
because Mr Pugachev did not intend to lose beneficial ownership of the assets.202  
 
In conclusion, the judge stated: 
 
“However, whatever label is to be applied to this case, in my judgment the 
combination of circumstances here means that the court should not give effect to these 
instruments that would result in the assets being regarded as outside Mr Pugachev’s 
ultimate control. The whole scheme was set up to facilitate a pretence about ownership 
(or rather its absence) should the need arise.”203 
 
The orders following this judgment were made separately, the claimant claiming that the 
assets be transferred to them or a receiver.204 It remains to be seen whether the judgment will 
be appealed, but it appears to have opened up another route for attacking trusts under which 
settlors retain extensive powers.  
 
It is unfortunate that the facts were so extreme, as it is difficult to distill general principles, 
but the judgment has certainly created a renewed level of awareness of settlor reserved 
powers. It has also emphasised the need for trustee independence, especially in the case of 
private trustee companies, in order to ensure that the protection offered by the trust is not lost.  
 
4 2 3 Case law dealing with divorce 
 
The English courts have dealt with many divorce cases involving trusts and over the last few 
years these have become quite noteworthy, often because of the sums involved.  
 
                                                      
202 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 436-437. 
203 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) para 442. 
204 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) paras 449-450. 
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4 2 3 1  A v A205  
 
In this case dealing with sham, the husband was not the settlor but a beneficiary. Although 
this was therefore not a classic case of settlor control, it was clear that the husband was 
involved in the businesses owned by the trust and had a role in their financial welfare. The 
wife claimed that the trusts were shams, so that the husband should be treated as owning the 
trust assets, and that the assets were in any event to be treated as the husband’s on the basis 
that it was a source of wealth available to him.206 The judgment contains a helpful and recent 




The court concluded that the sham allegations were unfounded, as it could not be proved that 
the trustees were a party to the sham.207  
 
The point was made that the fact that a settlor exercises control over a trust does not mean that 
it is a sham. Although the court will take a robust approach where settlor control is present or 
the trust is an alter ego of the settlor, it will not completely ignore the established principles 
relating to the ownership of assets by a trust, especially where third parties are involved. In 
other words, there has to be a proper basis for ignoring the existence of a trust.208  
 
Munby J also held, by reference to Charman v Charman209 (where trust assets were brought 
into account for purposes of a divorce order), that a settlor’s access to funds does not 
necessarily indicate improper conduct on the part of the trustee. A trustee who properly 
controls a trust can quite rightly, on the request of the settlor, decide to distribute capital to the 
settlor or someone else, provided that all the relevant circumstances were taken into account 
and the decision was reached in good faith. 210 
 
Once a valid trust existed, the court said that the trustee cannot divest himself of his fiduciary 
obligations by his own improper acts. Even if a trustee subsequently agrees to treat the trust as 
                                                      
205 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam). 
206 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 25-26. 
207 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 32-42. 
208 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 17-19. 
209 Charman v Charman [2005] EWCA Civ 1606. 
210 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) para 29. 
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a sham, this does not turn a valid trust into a sham. It may expose the trustee to a claim for a 
breach of trust, but once a valid trust is created it cannot turn into a sham.211 
 
(b) Financial resource 
 
In support of the second claim that the trust assets were a resource available to the husband, 
the wife alleged that the husband controlled the trust assets and could do with it as he pleased. 
In this context, whether the spouse has immediate access to the funds has been found to be 
more important than whether he has effective control over it.212 
 
Although a court can encourage a trustee to transfer assets to a spouse, it cannot compel or 
exercise improper pressure on the trustee to do so.213 Can this be interpreted to mean that the 
court cannot in these circumstances go behind the trust or lift the veil of the trust? Counsel for 
the husband pointed out that even where a court gives judicious encouragement to trustees, 
the trustees should “jealously guard their independence in this respect”214 – they must consider 
the interests of the beneficiaries as a whole. Munby J concluded that for the court to suggest 
that the trustees should advance capital from the trust to the husband to allow him to meet his 
obligations under a divorce order would constitute improper pressure. He therefore declined 
to make such an order.215 
 
4 2 3 2  Charman v Charman216  
 
This Court of Appeal judgment was heard in the same year as A v A.217 At the time of the first 
hearing of Charman218 it was the largest ever contested divorce case in England in monetary 
terms, the parties’ assets amounting to £131 million. One of the main grounds of the appeal 
by the husband was that assets worth £68 million, held in a discretionary Jersey law trust set 
                                                      
211 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 42-43. 
212  A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 88-92. The position in English law is that, for purposes of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the court can take into account assets owned or administered by third parties, if 
those assets are available to the relevant spouse. The question is whether the trustee would be likely, either 
immediately or in the foreseeable future, to accede to a request of the spouse to exercise the trustee’s discretion 
in the spouse’s favour or for his benefit. 
213 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 95-96. 
214 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) para 97. 
215 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) para 100. 
216 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503. 
217 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam). 
218 Charman v Charman [2006] EWHC 1879 (Fam). 
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up by the husband, of which he and his wife and children were beneficiaries, should not have 
been taken into account in computing their total assets.219 At the time of creating the trust, the 
husband transferred a modest amount of money to fund the trust, which amount was used by 
the trustees to purchase shares in the husband’s business. Over time, this business became 
hugely successful and extremely valuable.220 Further sales and investments were made in the 
businesses of the husband, always at his request.221 
 
Although the central question was whether, if the settlor had asked the trustees for a 
distribution, they were likely to agree, there were elements of settlor control. This included 
(apart from the fact that the trust assets were mainly the businesses run by the settlor) the fact 
that the settlor had the power to replace the trustee. This provision, in fact, appears to have 
been added in order to increase the likelihood that the trust would be administered in 
accordance with the settlor’s letter of wishes.222 The letter of wishes initially provided, inter 
alia, that: 
 
“Insofar as is consistent with the terms of the Settlement I wish to have the fullest 
possible access to the capital and income of the Settlement including the possibility of 
investing the entire Fund in business ventures undertaken by me.”223 
 
A later version, written after the breakdown of the marriage, still stated that he wished to be 
treated as the primary beneficiary.224 
 
The Court of Appeal found that the court a quo was correct to hold that the assets of the trust 
should be attributed to the husband. The husband’s arguments that the trust was dynastic and 
that he did not intend to benefit from it were rejected, given that there was no evidence to 
corroborate such an argument. A dynastic intention may in any event not have made much 
difference according to the lower court, the test being whether the assets are available as a 
“resource”.225 The court was of the view that, although the trust assets were not the husband’s, 
                                                      
219 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 7. 
220 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 34. 
221 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 36. 
222 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 55. 
223 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 33. 
224 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 52. 
225 Charman v Charman [2006] EWHC 1879 (Fam) para 79. 
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they could at the same time be available to him on demand and therefore it would be wrong 
not to include the assets in the computation.226  
 
Relevant to the issue of control, the Court of Appeal further mentioned the husband’s express 
power to replace the trustee. If the trustee refused the settlor’s request for the advancement of 
capital, the settlor could simply replace him. The court concluded that this was another factor 
relevant to the likelihood of an advancement.227  
 
The appeal was dismissed and the court remarked: 
 
“But, whenever it is necessary to conduct such an enquiry, it is essential for the court 
to bring to it a judicious mixture of worldly realism and of respect for the legal effects 
of trusts, the legal duties of trustees and, in the case of off-shore trusts, the 
jurisdictions of off-shore courts. In the circumstances of the present case it would have 
been a shameful emasculation of the court’s duty to be fair if the assets which the 
husband built up in [the trust] during the marriage had not been attributed to him.”228 
 
The basis for this decision appears not to be ignoring the trust, but attributing assets to the 
settlor on the ground that the assets are a resource available to him. In this respect, it appears 
that settlor control could indeed be a factor in determining whether the trust fund is available 
to a spouse as a financial resource. 
 
4 2 3 3  Clayton v Clayton229 
 
Although not a classical offshore jurisdiction, New Zealand is part of the Commonwealth and 
its trust law closely follows that of England.230 A recent case in the context of divorce has 
brought to the fore the question of whether there is a distinction between a sham trust and an 
                                                      
226 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 paras 45-46. 
227 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 55. 
228 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 para 57. 
229 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29. 
230  Anonymous http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/our-projects/law-trusts (accessed 02-08-2018). A favourable tax 
regime exists for New Zealand trusts with a non-New Zealand resident settlor, even if the beneficiaries and 
trustees are resident in New Zealand. Such a trust is not taxable on foreign sourced income (and in that sense can 
be used like a classic offshore trust), although disclosure requirements were introduced recently, which have to 
be complied with in order to benefit from this tax regime. 
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illusory trust. In Clayton v Clayton,231 a number of trusts established by Mr Clayton were at 
stake, only one of which was relevant in the context of settlor control. Both the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court judgments are of interest. 
 
By way of background, Mr Clayton was the settlor, the sole trustee and the principal 
beneficiary of the trust in question. The other beneficiaries included his children and their 
issue, Mrs Clayton and any person appointed as a beneficiary by Mr Clayton. Mr Clayton had 
normal trustee powers, including being able to distribute all the trust assets to himself as 
principal beneficiary, and also to deal with the trust assets as if he were the absolute owner of 
it and beneficially entitled to it. As principal beneficiary he had the power to appoint and 
remove beneficiaries as well as trustees.232 
 
Mrs Clayton claimed that the relevant trust was either a sham or an illusory trust, and 
therefore the assets still belonged to Mr Clayton and should be taken into account in the 
division of the matrimonial assets. As an alternative claim, if the trust was found to be valid, 
Mrs Clayton claimed that the rights and powers conferred on Mr Clayton amounted to 
property that can be taken into account in such a division. 
 
As the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the powers did amount to property, the part of the 
judgment dealing with this aspect will be examined first. 
 
(a) Is power tantamount to property? 
 
The Court of Appeal found that the essential requirements for the establishment of a valid 
trust existed and that, despite the wide powers conferred on Mr Clayton, this did not eradicate 
the irreducible core of obligations – to act honestly and in good faith – enforceable by the 
other beneficiaries.233 Unlike the High Court,234 the Court of Appeal therefore did not find that 
Mr Clayton’s retained powers amounted to ownership of the trust property.235  
                                                      
231 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30; Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29. 
232 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 paras 45-47. Although under New Zealand law a person can be both 
settlor and trustee, and both trustee and a member of a class of beneficiaries, the trustee cannot be the sole 
beneficiary. That would mean that the legal and equitable interests in the trust property are vested in the same 
person and as a result there would be no trust. 
233 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 paras 50-52 where reference is made to the English case of Armitage v 
Nurse (1998) Ch 241. 
234 Clayton v Clayton [2013] NZHC 301. 
235 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 para 55. 
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This finding was overturned by the Supreme Court. Both the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court referred to the TMSF236 case, discussed above, where a power of revocation 
reserved to the settlor was found to be tantamount to ownership. 237  The Supreme Court 
analysed the clause that allowed Mr Clayton to appoint or remove discretionary beneficiaries. 
They found that the power was conferred on him in his capacity as principal family member 
(being the principal beneficiary) and not his capacity as trustee. It meant that he had the 
power to remove all other beneficiaries and appoint the whole trust fund to himself.  
 
The court did not think that this power on its own amounted to a general power of 
appointment or, to put it differently, to ownership of the assets. 238  The Supreme Court 
examined the other powers conferred on Mr Clayton and found that he could exercise these 
powers in his own interest and to the detriment of the other beneficiaries, without being 
constrained by any fiduciary duty. Even though he could not remove the final default 
beneficiaries, being his children, there was nothing to prevent him from appointing the whole 
trust fund to himself.239 The Supreme Court therefore concluded: 
 
“…[T]he combination of powers and entitlements of Mr Clayton as Principal Family 
Member, Trustee and Discretionary Beneficiary of the [trust] amount in effect to a 
general power of appointment in relation to the assets of the [trust].”240 
 
The court relied on the Privy Council decision in TMSF 241  that a general power of 
appointment can be treated as property in certain circumstances. In casu the powers and 
entitlements of Mr Clayton, including the general power of appointment, were regarded as 





                                                      
236 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17. 
237 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 paras 94-114; Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 paras 39-44. 
238 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 para 49. 
239 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 paras 50-67. 
240 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 para 68. 
241 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17. 
242 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 para 98. 




The lower courts, including the Court of Appeal, found that the trust was not a sham, as it was 
clear that Mr Clayton had a genuine intention to create a trust, albeit mainly for business 
purposes.243 The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning.244 This is another affirmation of 
the difficulty to demonstrate the requisite intention for a finding that a trust is a sham. 
 
(c) Illusory trust 
 
This was the first time the concept of an illusory trust has been considered in New Zealand 
case law as a concept distinct from a sham trust. This was clear from the diverging judgments 
and reasoning on this point. The court of the first instance found that the trust was illusory 
because Mr Clayton had total control over the trust – he had no accountability towards the 
beneficiaries and he could revoke the trust in his favour at any time.245 
 
The High Court agreed that the trust was illusory but for different reasons, namely because 
Mr Clayton effectively retained all powers of ownership and could in reality deal with the 
assets of the trust as if the trust had never been created.246 
 
The Court of Appeal overturned this finding, disregarding the concept of an illusory trust and 
remarking that no authority was referred to for the concept of an illusory trust as distinct from 
a sham trust.247  
 
The Supreme Court pointed out that the same factors that led them to conclude that Mr 
Clayton’s powers amounted to a general power of appointment led the High Court to 





                                                      
243 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 paras 57-70. 
244 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 para 117. 
245 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 para 71-72. 
246 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 para 73. 
247 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30 paras 74-85. 
248 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 para 118. 
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The Supreme Court concluded: 
 
“…[A] finding that a trust deed is not a sham does not seem to us to preclude a finding 
that the attempt to create a trust failed and that no valid trust came into existence… 
For our part we do not see any value in using the “illusory” label: if there is no valid 
trust, that is all that needs to be said.”249 
 
Because the Supreme Court found that the combination of powers and entitlements vested in 
Mr Clayton amounted to property to be taken into account in the division of assets, they did 
not have to determine whether the powers held by Mr Clayton were so broad that, although he 
intended to establish a trust, he failed to create a valid trust. 
 
4 2 4 Case law dealing with claims other than from creditors or former spouses 
 
4 2 4 1  The A Q Revocable Trusts250 
 
An example of where a trust was found to be invalid or illusory is the Supreme Court of 
Bermuda’s judgment in the case of the AQ Revocable Trusts.251 The facts relating to this trust 
governed by Bermudan law were extreme in that the settlor was also the sole trustee for the 
first four years, after which his wife was appointed as co-trustee; the trusts were revocable by 
the settlor; he had the right to the entire net income and such capital as the trustee decided; 
and he had the power to appoint and remove trustees. The trustees were absolved from 
liability for investments and a further provision released them from all liability if a transaction 
had the written approval of the settlor.252  
 
The settlor’s sons brought an application declaring the trusts invalid on the basis that they 
were, on a true construction, testamentary, the result of which would be that the trusts were 
                                                      
249 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 para 123. 
250 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ. 
251 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ. 
252 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ paras 4-7. 
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revoked by the settlor’s last subsequent will and the assets therefore fell into the trusts 
established by that will.253 
 
The judge referred to Lewin’s work on trusts254 for authority that the reservation by the settlor 
of large beneficial powers and interests may cause an inter vivos trust to be considered 
illusory and in some cases, where a power or revocation is also reserved, considered 
testamentary. However, the reservation of such rights and powers would not necessarily cause 
a trust to be considered illusory – it would only be the case where the settlor was in all but 
name the equitable owner of the property during his lifetime.255 
 
A crucial factor in this objective test appears to be whether the settlor retained an unrestricted 
power to dispose of the assets without being accountable for those assets.256 This requirement 
plays into the essential requirement of accountability of a trustee towards the beneficiaries.257 
Although American law seemingly developed in such a way as to uphold inter vivos trusts 
regardless of the reservation by the settlor of extensive powers over the administration of the 
trust, the judge considered the general common law position, and certainly that under English 
law, to be that such a reservation may in certain circumstances be inconsistent with the 
existence of a trust.258  
 
In conclusion the court held: 
 
“…[T]he concatenation of rights and powers in the Settlor, when coupled with the fact 
that he was the sole trustee at the time of the constitution of the Trusts, rendered this 
trust illusory during his lifetime… I accept [the] submission that the cumulative effect 
of the trust documents, when taken with the de facto situation, means that the Settlor 
as Trustee could not effectively be called to account during his lifetime. Crucial to this 
                                                      
253 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ paras 1-3. 
254 Tucker et al Lewin on Trusts, but note that the judge referred to the previous edition of this work. 
255 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ para 9. 
256 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ para 13; in para 20 reference is made to s 2(2)(a) Trusts (Special Provisions) 
Act 1989, where the accountability of the trustee is listed as one of the characteristics of a trust under Bermudan 
law. 
257 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253-254. 
258 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ paras 16-17. 
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conclusion is Art. VIII H, which allows the Settlor to absolve himself as Trustee from 
any and all breaches of trust. While it may be that I would not have come to that 
conclusion had Art. VIII H been coupled with a distinct and independent trustee, in 
this case it is the combination which pushes it over the top.”259 
 
The judge further found that the settlor had no intention to fetter his control and enjoyment 
over the trust property and had understood that he would retain such control and enjoyment 
when he executed the trust documents. The way the trusts were administered corroborated this 
– there were no trustee minutes or books of account and the settlor dealt with the assets as if 
they were his. Therefore, even if the court were wrong to hold that the trusts were “bad on 
their face”, they were in fact invalid as the settlor did not have the necessary intent to create 
inter vivos trusts, but only intended the trusts to take effect upon his death. As no valid 
lifetime trusts were created, the assets fell into the trusts created by the settlor’s subsequent 
will.260 
 
4 2 4 2  The A and B Trusts261 
 
The use of a protector as a means of controlling the trustee was examined in In the matter of 
the A and B Trusts, 262 a Jersey case concerning an application for the removal of a protector. 
Although the hearing took place in private, extracts from the judgment were published in 
view of the scarcity of reported judgments concerning the role of protectors. The protector in 
this case was of the view that one of his main duties was to ensure that the settlor’s wishes 
were carried out by the trustee. The court, however, confirmed that his paramount duty was to 
the beneficiaries of the trust and that, with regard to the settlor’s wishes, his duty was merely 
to do his best to see that the trustee had due regard to the settlor’s wishes.263  
 
This indicates that the settlor and his wishes are not to be ignored as soon as he signs the trust 
deed, but that they should not be slavishly followed without the trustee exercising 
                                                      
259 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ para 29. 
260 In the matter of the AQ Revocable Trust for Sons dated 1976 and the AQ Revocable Trust for Grandchildren 
dated 1976 [2010] SC (Bda) 40 Civ paras 31-31. 
261 In the matter of the representation of C, D, E and F and in the matter of the A and B Trusts [2012] JRC 169A. 
262 In the matter of the representation of C, D, E and F and in the matter of the A and B Trusts [2012] JRC 169A. 
263 In the matter of the representation of C, D, E and F and in the matter of the A and B Trusts [2012] JRC 169A 
paras 3-4. 
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independent discretion.264 The interests of the beneficiaries are more important. Given the 
protector’s “overactive” part in the management of the trusts and the breakdown of the 
relationship between the protector and the beneficiaries, the court decided that allowing him 
to continue in this role would have a serious detrimental effect on the trust relationship and he 
was therefore removed.265 
 
4 2 5 Conclusion regarding English and offshore case law review 
 
It is interesting to note that a number of recent cases have referred to the combination of 
powers and entitlements vested in the settlor as the decisive factor in deciding in favour of the 
party attacking the integrity of the trust. A settlor can exercise control in a number of ways, 
some less obvious than others. Control by someone other than the trustee does not, without 
more, constitute a problem. A combination of control and entitlement, however, particularly 
when concentrated in the settlor, indicates that there is no, or very little, accountability 
towards other beneficiaries. It exposes a lack of separation between ownership and enjoyment 
of the trust assets. It can even indicate that the settlor had no intention to divest himself of the 
beneficial or equitable ownership of the trust assets. Such extreme cases appear to be 
increasingly vulnerable to attack, and recent judgments such as Clayton, 266  TMSF 267  and 
Pugachev268 signify the attitude of courts with regard to abuse of the trust form, particularly 
where the interests of creditors or divorcing spouses are concerned.  
 
It is submitted that a distinction should be made between powers over investment of the trust 
fund and powers over the disposition thereof. Carving out investment powers is not unusual. 
Depending on the type of trust asset, it is likely that the trustee does not have the necessary 
expertise to manage the trust’s investments and would outsource this function in any event. 
Where the settlor is suitably qualified, it may be perfectly acceptable for him to retain 
investment powers, although this should be properly documented. In such a case, the trustee 
would not want to retain liability to the beneficiaries for investment of the trust fund. 269 
                                                      
264 In practice it would be very difficult for a trustee to administer a discretionary trust without consulting the 
settlor, a protector or the beneficiaries from time to time. 
265 In the matter of the representation of C, D, E and F and in the matter of the A and B Trusts [2012] JRC 169A 
paras 8, 10-11. 
266 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29. 
267 Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] UKPC 17. 
268 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch). 
269 This interplay between control and liability is examined in the final chapter. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 274 
However, a settlor reserving power over decisions with regard to the distribution of the trust 
fund, especially if he is a beneficiary himself, interferes with the separation between control 
and enjoyment.  
 
The drafting of trust deeds under English and, especially, offshore trust law, having evolved 
over years to become much more settlor focused, may have to undergo another revision if the 
integrity of such trusts is to be retained. Moreover, care needs to be taken not to assume that a 
trust deed can say one thing but the settlor can do something else. Although difficult to prove, 
such an intention from the outset may invite allegations of sham. 
 
Launching a successful attack based on sham is not simple. Narrowly defined requirements 
must be met. However, where it is clear that the settlor did not intend to create a trust and did 
not want to divest himself of the beneficial ownership of the assets, a claimant may be able to 
prove that no valid trust came into existence in the first place, without the need to evidence a 
shared intention on the part of the trustee. This is because one of the three certainties required 
to create a valid express trust is lacking – certainty of intention.270  
 
Given the way trust law, drafting practices and the use of discretionary trusts have developed, 
especially offshore, many settlors have over time become accustomed to being offered 
extensive powers over trusts settled by them. They are advised that retaining such powers 
would not affect the validity of those trusts, especially if governed by the law of a jurisdiction 
that recognises reserved power trusts.271 Trusts are sold on this basis. Trust deeds are drafted 
accordingly. This reduces the risk of a sham argument, because the trust deed reflects the 
reality of the situation, namely that the settlor wishes to retain extensive powers (and in many 
cases, entitlements too).  
 
Recent case law suggests that this may now have to be reconsidered, as such a trust deed may 
be construed not to create a valid trust.272  
 
Although none of the cases under consideration concerned trusts governed by a legal system 
that specifically allows reserved powers trusts, 273  such trusts have never, to the writer’s 
                                                      
270 See ch 2 para 2 7 1 1 where the substantive requirement of certainty of intention is discussed. 
271 See ch 4 para 3 2 1. 
272  The most recent example of this, according to the writer’s knowledge, being JSC Mezhdunarodniy 
Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch). 
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knowledge, been the subject of litigation in a foreign court. In view of the trends set by the 
cases examined above, it is not impossible that a court in another jurisdiction (for example 
where trust assets are located or where the settlor is tax resident) may find that, given the lack 
of certainty of intention to create a trust, a valid trust never came into existence. At the most, 
a bare trust may be said to exist. A bare trust confers no tax, estate planning or asset 
protection benefits on the settlor or beneficiaries. Alternatively, such a trust may be described 
as illusory, although this does not appear to be a term favoured by the judiciary.  
 
Another emerging trend can be observed in the equation of broad powers over trust property 
and property itself. An example is the power of revocation. 274 However, it can also be a 
combination of other powers and entitlements that causes the powers to be regarded as 
tantamount to property.275 Although such a trust is not invalid, the normal consequences of 
using a trust may, in appropriate circumstances, be disregarded – this appears to be akin to the 
South African concept of going behind the trust form. If power is tantamount to property, it 
means there is no separation between control (power) and enjoyment (property).  
 
Case law indicates that such a ruling, that power is tantamount to property, would be made 
only where justice and fairness demand it. The effect is also not the same as invalidity, where 
the assets will generally be regarded as not having left the ownership of the settlor in the first 
place. Where power is considered tantamount to property, a court may compel the power 
holder (the settlor) to exercise the power in a certain way. 
 
It further appears that the judiciary is hesitant to ignore (the consequences of) a validly 
constituted trust. A trustee who abdicates his fiduciary duties by allowing a settlor to control a 
trust may well be liable for a breach of trust, but it is unlikely that this would lead to a valid 
trust being ignored, or the veil being pierced. It has been observed that such a result would be 
disadvantageous to the beneficiaries of a trust, as discussed below.  
 
Even if a trustee always went along with the settlor’s wishes, it seems he may be found to 
have abdicated his fiduciary duties to the extent required to pierce the veil of the trust only if 
                                                                                                                                                                      
273 This legislation typically provides that a trust is not invalid, despite the retention of broad powers by the 
settlor. See also ch 4 para 3 2 1. 
274 As in Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd [2011] 
UKPC 17. 
275 As in Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29. 
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he completely failed to apply an independent mind in exercising his powers. This indicates 
that the required standard of trustee independence is not particularly high. Such a complete 
failure would, moreover, be difficult to establish on the facts: Most professional trustees 
would be able to show that they did consider requests from the settlor independently – even if 
they always went along with such requests.276 
 
Different reasons are advanced for the enforcement of validly constituted trusts, apart from 
the obvious desire to promote certainty of legal transactions. One is the protection of 
beneficiaries. It would indeed seem unfair if the trustee’s wrongdoing prejudices the 
beneficiaries’ interests. After all, under English law, and that of most offshore jurisdictions, 
beneficiaries have an equitable proprietary interest in the trust fund,277 so that applying trust 
property in satisfaction of a settlor’s creditors, for example, defeats that interest. On the other 
hand, it has been illustrated how modern discretionary trust drafting can be used in a way that 
confers scant protection to objects of the trustee’s discretion, casting doubt on this 
argument.278 Another reason is that alternative remedies exist for parties adversely affected by 
a settlor’s retention of power or a trustee’s abdication of his fiduciary duties.279 
 
These conclusions will be further analysed in the final chapter. 
 
4 3 South Africa 
 
4 3 1 General remarks 
 
In Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk280 the Supreme Court of Appeal made mention 
of a “newer type of trust”,281 where a person places assets in trust, either for estate planning 
reasons or because trusts are less regulated than corporate entities, but then continues to deal 
with the assets as if they were not held in a trust. Such cases can become problematic, 
especially for third parties dealing with the trust. The court in fact warned that persons dealing 
with a trust should take extra care.282 
                                                      
276 See In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188]. 
277 See ch 2 paras 2 4 2, 3 3 2. 
278 See ch 4 para 3 1. 
279 This was mentioned specifically in In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188]. 
280 Nieuwoudt NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA). 
281 Nieuwoudt NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para 17. 
282 Nieuwoudt NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) paras 22-24. 
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A fair amount has been written in South Africa with regard to the concepts of sham trusts, 
alter ego trusts, abuse of the trust and going behind the trust form. The topic has been 
particularly prevalent in relation to the division of matrimonial assets on divorce,283 and to 
some extent in relation to claims by creditors and others.  
 
In the context of divorce, it is important to note at the outset that different marital regimes are 
treated distinctly. A court is able to alter the default distribution on the dissolution of a 
marriage only in certain circumstances.284 The first relevant circumstance is in the case of 
marriages out of community of property before the accrual system became available. Here the 
court has a wide discretion, where it would be equitable and just, taking into account relevant 
factors, to order a redistribution of assets from the estate of one party to the other.285 The 
other order a court can make, and which is more commonly used, is that patrimonial benefits 
belonging to a spouse personally should be forfeited if that spouse benefits unduly in relation 
to the other spouse. This type of order can be made regardless of the applicable marital 
regime.286 
 
A plethora of descriptions are found in case law and academic writing to describe the act of 
ignoring the fact that trust assets form a separate estate – piercing the veneer of the trust, 
lifting the veil of the trust, disregarding the trust, and going behind the trust form. It has been 
suggested that terminology from company law (such as piercing the veneer or lifting the veil 
of the trust) is not helpful and that, in Du Toit’s words, it “clouds the conceptual clarity 
demanded by the still-developing South African trust law”.287 A better description may be that 
used by De Waal, namely “going behind the trust form”.288 The latter description is, where 
appropriate, used in this part of the chapter. 
 
It is clear that invalid and sham trusts are to be distinguished from the case of valid trusts that 
have been abused.289 If a trust is a sham or otherwise invalid, there is nothing to go behind. 
However, uncertainty remains with regard to the circumstances in which a court will find that 
                                                      
283 Du Toit (2015) 8 J Civ L Stud 655.  
284 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 514-515. 
285 This is in terms of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 s 7(3). 
286 This is provided for in the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 s 9. 
287 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 871.  
288 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078. 
289 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1085-1086; Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 518-521. 
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it is appropriate to go behind the trust (or pierce the veil, as some authors290 refer to it) and the 
consequences of such a finding. 
 
The cases discussed below were selectively identified and analysed with a view to 
highlighting aspects relevant to the overriding theme of this dissertation. It should be borne in 
mind that, unlike the cases dealing with English and offshore trusts, in these cases the settlor 
(or at least the true economic settlor) is more often than not one of the trustees, even the 
dominant trustee, and quite possibly also a beneficiary. 
 
4 3 2 Case law dealing with claims by third parties or creditors 
 
4 3 2 1  Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker291 
 
Although not a clear incidence of settlor control, given that the trust in question was set up by 
the father of Mr Parker, this judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal dealing with the use 
and abuse of trusts in business transactions has been very influential in the context of cases of 
abuse of the trust. Mr Parker himself was one of the trustees and a beneficiary of the trust. 
 
Cameron JA stressed the importance of the separation of ownership or control over trust 
assets from the enjoyment of those assets as the core idea of the trust.292 He approached the 
argument from the point of view of a trustee who is also a beneficiary. By itself, this is not 
problematic, but if the sole trustee were also the sole beneficiary, there would be no trust.293  
 
Cameron JA referred to the traditional view of the trust as protecting the weak and that the 
trustee is essentially appointed to “exercise fiduciary responsibility over property on behalf of 
and in the interests of another”.294 It has been illustrated that this traditional view of the trust is 
not necessarily reflective of trust modern practice. However, it was not that long ago that the 
position of beneficiaries was much stronger.295 
 
                                                      
290 See in particular Smith (2016) 41 JJS 68; Smith (2017) 42 JJS 1. 
291 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
292 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) [19]. 
293 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 19. 
294 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 20. 
295 See ch 4 para 3 1. 
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The reasons why a separation of control and enjoyment are important become clear later in 
the judgment: such separation explains the duty of care and the accountability and liability of 
a trustee; it also ensures that a trustee exercises independent judgment.296  
 
The judgment further explains that although the features of a “traditional” trust typically 
ensure that the aforementioned requirements are met, this is not the case in many family trusts 
where a group of family members make up the settlor, trustees and beneficiaries. The trust 
form is abused because it is not used to separate control from enjoyment, but rather to confer 
benefit on the very same persons that exercise control over the assets.297 In such a case, where 
the beneficiaries are also trustees, there is virtually no accountability. The power over trust 
assets is in the same hands as the beneficial interests therein. It is not hard to see how this can 
prejudice third parties who deal with a trust in the belief that the trust is bound to a 
transaction, only to find out later that, because of the trustees’ non-compliance with certain 
formalities, it is not. 
 
The theme of trustee independence to counter trust abuse clearly emerged in Cameron JA’s 
judgment. In view of this, he suggested the involvement of the Master of the High Court in 
ensuring that every trust has an independent trustee; he also did not rule out legislative 
intervention.298  
 
4 3 2 2  Van Zyl v Kaye299  
 
The applicants in this case contended that the trust in question was the alter ego of Kaye, the 
settlor of the trust who was also a trustee before his sequestration and a member of the class 
of beneficiaries. They applied for the court to go behind the trust and disregard its veneer to 
give effect to the true situation, namely that the trust assets, two immovable properties, 
belonged to Kaye personally. Their allegations were based on Kaye’s apparent control of the 
trust.300 
                                                      
296 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 22. 
297 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 23-26. 
298 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 34-36. See also ch 4 para 4 3 4 
where progress in this regard is discussed. 
299 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC). 
300 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 455-457. Kaye was the sole director of the company 
(owned by the trust) that owned one of the trust properties, and the accounting practices between the trust, 
company and his personal affairs were, to say the least, fluid. 
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The court found that this result – that the assets belonged to the settlor-trustee and not to the 
trust – could only stem from a finding that the trust is invalid, or a sham, or that the 
immovable property had not really been vested in the trust.301 Binns-Ward J also made the 
important observation, with reference to New Zealand case law, that factual control by 
someone other than a trustee (or by a specific trustee if there is more than one trustee) does 
not in and of itself invalidate a trust. 302  Similar comments have been made in other 
jurisdictions.303  
 
The court distinguished sham from going behind the trust form: 
 
“Holding that a trust is a sham is essentially a finding of fact … that the requirements 
for the establishment of a trust were not met, or that the appearance of having met 
them was in reality a dissimulation.”304 
 
In this case it was not even contended, much less proved, that the trust had not been 
legitimately founded.305 However, not much more was said about sham trusts. 
 
The court confirmed that, for it to make an order to go behind the trust form, there has to be a 
valid trust in the first place, as there would otherwise be nothing to go behind. Binns-Ward J 
stated: 
 
“Going behind the trust form … essentially represents the provision by a court of an 
equitable remedy to a third party affected by an unconscionable abuse of the trust 
form… It is a remedy that will generally be given when the trust form is used in a 
dishonest or unconscionable manner to evade a liability, or avoid an obligation.”306 
 
Parker307 also referred to unscrupulous behaviour, which, by definition, means acting in an 
unprincipled or dishonest way. After Van Zyl,308 unconscionability or dishonesty seem to have 
                                                      
301 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 458, 466. 
302 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 464-465. 
303 See ch 4 paras 4 2 3 1, 4 2 4 1. 
304 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 459. 
305 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 459. 
306 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 460 para 22. 
307 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 29-30. 
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acquired the status of requirements for going behind the trust form. The judge in Van Zyl,309 
however, preferred to describe it as an equitable remedy, free from the strict constraints of 
defined principles.310  
 
Binns-Ward J was not aware of any South African judgment where the veneer of a trust was 
pierced. He was of the view that in Badenhorst311 (discussed below), on which the applicants 
relied, the trust was not disregarded. However, he said that if he was wrong and the court 
there did in fact go behind the trust form, it was on the basis of Mr Badenhorst’s use of the 
trust in an unconscionable manner to evade his obligations on the dissolution of his marriage. 
 
However, in this case the judge found that a sufficient basis for going behind the trust form 
did not exist (although this would in any event not have led to the result the applicants were 
hoping for). The fact that trust assets held in a validly constituted trust were administered in 
an objectionable way did not, according to the court, afford a legal basis to invalidate the trust 
or to find that the assets do not vest in the trustee (qua trustee).312 (It is submitted that this is, 
however, different from the result of going behind the trust, at least as far as invalidity is 
concerned. The consequences of an invalid trust are different to those of going behind a valid 
trust.) 
 
A trustee (in this case the settlor) who administers a trust without due regard to his fiduciary 
duties and who treats it as his alter ego cannot make the trust a sham, although it may have 
other consequences. This may include giving cause for his removal as trustee or the 
appointment of an independent co-trustee, or it may render him personally liable for 
transactions he concluded ostensibly on behalf of the trust, or delictually liable to the 
beneficiaries. It does not, however, mean that the trust assets belong to him personally.313  
 
The court found that there was no evidence that the trust was used dishonestly or 
unconscionably to evade a liability to the applicants or Kaye’s creditors.314  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
308 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC). 
309 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC). 
310 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 460. 
311 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
312 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 459. 
313 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 465. 
314 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 466. 
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It appears that, based on Binns-Ward J’s dicta referred to above,315 subsequent judgments 
regarded dishonesty or unconscionability as a requirement for going behind the trust form.   
 
4 3 3 Case law dealing with divorce 
 
4 3 3 1  Jordaan v Jordaan316  
 
This case was concerned with the question whether, for purposes of a redistribution order in 
the context of divorce, assets transferred to a trust by one of the divorcing parties could be 
taken into account. The defendant, the husband in this case, averred that the assets in the 
trusts should be left out of reckoning in determining the value of his estate. He set up various 
trusts, some after divorce proceedings had commenced, and admitted, at least in the case of 
one trust, that it was set up with a view to frustrate a claim by his wife, the claimant in this 
case.317 It appears, but it is not clear from the facts, that the defendant was a trustee of some of 
the trusts, but not of all of them. Traverso J held that, in deciding whether to take trust assets 
into account in the redistribution order, the way in which the trusts were administered was 
relevant.318  
 
The judge referred to various instances that indicated that the defendant did not regard the 
trust assets as different from his own. These included the transfer of funds to himself without 
formal decisions by the trustee or trustees; the defendant taking actions without consulting his 
co-trustees; and evidence that the defendant treated the income of the trusts as his own. She 
considered the trust as the defendant’s alter ego, used by him for his own financial advantage. 
In the case of the trust set up after divorce proceedings were instituted, he was considered to 
have had a fraudulent intent.  
 
For these reasons, based on the settlor’s control over the administration of the trust, it was 
considered just and fair to take the trust assets into account in valuing the defendant’s estate 
for purpose of the redistribution order. 319  The judge nevertheless found that it was not 
                                                      
315 See ch 4 fn 304, 306. 
316 Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
317 Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C) para 17. 
318 Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C) paras 27-29. 
319 Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C) paras 24-25, 29-34. 
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necessary to consider whether to pierce the “corporate veil”.320 This may have been because of 
uncertainty as to the consequences of piercing, or because the defendant had sufficient assets 
in his own name to satisfy the court order, so that the trust assets did not have to be legally 
transferred to him. 
 
4 3 3 2  Badenhorst v Badenhorst321  
 
This decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal also concerned a redistribution order on 
divorce and the question of taking trust assets into account. The case is another rare instance 
of a South African court finding that trust assets should be taken into account in a 
redistribution order in the context of divorce. However, there appears to be disagreement in 
academic circles as to the basis on which the order was made.322  
 
The facts, very briefly, were that the husband, Mr Badenhorst, was the economic settlor of the 
trust, that he and his brother were the trustees (although the brother did not take an active 
role) and that Mr Badenhorst had the power to remove his co-trustee and appoint another in 
his place. He was also paid for his services as trustee. The court a quo found that, unless it 
was decided that the trust was a sham, it could not order that the trust assets be taken into 
account in the calculation of the redistribution order and that it could not assume that the 
husband would be able to access trust property to satisfy the order. This is because, according 
to the lower court, the trust remained a separate entity and not the alter ego of the husband, 
who, despite wide powers being vested in him, did not abuse those powers.323 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held, after pointing out that it is incorrect to refer to a trust as a 
separate legal entity,324 that the separation of the estates of a trustee personally and in his 
capacity as trustee did not per se exclude trust assets from consideration in cases like these. In 
order successfully to include trust assets in the personal estate of a person (for example the 
settlor or trustee – in this case they were the same person), it has to be shown that the person 
had de facto control over the assets and that, were it not for the trust, the assets would have 
belonged to him personally.  
                                                      
320 Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C) para 34. 
321 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
322 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 515. 
323 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) para 7. 
324 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) para 8. 
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Combrinck AJA said that finding such control depended on two things: firstly, the terms of 
the trust deed and, secondly, the way in which the trust was administered.   
 
The judge had no doubt that Mr Badenhorst was in full control of the trust and used it as a 
vehicle for his business activities. He came to this conclusion by analysing both requirements 
mentioned above. The terms of the trust deed included Mr Badenhorst’s role as trustee 
together with his brother, who was not actively involved, and the fact that he could remove 
his brother and appoint another co-trustee should this be desired. The capital beneficiaries 
were the children of Mr Badenhorst, either by his first marriage or any subsequent marriage, 
whereas Mrs Badenhorst was only an income beneficiary. The rights of the beneficiaries 
would not vest until a date determined by the trustees (in other words, Mr Badenhorst). Mr 
Badenhorst had the power to amend the trust deed during his lifetime. The discretion of the 
trustees (in other words, Mr Badenhorst) in dealing with the trust assets was, therefore, 
unfettered. Furthermore, Mr Badenhorst was paid for his duties as trustee.325 
 
An examination of the second limb of Combrinck AJA’s test, the practical administration of 
the trust, also proved that Mr Badenhorst was in full control of the trust. He managed the trust 
assets without consulting or seeking the approval of his co-trustee, save in very few 
circumstances. He disregarded the separation of his personal estate and that of the trust, for 
example, by listing trust assets as his own in a personal credit application, or by insuring trust 
assets in his own name. The income he received from the businesses owned by the trust did 
not take account of the fact that the businesses were partly owned by the trust. Therefore, the 
judge found that, but for the trust, ownership of the assets would have vested in Mr 
Badenhorst.326 
 
The court referred to judgments of lower courts including Jordaan, 327  where similar 
conclusions were reached, and held that the value of the trust assets should be added to the 
value of Mr Badenhorst’s estate for purposes of the redistribution order.328 The amount Mr 
Badenhorst was ordered to pay to Mrs Badenhorst did not exceed his personal assets and the 
                                                      
325 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) para 10. 
326 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) para 11. 
327 Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
328 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) paras 12-13. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 285 
judge therefore did not have to make an order to go behind the trust, or to ignore the 
consequences or existence of the trust by effectively awarding Mrs Badenhorst trust assets.  
 
De Waal 329  and Shipley 330  are, however, of the view that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
effectively decided that the trust assets should be regarded as Mr Badenhorst’s on the basis 
that the trust was his alter ego and that this was, therefore, a case where the court went behind 
the trust form. The writer is in agreement with this view. 
 
4 3 3 3  WT v KT331 
 
Two further relevant cases in the context of divorce are the recent judgments of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in WT v KT332 and REM v VM,333 the latter effectively overturning the former 
with regard to who has locus standi to bring a claim for piercing the veneer of a trust. The 
lower court decisions334 will be referred to briefly as they contain more detail about the abuse 
of the trusts in question. Although in both instances the lower court found that the trusts were 
the alter egos of the settlors and that the trust assets should therefore be taken into account for 
purposes of the division of the marital assets, no decision to go behind the trust was taken by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
 
WT v KT 335  involved a marriage in community of property. WT, the husband, was the 
economic settlor of the trust in question, although his father was named as the founder in the 
trust documents. He and his brother were the trustees. The beneficiaries were WT’s issue. His 
spouse, KT, was not a beneficiary. It was clear that there was no distinction between the 
affairs of WT, the trust and the companies owned by the trust.336  
 
                                                      
329 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1079, 1090-1091. 
330 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 529. 
331 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA). 
332 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA). 
333 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA). 
334 T v T [2014] ZAGPJHC 245 (19 September 2014); M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 
2015). 
335 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA). 
336 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) paras 10-12, 17, 19. Examples of this include the operation by WT of his 
property development business through companies owned by the trust and the fact that WT used part of his 
inheritance from his father to repay a bank loan taken out by the trust and invested the remainder in an account 
in the name of one of the companies owned by the trust. 
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Ample evidence was provided to show that transactions entered into by the trust were very 
rarely properly recorded in trustee resolutions, and that WT’s brother as co-trustee did not 
apply an independent mind in relation to any of the trust’s affairs – he was in fact referred to 
as a “malleable trustee”.337 WT furthermore shifted funds between trust and personal bank 
accounts to cover his living costs, without any accounting or reconciliation in the books of the 
trust. The High Court judge found that, on the evidence, WT had no intention to divest 
himself of his wealth and instead misused the trust and its assets purely to suit himself and his 
objective of wealth creation. Accordingly, the court found that WT managed the trust 
exclusively at all relevant times338 and, therefore, that the assets of the trust were in fact those 
of WT and that the assets should form part of the joint estate to be divided on divorce.339 WT 
appealed against this decision. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal referred obiter to the averment that the trust was the alter ego 
of WT because, amongst other reasons, he controlled the trust purely for his own financial 
benefit.340 The court, however, disagreed with the order given by the trial court, not because 
they did not think that the settlor controlled the trust or that this should not result in taking the 
trust assets into account in the division, but because the court considered that KT lacked locus 
standi.341  
 
Mayat AJA referred to the principles of piercing the corporate veil as a starting point in his 
examination of the issue of “looking behind the veneer of the trust as the alter ego of WT”. 
He further referred to Cameron JA’s judgment in Parker342 where it was held that, where the 
trust form is debased, justice would require that the veneer of the trust be pierced in the 
interest of creditors. As an analogy to this but without specifically referring to Van Zyl,343 
(where unconscionability and dishonesty were explicitly referred to, albeit not as a 
requirement) Mayat AJA said that: 
 
                                                      
337 T v T [2014] ZAGPJHC 245 (19 September 2014) para 19. 
338 T v T [2014] ZAGPJHC 245 (19 September 2014) paras 29-47. 
339 T v T [2014] ZAGPJHC 245 (19 September 2014) para 47.  
340 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) para 27. 
341 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) para 32. 
342 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
343 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC). 
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“…[U]nconscionable abuse of the trust form through fraud, dishonesty or an 
improper purpose will justify looking behind the trust form.”344 
 
Smith remarks that “unconscionable abuse” is not required under the common law test for 
piercing the veil, borrowed from company law. That test is more flexible and dependent on 
the facts of each case. Furthermore, it is an exceptional remedy available only if there is no 
alternative. According to Smith, the use of “unconscionable abuse” as a requirement for going 
behind the trust allows any third party affected by such an abuse to bring a claim on that 
basis, regardless of whether an alternative remedy is available.345  
 
However, the court held that KT had no standing to challenge the management of the trust by 
WT because she was not a beneficiary of the trust and neither had she transacted with the 
trust.  
 
According to Mayat AJA, the effect of Cameron JA’s judgment in Parker 346  is that the 
separation of ownership and enjoyment of trust assets is important only to third parties who 
entered into transactions with the trust (and perhaps also to beneficiaries, given that Mayat 
AJA referred to both third parties and beneficiaries when he described KT’s lack of locus 
standi).347 The separation between control and enjoyment is, however, widely referred to as a 
fundamental requirement, or the core idea, of South African trust law, not only in relation to 
third parties, although they are most likely to be prejudiced by the lack thereof. It is submitted 
that the court in Parker348 did not intend to confine the class of persons with standing to bring 
a claim to go behind the trust in this way.349 
 
Finally, the court cast doubt on whether the discretion given to a court by the Divorce Act,350 
where this applied, was wide enough to order an effective transfer of assets from the trust 
estate to the joint estate of the parties, or whether the only possibility was to include the value 
of the assets in the calculation of the redistribution order.351 That is effectively what was done 
                                                      
344 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) para 31. 
345 Smith (2016) 41 JJS 68 73-76. 
346 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
347 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) paras 32-33. 
348 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
349 Du Toit (2015) 8 J Civ L Stud 655 658; Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 527. 
350 Divorce Act 70 of 1979 s 7(3). 
351 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) para 36. 
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in Badenhorst,352 but possibly only because Mr Badenhorst had sufficient assets in his own 
name to make the required payment to Mrs Badenhorst. It is not clear what would have been 
ordered if Mr Badenhorst did not have sufficient assets in his own name. It is, however, 
submitted that it would not be logical to include trust assets in the calculation of a 
redistribution order if those assets cannot be accessed, particularly in cases where there is not 
sufficient personal assets to make the required payment. 
 
4 3 3 4  REM v VM353 
 
The position taken by the Supreme Court of Appeal in WT v KT354 – that a person who is not a 
beneficiary of a trust (or did not transact with the trust) has no locus standi to attack that trust 
of which his or her spouse is the settlor and trustee – was overturned more recently by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in REM v VM.355 Amongst other claims made by the former spouse 
of REM in this case, one is relevant to this discussion, namely that a number of trusts set up 
by REM were his alter egos and that the assets of the trusts therefore in reality belonged to 
him.356 REM’s defence was that the trust assets could only be regarded as part of his own 
estate for purposes of the accrual if the trusts were either shams, which was not alleged, or if 
REM acted fraudulently in controlling the trusts.357  
 
The court a quo examined both the terms of the trusts and the practical administration thereof, 
based on the two-tiered test used by Combrinck AJA in Badenhorst,358 and found that the 
requirements for both tests were fulfilled.359 The court found that the terms of the trusts gave 
REM absolute control of the trusts so that he was not able to separate his estate from that of 
the trusts. He could add himself as a beneficiary of the trust, had full power to deal with the 
trust assets and had the power to decide which beneficiaries should benefit.360 Although the 
                                                      
352 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
353 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA). 
354 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA). 
355 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA). 
356 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 3(b). 
357 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 4(b). 
358 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
359 M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 2015) paras 73-74. 
360 M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 2015) para 76. 
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court did not explicitly state this, it was clear that REM was in a position to distribute all of 
the trust assets to himself.361  
 
As to the second limb of the test, and with reference to the requirement for separation 
between control and enjoyment of trust assets, the court found that REM controlled and 
conducted the trusts as vehicles for his personal and business activities. There was thus also 
no separation between the trust assets and his personal and business assets. 362  This was 
evidenced, for example, by the indiscriminate use by REM of trust and personal funds 
without reconciliation and the lack of trustee minutes recording trustee decisions.363 
 
The court considered the requirements for piercing the veil of a corporate entity with specific 
reference to improper conduct.364 It was averred on behalf of REM that, in casu, there was no 
misuse, abuse or unfair advantage and, therefore, the veil of the trust should not be pierced. 
This argument was rejected by the court a quo. It was held that the management and 
administration of the trusts did constitute improper conduct, allowing the court to enquire into 
the separation between the trust estate and that of the trustee personally.365 It was, therefore, 
decided that the assets of the trusts should be taken into account in determining the accrual of 
REM’s estate.366 REM appealed against this judgment. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal considered VM’s allegations that: (a) REM’s purpose in setting 
up the trusts was to defeat her matrimonial claims; (b) REM did not intend to transfer 
ownership of his personal assets to the trusts and was dealing with the trust assets as if they 
were his own; (c) REM failed to perform his fiduciary duties as trustee in a proper manner, 
evidenced by REM’s concessions that he intermingled trust and personal funds; and (d) REM 
transferred further assets to a trust after VM instituted divorce proceedings with the fraudulent 
intent to protect this asset from the divorce.367 
 
                                                      
361 This was also the conclusion of the English High Court in JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v 
Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) where, however, it was decided that the terms of the trust deed were not 
effective to divest the settlor of the beneficial ownership of the trust assets and therefore the trust was invalid. 
362 M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 2015) para 77. 
363 M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 2015) paras 78-84. 
364 M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 2015) para 88 where the court referred to Ebrahim v 
Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA). 
365 M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 2015) paras 89-91. 
366 M v M and Others [2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (4 February 2015) para 92. 
367 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) paras 15-16. 
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It was not disputed that the alter ego claim accepts that there is a valid trust and that no 
allegations of sham were made. Swain JA also quoted from Van Zyl v Kaye368 in describing 
the remedy of going behind a validly established trust or piercing the veneer of a validly 
established trust. It is described as an equitable remedy to address the consequences of an 
unconscionable abuse of the trust form. Furthermore, it will generally be given where “the 
trust form is used in a dishonest or unconscionable manner to evade a liability, or avoid an 
obligation”.369 However, in Van Zyl,370 Binns-Ward J used this description to indicate one of 
the types of circumstances where the remedy might be appropriate. He specifically said that 
defining applicable principles would likely be a difficult task, and probably did not intend to 
limit or define the circumstances where such a remedy would be applicable.371 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the conduct of REM referred to above in (a) to (d) 
was central to the determination of whether the veneer should be pierced. Where the 
separation of control and enjoyment is lacking, the veneer of the trust can be pierced in the 
interests of disadvantaged creditors and, by analogy, also where there is an unconscionable 
abuse through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose.372  
 
The court, however, disagreed with WT v KT373 that a spouse, who is not a beneficiary and not 
a third party who dealt with the trust, has no standing to attack the administration of a trust by 
the other spouse. The court felt that there is no basis in logic or principle to limit standing to 
those to whom a fiduciary responsibility is owed by the trustee (although a trustee does not 
owe a fiduciary responsibility, but rather a contractual duty, to a third party he contracted 
with) or to distinguish between a third party who transacted with the trust and a spouse with a 
matrimonial claim.374 It is submitted that this is correct.375 
 
The court held that a breach of fiduciary duty is not the determining factor. Instead, a claim 
lies against the errant trustee (who, it should be noted in this case, was also the settlor): 
 
                                                      
368 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC). 
369 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) paras 20-21; REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 17. 
370 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC). 
371 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) para 22. 
372 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 19. 
373 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA). 
374 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) paras 20-21. 
375 Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 526-528 makes the same argument. 
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“… on the basis that the unconscionable abuse of the trust form by the trustee, in his 
or her administration of the trust, through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose 
prejudices the enforcement of the obligation owed to the third party, or a spouse.”376 
 
In this case, a fraudulent or dishonest purpose of avoiding an obligation was, however, not 
established on the evidence. At most, the court felt that REM’s conduct could have led to his 
removal as trustee or to the appointment of an independent co-trustee.377 This indicates that 
extreme conduct would be required before a court will decide to go behind the trust or pierce 
the veil or veneer of the trust. 
 
4 3 4 Conclusion regarding South African case law review 
 
The cases examined above showcase the typical scenario where the settlor is also the 
dominant trustee and one of the beneficiaries, or at least able to appoint himself as a 
beneficiary.  
 
This echoes a similar concentration of powers and entitlements as seen in some English and 
offshore cases, where it has led to rulings ranging from invalidity to equating power with 
property – something analogous to the South African remedy of going behind the trust.378 
 
It has been noted before that the core idea of the trust under South African law is the 
separation of ownership or control over the trust assets from the enjoyment of those assets.379  
 
A reading of academic contributions and case law leaves little doubt that the common 
denominator in finding a theoretical basis for going behind the trust is non-compliance with 
this core idea of the trust. Smith further explains that the duty of a trustee to maintain a 
separation between trust property and his personal estate is a derivative of this core idea.380 
The concept of two separate estates is, according to De Waal, vital to South African trust law 
                                                      
376 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 20.  
377 REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 20. 
378 See ch 4 para 4 2 5. 
379 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 2; ch 4 para 4 3 2 1. 
380 Smith (2016) 41 JJS 68 69. 
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and explains why the common law trust can function in civil law jurisdictions where there is 
no dichotomy of legal and equitable ownership that protects the interests of beneficiaries.381 
 
In the type of circumstances found in the cases examined above, there is evidently no 
functional separation between control of the trust assets and enjoyment thereof. There is also 
no trustee independence. The settlor is also a trustee and one of the beneficiaries. His family 
members, the other beneficiaries, are unlikely to hold him to account. Where the core idea of 
the trust is debased to such an extent, it would be logical if the result of such a lack of 
separation had a profound effect and it would be entirely understandable for a divorcing 
spouse to request that trust assets are taken into account in the division of matrimonial 
assets.382  
 
The availability of the remedy of going behind the trust is now fairly undisputed in South 
African law. De Waal describes going behind the trust as a situation where the court ignores 
the separation of the trustee’s personal estate and that of the trust.383 Smith describes it as an 
equitable remedy, available where a valid trust has been abused as the result of a failure on 
the part of the trustees to adhere to their duties and where the core idea of the trust has thus 
been breached.384 Where there is no separation between control and enjoyment, why should its 
derivative, the separation of estates, be respected? 
 
Despite the availability of the remedy being undisputed, the exact requirements for a decision 
to go behind the trust and the consequences of such a finding are not entirely clear. It can only 
be hoped that, as more cases are considered by the courts, the law in this regard will become 
more certain. 
 
In all this, the importance of trustee independence – a corollary of the separation of control 
from enjoyment – cannot be overstated.385 This issue has particular relevance where the settlor 
is one of the trustees, in other words, where the person with control is also the one enjoying 
the trust property, as is often the case with South African trusts. De Waal points out that this 
                                                      
381 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1088. 
382 Du Toit (2015) 8 J Civ L Stud 655 657-658; Van der Linde (2012) 75 THRHR 371 379-380. 
383 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1079; Shipley (2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 509. 
384 Smith (2016) 41 JJS 68 76-77. 
385 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1079, 1090-1093; Du Toit (2015) 8 J Civ L Stud 655 658, 665-666; Shipley 
(2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 508 509; Van der Linde (2012) 75 THRHR 371 379-380. 
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multi-faceted role – settlor, trustee and beneficiary – has contributed greatly to this 
problem.386 It is submitted that this is correct.  
 
This is not to say that settlors of trusts elsewhere have no desire for control.  It was illustrated 
in the previous section that there are various alternative measures allowing the settlor of an 
English or offshore trust to exercise control over the trust. This may impact on trustee 
independence in a similar way. In fact, trustee independence emerges as a crucial component 
in the countering of settlor control.  
 
The need for such a balancing act was also illustrated in the examination of English and 
offshore cases above.387 A settlor may attempt to exercise control, but as long as the trustee 
exercised an independent mind in considering whether to execute the settlor’s wishes or 
instructions, the trustee would not be considered by a court to have abdicated his fiduciary 
duties. In light of this, one may argue that the level of trustee independence required is not 
particularly high and that more should be expected from a trustee in this regard. However, this 
appears to be the current state of affairs. 
 
In the South African context, where the settlor is a co-trustee, especially where he is also one 
of the beneficiaries, this requires even more rigorous independence on the part of the other 
trustees – but typically they do not display this characteristic, as they are lay persons without 
knowledge of trusts, and, furthermore, close family members of the dominant settlor-trustee.  
 
Cameron JA’s suggestion in Parker388 with regard to the need for an independent trustee was 
instrumental in the recent issuing of a Chief Master’s Directive389 (directive) dealing, amongst 
other things, with the appointment of an independent trustee. It appears to be required only 
where the trust is a so-called ‘family business trust’. This is described as a trust where the 
trustees have power to enter into transactions with third party creditors, the trustees are all 
beneficiaries and the beneficiaries are all related to one another.390  
 
                                                      
386 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1090. 
387 See ch 4 para 4 2. 
388 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) paras 34-36. 
389 Department: Justice and Constitutional Development Trusts: Dealing with Various Trust Matters (Chief 
Master’s Directive 2 of 2017) 13-16. 
390 See ch 2 para 4 3 4 2 where this type of arrangement is also mentioned. 
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The directive requires the Master to consider the appointment of an independent trustee where 
such a family business trust is registered with the Master for the first time.391 It is submitted 
that the scope for abuse of the trust is higher in such cases and the appointment of a truly 
independent trustee should aid in reducing such abuse. The directive does not apply to 
existing trusts and affords the Master some discretion, depending on the circumstances of the 
case, as to whether an independent trustee must in fact be appointed or not.392 
 
A description is provided of what constitutes an independent trustee. Crucially, the 
independent trustee must not have any family relationship with any of the other trustees, the 
settlor or the beneficiaries nor can he have an interest in the trust assets. Although there is no 
requirement for the independent trustee to be a professional person, he must be competent to 
review the conduct of non-independent trustees, he must be knowledgeable about the law of 
trusts, he must have knowledge and experience of the business field in which the trust 
operates and he must also be aware that he may be liable for breach of trust should he fail to 
act as an independent trustee.393  
 
It is submitted that only certain professional individuals or corporate entities active in the 
field of trust administration would be able to fulfill these requirements. Even for them, having 
knowledge of the field of business in which the trust is active may be difficult if this is, for 
example, an agricultural business. This may admittedly not be a strictly necessary 
requirement, as the trustees may appoint an expert in the field to advise them where required, 
just as they would do with investment advice.  
 
The directive also contains provisions relating to the nomination, resignation and 
remuneration of the independent trustee.  
 
The directive can be considered a vital step in the right direction, although the practical affect 
is, of course, still unknown. The review of South African case law leaves no doubt that an 
increase in the proportion of trusts, particularly family business trusts, with an independent 
trustee should contribute greatly to the prevention of abuse of the trust form.  
                                                      
391 Department: Justice and Constitutional Development Trusts: Dealing with Various Trust Matters (Chief 
Master’s Directive 2 of 2017) 13. 
392 Department: Justice and Constitutional Development Trusts: Dealing with Various Trust Matters (Chief 
Master’s Directive 2 of 2017) 14. 
393 Department: Justice and Constitutional Development Trusts: Dealing with Various Trust Matters (Chief 
Master’s Directive 2 of 2017) 13-14. 
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As in England and offshore jurisdictions, South African courts do not easily decide to go 
behind a validly constituted trust, precisely because it goes against well-established principles 
of trust law holding that trust assets do not form part of the estate of either the settlor or the 
trustee personally. It ignores the normal consequences of a valid trust.  
 
The consequences of going behind the trust should be differentiated from the consequences of 
a sham trust.394 Where no valid trust came into existence (either because the settlor lacked the 
necessary intention to create a trust or because the settlor and the trustee shared the intention 
to create something other than a trust, despite giving the appearance of intending to create a 
trust), the assets are deemed to belong to the settlor because he did not properly divest himself 
of the ownership thereof. Where, on the other hand, a valid trust comes into existence, the 
beneficiaries acquire certain rights in respect of the trust assets. A court cannot simply ignore 
the consequences of the trust and the existence of these rights by ruling that the assets still 
belong to the settlor.395 
 
Smith argues that this may go some way to explain the uncertainty regarding going behind the 
trust in divorce proceedings (although there is not necessarily more clarity in other scenarios, 
such as creditor claims). Is a decision to take trust assets into account in determining the value 
of a trustee-spouse’s estate the result of going behind the trust form, or is it the result of a 
judicial discretion to redistribute assets in terms of the Divorce Act?396 If the latter, does that 
mean that trust assets cannot be taken into account in matrimonial regimes not governed by 
that legislation?397 
 
Badenhorst398 may well be interpreted as an example of a court going behind the trust as a 
result of the effective control exercised by the settlor (based on the provisions of the trust 
deed and the practical administration of the trust), but recent judgments399 have cast doubt on 
the basis for the order made in Badenhorst.400 
                                                      
394 De Waal (2012) 76 RabelsZ 1078 1079; Smith (2016) 41 JJS 68 77. 
395 Similar comments were made in In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 421; see also ch 4 
para 4 2 2 2 where this case is discussed. 
396 Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
397 Smith (2016) 41 JJS 68 77. 
398 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
399 WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA); REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA). 
400 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
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The writer is not aware of instances where trusts were found to be shams or invalid due to 
excessive control by the settlor. Much of the focus in South African law is on the issue of 
going behind the trust, or piercing the veil, and the requirements for and consequences of such 
a decision. 
  
It does indeed appear that it is more difficult under South African law to establish a case of 
abuse of trust that justifies a court to ignore the consequences of the trust. As mentioned 
above, recent case law 401 indicates that fraud or dishonesty and avoiding an obligation or 
evading a duty may now be required before a court would go behind the trust, even if it were 
clear that the settlor treated the trust as his alter ego. However, this requirement appears to be 
premised on the party bringing the claim not being owed a fiduciary duty by the trustee. It is 
not clear whether these elements would also be required if a claim was made by a beneficiary, 
to whom the trustee does, in fact, owe a fiduciary duty. It is, however, unlikely that 
beneficiaries would bring an action for going behind the trust – this would most likely 
prejudice their interests – and a claim against the trustee for a breach of trust may be more 
appropriate. 
 
5 Conclusion and next steps 
 
From a comparative perspective, the issue of settlor control illustrates interesting similarities 
as well as divergences. Settlors’ desire for more control is common across the jurisdictions 
under review. Retaining control over assets transferred to a trust can be achieved in a variety 
of ways. Although it does not necessarily affect the validity or effectiveness of a trust, in 
many cases it does. Judging the acceptable level of control that a settlor can retain appears to 
be more of an art than a science. 
 
Validity is at stake where the settlor did not have the required intention to transfer beneficial 
or equitable ownership of the trust assets to the trustee. In addition, a trust will also be invalid 
if it is found to be a sham, namely where the settlor and trustee both intended to dress another 
type of legal relationship up as a trust. Recent case law suggests that this result is more than a 
theoretical possibility. 
                                                      
401 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC); REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 297 
 
In other cases, a valid trust may come into existence, but its effectiveness and consequences 
may be compromised if the settlor exercises too much control over the trust. How much 
control is too much? 
 
In the context of English and offshore law, it appears the answer to this question depends on 
the quantity and quality of control exercised by the trustee. Settlor control is typically 
achieved by reserving certain powers, normally exercised by the trustee, to the settlor or to a 
protector controlled by the settlor. Only if the trustee were to abdicate all fiduciary 
responsibility and fail to exercise an independent mind would a court decide to pierce the 
veneer of the trust and to ignore the fact that the trust assets belong to the trustee qua trustee, 
and not to the settlor. The result is that trust assets may be made available to meet the 
demands of creditors, tax authorities or divorcing spouses. Thus, trustee independence is 
paramount, but the standard required does not appear to be very rigorous. 
 
From a South African perspective, settlor control is often achieved by the settlor acting as a 
co-trustee, frequently being the dominant trustee in an environment where the other trustees 
are family members. As one would expect the trustee to exercise control over the trust assets, 
it is not a straightforward question of the settlor (who is also the trustee) having too much 
control. The pertinent question is whether the settlor-trustee exercises his powers in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries as a whole, or whether he treats the trust as an extension of his 
personal or business assets and exercises those powers to further his own interests. One 
should ask whether the co-trustees are actively and independently involved in decisions 
relating to the trust, or whether the settlor-trustee effectively takes all decisions alone. Again, 
trustee independence is crucial in determining the integrity of the trust. 
 
In neither of the jurisdictions under review is it entirely clear when a court will decide to look 
behind a trust, or pierce the veneer of the trust. It is, however, evident that trusts and the legal 
consequences following from trusts are well respected and such a decision will not be taken 
lightly. 
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Where trustee independence is compromised, the essence of the trust is compromised. The 
core values referred to earlier in this dissertation 402  are the embodiment of essential 
requirements that are conspicuously absent in the type of circumstances described above. 
 
To follow on these conclusions, the next, final, chapter will look, amongst other things, at the 
interrelationship between settlor control and trustee liability. To what extent can a trustee who 
allows a settlor too much control over a validly constituted trust be liable towards 
beneficiaries who were disadvantaged by the ineffectiveness of the trust? Can such a trustee 
be guilty of a breach of trust? Should an exoneration clause relieve the trustee from liability? 
Furthermore, the final chapter will look at what the rise in settlor control and limitation of 
trustee liability may mean for the traditional concept of the trust and for the trust industry as 
such. Is a trust still a trust if the settlor exercises broad powers and the trustee is only 
accountable to a very limited extent? Finally, can South African law benefit from the 
developments seen in other jurisdictions? 
                                                      
402 See ch 2 para 5; ch 3 para 1; ch 4 para 1 1.  









The phenomena examined in the previous chapters – settlor control and exclusion of trustee 
liability for breach of trust – are both fairly contemporary developments of the traditional trust 
concept. They are often, but not always, simultaneously present. Chapter 4 has illustrated that 
settlor control can, in certain circumstances, lead to the invalidity of a trust, or to a court 
going behind the trust, although the requirements that lead to such a result are strict and, to 
some extent, unclear. Trustee behaviour, and the need for trustee independence (especially in 
the South African context), emerged as crucial factors in such cases.1 
 
This chapter concludes the study of these topics. It looks at whether a trustee can be liable for 
breach of trust in cases where excessive settlor control is present (whether or not a court may 
decide to go behind the trust). If that is the case, can and should the trustee escape liability for 
such breach of trust as a result of provisions in the trust deed? It asks whether such an 
arrangement can still be called a trust or whether it pushes the boundaries of the trust too far. 
Possible consequences of these developments for the trust industry and potential alternative 
solutions are touched upon, as well as whether South African trust law can benefit from 
developments seen elsewhere. 
 
It may be helpful at this juncture to refer back to the core values identified at the end of 
chapter 22 and referred to throughout this dissertation. These pan-jurisdictional themes may be 
useful as a framework against which to evaluate the questions raised in this chapter. The core 
values that have been identified are the following: 
 
(a) although trusts can be analysed both in terms of obligation or property, and both 
dimensions need to be present in order to have a trust, an analysis focusing on 
                                                      
1 See ch 4 para 5. 
2 See ch 2 para 5. 
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obligation may have certain benefits, particularly in view of the discussion in this 
chapter; 
 
(b) an irreducible core of duties owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries must be 
present for a valid trust to exist – this can be referred to as the irreducible core of 
the trust; 
 
(c) flowing from this is the fact that the beneficiaries must be able to enforce the trust 
and hold the trustee to account for the fulfilment of his duties; 
 
(d) the trustee has an overarching duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, 
and not in furtherance of his own interest. This flows from his position as a 
fiduciary; 
 
(e) there must be a functional separation between ownership or control over trust 
assets and the enjoyment of the assets; and 
 
(f) as a derivative of this separation, some jurisdictions recognise a separate estate of 
trust assets, distinct from the personal assets of the trustee. 
 
The following conclusions have already been drawn. As a result of changing social and 
economic conditions, the increased use of the trust by settlors from civil law countries (who 
may not understand the nature of a trust), and the flexible and unregulated nature of the trust, 
the common law trust has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis over the last few decades: 
from an arrangement aimed at protecting and providing for beneficiaries, into an investment 
vehicle at the behest of the settlor. It is clear that this may be putting the interests of the trust 
beneficiaries at risk. At the same time, it has been noted that, as a result of the way in which 
modern trust deeds are used and drafted, the rights of beneficiaries are in any event becoming 
increasingly tenuous.3  
 
It may even be argued that the reluctance to go behind the trust has its roots in a desire to 
respect the trust as a legal institution and to promote certainty in relation to the use of trusts, 
                                                      
3 See ch 4 para 3 1.  
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rather than with protecting the interests of beneficiaries who, in many cases, only have a very 
remote chance of benefitting.  
 
If the beneficiaries named in the trust deed are unlikely to remain beneficiaries in the long run 
and ultimately benefit from the trust, it is hard to quantify their interest and it may not matter 
if that interest is exposed to high levels of risk. However, should such an arrangement take the 
form of a family trust, which was conceived as an arrangement to protect beneficiaries? 
 
The questions raised above will now be examined in more detail. 
 
2 Settlor control, breach of trust and exclusion of trustee liability towards 
beneficiaries: do the core values remain? 
 
2 1 Introductory remarks 
 
2 1 1 Settlor control and breach of trust 
 
Attempts to go behind the trust on the basis of settlor control are typically made, not by 
beneficiaries, but by creditors, tax authorities or divorcing spouses. In the case of a creditor, it 
would usually be where the settlor does not own sufficient assets in his own name to satisfy 
his debt to that creditor. In the case of divorce, the settlor’s spouse would normally allege that 
the trust assets should be taken into account in determining the pot that should be divided. 
The spouse may or may not be a beneficiary of the trust. In these cases, settlor control 
indicates a reluctance of the settlor to divest himself of beneficial ownership of the trust 
assets, or, in the South African context, disrespect for the separation between control and 
enjoyment of trust assets. This makes the trust more vulnerable to being attacked by third 
parties. 
 
Whether or not the third party is successful, what is the position of beneficiaries of the trust 
who suffered loss as a result of the trustee allowing the settlor too much control? It is 
submitted that such behaviour can, in certain circumstances, constitute a breach of trust on the 
part of the trustee. 
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It is clear that if the trustee allows, for example, decisions regarding the investment of the 
trust assets to be made by a settlor or protector who is not suitably qualified and, as a result, 
there is a financial loss to the trust fund, the beneficiaries would be able to bring a claim for 
breach of trust against the trustee.  
 
Arguably, beneficiaries can also suffer financial loss if a court decides to go behind the trust 
and the trust fund or a part thereof is applied towards, for example, the satisfaction of the 
settlor’s debt. Can beneficiaries in such a scenario claim that the trustee committed a breach 
of trust and should therefore make good their loss?  
 
If one takes the view that abdicating fiduciary responsibility and not applying an independent 
mind are breaches of trust,4 and if there was a loss to the trust fund occasioned by that breach, 
then, under the principles examined in chapter 3, the trustee should be held liable. This may 
not be the case where the settlor has a power of revocation, as the exercise of that power 
would have meant that the beneficiaries do not benefit at all. The case of an irrevocable trust 
would, however, be different. 
 
It has been shown that trustee duties generally extend to all beneficiaries, even discretionary 
or contingent beneficiaries. If, however, the terms of the trust deed imply that the 
beneficiary’s interest is nothing more than nebulous,5 it would be difficult to hold the trustee 
to account in the way suggested above – the core value of accountability would be lacking. 
 
2 1 2 Exclusion of liability for breach of trust 
 
However, in all these cases, if one assumes that there is an actionable breach of trust, to what 
extent can – and should – trustee exoneration or exculpation clauses6 protect the trustee? What 
is the core of trustee duties and accountability that remains in such a case? 
 
                                                      
4 Examples of case law where this statement was made include In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 
188] 239-240; A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) paras 42-43; Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) 
465. 
5 Some offshore trust deeds, known as “Red Cross trusts” or “blind trusts”, name only a charity as beneficiary in 
the trust deed, with a power for the trustees, settlor or protector to add and remove beneficiaries as is deemed 
suitable in the circumstances. See ch 2 para 3 6 3.  
6 See ch 3 para 5. 
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When a trustee (who is not the settlor) is faced with a settlor who wishes to exercise powers 
over the trust in one of the ways described in chapter 4,7 it is natural for the trustee to be 
concerned about his liability towards the beneficiaries. The accountability of a trustee towards 
the beneficiaries is crucial to the existence of a trust, but equally, if the trustee is not able to 
exercise a certain power, why should he be liable if the exercise of that power by someone 
else causes loss?  
 
Different jurisdictions have different thresholds for the exclusion of trustee liability in trust 
deeds. In addition, some methods of affording the settlor more control automatically reduce 
the accountability of the trustee towards the beneficiaries by excluding trustee liability for 
breach of trust. Unless someone else becomes accountable to the beneficiaries, it is submitted 
that in these cases the irreducible core of the trust is most at risk. 
 
The following constitutes a brief comparative summary of the findings so far and how they 
relate to these questions. 
 
2 2 England 
 
2 2 1 Fiduciary position of the trustee 
 
The fiduciary duty of a trustee under English law generally relates to avoiding conflicts 
between his personal interests and those of the beneficiaries of the trust, and not making an 
unauthorised profit from his position as trustee. It requires the trustee to be loyal and faithful.8  
 
Beneficiaries of the trust can hold the trustee to account for the proper administration of the 
trust and can bring a claim for a loss caused by a breach of trust.9 In fact, so important is the 
accountability of a trustee to the beneficiaries that it has been held that: 
 
“If the beneficiaries have no rights enforceable against the trustees, there are no 
trusts.”10 
 
                                                      
7 See ch 4 para 3 2. 
8 See ch 3 para 2 1 2. 
9 See ch 2 paras 2 4 2, 2 6 5, 3 5 5, 4 3 5 5. 
10 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 304 
2 2 2 Duty of care 
 
Although the above is quite a powerful statement, the same judge went on to state that 
honesty and good faith are sufficient to give substance to a trust, and that the core obligation 
of a trustee under English law does not include the duties of skill, care, prudence and 
diligence.11 It is also the case that the duty of care is not regarded a fiduciary duty under 
English trust law.12  
 
The English duty of care and skill evolved out of the 20th century prudent man of business 
rule and was codified in the Trustee Act 2000.13 As explained below, the prudent man of 
business test may in theory be argued to imply a less rigorous standard than the more 
paternalistic rules out of which the duty of care evolved in Jersey and South Africa.  
 
In mitigation of this, it is now generally accepted that a higher standard of care is expected of 
a professional trustee who holds himself out as having specialist skills and expertise, than of a 
layperson who acts out of a sense of moral or family duty.14 However, in response to the 
introduction of this higher standard, it is now also common practice to include a clause in the 
trust deed that excludes the duty of a trustee to interfere in the management of a company 
owned by it, unless the trustee has actual knowledge of dishonesty by the managers of the 
company.15 Furthermore, it is possible to exclude the duty of care altogether. Although this 
may not occur frequently in practice, particularly where a professional trustee is involved, it 
remains the case that the core obligation of a trustee under English law does not include the 
duties of skill, care, prudence and diligence.16  
 
2 2 3 Settlor control 
 
The settlor of an English law trust can reserve certain powers to himself or to a protector. 
However, extensive reservation of powers may defeat the objective for which the trust was set 
up, be it tax mitigation or asset protection, and therefore this is not a common occurrence. 
There is no specific legislation allowing the reservation of broad powers to the settlor, as 
                                                      
11 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253-254; ch 2 para 2 6 3. 
12 See ch 3 paras 2 1 2, 2 1 3. 
13 See ch 3 para 2 1 3. 
14 The landmark case in this regard is Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 139. 
15 See ch 3 para 2 1 3 1. 
16 Armitage v Nurse (1998) Ch 241 253-254. 
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found in many offshore jurisdictions. 17 A settlor who wishes to reserve wide powers will 
presumably choose the law of one of these offshore jurisdictions to govern the trust, rather 
than English law. 
 
Recent case law in England and other onshore common law jurisdictions, such as New 
Zealand, substantiates the premise that a settlor (or a protector who acts in accordance with 
his wishes) cannot reserve extensive powers to himself or a protector without jeopardising the 
validity of the trust. This can be either because the settlor had no intention to part with the 
beneficial ownership of the assets, or because the trust was a sham.18 Alternatively, as was 
decided in New Zealand recently, a concentration of powers and entitlements in the settlor 
could result in the powers being equated to ownership of the trust assets, with the result that 
the trust assets are exposed to claims made against the settlor personally.19 In such cases it is 
clear that there is no, or extremely little, accountability of the trustee towards the 
beneficiaries, and no separation of control and enjoyment of trust assets. Thus, the core values 
are being threatened. 
 
English courts appear hesitant to ignore validly constituted trusts, although in the context of 
divorce it is not unheard of that trust assets are attributed to a settlor on the basis that the 
assets are a resource available to him, and control exercised by the settlor could be a 
contributing factor in this regard.20 In practice, one may argue that this has the same effect as 
“piercing the veil” of the trust. 
 
2 2 4 Breach of trust 
 
In other divorce cases, the English High Court has indicated that where a trustee allows a 
settlor to exercise control over a validly constituted trust, this does not affect the validity of 
the trust (or, at least, it cannot turn the trust into a sham), but may expose the trustee to a 
claim for breach of trust.21  
                                                      
17 See ch 4 para 2 1 1. 
18 JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) discussed in ch 4 para 4 2 2 
4. 
19 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 discussed in ch 4 para 4 2 3 3. 
20 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503. 
21 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam). In this case, the court said that it cannot compel a trustee to transfer trust assets 
to a spouse to fulfil his financial obligations on divorce. However, the spouse did not exercise control over trust 
assets to the same extent as in other cases, which may explain the different result. 
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English law distinguishes between breach of trust (an unauthorised or inadequate action of the 
trustee) and breach of fiduciary duty (which is what the phrase implies).22  
 
Liability for an unauthorised action or breach of fiduciary duty is strict. However, in the case 
of an authorised but inadequate action of the trustee, loss and a causal link between the breach 
of trust and the loss are required in order to succeed with a breach of trust claim.23  
 
The writer has not been able to find clear authority on whether allowing excessive settlor 
control is a breach of fiduciary duty, an unauthorised action or an authorised but inadequate 
action. It is submitted that much may depend on the factual circumstances of each case. 
However, an argument that allowing the settlor too much control is a breach of fiduciary duty 
is not untenable. In any event, if there was loss and a causal link, the trustee could be guilty of 
a breach of trust either way.  
 
Although objects of a discretionary trust do not have proprietary rights under English law, 
they do have personal rights and can enforce the obligations owed to them by the trustee.24 It 
would, therefore, appear that a breach of trust claim can be brought by beneficiaries with 
fixed or vested interests as well as those with a mere hope of benefitting. However, if a 
beneficiary were to be removed from the class of beneficiaries, he can no longer bring such a 
claim, and herein lies a weakening of his position. 
 
2 2 5 Exoneration clauses 
 
As far as the exclusion or limitation of liability for breach of trust is concerned, it is possible 
under English law to exclude liability for all but dishonest breaches of trust, namely fraud or 
wilful wrongdoing. A trustee of a trust governed by English law is thus able to exclude 
liability for negligence and even gross negligence.25 The background to and operation of these 
clauses were discussed in chapter 3. Although there is no statutory requirement for a trustee to 
                                                      
22 See ch 3 para 3 1 1. 
23 See ch 3 para 3 1 2. 
24 See ch 2 para 2 6 5. 
25 Spread Trustee Company Limited v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13. The irreducible core of the trust is not 
regarded under English law as including the duty to act with care and skill (which duty can, in fact, be excluded 
from a trust deed altogether), which may go some way towards explaining the ability of a trustee to exclude 
liability for gross negligence. See ch 3 para 5 1. 
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make a settlor aware of such a clause in a trust deed, it is generally expected that a 
professional trustee would do so.26 
 
If one assumes that a trustee may be exposed to a claim for breach of trust by allowing the 
settlor to control the trust, the question is whether an exoneration clause excluding liability for 
gross negligence can (and should) relieve the trustee from such liability.  
 
If allowing the settlor too much control was a fraudulent or wilful act on the part of the 
trustee, the trustee cannot be protected in this way. However, in cases of negligence or even 
gross negligence, it would be possible for the trustee to escape liability.  
 
2 2 6 Do the core values remain? 
 
The diverging views regarding the acceptability of exoneration clauses were discussed in 
chapter 3.27 Using the core values identified in chapter 228 as a benchmark, it can at least be 
argued that a trust deed that excludes the duty of care or liability for gross negligence falls 
short of those requirements and is leaning towards a contractual arrangement. Where a 
trustee, acting in a grossly negligent way, allows a settlor too much control and in the process 
abdicates his fiduciary responsibility towards the beneficiaries, it would indeed seem contrary 
to the core values identified earlier to allow such a trustee to escape liability for his breach of 
fiduciary duty on the basis of an exoneration clause in the trust deed.  
 
Although many hold the view that the current position falls short of safeguarding the 
irreducible core of the trust, neither the judiciary nor the legislature has yet taken a firmer 







                                                      
26 See ch 3 para 5 1. 
27 See ch 3 para 5 4. 
28 See ch 2 para 5. 
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2 3 Jersey and other offshore jurisdictions 
 
2 3 1 Fiduciary position of the trustee  
 
The position of the trustee as fiduciary under Jersey law bears a close resemblance to the 
position under English law and does not require further elaboration at this point.29  
 
 2 3 2 Duty of care 
 
Although it is not entirely clear whether the duty of care is considered a fiduciary duty, it does 
appear to be the case, differentiating Jersey law from English law in this respect.30 
 
The duty for a trustee under Guernsey customary law to act en bon père de famille likely 
applies in Jersey as well, and requires the trustee to exhibit utmost care.31 It may be argued 
that this duty implies a higher standard than the prudent man of business test of English law. 
It may also explain why under Jersey and Guernsey law it is not possible to exclude either the 
duty of care or liability for gross negligence, as is the case in England.32  
 
On the other hand, as in English trust deeds, it is common practice in offshore trust deeds to 
include a clause allowing the trustee not to interfere with the management of a company 
owned by it unless it has actual knowledge of misconduct of the directors or officers of that 
company. 
 
2 3 3 Settlor control 
 
The most popular methods of ensuring settlor control, from an offshore perspective, revolve 
round the reservation of certain powers – traditionally exercised by the trustee – to the settlor. 
The appointment of a protector, who could be the settlor himself or someone he knows and 
trusts and who has specific powers over the trust, is another widely accepted method of 
securing an enduring influence over the trust,33 as is the use of a private trust company where 
                                                      
29 See ch 3 para 2 2 1. 
30 See ch 3 para 2 4. 
31 Clarry (2014) 1 JGLR paras 15-16. 
32 See ch 3 paras 2 2 2 , 2 2 3, 5 2 1, 5 2 2. 
33 See ch 4 para 3 2 4. 
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the settlor or his representative can have a seat on the board of the trust company. 34 This 
dissertation has, however, focused on reserved powers trusts, particularly as such trusts also 
allow a trustee to escape liability for breach of trust, and therefore are in stark contrast with 
the traditional trust concept. 
 
Many offshore jurisdictions have introduced legislation specifically designed for this purpose. 
It is widely accepted that the introduction of reserved powers legislation was aimed at 
attracting more business to the relevant offshore centres, in the same way as the innovative 
legislation regarding non-charitable purpose trusts35 and a statutory Hastings-Bass rule.36  The 
reserved powers legislation is aimed, firstly, at ensuring the validity of a trust in which the 
trustee may retain very little power, and, secondly, at exonerating the trustee from liability if 
he acts in accordance with the powers exercised by the settlor.37  
 
This demonstrates the inherent defect of reserved powers trusts: without this special 
legislation they would not be valid common law trusts and it would be virtually impossible to 
find a willing trustee.   
 
2 3 4 Breach of trust 
 
Jersey law defines breach of trust as a breach of any duty imposed on the trustee by law or the 
terms of the trust.38 
 
Case law has established that a trustee who abdicates all fiduciary responsibility could be held 
liable for breach of trust (rather than allow a court to pierce the veil of the trust and expose 
trust assets – held for the benefit of the beneficiaries – to claims by creditors of the settlor, 
which courts appear reluctant to do).39 It is not entirely clear whether it is required to prove 
loss and causation in order to succeed with a breach of trust claim under Jersey law, but there 
would have to be at least evidence that a profit would have accrued to the trust in the absence 
of the breach.40  
                                                      
34 See ch 4 para 3 2 2. 
35 See ch 2 para 3 4 3. 
36 See ch 3 para 4 2 2 1. 
37 See ch 4 para 3 2 1. 
38 See ch 3 para 3 2 1. 
39 In the matter of the Esteem Settlement [2003 JLR 188] 239-240. 
40 See ch 3 para 3 2 2. 
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It has been established that, under Jersey law, objects of discretionary trusts have the same 
standing to seek relief for the protection of their rights as beneficiaries with fixed and 
transmissible interests.41 The relief granted will, of course, depend on the court’s discretion. 
However, a breach of trust claim can in principle be brought by a beneficiary who merely 
forms part of a discretionary class, provided, needless to say, that the person forms part of that 
class at the relevant time. 
 
2 3 5 Exoneration clauses 
 
Given the importance of the duty of care, and the fact that liability for gross negligence 
cannot be excluded, it appears prima facie that the Jersey law approach to trustee liability may 
be stricter than in England.42 This would be the case for trusts that do not reserve extensive 
powers to the settlor, but because the Jersey trust law43 allows such reservation of powers and 
at the same time excludes trustee liability for breach of trust, this position is effectively 
nullified. 
 
From the point of view of the trustee, it is understandable that he would not want to be liable 
for a breach of trust caused by a party other than himself. This explains why the most 
important feature of offshore reserved powers trusts, from the trustee’s perspective, is the 
statutory limitation of trustee liability. Provided that the power exercised by the settlor is one 
reserved to him, under the designer legislation of offshore jurisdictions, a trustee who acts in 
accordance with this is not acting in breach of trust.44  
 
However, in such a scenario, the accountability of the trustee towards the beneficiaries is 
severely limited. The overriding fiduciary duty of the trustee to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries has no substance, as his function becomes more closely assimilated with that of 
a mere administrator. Can there still be a trust, especially if the person to whom extensive 
powers are reserved can exercise those powers in a personal, rather than fiduciary, capacity?45  
 
                                                      
41 Brown The Jersey Law of Trusts 116-117; Freeman v Ansbacher Trustees (Jesey) Limited [2009 JLR 1]. 
42 See ch 3 para 5 2 1. 
43 Trusts (Amendment No 4) (Jersey) Law 2006. 
44 See ch 4 para 3 2 1 1. 
45 See ch 4 para 3 2 1 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 311 
The reserved powers trust may at first sight appear to be a clever invention – and is certainly 
very much in demand with settlors who use a trust more as a tax-efficient, confidential 
investment vehicle than a succession planning arrangement. It is, however, not clear whether, 
if a foreign court is faced with a claim that such a trust is invalid, or that the trustee should be 
held liable for breach of trust, these statutory protections would prevail. A foreign court may 
find that the trust is invalid on the basis that the settlor did not divest himself of the beneficial 
ownership of the assets, or the trustee could be held liable for a breach of trust 
notwithstanding the provisions of the offshore legislation on the basis that he abdicated his 
fiduciary responsibilities. 
 
To the writer’s knowledge, offshore reserved powers trusts have not yet been subjected to the 
scrutiny of a foreign court. This constitutes one of the fundamental limitations of such trusts, 
particularly where assets are kept outside the jurisdiction of the governing law. As trusts 
governed by the law of a particular offshore jurisdiction are very rarely created by settlors 
resident in that jurisdiction, and the trust assets would often be located elsewhere, it is 
submitted that this constitutes a serious disadvantage.  
 
In addition, many offshore jurisdictions, not least Jersey and Guernsey as British Crown 
Dependencies, are increasingly imposing regulatory requirements on professional trustees.46 
The effect of this is that a trustee subject to these requirements must have professional 
oversight of the trust assets and activities undertaken in relation to the assets, regardless of 
whether his powers in relation to those assets have been restricted.47 The trustee cannot stand 
back when the trust or the assets are managed in a way that is detrimental to the beneficiaries 
of the trust.48 This means that even if, on paper, all trustee liability is excluded, in practice that 
may not be the case. This leads to increasing uncertainty in relation to the use of these trusts, 
as described below. 
 
 
                                                      
46 A person carrying on trust business in or from within Jersey, or holding himself out as doing so, must be 
registered under the Financial Services (Jersey) Law 1998 and is subject to ongoing regulatory oversight. The 
regulator, the Jersey Financial Services Commission is responsible for the licensing, regulation and ongoing 
supervision of the financial services industry (Anonymous http://jerseyfsc.org (accessed 29-06-2018)). 
47 Of course, it should be noted that a reserved powers trust governed by Jersey law does not have to have a 
Jersey-resident trustee, and the jurisdiction where the trustee is resident may not always impose regulatory 
oversight requirements of the type described here. 
48 Careful drafting of such trust deeds is, in fact, required to ensure that the trustee is able to take action when 
necessary, in order to avoid the trustee having to apply to court in order to be able to intervene. 
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2 3 6 Do the core values remain? 
 
Arguably, a trust with the characteristics mentioned above resembles a contract between the 
settlor and trustee more than a trust arrangement characterised by the core values referred to 
above. In such a scenario the settlor and trustee agree on the parameters of their relationship 
with very little constraint.49 Adding to that the ease with which beneficiaries of offshore trusts 
can usually be removed or added, the trust appears to be a vehicle not for their benefit, but to 
make it possible for the settlor to make and control investments with the additional benefits of 
tax mitigation and confidentiality.  
 
It is submitted that in such situations there remains very little, if any, of the irreducible core of 
the trust, and neither is there much separation between control and enjoyment of the trust 
assets, particularly if the settlor is a beneficiary. The overriding duty of a trustee to act in the 
best interests of the beneficiaries all but disappears. 
 
That does not mean that, in practice, a trustee of such a trust necessarily abdicates all 
fiduciary responsibility even if he is allowed to do so under the applicable offshore trust law. 
This may be because there is doubt regarding the extra-jurisdictional recognition of such 
trusts, because regulatory stipulations may require the trustee to have more oversight than the 
law requires of him, because he may expose himself to a claim for breach of trust, or because 
of reputational concerns. It is, however, the legal position.  
 
In those circumstances where the English courts have had to deal with discretionary trusts 
governed by offshore law (albeit that a reserved powers trust has not yet been the subject of 
such litigation), it is clear from the judges’ comments, many of them obiter, that there is very 
little appetite for allowing settlors to use offshore trusts for improper purposes, be that tax 
evasion or hiding assets from creditors or spouses.50 One can expect this trend to continue 




                                                      
49 As illustrated in ch 4 para 3 2 1, the list of powers that can be reserved is extensive. 
50 Hudson Equity and Trusts 919; Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709 para 1; Minwalla v Minwalla 
and DM Investments SA, Midfield Management SA and CI Law Trustees Ltd [2004] EWHC 2823 (Fam) para 1. 
51 See ch 1 para 2 2 2. 
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2 4 South Africa  
 
2 4 1 Fiduciary position of the trustee 
 
South African trust law follows its English counterpart as far as the fiduciary position of a 
trustee is concerned. The duties of loyalty and good faith find resonance in South African case 
law. It has, in fact, been argued that, because the duty of care is so clearly described as 
fiduciary under South African law, it goes even further than English law.52  
 
2 4 2 Duty of care 
 
The duty of care appears to have evolved from the Roman-Dutch concept of acting as bonus 
et diligens paterfamilias.53 This seems more closely linked to the duty to act en bon père de 
famille found in Guernsey and Jersey customary law,54 as it clearly concerns the management 
of the affairs of someone with whom the trustee stands in a relationship of trust, rather than 
the English law prudent man of business55 who looks after his own affairs. 
 
The duty of care, regarded a fiduciary duty, is also entrenched in statute.56 The non-fulfilment 
of this duty has been held to be sufficient to remove trustees from their office where they 
were dealing with trust assets as if the assets were their own, co-mingling trust and personal 
assets, unnecessarily exposing trust assets to risk, and failing to act in the interests of the 
beneficiaries as a whole. It was held not to be necessary to prove mala fides in order to 
remove a trustee from office.57 
 
The removal of a settlor-trustee who is guilty of this type of misconduct and 
maladministration may be a way of ensuring that an independent trustee is appointed in his 
place. Where no loss has been proved so that a breach of trust claim would not succeed, 
because the duty of care is so entrenched in South African law, this could be a useful remedy 
for aggrieved beneficiaries and may avoid future loss.  
 
                                                      
52 See ch 3 paras 2 3 1, 2 3 2. 
53 See ch 3 para 2 3 3. 
54 See ch 3 para 2 2 2. 
55 See ch 3 para 2 1 3 1. 
56 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(2). 
57 Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 459 (T) discussed in ch 3 para 2 3 4. 
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2 4 3 Settlor control 
 
In the South African context, although a settlor can revoke or vary a trust under certain 
circumstances, it is not possible to reserve to the settlor or a protector the same wide powers 
as under offshore reserved powers legislation.58 However, the settlor, more often than not, 
exercises power by acting as a co-trustee, and may in addition be the dominant trustee. This 
can be problematic if the co-trustees are not sufficiently independent, and particularly so if the 
class of beneficiaries comprises the settlor and his immediate family members.59 Unless there 
were to be a rigorously independent co-trustee, this may be argued to be a more direct and 
effective way for the settlor to exercise control than merely reserving certain powers under the 
trust deed. 
 
However, if there is a truly independent co-trustee acting alongside the settlor, it is submitted 
that this may, in an ideal world, constitute a workable model of acceptable settlor control. The 
settlor who acts as co-trustee would remain liable (to a higher degree than under English or 
Jersey law) and must therefore at all times act in a fiduciary capacity. Thus, the core values, 
such as an irreducible core of trustee duties, and a separation of control and enjoyment, would 
remain. It is, however, doubtful whether one can realistically expect such a level of 
independence from an unregulated co-trustee whose activities may, to a large extent, go 
unchecked. 
 
2 4 4 Breach of trust 
 
Under South African law, breach of trust is explained by reference to the duty of care (which 
is considered a fiduciary duty). If this duty is breached, there is a breach of trust.60 
 
In case law reference has been made to the possibility of a breach of trust claim where a 
trustee allows a settlor too much control and disregards his fiduciary duties.61 
 
If the settlor’s control is a result of him acting as co-trustee, he is entitled to such control in 
his capacity as trustee, but has to exercise his powers in a fiduciary manner – independent and 
                                                      
58 See ch 4 para 2 1 3. 
59 See ch 4 para 4 3 4. 
60 See ch 3 para 3 3 1. 
61 Van Zyl NNO v Kaye NO 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC) discussed in ch 4 para 4 3 2 2. 
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in the best interests of the beneficiaries as a whole (and not simply for his own benefit). 
Failing to act in this way could expose the settlor-trustee to a breach of trust claim. Similarly, 
where a trustee, who is not also the settlor, allows the settlor to control the trust, a breach of 
trust claim may be possible on the basis that allowing such control is at least negligent. 
 
However, it has to be borne in mind that, in order to succeed with a breach of trust claim 
under South African law, there must be a wrongful act on the part of the trustee, loss to the 
beneficiary and a causal link between the breach of trust and such loss.62 Allowing a settlor to 
effectively control the trust, or failing to exercise trustee powers for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries, would not without fulfilling the requirements of loss and causation enable the 
beneficiaries to succeed with a breach of trust claim. (If there is no loss, it may, however, still 
be possible to have the trustee removed from office, as mentioned above.) 
 
If a court decides to go behind the trust and ignore the separation between the trustee’s 
personal estate and the trust estate, so that trust assets can be used to satisfy personal debts of 
the settlor-trustee, the beneficiaries (who will likely be the settlor’s close family members) 
may well have a claim against the trustee or co-trustees for breach of trust. This would be on 
the basis that there is a loss to the trust fund, caused by the trustee’s failure to comply with his 
duty of care. The position under South African law is that the fiduciary duty of a trustee 
extends to all beneficiaries, whether their interests are vested or potential, and whether they 
have accepted benefits or not.63  
 
2 4 5 Exoneration clauses 
 
South African trust law prevents any exemption from liability for breach of trust. 64 This 
means that a trustee is liable for breaches of trust caused by either negligence or gross 
negligence. The South African position therefore appears the strictest, with beneficiaries 




                                                      
62 See ch 3 para 3 3 2. 
63 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) 813; see discussion in ch 3 para 2 3 2. 
64 See ch 3 para 5 3. 
65 Clarry (2014) 1 JGLR para 29. 
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2 4 6 Do the core values remain? 
 
Of the core values referred to above, the separation of control and enjoyment of trust assets is 
possibly the most frequently referred to in South African academic writing and it has been 
referred to as the “core idea” of the trust.66 However, the other core values, including the 
overriding duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries and the accountability of the 
trustee, are certainly deemed essential to the trust relationship.  
 
If a trustee is found to be in breach of trust for allowing settlor control or for furthering his 
own interests rather than acting in the best interests of the beneficiaries, it is not possible for 
the trustee to escape liability – whether for negligence or gross negligence – on the basis of a 
trustee exoneration clause. From this perspective it would appear that the irreducible core of 
the trust is therefore better protected than in the other jurisdictions under review. However, 
the issue of abuse of the trust through excessive settlor control is highly relevant and much 
debated.  
 
Traditionally, South African law does not require rigorous trustee independence, and thus, 
combined with the ease and flexibility with which a trust can be used, a state of affairs has 
developed where it is common to transfer assets to a trust, but to continue to deal with the 
assets as if nothing has changed.67 This clearly violates the principle of separation of control 
and enjoyment and the presence of an irreducible core may be questioned in these 
circumstances. As discussed below, there are clear indications that the legislature and the 
judiciary are growing intolerant of this abuse.  
 
3 Alternative solutions  
 
Throughout this dissertation it has been shown that legislation and the judiciary have both 
played a crucial role in developing trust law. In the offshore jurisdictions, frequent new 
legislation is the norm – it seems to be the way in which these jurisdictions attempt to keep 
their competitive edge. 68  Case law plays a much bigger role in both England and South 
                                                      
66 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 2. 
67 Nieuwoudt NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para 17; see ch 4 para 4 3 1. 
68 See ch 2 para 3 7. 
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Africa.69 Although there have been amendments to the legislation affecting trusts over the 
years, this has been quite limited compared to their offshore counterparts.  
 
It is, therefore, not surprising that offshore jurisdictions are inventing new structures that have 
some characteristics of a trust and some that more closely resemble a separate incorporated 
legal entity. In Jersey this took the form of the Foundations (Jersey) Law 2009. These 
foundations are intended as private succession planning and wealth management structures, 
and are said to be highly flexible;70 in this respect it resembles a trust. However, foundations 
have legal personality and may contract in their own name, thus making them more accessible 
and understandable for founders from a civil law background. There is also no separation of 
legal and beneficial or equitable title to the foundation property, as there is with a trust.71 
Beneficiaries under foundations have no interest, legal or beneficial, in the foundation’s 
assets, unless the beneficiary has become entitled to receive a benefit under the foundation’s 
constitutive documents. 
 
A council administers the foundation and carries out its objects. Importantly, council 
members do not owe any form of fiduciary duty to the foundation’s beneficiaries (should it 
have beneficiaries). They do have to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best 
interests of the foundation (not the beneficiaries) and they need to exercise the care, diligence 
and skill that a reasonable, prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances. 
However, compared to the statutory duty of care under trust law,72 this is a much-reduced 
standard.  
 
It is clear that the foundation law described above is intended to offer the same advantages as 
a trust, but without some of the constraints, in a way that makes the foundation more 
appealing than the trust, both for the founder and for the council members. 
 
The Cayman Islands have taken the foundation idea one step further by introducing the 
foundation company as a new vehicle for wealth planning and for use in commercial 
                                                      
69 See ch 2 paras 2 10, 4 7.  
70 Anonymous “Jersey Foundations” Carey Olsen Briefings (accessed 25-07-2018). 
71 It is also possible to establish a non-charitable purpose foundation, as is the case with trusts under the Trusts 
(Amendment No 3) (Jersey) Law 1996 discussed in ch 2 para 3 4 3. 
72 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 s 21(1) discussed in ch 3 para 2 2 3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 318 
transactions.73 Although it appears very similar to the Jersey foundation described above, the 
new vehicle has its origins in the traditional limited liability company, to which certain 
features have been added (or taken away). As a result, it is expected that this new vehicle will 
be able to benefit from the extensive Cayman case law on companies, adding to the certainty 
as to how courts will treat this vehicle (although this remains to be seen). In any event, what 
is evident is that the Cayman Islands have drafted this legislation with the main objective of 
“adding another string to the bow of options for the wealth planning industry, while keeping 
an eye on other, wider commercial strategies”.74 
 
It is probably fair to say that the offshore jurisdictions will continue to legislate in order to 
keep their competitive advantage. Provided that these new vehicles fulfil the requirements of 
the wealth owners who wish to use them and are accepted and respected for what they are in a 
foreign court (because inevitably there will be an international element to the use of these 
vehicles), it would seem preferable to use such a vehicle rather than using a trust but violating 
many of the core principles thereof. 
 
Other relatively new inventions are the trust laws enacted by certain civil law jurisdictions, 
notably China, whose trust law dates from 2001. There are clear divergences from the 
common law trust as developed by English law. It appears that certain characteristics of this 
trust law were specifically moulded to be compatible with the requirements of modern wealth 
owners who wish to have the benefits of a common law trust but without the restrictions 
thereof. 
 
The settlor can continue to own the trust property and as a result has a continuing role in the 
trust. The rights of beneficiaries are not clear; exclusion of trustee liability for wilful 
misconduct and gross negligence is not possible where the trust takes the form of a contract 
but not otherwise, leaving the position of, say, testamentary trusts unclear. Much of the 
required clarity will have to be provided by case law, but there is no certainty as to how the 
Chinese judiciary, presumably unschooled in trust law, would interpret the trust, especially in 
a private wealth, as opposed to commercial, context.75  
                                                      
73  Foundation Companies Law, 2017; Partridge “Another String to the Bow – The Cayman Islands New 
Foundation Company Legislation” Ogier Publications (accessed 25-07-2018). 
74  Foundation Companies Law, 2017; Partridge “Another String to the Bow – The Cayman Islands New 
Foundation Company Legislation” Ogier Publications (accessed 25-07-2018). 
75 Graham and Steen (2012) 18 T&T 36. 
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Returning to the jurisdictions under review in this dissertation, the South African judiciary 
has always played a central role in developing the relatively young South African trust law. It 
is no different when it comes to issues such as abuse of the trust through excessive settlor 
control. South African courts now recognise the remedy of going behind the trust in instances 
where the trust is abused in this way, with the judiciary referring to this remedy on numerous 
occasions. There have not been many instances of a final decision to go behind a trust and the 
exact requirements for doing so have not yet fully crystallised, but future judgments and 
academic discourse will hopefully bring more clarity on the subject.  
 
Although a settlor acting as co-trustee can exercise fairly direct control over a trust, an 
independent co-trustee may prevent flagrant abuse of the trust in such circumstances. The 
need for an independent trustee in circumstances where the settlor, trustees and beneficiaries 
all form part of the same family group has long been recognised by the judiciary76 and has 
now been acknowledged in the form of a Chief Master’s Directive.77 This move is a step in 
the right direction and should help to avoid the abuse of trust that is common in such 
situations, although it may be that a legislative change is required if the directive is not 
satisfactorily implemented.  
 
4 Final conclusions 
 
4 1 England and offshore jurisdictions whose trust laws are closely aligned with that of 
England 
 
Earlier in this dissertation it has been explained that certain developments in trust law and 
practice are contributing to a situation where the common law trust concept is losing its 
unique characteristics and becoming increasingly assimilated with the concepts of legal 
personification, contract or even agency. It is doubtful whether, in some arrangements 
labelled a trust, the core values referred to above are present.78 
 
                                                      
76 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
77 See ch 2 para 4 5 for the role of the Master of the High Court with regard to trusts; see ch 4 para 4 3 4 for the 
directive. 
78 See the discussions in ch 3 paras 2 4, 5 4; ch 4 para 3 1. 
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This creates uncertainty, as the boundaries of what can be achieved with a trust are becoming 
increasingly blurred. One example of this uncertainty is whether the validity and effectiveness 
of offshore reserved powers trusts would be respected in a foreign (onshore) court.79 Another 
example is the diverging opinions on the acceptability of trustee exoneration clauses in 
England. 80 In similar vein, judges and academic scholars grapple with the issue of going 
behind the trust. It appears to be a suitable remedy in cases of abuse of the trust, but ignores 
the consequences of a trust and, in the South African context, the separation of the trustee’s 
personal estate from the trust estate.81 
 
Waters82 is of the view that common law jurisdictions have arrived at a point where they need 
to decide whether to retain the trust concept that developed to a large extent over the last two 
centuries, or whether to be open to other possible conceptions regarding the nature of the 
trust. If no decision is made, he fears that the trust will cease to be distinguishable from other 
legal concepts, and the uncertainty surrounding what constitutes a trust – how far the 
boundaries can be pushed – will substantially curtail its use across borders.83 The uncertainty 
also impacts negatively on the use of trusts in other sectors, such as pension fund trusts, unit 
trusts and other collective investment trusts, which generally are regulated to a much larger 
extent, but have their foundation in the common law trust.84 
 
The classic private trust arrangement sits, according to Waters, in the middle of the spectrum 
between legal personification and contract. Even further out on the spectrum is agency.85  
 
If a trust were a legal entity, it would burden the trustee with limited liability similar to that of 
a director of a company and prevent personal liability (apart from cases of wilful 
wrongdoing), without the need for exculpation clauses in trust deeds. 86  However, such a 
change would irrevocably alter the relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary, to 
whom the trustee is accountable. The trust would also lose much of its flexibility, insofar as 
legislation and regulation would largely replace the pragmatic judicial development of the 
                                                      
79 See ch 4 para 3 2 1. 
80 See ch 3 para 5 1. 
81 See ch 4 paras 4 3 1, 4 3 4. 
82 Waters in The International Trust. 
83 Waters in The International Trust 838. 
84 Kulms (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 1091. 
85 Waters in The International Trust 875-880. 
86 Waters in The International Trust 880-882. 
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concept. It would presumably also cease to offer advantages such as tax mitigation and 
succession planning, as the settlor or beneficiaries would own the “trust entity” or a part 
thereof. 
 
As far as settlor autonomy goes, characterising the trust as a contract would enable the settlor 
to agree to any level of control with the trustee. The settlor would also be able to replace the 
trustee at his discretion. Again, the position of the beneficiary and its relationship with the 
trustee is at risk if this route is followed. Contemporary trust drafting, especially offshore, 
means that beneficiaries can be added and removed with ease and their right to information 
may to a certain extent be curtailed. This puts the beneficiary in a very weak position, 
particularly when compared with standard trust deeds of 40 or 50 years ago, where the 
beneficiaries were clearly named and it was not possible to make changes to the beneficiary 
class at will.  
 
These observations accord with what was said earlier: the trust appears to have evolved from 
a relationship where the trustee administered the trust property in the best interest of the trust 
beneficiary, into an investment holding vehicle where the settlor uses the trust not in order to 
benefit someone else, but in order to gain advantages related to tax, asset protection or 
confidentiality. In some cases of extreme settlor control and very limited trustee 
accountability, the arrangement between the settlor and trustee may come uncomfortably 
close to agency. These are, of course, the extreme ends of the spectrum and it is likely that a 
vast majority of personal family trusts fall somewhere in-between these two extremes. 
 
In addition to the changes highlighted in chapter 4 (new opportunities for wealth creation, 
taxation developments and an increasing use of the trust by settlors from civil law 
countries),87 it is submitted that the financial importance of the trust industry to the offshore 
jurisdictions and the prevalence of corporate trustees that charge for their services are major 
contributors to the state of affairs described above. These corporate bodies, and the legal and 
tax advisors of would-be settlors, depend on a steady flow of new and continuing trusts for 
their survival. Trusts are often mis-sold to settlors insofar as settlors are led to believe that 
they can retain a fair degree of control over the assets, or, alternatively, the trust is established 
under the law of a jurisdiction that allows a wide reservation of powers to the settlor. The 
                                                      
87 See ch 4 para 3 1. 
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latter course of action is preferable from the trustee’s point of view, as his liability for acting 
in accordance with the settlor’s instructions is either excluded or severely curtailed.  
 
Because the concepts of settlor control and exclusion of trustee liability conflict with the 
traditional view of the trust, settlors, trustees and advisers, from both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions, are left in an uncertain state as to how far these concepts can be pushed 
before it becomes unacceptable. 
 
Waters, who writes from the perspective of the international use of the trust, argues that the 
trust may become unrecognisable (or, as he phrases it, a “jumble of ideas without focus”)88 if 
the common law jurisdictions, where the trust is argued by some to be most at home, do not 
set clear boundaries for the use of the trust, not only within the confines of common law 
jurisdictions, but also elsewhere. 
 
4 2 South Africa 
 
South African trust law is not free from uncertainty either. The trajectory of the development 
of trust law in South Africa was, and still is, unique, although it is very similar indeed in most 
respects to the Scottish trust.89 The trust law that has developed on South African soil shows 
many fundamental similarities with English trust law and, as a result, it can safely be argued 
that a South African trust is a real trust.90 However, as a result of this unique, and more 
modern, path of development, there are subtle differences vis a vis English law, some of 
which may have the result that South African trust law is better able to deal with the issues 
raised in this dissertation. Examples of these differences are in relation to the trust as a legal 
entity and the trust as a contract, as explained below. 
 
It has been noted that, although a trust is not regarded as a separate legal entity under South 
African law, the recognition of separate estates – the trustee’s personal estate and the trust 
estate – may come close to recognising the trust as a legal entity.91 Du Toit refers to the 
                                                      
88 Waters in The International Trust 886. 
89 See ch 2 para 4 2 3. 
90 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 1. 
91 See ch 2 para 4 3 2 2. 
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“gravitational pull of the law of persons”, illustrated by incorrect and confusing references by 
legal scholars, as well as the judiciary, to the trust as an entity.92 
 
Furthermore, elements of the law of contract are visible in South African trust law, insofar as 
it is accepted that inter vivos trusts are created by way of contract or, to be more precise, a 
contract for the benefit of a third party. However, the contractual analogy does not permeate 
all aspects of a South African trust, and appears to be limited to the creation, variation and 
revocation of trusts.93 
 
Despite accepting that the inter vivos trust deed is a contract between the settlor and the 
trustee, settlor autonomy does not go as far as it does in other jurisdictions, particularly 
offshore jurisdictions such as Jersey. Of course, the reservation of powers to the settlor or a 
protector is not necessary if the settlor acts as co-trustee. In addition, the trustee is less able to 
protect himself against liability, as the Trust Property Control Act94 prohibits any exclusion of 
liability for breach of trust – even in cases of simple negligence. In theory, this applies to 
settlor-trustees as well, but, as explained below, in many of these cases there is no trustee 
accountability or independence, so this limitation may not concern a settlor-trustee, at least, 
not until something goes wrong.  
 
Although one may argue that the impossibility of excluding liability for negligence is unfair 
and may discourage potential trustees from accepting the office of trustee (and could be a 
reason why there is a scarcity of independent trustees), this is the current position.95  
 
As is the case in the other jurisdictions under review, abuse of the trust concept occurs most 
frequently where the benefits of using a trust are desired, without a willingness to accept the 
reality of having to hand over control of the trust assets. In South Africa, this manifests itself 
particularly where business or commercial trusts are fused with family trusts.96 In such a case, 
the trust is used for commercial purposes, typically the ownership and running of a business 
operation, or the holding of more passive investments, but the settlor, trustees and 
beneficiaries all form part of the same family. As a result, there is no substance to the 
                                                      
92 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 859. 
93 See ch 2 para 4 3 2 1. 
94 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 9(2). 
95 See ch 3 para 5 3. 
96 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 870. 
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accountability of the trustee. The beneficiaries are his close family members and may not 
even be aware of the existence of the trust. There is no separation between control over the 
trust assets by the trustee and enjoyment thereof by the beneficiaries. Evidently this is not an 
acceptable state of affairs, and the core values referred to before are conspicuously absent.  
 
Reference was first made to the possibility of piercing the veneer of the trust in the interest of 
third parties in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker.97 The notion of piercing 
a corporate veil in the context of trust law has, however, been said to cloud the “conceptual 
clarity demanded by the still-developing South African trust law”.98 Therefore, the description 
“going behind the trust” is preferred.99  
 
Another aspect of the South African development of the trust that may have led to some of the 
differences in comparison to the English trust, is that South African law engages with the trust 
in a realistic and pragmatic manner. It is less constricted than its English counterpart by 
abstract (and some may say antiquated) legal concepts, but at the same time not devoid of 
academic rigour. Du Toit is of the view that this model may provide valuable lessons with 
regard to the introduction of the trust into new contexts.100 
 
Despite this flexible and pragmatic approach, or perhaps because of it, uncertainties remain 
when it comes to abuse of the trust through settlor control. It may be that, in addition to the 
recent Chief Master’s Directive,101 legislation is required to ensure that an independent trustee 
is present in those circumstances where there are abundant opportunities for abuse, such as 
the fused business and family trust referred to above. This may take away some flexibility for 
settlors, but the benefits in terms of certainty and respect for the trust as an institution would 
far outweigh that.  
 
4 3 Closing remarks: lessons for South African trust law? 
 
It cannot be disputed that trusts, and particularly express inter vivos trusts used in a family 
context, are regarded, often undeservedly, with skepticism by tax authorities. It can also not 
                                                      
97 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
98 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 871. 
99 See ch 4 para 4 3 1. 
100 Du Toit (2015) 79 Rabel Journal 852 877. 
101 See ch 4 para 4 3 4.  
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be disputed that there is a global drive towards greater tax transparency and compliance, and a 
rise in populist movements opposed to capitalism and wealth creation. Some of the classic 
advantages of using a trust – tax mitigation and confidentiality – have already been curtailed 
by these developments in onshore, high tax jurisdictions such as England and South Africa.  
 
The judiciary, across the jurisdictions under review, has already signalled that it may be time 
for a change. The alternatives are increased regulation and legislation, which could lead to 
less flexibility for those who wish to use the express inter vivos trust for the purposes it was 
intended to achieve.   
 
Although a situation where all trusts are strictly regulated may not be desirable, this chapter 
explained the positive aspect of the regulation of licensed trustees in certain offshore 
jurisdictions, such as Jersey. The requirement of professional oversight over trust assets 
makes it very hard for a professional trustee to abdicate his fiduciary responsibilities without 
exposing himself to liability for breach of trust. Unfortunately, in the offshore context, this 
regulation is in stark contrast with what the applicable trust law allows, and therefore does not 
result in increased certainty regarding the effectiveness of these trusts in other jurisdictions. In 
fact, it may be adding to the uncertainty that surrounds the question of how far settlor control 
and exclusion of trustee liability can go.  
 
In a purely South African context, it is submitted that, when it comes to the abuse of the trust, 
the principal area for improvement is trustee independence.102 A trustee of a South African 
trust cannot, as the law currently stands, be relieved from liability for gross negligence, or 
even negligence. This position, although in line with many of the core values identified 
before, may be too strict if there is a desire to increase the prevalence of independent (and 
professional) trustees. The English position, on the other hand, where liability for gross 
negligence can be excluded in the trust deed, may be a step too far in the opposite direction 
and raises questions about whether the irreducible core of trustee obligations remains. The 
position adopted in Jersey, Guernsey and many other offshore jurisdictions, namely that 
liability for negligence, but not gross negligence, can be excluded, may potentially be a 
sensible and prudent middle ground, and would take cognisance of changing circumstances 
                                                      
102 This conclusion was drawn in ch 4 para 4 3 4. 
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and the need for pragmatic solutions. This is an aspect that may require further evaluation and 
qualification. 
 
As far as the requirement to have an independent trustee is concerned, the Chief Master’s 
Directive,103 which resulted from the Parker104 decision, is a crucial step. It may be, however, 
that an amendment to the Trust Property Control Act105 is required to ensure that the spirit of 
this directive is complied with. It is submitted that the requirement to appoint an independent 
trustee should be applicable to all trusts where the settlor, beneficiaries and trustees (apart 
from the independent trustee) are members of the same family, and not only to so-called 
‘family business trusts’ as suggested by the Chief Master’s Directive.106 
 
Well drafted legislative change typically has the benefit of affording certainty. It has been 
illustrated that the uncertainty regarding the efficacy of offshore reserved powers trust 
legislation is one of its major flaws. This appears to be because the principles of excessive 
settlor control combined with lack of trustee accountability present an unacceptable abuse of 
the traditional trust concept. It is submitted that legislation of the sort described in the 
previous paragraphs – allowing a trustee, at least in certain circumstances, to escape liability 
for negligence (but not gross negligence) and allowing a settlor to act as co-trustee and 
therefore exercise control, but, at the same time, requiring an independent trustee who needs 
to fulfil a list of clearly defined requirements – would not violate the South African trust 
concept. Bearing in mind the significance of the separation between control over trust 
property and enjoyment of the trust property, regarded as the core idea of the South African 
trust,107 one may argue that the requirement for an independent trustee is indispensable.  
 
It is submitted that, in order to continue to benefit from the flexibility and advantages offered 
by the trust concept, wealth owners and the trust industry that serves them, both within and 
outside of the confines of common law jurisdictions, have no choice but to accept that those 
benefits come at a price: for the settlor, a separation between the control and enjoyment of the 
trust assets; for the trustee, the accountability that comes with acting as a fiduciary. Only if 
the correct balance can be maintained will the trust survive for generations to come. 
                                                      
103 See ch 4 para 4 3 4. 
104 Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 35. 
105 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
106 See ch 4 para 4 3 4 where this is discussed. 
107 See ch 2 para 4 3 1 2; ch 4 para 4 3 2 1. 
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